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A

HISTORY OF GREECE;

FROM THE

EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE CLOSE OF THE GENERATION
CONTEMPORARY WITH ALEXANDER THE GREAT.

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HISTORY OF GREECE.

PART II.

CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.

CHAPTER LVIII.

FROM THE RESOLUTION OF THE ATHENIANS TO ATTACK SYRACUSE, DOWN TO THE FIRST WINTER AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL IN SICILY.

FOR the two or three months immediately succeeding the final resolution taken by the Athenians to invade Sicily (described in the last chapter), the whole city was elate and bustling with preparation. I have already mentioned that this resolution, though long opposed by Nikias with a considerable minority, had at last been adopted (chiefly through the unforeseen working of that which he intended as a counter-manœuvre) with a degree of enthusiasm and unanimity, and upon an enlarged scale, which surpassed all the anticipations of its promoters. The prophets, circulators of oracles, and other accredited advisers, announced generally the favourable dispositions of the gods, and promised a triumphant result.¹ All classes in the city, rich and poor—cultivators, traders, and seamen—old and young—all embraced the project with ardour; as requiring a great effort, yet promising unparalleled results, both of public aggrandisement and individual gain. Each man was anxious to put down his own name for

B.C. 415.
April.
Preparations for the expedition against Sicily—general enthusiasm and sanguine hopes at Athens.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 1.

personal service; so that the three generals, Nikias, Alkibiadês, and Lamachus, when they proceeded to make their selection of hoplites, instead of being forced to employ constraint or incur ill-will, as happened when an expedition was adopted reluctantly with many dissentients, had only to choose the fittest among a throng of eager volunteers. Every man provided himself with his best arms and with bodily accoutrements, useful as well as ostentatious, for a long voyage and for the exigencies of a varied land and sea-service. Among the trierarchs (or rich citizens who undertook each in his turn the duty of commanding a ship of war) the competition was yet stronger. Each of them accounted it an honour to be named, and vied with his comrades to exhibit his ship in the most finished state of equipment. The state indeed furnished both the trireme with its essential tackle and oars, and the regular pay for the crew; but the trierarch, even in ordinary cases, usually incurred various expenses besides, to make the equipment complete and to keep the crew together. Such additional outlay, neither exacted nor defined by law, but only by custom and general opinion, was different in every individual case according to temper and circumstances. But on the present occasion, zeal and forwardness were universal. Each trierarch tried to procure for his own ship the best crew, by offers of additional reward to all, but especially to the Thranitæ or rowers on the highest of the three tiers:¹ and it seems that the seamen were not appointed especially to one ship, but were at liberty to accept these offers and to serve in any ship they preferred. Each trierarch spent more than had ever been known before—in

¹ Thucyd. vi. 31. ἐπιφοράς τε πρὸς τῷ ἐκ δημοσίου μισθῷ διδόντων τοῖς θρανίταις τῶν ναυτῶν καὶ ταῖς ὑπηρεσίαις, καὶ ἄλλα σημεῖοις καὶ κατασκευαῖς πολυτελέσι χρησαμένων, &c.

Dobrec and Dr. Arnold explain ὑπηρεσίαις to mean *the petty officers* such as κυβερνήτης, κελυστήρ, &c. Göller and Poppo construe it to mean "*the servants of the sailors.*" Neither of the two explanations seems to me satisfactory. I think the word means "to the crews generally;" the word ὑπηρεσία being

a perfectly general word, comprising all who received pay in the ship. All the examples produced in the notes of the commentators testify this meaning, which also occurs in the text itself two lines before. To construe ταῖς ὑπηρεσίαις as meaning—"the crews generally, or the remaining crews, along with the Thranitæ"—is doubtless more or less awkward. But it departs less from ordinary construction than either of the two senses which the commentators propose.

pay, outfit, provision, and even external decoration of his vessel. Besides the best crews which Athens herself could furnish, picked seamen were also required from the subject-allies, and were bid for in the same way by the trierarchs.¹

Such efforts were much facilitated by the fact, that five years had now elapsed since the peace of Nikias, without any considerable warlike operations. While the treasury had become replenished with fresh accumulations,² and the triremes increased in number—the military population, reinforced by additional numbers of youth, had forgotten both the hardships of the war and the pressure of epidemic disease. Hence the fleet now got together, while it surpassed in number all previous armaments of Athens, except a single one in the second year of the previous war under Periklês,—was incomparably superior even to that, and still more superior to all the rest, in the other ingredients of force, material as well as moral; in picked men, universal ardour, ships as well as arms in the best condition, and accessories of every kind in abundance. Such was the confidence of success, that many Athenians went prepared for trade as well as for combat; so that the private stock thus added to the public outfit and to the

Abundance in the Athenian treasury—display of wealth as well as of force in the armament.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 13. οἱ ξένοι, οἱ μὲν ἀναγκαστοὶ ἐσβάντες, &c.

² Thucyd. vi. 26. I do not trust the statement given in Æschinês De Fals. Legat. c. 51, p. 302, and in Andokidês, De Pace, sect. 8, that 7000 talents were laid by as an accumulated treasure in the acropolis during the peace of Nikias, and that 400 triremes, or 300 triremes, were newly built. The numerous historical inaccuracies in those orations, concerning the facts prior to 400 B.C., are such as to deprive them of all authority, except where they are confirmed by other testimony.

But there exists an interesting Inscription which proves that the sum of 3000 talents at least must have been laid by, during the interval between the conclusion of the peace of Nikias and the Sicilian

expedition, in the acropolis: that over and above this accumulated fund, the state was in condition to discharge, out of the current receipts, sums which it had borrowed during the previous war from the treasures of various temples: and there was besides a surplus for docks and fortifications. The Inscription above named records the vote passed for discharging these debts, and for securing the sums so paid in the Opisthodomus or back-chamber of the Parthenon, for account of those gods to whom they respectively belonged. See Boeckh's Corp. Inscr. part ii. Inscr. Att. No. 76. p. 117; also the Staats-haushaltung der Athener of the same author, vol. ii. p. 198. This Inscription belongs unquestionably to one of the years between 421-415 B.C., to which year we cannot say.

sums placed in the hands of the generals, constituted an unparalleled aggregate of wealth. Much of this was visible to the eye, contributing to heighten that general excitement of Athenian imagination which pervaded the whole city while the preparations were going forward: a mingled feeling of private sympathy and patriotism—a dash of uneasiness from reflection on the distant and unknown region wherein the fleet was to act—yet an elate confidence in Athenian force such as had never before been entertained.¹ We hear of Sokratês the philosopher, and Meton the astronomer, as forming exceptions to this universal tone of sanguine anticipation: the familiar genius which constantly waited upon the philosopher is supposed to have forewarned him of the result. It is not impossible that he may have been averse to the expedition, though the fact is less fully certified than we could wish. Amidst a general predominance of the various favourable religious signs and prophecies, there were also some unfavourable. Usually, on all public matters of risk or gravity, there were prophets who gave assurances in opposite ways: those which turned out right were treasured up; the rest were at once forgotten, or never long remembered.²

After between two and three months of active preparations, the expedition was almost ready to start, when an event happened which fatally poisoned the prevalent cheerfulness of the city. This was, the mutilation of the Hermæ, one of the most extraordinary events in all Grecian history.

The Hermæ, or half-statues of the god Hermes, were blocks of marble about the height of the human figure. The upper part was cut into a head, face, neck, and bust; the lower part was left as a quadrangular pillar, broad at the base, without arms, body, or legs, but with the significant mark of the male sex in front. They were distributed in great numbers throughout Athens, and always in the most conspicuous situations; standing beside the outer doors of private houses as well as of temples—near the most frequented porticos—at the intersection of cross ways—in the public agora. They were thus present to the eye

¹ Thucyd. vi. 31; Diodor. xiii. 2, 3.

² Plutarch (Nikias, c. 12, 13; Alkibiad. c. 17). Immediately after the catastrophe at Syracuse the Athe-

nians were very angry with those prophets who had promised them success (Thucyd. viii. 1).

of every Athenian in all his acts of intercommunion, either for business or pleasure, with his fellow-citizens. The religious feeling of the Greeks considered the god to be planted or domiciliated where his statue stood,¹ so that the companionship, sympathy, and guardianship of Hermês, became associated with most of the manifestations of conjunct life at Athens, political, social, commercial, or gymnastic. Moreover the quadrangular fashion of these statues, employed occasionally for other gods besides Hermês, was a most ancient relic handed down from the primitive rudeness of Pelasgian workmanship; and was popular in Arcadia, as well as peculiarly frequent in Athens.²

About the end of May 415 B.C., in the course of one and the same night, all these Hermæ, one of the most peculiar marks of the city, were mutilated by unknown hands. Their characteristic features were knocked off or levelled, so that nothing was left except a mass of stone with no resemblance to humanity or deity. All were thus dealt with in the same way, save and except very few: nay, Andokidês affirms (and I incline to believe him) that there was but *one* which escaped unharmed.³

¹ Cicero, Legg. ii. 11. "Melius Græci atque nostri; qui, ut augeant pietatem in Deos, easdem illas urbes, quas nos, *incolere* voluerunt."

How much the Grecian mind was penetrated with the idea of the god as an actual inhabitant of the town, may be seen illustrated in the Oration of Lysias, cont. Andokid. sect. 15-46: compare Herodotus, v. 67—a striking story, as illustrated in this History, ch. ix.—also Xenophon, Hellen. vi. 4-7; Livy, xxxviii. 43.

In an inscription in Boeckh's Corp. Insc. (part ii. No. 190, p. 320) a list of the names of Prytaneis appears, at the head of which list figures the name of Athênê Polias.

² Pausanias, i. 24, 3; iv. 33, 4; viii. 31, 4; viii. 48, 4; viii. 41, 4. Plutarch, An Seni sit Gerenda Respubl. ad finem; Aristophan. Plut. 1153, and Schol.: compare O. Müller, Archæologie der Kunst, sect.

67, K. F. Hermann, Gottesdienstl. Alterth. der Griechen, sect. 15; Gerhard, De Religione Hermarum. Berlin, 1845.

³ Thucyd. vi. 27. ὅσοι Ἑρμαῖ ἦσαν λίθινοι ἐν τῇ πόλει τῇ Ἀθηναίων.... μιᾷ νυκτὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι περιέκοπταν τὰ πρόσωπα.

Andokidês (De Myst. sect. 63) expressly states that only a single one was spared—καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ὁ Ἑρμῆς ὃν ὄρατε πάντες, ὁ παρὰ τῆν πατρίων οἰκίαν τῆν ἡμετέραν, οὗ περιέκοπη, μόνος τῶν Ἑρμῶν τῶν Ἀθηνῶν.

Cornelius Nepos (Alkibiad. c. 3) and Plutarch (Alkib. c. 13) copy Andokidês: in his life of Nikias (c. 18) the latter uses the expression of Thucydidês—οἱ πλεῖστοι. This expression is noway at variance with Andokidês, though it stops short of his affirmation. There is great mixture of truth and falsehood in the Oration of Andoki-

It is of course impossible for any one to sympathize fully with the feelings of a religion not his own: indeed the sentiment with which, in the case of persons of different creed, each regards the strong emotions growing out of causes peculiar to the other,—is usually one of surprise that such trifles and absurdities can occasion any serious distress or excitement.¹ But if we take that reasonable pains, which is incumbent on those who study the history of Greece, to realise in our minds the religious and political associations of the Athenians²—noted in ancient times for their superior piety, as well as for their accuracy and magnificence about the visible monuments embodying that feeling—we shall in part comprehend the intensity of mingled dismay, terror, and wrath, which beset the public mind on the morning after this nocturnal sacrilege, alike unforeseen and unparalleled. Amidst all the ruin and impoverishment which had been inflicted by the Persian invasion of Attica, there was nothing which was so profoundly felt or so long remembered as the deliberate burning of the statues and temples of the gods.³ If we could imagine

dès; but I think that he is to be trusted as to this point.

Diodorus (xiii. 2) says that all the Hermæ were mutilated—not recognising a single exception. Cornelius Nepos, by a singular inaccuracy, talks about the Hermæ as having been all *thrown down* (dejeicerentur).

¹ It is truly astonishing to read the account given of this mutilation of the Hermæ, and its consequences, by Wachsmuth, *Hellen. Alterthümer*, vol. ii. sect. 65. p. 191-196. While he denounces the Athenian people, for their conduct during the subsequent inquiry, in the most unmeasured language—you would suppose that the incident which plunged them into this mental distraction, at a moment of overflowing hope and confidence, was a mere trifle: so briefly does he pass it over, without taking the smallest pains to show in what

way it profoundly wounded the religious feeling of Athens.

Büttner (*Geschichte der politischen Hetaerrien zu Athen*. p. 65), though very brief, takes a fairer view than Wachsmuth.

² Pausanias, i. 17, 1; i. 24, 3; Harpokration v. Ἑρμαῖ. See Sluiter, *Lectiones Andocidae*, cap. 2.

Especially the ἀγυιαῖδες θεοπαῖσι (Eurip. *Ion*. 187) were noted at Athens: ceremonial attentions towards the divine persons who protected the public streets—a function performed by Apollo Agæus, as well as by Hermes.

³ Herodot. viii. 144; Æschylus, *Pers.* 810; Æschyl. *Agam.* 339; Isokratês, *Or.* iv. *Panegy.* s. 182. The wrath for any indignity offered to the statue of a god or goddess, and impatience to punish it capitally, is manifested as far back as the ancient epic poem of Arktinus: see the argument of the Ἰλίου

the excitement of a Spanish or Italian town, on finding that all the images of the Virgin had been defaced during the same night, we should have a parallel, though a very inadequate parallel, to what was now felt at Athens—where religious associations and persons were far more intimately allied with all civil acts and with all the proceedings of every-day life—where, too, the god and his efficiency were more forcibly localised, as well as identified with the presence and keeping of the statue. To the Athenians, when they went forth on the following morning, each man seeing the divine guardian at his doorway dishonoured and defaced, and each man gradually coming to know that the devastation was general,—it would seem that the town had become as it were godless—that the streets, the market-place, the porticos, were robbed of their divine protectors; and what was worse still, that these protectors, having been grossly insulted, carried away with them alienated sentiments,—wrathful and vindictive instead of tutelary and sympathising. It was on the protection of the gods that all their political constitution as well as the blessings of civil life depended; insomuch that the curses of the gods were habitually invoked as sanction and punishment for grave offences, political as well as others:¹ an extension and generalization of the feeling still attached to the judicial oath. This was, in the minds of the people of Athens, a sincere and literal conviction,—not simply a form of

Ἡέρσις in Proelus, and Weleker, Griechische Tragödien, *Sophoklés*, sect. 21. vol. i. p. 162. Herodotus cannot explain the indignities offered by Kambyzes to the Egyptian statues and holy customs, upon any other supposition than that of stark madness—ἐμάνη μεγάλως—Herod. iii. 37-38.

Timæus the Sicilian historian (writing about 320-290 B.C.) represented the subsequent defeat of the Athenians as a divine punishment for the desecration of the Hermæ, inflicted chiefly by the Syraensan Hermokratês, son of Hermon and descendant of the god Hermes (Timæi Fragm. 103-104, ed. Didot; Longinus, de Sublim. iv. 3).

The etymological thread of con-

nexion between the Hermæ and Hermokratês, is strange enough: but what is of importance to remark, is the deep-seated belief that such an act must bring about its divine punishment, and that the Athenians as a people were collectively responsible, unless they could appease the divine displeasure. If this was the view taken by the historian Timæus a century and more after the transaction, much more keenly was it present to the minds of the Athenians of that day.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 97; Plato, Legg. ix. pp. 871 b, 881 d. ἡ τοῦ νόμου ἄρχη, &c. Demosthen. Fals. Legat. p. 363. e. 24. p. 404. e. 60: Plutarch, Solon, e. 24.

speech to be pronounced in prayers and public harangues, without being ever construed as a reality in calculating consequences and determining practical measures. Accordingly they drew from the mutilation of the Hermæ the inference, not less natural than terrifying, that heavy public misfortune was impending over the city, and that the political constitution to which they were attached was in imminent danger of being subverted.¹

Such was the mysterious incident which broke in upon the eager and bustling movement of Athens, a few days before the Sicilian expedition was in condition for starting. In reference to that expedition, it was taken to heart as a most depressing omen.² It would doubtless have been so interpreted, had it been a mere undesigned accident happening to any venerated religious object,—just as we are told that similar misgivings were occasioned by the occurrence, about this same time, of the melancholy festival of the Adonia, wherein the women loudly bewailed the untimely death of Adonis.³ The mutilation of the Hermæ, however, was something much more ominous than the worst accident. It proclaimed itself as the deliberate act of organised conspirators, not inconsiderable in number,

¹ Dr. Thirlwall observes in reference to the feeling at Athens after the mutilation of the Hermæ—

“We indeed see so little connexion between acts of daring impiety and designs against the state, that we can hardly understand how they could have been associated together, as they were in the minds of the Athenians. But perhaps the difficulty may not without reason have appeared much less to the contemporaries of Alcibiadēs, who were rather disposed by their views of religion to regard them as inseparable.” (Hist. Gr. ch. xxv. vol. iii. p. 394.)

This remark, like so many others in Dr. Thirlwall’s history, indicates a tone of liberality forming a striking contrast with Wachsmuth; and rare indeed among the learned men who have undertaken to depict

the democracy of Athens. It might however have been stated far more strongly, for an Athenian citizen would have had quite as much difficulty in comprehending our *dissjunction* of the two ideas, as we have in comprehending his *association* of the two.

² Thueyd. vi. 27. Καὶ τὸ πρῶτον μετίζοντας ἐλάμβανον τοῦ τε γὰρ ἐκπλοῦ σίωνος ἐδόκει εἶναι, καὶ ἐπὶ ξυνομοσίᾳ ἅμα νεωτέρων πραγμάτων καὶ ὄχλου καταλύσεως γεγενῆσθαι.

Cornelius Nepos, Alcibiad. c. 3. “Hoc quum appareret non sine magnâ multorum consensione esse factum,” &c.

³ Plutarch, Alcibiad. c. 18; Pherekratēs, Fr. Inc. 84, ed. Meineke; Fragment. Comic. Græc. vol. ii. p. 358, also p. 1164; Aristoph. Frag. Inc. 120.

whose names and final purpose were indeed unknown, but who had begun by committing sacrilege of a character flagrant and unheard of. For intentional mutilation of a public and sacred statue, where the material afforded no temptation to plunder, is a case to which we know no parallel: much more, mutilation by wholesale—spread by one band and in one night throughout an entire city. Though neither the parties concerned, nor their purposes, were ever more than partially made out, the concert and conspiracy itself is unquestionable.

It seems probable, as far as we can form an opinion, that the conspirators had two objects, perhaps some of them one and some the other:—to ruin Alkibiadês—to frustrate or delay the expedition. How they pursued the former purpose, will be presently seen: towards the latter, nothing was ostensibly done, but the position of Teukrus and other metics implicated, renders it more likely that they were influenced by sympathies with Corinth and Megara,¹ prompting them to intercept an expedition which was supposed to promise great triumphs to Athens—rather than corrupted by the violent antipathies of intestine politics. Indeed the two objects were intimately connected with each other; for the prosecution of the enterprise, while full of prospective conquest to Athens, was yet more pregnant with future power and wealth to Alkibiadês himself. Such chances would disappear if the expedition could be prevented; nor was it at all impossible that the Athenians, under the intense impression of religious terror

Various parties suspected—great probability beforehand that it would induce the Athenians to abandon or postpone the expedition.

¹ Plutarch, *Alkib.* c. 18; Pseudo-Plutarch, *Vit. X. Orator.* p. 834, who professes to quote from Kratippus, an author nearly contemporary. The Pseudo-Plutarch however asserts—what cannot be true—that the Corinthians employed Leontine and Egestæan agents to destroy the Hermæ. The Leontines and Egestæans were exactly the parties who had greatest interest in getting the Sicilian expedition to start: they are the last persons whom the Corinthians would have chosen as instruments. The fact is, that no foreigners could well have done the

deed: it required great familiarity with all the buildings, highways, and byways of Athens.

The Athenian Philoch. (writing about the date 310-280 B. C.) ascribed the mutilation of the Hermæ to the Corinthians; if we may believe the scholiast on Aristophanês—who however is not very careful, since he tells us that *Thucydides* ascribed that act to Alkibiadês and his friends; which is not true (*Philochor. Fragm.* 110, ed. Didot; *Schol. Aristoph. Lysistr.* 1094).

consequent on the mutilation of the Hermæ, might throw up the scheme altogether. Especially Nikias, exquisitely sensitive in his own religious conscience, and never hearty in his wish for going (a fact perfectly known to the enemy¹), would hasten to consult his prophets, and might reasonably be expected to renew his opposition on the fresh ground offered to him, or at least to claim delay until the offended gods should have been appeased. We may judge how much such a proceeding was in the line of his character and of the Athenian character, when we find him, two years afterwards, with the full concurrence of his soldiers, actually sacrificing the last opportunity of safe retreat for the half-ruined Athenian army in Sicily, and refusing even to allow the proposition to be debated, in consequence of an eclipse of the moon; and when we reflect that Spartans and other Greeks frequently renounced public designs if an earthquake happened before the execution.²

But though the chance of setting aside the expedition altogether might reasonably enter into the plans of the conspirators, as a likely consequence of the intense shock inflicted on the religious mind of Athens, and especially of Nikias—this calculation was not realised. Probably matters had already proceeded too far even for Nikias to recede. Notice had been sent round to all the allies; forces were already on their way to the rendezvous at Korkyra; the Argeian and Mantineian allies were arriving at Peiræus to embark. So much the more eagerly did the conspirators proceed in that which I have stated as the other part of their probable plan; to work that exaggerated religious terror, which they had themselves artificially brought about, for the ruin of Alkibiadês.

Few men in Athens either had, or deserved to have a greater number of enemies, political as well as private, than Alkibiadês; many of them being among the highest citizens, whom he offended by his insolence, and whose liturgies and other customary exhibitions he outshone by his reckless expenditure. His importance had been already so much increased, and threatened to be so much more increased, by the Sicilian enterprise, that they no longer observed any measures in com-

The political enemies of Alkibiadês take advantage of the reigning excitement to try and ruin him.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 34.

² See Thucyd. v. 45; v. 50; viii. 5. Xenophon, Hellen. iv. 7, 4.

passing his ruin. That which the mutilators of the Hermæ seemed to have deliberately planned, his other enemies were ready to turn to profit.

Amidst the mournful dismay spread by the discovery of so unparalleled a sacrilege, it appeared to the Athenian people—as it would have appeared to the Ephors at Sparta, or to the rulers in every oligarchical city of Greece—that it was their paramount and imperative duty to detect and punish the authors. So long as these latter were walking about unknown and unpunished, the temples were defiled by their presence, and the whole city was accounted under the displeasure of the gods, who would inflict upon it heavy public misfortunes.¹ Under this displeasure every citizen felt himself comprehended, so that the sense of public security as well as of private comfort were alike unappeased, until the offenders should be discovered and atonement made by punishing or expelling them. Large rewards were accordingly proclaimed to any person who could give information, and even impunity to any accomplice whose confession might lay open the plot. Nor did the matter stop here. Once under this painful shock of religious and political terror, the Athenians became eager talkers and listeners on the subject of other recent acts of impiety. Every one was impatient to tell all that he knew, and more than he knew,

Anxiety of the Athenians to detect and punish the conspirators—rewards offered for information.

¹ See the remarkable passage in the contemporary pleading of Antiphon on a trial for homieide (Orat. ii. Tetralog. 1. 1. 10).

Ἀσόμερον θ' ὅμιν ἐστὶ τόνδε μιᾶρὸν καὶ ἀναγρὸν ὄντα εἰς τὰ τεμένη τῶν θεῶν εἰσόντα μιᾶναι τὴν ἀγγελίαν αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τε τὰς αὐτὰς τραπέζας ὄντα συγκαταπιμπλάναι τοὺς ἀνακτιοὺς· ἐκ γὰρ τούτων αἶτε ἀφορίζονται γίγνονταί τε δυστυχεῖς θ' αἱ πράξεις καθίστανται. Οἰκείαν οὖν χρὴ τὴν τιμωρίαν ἡγήσασμένους, αὐτῷ τούτῳ τὰ τοῦτου ἀσεβήματα ἀναθέντας, ἰδίαν μὲν τὴν συμφορὰν καθάραν δὲ τὴν πόλιν καταστῆσαι.

Compare Antiphon, De Cæde Herodis, sect. 83, and Sophoklēs,

Œdip. Tyrann. 26, 96, 170—as to the miseries which befel a country, so long as the person guilty of homieide remained to pollute the soil, and until he was slain or expelled. See also Xenophon, Hiero, iv. 4, and Plato, Legg. x. p. 885-910, at the beginning and the end of the tenth book. Plato ranks (ὄβρις) outrage against sacred objects as the highest and most guilty species of ὄβρις; deserving the severest punishment. He considers that the person committing such impiety, unless he be punished or banished, brings evil and the anger of the gods upon the whole population.

about such incidents; while to exercise any strict criticism upon the truth of such reports, would argue weakness of faith and want of religious zeal, rendering the critic himself a suspected man—"metuunt dubitasse videri." To rake out and rigorously visit all such offenders, and thus to display an earnest zeal for the honour of the gods, was accounted one auxiliary means of obtaining absolution from them for the recent outrage. Hence an additional public vote was passed, promising rewards and inviting information from all witnesses,—citizens, metics or even slaves,—respecting any previous acts of impiety which might have come within their cognizance;¹ but at the same time providing that informers who gave false depositions should be punished capitally.²

While the Senate of Five Hundred were invested with full powers of action, Diognêtus, Peisander, Chariklês, and others, were named commissioners for receiving and prosecuting inquiries; and public assemblies were held nearly every day to receive reports.³ The first informations received, however, did not relate to the grave and recent mutilation of the Hermæ, but to analogous incidents of older date; to certain defacements of other statues, accomplished in drunken frolic—and above all to ludicrous ceremonies celebrated in various houses,⁴ by parties of

¹ Thucyd. vi. 27.

² Audokidês de *Mysteriis*, sect. 20.

³ Andokidês de *Mysteriis*, sect. 14, 15, 26; Plutarch, *Alkibiad.* c. 18.

⁴ Those who are disposed to imagine that the violent feelings and proceedings at Athens by the mutilation of the Hermæ were the consequence of her democratical government, may be reminded of an analogous event of modern times from which we are not yet separated by a century.

In the year 1766, at Abbeville in France, two young gentlemen of good family (the Chevalier d'Etallonde and Chevalier de la Barre) were tried, convicted and condemned for having injured a wooden crucifix which stood on the bridge of that town: in aggravation of this

offence they were charged with having sung indecent songs. The evidence to prove these points was exceedingly doubtful: nevertheless both were condemned to have their tongues cut out by the roots—to have their right hands cut off at the church gate—then to be tied to a post in the market-place with an iron chain, and burnt by a slow fire. This sentence, after being submitted by way of appeal to the Parliament of Paris and by them confirmed, was actually executed upon the Chevalier de la Barre (d'Etallonde having escaped) in July 1766; with this mitigation, that he was allowed to be decapitated before he was burnt—but at the same time with this aggravation, that he was put to the tor-

revellers caricaturing and divulging the Eleusinian mysteries. It was under this latter head that the first impeachment was preferred against Alkibiadès.

So fully were the preparations of the armament now complete, that the trireme of Lamachus (who was doubtless more diligent about the military details than either of his two colleagues) was already moored in the outer harbour, and the last public assembly was held for the departing officers,¹ who probably laid before their countrymen an imposing account of the force assembled — when Pythonikus rose to impeach Alkibiadès. “Athenians” (said he), “you are going to despatch this great

First accusation of Alkibiadès, of having profaned and divulged the Eleusinian mysteries.

ture, ordinary and extraordinary, to compel him to disclose his accomplices (Voltaire, *Relation de la Mort du Chevalier de la Barre*. Œuvres, vol. xlii. p. 361-379, ed. Beauchot: also Voltaire, *Le Cri du Sang Innocent*, vol. xii p. 133).

I extract from this treatise a passage showing how (as in this mutilation of the Hermæ at Athens) the occurrence of one act of sacrilege turns men's imagination, belief, and talk, to others real or imaginary:—

“Tandis que Belleval ourdissoit secrètement cette trame, il arriva malheureusement que le crucifix de bois, posé sur le pont d'Abbeville, étoit endommagé, et l'on soupçonna que des soldats ivres avoient commis cette insolence impie.

“Malheureusement l'évêque d'Amiens, étant aussi évêque d'Abbeville, donna à cette aventure une célébrité et une importance qu'elle ne méritoit pas. Il fit lancer des monitoires: il vint faire une procession solennelle auprès du crucifix; et on ne parla en Abbeville que de sacrilèges pendant une année entière. On disoit qu'il se formoit une nouvelle secte qui brisoit les crucifix, qui jettoit par terre toutes les hosties, et les

perçoit à coups de couteaux. On assuroit qu'ils avoient répandu beaucoup de sang. Il y eut des femmes qui crurent en avoir été témoins. On renouvela tous les contes calomnieux répandus contre les Juifs dans tant de villes de l'Europe. Vous connoissez, Monsieur, jusqu'à quel point la populace porte la crédulité et le fanatisme, toujours encouragé par les moines.

“La procédure une fois commencée, il y eut une foule de délations. Chacun disoit ce qu'il avoit vu ou cru voir—ce qu'il avoit entendu ou cru entendre.”

It will be recollected that the sentence on the Chevalier de la Barre was passed, not by the people nor by any popular judicature; but by a limited court of professional judges sitting at Abbeville, and afterwards confirmed by the Parlement de Paris, the first tribunal of professional judges in France.

¹ Andokidès (De Myster. s. 11) marks this time minutely—Ἦν μὲν γὰρ ἐκκλησία τοῖς στρατηγοῖς τοῖς εἰς Σικελίαν, Νικίᾳ καὶ Λαμάχῳ καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ, καὶ τριτηρῆς ἡ στρατηγὶς ἥδη ἐξώρμει ἡ Λαμάχου ἀναστὰς δὲ Πυθόνικος ἐν τῷ δήμῳ εἶπεν, &c.

force and incur all this hazard, at a moment when I am prepared to show you that your general Alkibiadês is one of the profaners of the holy mysteries in a private house. Pass a vote of impunity, and I will produce to you forthwith a slave of one here present, who, though himself not initiated in the mysteries, shall repeat to you what they are. Deal with me in any way you choose, if my statement prove untrue." While Alkibiadês strenuously denied the allegation, the Prytanes (senators presiding over the assembly, according to the order determined by lot for that year among the ten tribes) at once made proclamation for all uninitiated citizens to depart from the assembly, and went to fetch the slave (Andromachus by name) whom Pythonikus had indicated. On being introduced, Andromachus deposed before the assembly that he had been with his master in the house of Polytion, when Alkibiadês, Nikiadês, and Melêtus went through the sham celebration of the mysteries; many other persons being present, and especially three other slaves besides himself. We must presume that he verified this affirmation by the describing what the mysteries were which he had seen—the test which Pythonikus had offered.¹

Such was the first direct attack made upon Alkibiadês by his enemies. Pythonikus, the demagogue Androklês, and other speakers, having put in evidence this irreverent proceeding (probably in substance true), enlarged upon it with the strongest invective, imputed to him many other acts of the like character, and even denounced him as cognizant of the recent mutilation of the Hermæ. "All had been done (they said) with a view to accomplish his purpose of subverting the democracy, when bereft of its divine protectors—a purpose manifested by the constant tenor of his lawless, overbearing, antipopular demeanour." Infamous as this calumny was, so far as regarded the mutilation of the Hermæ, (for whatever else Alkibiadês may have done, of that act he was unquestionably innocent, being the very person who had most to lose by it, and whom it ultimately ruined,) they calculated upon the reigning excitement to get it accredited, and probably to procure his deposition from the command, preparatory to public trial. But in spite of all the disquietude arising from the

Violent
speeches in
the assem-
bly against
Alkibiadês
unfavour-
ably re-
ceived.

¹ Andokid. de Myst. s. 11—13.

recent sacrilege, their expectations were defeated. The strenuous denial of Alkibiadês—aided by his very peculiar position as commander of the armament, as well as by the reflection that the recent outrage tended rather to spoil his favourite projects in Sicily—found general credence. The citizens enrolled to serve manifested strong disposition to stand by him; the allies from Argos and Mantinea were known to have embraced the service chiefly at his instigation; the people generally had become familiar with him as the intended conqueror in Sicily, and were loath to be balked of this project. From all which circumstances, his enemies, finding little disposition to welcome the accusations which they preferred, were compelled to postpone them until a more suitable time.¹

But Alkibiadês saw full well the danger of having such charges hanging over his head, and the peculiar advantage which he derived from his accidental position at the moment. He implored the people to investigate the charges at once; proclaiming his anxiety to stand trial and even to suffer death, if found guilty—accepting the command only in case he should be acquitted—and insisting above all things on the mischief to the city of sending him on such an expedition with the charge undecided, as well as on the hardship to himself of being aspersed by calumny during his absence, without power of defence. Such appeals, just and reasonable in themselves, and urged with all the vehemence of a man who felt that the question was one of life or death to his future prospects, were very near prevailing. His enemies could only defeat them by the trick of putting up fresh speakers, less notorious for hostility to Alkibiadês. These men affected a tone of candour—deprecated the delay which would be occasioned in the departure of the expedition, if he were put upon his trial forthwith—and proposed deferring the trial until a certain number of days after his return.² Such was the determination ultimately adopted; the supporters of Alkibiadês

He denies the charge and demands immediate trial—his demand is eluded by his enemies.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 29. Isokratês (Orat. xvi. De Bigis, sect. 7, 8) represents these proceedings before the departure for Sicily, in a very inaccurate manner.

² Thucyd. vi. 29. Οἱ δ' ἐχθροί, δεδιότες τὸ τε σπράτευμα, μὴ εἰδόντων

ἐχθρῶν, ἣν ἤδη ἀγωνίζεσθαι, ὃ τε δῆμος μὴ μαλακίζεσθαι, θεραπεύων ὅτι δι' ἐκείνων οἷ τ' Ἀργείοι ξυνοσπράτευον καὶ τῶν Μαντινέων τινέες, ἀπέτραπον καὶ ἀπέσπευδον, ἄλλους ῥήτορας ἐνιέντες, οἳ ἐλαγον νῦν μὲν πλεῖν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ κατασχεῖν τὴν ἀγωγὴν,

probably not fully appreciating its consequences, and conceiving that the speedy departure of the expedition was advisable even for his interest, as well as agreeable to their own feelings. And thus his enemies, though baffled in their first attempt to bring on his immediate ruin, carried a postponement which ensured to them leisure for thoroughly poisoning the public mind against him, and choosing their own time for his trial. They took care to keep back all farther accusation until he and the armament had departed.¹

The spectacle of its departure was indeed so imposing, and the moment so full of anxious interest, that it banished even the recollection of the recent sacrilege. The entire armament was not mustered at Athens; for it had been judged expedient to order most of the allied contingents to rendezvous at once at Korkyra. But the Athenian force alone was astounding to behold. There were one hundred triremes, sixty of which were in full trim

ἐλθόντα δὲ χρῖνεσθαι ἐν ἡμέραις ῥηταῖς, βουλόμενοι ἐκ μείζονος διαβολῆς, ἣν ἐμελλόν ῥᾶον αὐτοῦ ἀπόντος ποιεῖν, μετὰπεμπτον κομισθέντα αὐτὸν ἀγωνίσασθαι.

Compare Plutarch, Alkib. c. 19.

¹ The account which Andokidēs gives of the first accusation against Alkibiadēs by Pythonikus, in the assembly prior to the departure of the fleet, presents the appearance of being substantially correct, and I have followed it in the text. It is in harmony with the more brief indications of Thucydides. But when Andokidēs goes on to say, that "in consequence of this information Polystratus was seized and put to death, while the rest of the parties denounced fled, and were condemned to death in their absence" (sect. 13)—this cannot be true. Alkibiadēs most certainly did not flee, and was not condemned—at *that time*. If Alkibiadēs was not then tried, neither could the other persons have been tried, who were denounced as his accomplices in the same offence. My belief is that this information,

having been first presented by the enemies of Alkibiadēs before the sailing of the fleet, was dropped entirely for that time, both against him and against his accomplices. It was afterwards resumed, when the information of Andokidēs himself had satisfied the Athenians on the question of the Hermokopids: and the impeachment presented by Thessalus son of Kimon against Alkibiadēs, was founded, in part at least, upon the information presented by Andromachus.

If Polystratus was put to death at all, it could only have been on this second bringing forward of the charge, at the time when Alkibiadēs was sent for and refused to come home. But we may well doubt whether he was put to death at that time or on that ground, when we see how inaccurate the statement of Andokidēs is as to the consequences of the information of Andromachus. He mentions Panætius as one of those who fled in consequence of that information and were condemned in their absence: but Panætius appears after-

for rapid nautical movement—while the remaining forty were employed as transports for the soldiers. There were fifteen hundred select citizen hoplites, chosen from the general muster-roll—and seven hundred Thêtes, or citizens too poor to be included in the muster-roll, who served as hoplites on shipboard, (Epibatæ or marines) each with a panoply furnished by the state. To these must be added, five hundred Argeian and two hundred and fifty Mantineian hoplites, paid by Athens and transported on board Athenian ships.¹ The number of horsemen was so small, that all were conveyed in a single horse transport.

But the condition, the equipment, the pomp both of wealth and force, visible in the armament, was still more impressive than the number. At daybreak on the day appointed, when all the ships were ready in Peiræus for departure, the military force was marched down in a body from the city and embarked. They were accompanied by nearly the whole population, metics and foreigners as well as citizens, so that the appearance was that of a collective emigration like the flight to Salamis sixty-five years before. While the crowd of foreigners, brought thither by curiosity, were amazed by the grandeur of the spectacle—the citizens accompanying were moved by deeper and more stirring anxieties. Their sons, brothers, relatives, and friends, were just starting on the longest and largest enterprise which Athens had ever undertaken; against an island extensive as well as powerful, known to none of them accurately—and into a sea of undefined possibilities; glory and profit on the one side, but hazards of unassignable magnitude on the other. At this final parting, ideas of doubt and danger became far more painfully present than they had been in any of the preliminary discussions; and in spite of all the reassuring effect of the unrivalled armament before them, the relatives now separating at the water's edge could not banish the dark presentiment that they were bidding each other farewell for the last time.

wards, in the very same speech, as *not* having fled at that time (sect. 13, 52, 67). Harpokration states (v. Πολύστρατος), on the authority of an oration ascribed to Lysias, that Polystratus was put to death on the charge of having been concerned in the

mutilation of the Hermæ. This is quite different from the statement of Andokidès, and would lead us to suppose that Polystratus was one of those against whom Andokidès himself informed.

¹ Thueyd. vi. 43; vii. 57.

The moment immediately succeeding this farewell—when all the soldiers were already on board and the Keleustês was on the point of beginning his chant to put the rowers in motion—was peculiarly solemn and touching. Silence having been enjoined and obtained, by sound of trumpet, the crews in every ship, and the spectators on shore, followed the voice of the herald in praying to the gods for success, and in singing the pæan. On every deck were seen bowls of wine prepared, out of which the officers and the Epibatæ made libations, with goblets of silver and gold. At length the final signal was given, and the whole fleet quitted Peiræus in single file—displaying the exuberance of their yet untried force by a race of speed as far as Ægina.¹ Never in Grecian history was an invocation more unanimous, emphatic, and imposing, addressed to the gods; never was the refusing nod of Zeus more stern or peremptory. All these details, given by Thucydidês, of the triumphant promise which now issued from Peiræus, derive a painful interest from their contrast with the sad issue which will hereafter be unfolded.

The fleet made straight for Korkyra, where the contingents of the maritime allies, with the ships for burden and provisions, were found assembled. The armament thus complete was passed in review, and found to comprise 134 triremes with two Rhodian pentekonteres; 5100 hoplites; 480 bowmen, 80 of them Kretan; 700 Rhodian slingers; and 120 Megarian exiles serving as light troops. Of vessels of burden, in attendance with provisions, muniments of war, bakers, masons and carpenters, &c., the number was not less than 500; besides which, there was a considerable number of private trading ships, following voluntarily for purposes of profit.² Three fast-sailing triremes were despatched in advance, to ascertain which of the cities in Italy and Sicily would welcome the arrival of the armament; and especially to give notice at Eggesta that the succour solicited was now on its way, requiring at the same time that the money promised by the Eggestæans should be produced. Having then distributed by lot the armament into three divisions, one under each of the generals, Nikias,

Solemnities
of parting,
on ship-
board and
on the
water's
edge.

Full muster
of the
armament
at Korkyra.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 32; Diodor. xiii. 3.

² Thucyd. vi. 44.

Alkibiadês, and Lamachus—they crossed the Ionic Gulf from Korkyra to the Iapygian promontory.

In their progress southward along the coast of Italy to Rhegium, they met with a very cold reception from the various Grecian cities. None would receive them within their walls or even sell them provisions without. The utmost which they would grant was, the liberty of taking moorings and of watering; and even thus much was denied to them both at Tarentum and at the Epizephyrian Lokri. At Rhegium, immediately on the Sicilian strait, though the town gate was still kept shut, they were so far more hospitably treated, that a market of provisions was furnished to them and they were allowed to encamp in the sacred precinct of Artemis, not far from the walls. They here hauled their ships ashore and took repose until the return of the three scout ships from Eggesta; while the generals entered into negotiation with the magistrates and people of Rhegium, endeavouring to induce them to aid the armament in re-establishing the dispossessed Leontines, who were of common Chalkidian origin with themselves. But the answer returned was discouraging. The Rhegines would promise nothing more than neutrality, and cooperation in any course of policy which it might suit the other Italian Greeks to adopt. Probably they, as well as the other Italian Greeks, were astonished and intimidated by the magnitude of the newly-arrived force, and desired to leave to themselves open latitude of conduct for the future—not without mistrust of Athens and her affected forwardness for the restoration of the Leontines. To the Athenian generals, however, such a negative from Rhegium was an unwelcome disappointment; for that city had been the ally of Athens in the last war, and they had calculated on the operation of Chalkidic sympathies.¹

Progress to
Rhegium—
cold recep-
tion by the
Italian
cities.

It was not until after the muster of the Athenians at Korkyra (about July 415 B.C.) that the Syracusans became thoroughly convinced both of their approach, and of the extent of their designs against Sicily. Intimation had indeed reached Syracuse, from several quarters, of the resolution taken by the Athenians in the preceding March to assist Eggesta and Leontini, and of the preparations going on in consequence. There was however a prevailing

¹ Thucyd. vi. 44-46.

indisposition to credit such tidings. Nothing in the state of Sicily held out any encouragement to Athenian ambition: the Leontines could give no aid, the Egestæans very little, and that little at the opposite corner of the island; while the Syracusans considered themselves fully able to cope with any force which Athens was likely to send. Some derided the intelligence as mere idle rumour; others anticipated, at most, nothing more serious than the expedition sent from Athens ten years before.¹ No one could imagine the new eagerness and obstinacy with which she had just thrown herself into the scheme of Sicilian conquest, nor the formidable armament presently about to start. Nevertheless, the Syracusan generals thought it their duty to make preparations, and strengthen the military condition of the state.²

Hermokratês, however, whose information was more complete, judged these preparations insufficient, and took advantage of a public assembly—held seemingly about the time that the Athenians were starting from Peiræus—to impress such conviction on his countrymen, as well as to correct their incredulity. He pledged his own credit that the reports which had been circulated were not merely true, but even less than the full truth; that the Athenians were actually on their way, with an armament on the largest scale, and vast designs of conquering all Sicily. While he strenuously urged that the city should be put in immediate condition for repelling a most formidable invasion, he deprecated all alarm as to the result, and held out the firmest assurances of ultimate triumph. The very magni-

¹ Thueyd. vi. 32–35. Mr. Mitford observes—"It is not specified by historians, but the account of Thueydides makes it evident, that there had been a revolution in the government of Syracuse, or at least a great change in its administration, since the oligarchical Leontines were admitted to the rights of Syracusan citizens (ch. xviii. sect. iii. vol. iv. p. 46). The

democratical party now bore the sway," &c.

I cannot imagine upon what passage of Thueydides this conjecture is founded. Mr. Mitford had spoken of the government as a democracy before; he continues to speak of it as a democracy now, in the same unaltered vituperative strain.

² Thueyd. vi. 41. τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐπιμεμελημένα ἦδη, &c.

tude of the approaching force would intimidate the Sicilian cities and drive them into hearty defensive cooperation with Syracuse. Rarely indeed did any large or distant expedition ever succeed in its object, as might be seen from the failure of the Persians against Greece, by which failure Athens herself had so largely profited. Preparations, however, both effective and immediate, were indispensable; not merely at home, but by means of foreign missions, to the Sicilian and Italian Greeks—to the Sikels—and to the Carthaginians, who had for some time been suspicious of the unmeasured aggressive designs of Athens, and whose immense wealth would now be especially serviceable—and to Lacedæmon and Corinth, for the purpose of soliciting aid in Sicily, as well as renewed invasion of Attica. So confident did he (Hermokratês) feel of their powers of defence, if properly organised, that he would even advise the Syracusans with their Sicilian¹ allies to put to sea at once, with all their naval force and two months' provisions, and to sail forthwith to the friendly harbour of Tarentum; from whence they would be able to meet the Athenian fleet and prevent it even from crossing the Ionic Gulf from Korkyra. They would thus show that they were not only determined on defence, but even forward in coming to blows; the only way of taking down the presumption of the Athenians, who now speculated upon Syracusan lukewarmness, because they had rendered no aid to Sparta when she solicited it at the beginning of the war. The Syracusans would probably be able to deter or obstruct the advance of the expedition until winter approached: in which case, Nikias, the ablest of the three generals, who was understood to have undertaken the scheme against his

¹ Thucyd. vi. 34. "Ὁ δὲ μάλιστα ἐγὼ τε νομίζω ἐπίτακτον, ὑμεῖς δὲ διὰ τὸ ξύνηθες ἡσυχον ἡκιστ' ἂν ὀξέως πείθουσθε, ἅμωσ εἰρήσεται.

That "habitual quiescence" which Hermokratês here predicates of his countrymen, forms a remarkable contrast with the restless activity, and intermeddling carried even to excess, which Periklès and Nikias deprecate in the Athenians (Thucyd. i. 144; vi. 7). Both of the

governments however were democratical. This serves as a lesson of caution respecting general predications about *all* democracies; for it is certain that one democracy differed in many respects from another. It may be doubted however whether the attribute here ascribed by Hermokratês to his countrymen was really deserved, to the extent which his language implies.

own consent, would probably avail himself of the pretext to return.¹

Though these opinions of Hermokratês were espoused farther by various other citizens in the assembly, the greater number of speakers held an opposite language, and placed little faith in his warnings. We have already noticed Hermokratês nine years before as envoy of Syracuse and chief adviser at the congress of Gela—then, as now, watchful to bar the door against Athenian interference in Sicily—then, as now, belonging to the oligarchical party, and of sentiments hostile to the existing democratical constitution; but brave as well as intelligent in foreign affairs. A warm and even angry debate arose upon his present speech.² Though there was nothing, in the words of Hermokratês himself, disparaging either to the democracy or to the existing magistrates, yet it would seem that his partisans who spoke after him must have taken up a more criminationary tone, and must have exaggerated that, which he characterised as the “habitual quiescence” of the Syracusans, into contemptible remissness and disorganisation under those administrators and generals, characterised as worthless, whom the democracy preferred. Amidst the speakers, who in replying to Hermokratês and the others, indignantly repelled such insinuations and retorted upon their authors—a citizen named Athenagoras was the most distinguished. He was at this time the leading democratical politician, and the most popular orator, in Syracuse.³

¹ Thucyd. vi. 33—36.

² Thucyd. vi. 32-35. τῶν δὲ Συρακούσων ὁ δῆμος ἐν πολλῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐριδί ἦσαν, &c.

³ Thucyd. vi. 35. παρελθὼν δ' αὐτοῖς Ἀθηναγόρας, ὃς δῆμον τε προστάτης ἦν καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι πιθανωτάτος τοῖς πολλοῖς, εἰεγε τοιαύδε, &c.

The position ascribed here to Athenagoras seems to be the same as that which is assigned to Kleon at Athens—ἀνὴρ δημογωγός κατ' ἐκείνους τὸν χρόνον ὧν καὶ τῷ πιθανωτάτος, &c. (iv. 21).

Neither δῆμος προστάτης, nor δημογωγός, denotes any express

functions, or titular office (see the note of Dr. Arnold)—at least in these places. It is possible that there may have been some Grecian town constitutions, in which there was an office bearing such title: but this is a point which cannot be affirmed. Nor would the words δῆμος προστάτης always imply an equal degree of power: the person so designated might have more power in one town than in another. Thus in Megara (iv. 67) it seems that the oligarchical party had recently been banished: the leaders of the popular party had become the most influential men in the

"Every one,¹ (said he) except only cowards and bad citizens, must wish that the Athenians *would* be fools enough to come here and put themselves into our power. The tales which you have just heard are nothing better than fabrications, got up to alarm you; and I wonder at the folly of these alarmists in fancying that their machinations are not detected.² You will be too wise to take measure of the future from their reports: you will rather judge from what able men such as the Athenians are likely to do. Be assured that they will never leave behind them the Peloponnesians in menacing attitude, to come hither and court a fresh war not less formidable: indeed I think they account themselves lucky that we with our powerful cities have never come across to attack them. And if they *should* come, as it is pretended—they will find Sicily a more formidable foe than Peloponnesus: nay, our own city alone will be a match for twice the force which they can bring across. The Athenians, knowing all this well enough, will mind their own business; in spite of all the fictions which men on this side of the water conjure up, and which they have already tried often before, sometimes even worse than on the present occasion, in order to terrify you and get themselves nominated to the chief posts.³ One of these days, I fear they may even succeed, from our want of precautions beforehand. Such intrigues leave but short moments of tranquillity to our city: they condemn it to an intestine discord worse than foreign war, and have sometimes betrayed it even to despots and usurpers. However, if you will listen to me, I will try and prevent anything of this sort at present; by simple persuasion to you—by chastisement to these conspirators—and by watchful denunciation of the

Reply of
Athen-
agoras, the
popular
orator.

city. See also iii. 70—Peithias at Korkyra.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 36-40. I give the substance of what is ascribed to Athenagoras by Thucydides, without binding myself to the words.

² Thucyd. vi. 36. τοὺς δ' ἀγγέλλοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ περιφώβους ὑμᾶς ποιῶντας τῆς μὲν τόλμης οὐ θυμιάζω, τῆς δὲ ἀξυνεστίας, εἰ μὴ οἴονται ἐνδηλοὶ εἶναι.

³ Thucyd. vi. 39. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα,

ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, οἷ τε Ἀθηναῖοι γιγνώσκοντες, τὰ σφέτερά αὐτῶν, εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι, σώξουσιν, καὶ ἐνθιένδε ἄνδρας οὕτε ὄντα, οὕτε ἂν γενομένα, λογοποιῶσιν. Οὕς ἐγὼ οὐ νῦν πρῶτον, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ἐπίσταμαι, ἥτοι λόγοις γε τοιοῖσδε, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων κακουργοτέροις, ἢ ἔργοις, βουλομένους καταπλήξαντας τὸ ὑμέτερον πλῆθος αὐτοῖς τῆς πόλεως ἄρχειν. Καὶ δεδούκα μέντοι μήποτε πολλὰ πειρώμενοι καὶ κατὰ ὀρθώσωσιν, &c.

oligarchical party generally. Let me ask, indeed, what is it that you younger nobles covet? To get into command at your early age? The law forbids you, because you are yet incompetent. Or do you wish not to be under equal laws with the many? But how can you pretend that citizens of the same city should not have the same rights? Some one will tell me¹ that democracy is neither intelligent nor just, and that the rich are the persons best fitted to command. But I affirm, first, that the people are the sum

¹ Thucyd. vi. 39. φήσει τις δημοκρατίαν οὕτε ξυνοτέον οὐτ' ἴσον εἶναι, τοὺς δ' ἔχοντας τὰ χρήματα καὶ ἄρχειν ἄριστα βελτίστους. Ἐγὼ δὲ φημι, πρῶτα μὲν, δῆμον ξύμπαν ὠνομάσθαι, ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ μέρος· ἐπειτα, φύλακας μὲν ἀρίστους εἶναι χρημάτων τοὺς πλουσίους, βουλευσάσθαι δ' ἂν βέλτιστα τοὺς ξυνοτέους, κρίναι δ' ἂν ἀκούσαντας ἄριστα τοὺς πολλούς· καὶ ταῦτα ὁμοίως καὶ κατὰ μέρη καὶ ξύμπαντα ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ ἰσμοίρειν.

Dr. Arnold translates φύλακας χρημάτων—"having the care of the public purse"—as if it were φύλακας τῶν δημοσίων χρημάτων. But it seems to me that the words carry a larger sense, and refer to the private property of these rich men, not to their functions as keepers of what was collected from taxation or tribute. Looking at a rich man from the point of view of the public, he is guardian of his own property until the necessities of the state require that he should spend more or less of it for the public defence or benefit: in the interim, he enjoys it as he pleases, but he will for his own interest take care that the property does not perish (compare vi. 9). This is the service which he renders, *quatenus rich man*, to the state: he may also serve it in other ways, but that would be by means of his personal qualities: thus he may, for example, be intelligent as well as rich (ξυνοτέος as well as πλούσιος),

and then he may serve the state as *counsellor*—the second of the two categories named by Athenagoras. What that orator is here negating is, the better title and superior fitness of the rich to exercise command—which was the claim put forward in their behalf. And he goes on to indicate what is their real position and service in a democracy; that they are to enjoy the revenue, and preserve the capital, of their wealth, subject to demands for public purposes when necessary—but not expect command, unless they are personally competent. Properly speaking, that which he here affirms is true of the small lots of property taken in the mass, as well as of the large, and is one of the grounds of defence of private property against communism. But the rich man's property is an appreciable item to the state, individually taken: moreover, he is perpetually raising unjust pretensions to political power, so that it becomes necessary to define how much he is really entitled to.

A passage in the financial oration of Demosthenes—περὶ Συμμοριῶν (p. 185. c. 8) will illustrate what has been here said—Δεῖ τοίνυν ὑμᾶς τᾶλλα παρασκευάσασθαι· τὰ δὲ χρήματα νῦν μὲν ἔαν τοὺς κεκτημένους ἔχῃν—οὐδ' αὖ μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐν καλλίῳ σώζοντο τῇ πόλει—ἔαν δὲ πῶθ' ὁ καιρὸς οὕτως ἔλθῃ, τότε ἐκόντων εἰσφερόντων αὐτῶν λαμβάνειν.

total, and the oligarchy merely a fraction; next, that rich men are the best trustees of the aggregate wealth existing in the community—intelligent men, the best counsellors—and the multitude, the best qualified for hearing and deciding after such advice. In a democracy, these functions, one and all, find their proper place. But oligarchy, though imposing on the multitude a full participation in all hazards, is not content even with an exorbitant share in the public advantages, but grasps and monopolises the whole for itself.¹ This is just what you young and powerful men are aiming at, though you will never be able to keep it permanently in a city such as Syracuse. Be taught by me—or at least alter your views, and devote yourselves to the public advantage of our common city. Desist from practising, by reports such as these, upon the belief of men who know you too well to be duped. If even there be any truth in what you say—and if the Athenians *do* come—our city will repel them in a manner worthy of her reputation. She will not take you at your word, and choose *you* commanders, in order to put the yoke upon her own neck. She will look for herself—construe your communications for what they really mean—and instead of suffering you to talk her out of her free government, will take effective precautions for maintaining it against you.”

Immediately after this vehement speech from Athenagoras, one of the Stratêgi who presided in the assembly interposed; permitting no one else to speak, and abruptly closing the assembly, with these few words:—“We generals deprecate this interchange of personal vituperation, and trust that the hearers present will not suffer themselves to be biassed by it. Let us rather take care, in reference to the reports just communicated, that we be one and all in a condition to repel the invader. And even should the necessity not arise, there is no harm in strengthening our public force with horses, arms, and the other muniments of war. *We* generals shall take upon ourselves the care and supervision of these matters, as well as of the missions to neighbouring cities, for procuring information

Interposition of the Stratêgi to moderate the violence of the debate.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 39. Ὀλιγαρχία δὲ τῶν μὲν κινδύνων τοῖς πολλοῖς μεταδίδωσι, τῶν δ' ὠφελίμων οὐ πλεονεκτεῖ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑυμπαν ἀφελομένην

ἔχει· ἃ ὁμῶν οἱ τε δυνάμενοι καὶ οἱ νέοι προθυμοῦνται, ἀδύνατα ἐν μεγάλῃ πόλει κατατρεῖν.

and for other objects. We have indeed already busied ourselves for the purpose, and we shall keep you informed of what we learn."

The language of Athenagoras, indicating much virulence of party-feeling, lets us somewhat into the real working of politics among the Syracusan democracy. Athenagoras at Syracuse was like Kleon at Athens—the popular orator of the city. But he was by no means the most influential person, nor had he the principal direction of public affairs. Executive and magisterial functions belonged chiefly to Hermokratês and his partisans, the opponents of Athenagoras. Hermokratês has already appeared as taking the lead at the congress of Gela nine years before, and will be seen throughout the coming period almost constantly in the same position; while the political rank of Athenagoras is more analogous to that which we should call a leader of opposition—a function of course suspended under pressing danger, so that we hear of him no more. At Athens as at Syracuse, the men who got the real power, and handled the force and treasures of the state, were chiefly of the rich families—often of oligarchical sentiments, acquiescing in the democracy as an uncomfortable necessity, and continually open to be solicited by friends or kinsmen to conspire against it. Their proceedings were doubtless always liable to the scrutiny, and their persons to the animadversion, of the public assembly: hence arose the influence of the demagogue, such as Athenagoras and Kleon—the bad side of whose character is so constantly kept before the readers of Grecian history. By whatever disparaging epithets such character may be surrounded, it is in reality the distinguishing feature of a free government under all its forms—whether constitutional monarchy or democracy. By the side of the real political actors, who hold principal office and wield personal power, there are always abundant censors and critics—some better, others worse, in respect of honesty, candour, wisdom, or rhetoric—the most distinguished of whom acquires considerable importance, though holding a function essentially inferior to that of the authorised magistrate or general.

We observe here, that Athenagoras, far from being inclined to push the city into war, is averse to it even beyond reasonable limit; and denounces it as the interested

Relative position of Athenagoras and other parties at Syracuse.

policy of the oligarchical party. This may show how little it was any constant interest or policy on the part of the persons called Demagogues, to involve their city in unnecessary war; a charge which has been frequently advanced against them, because it so happens, that Kleon, in the first half of the Peloponnesian war, discountenanced the propositions of peace between Athens and Sparta. We see by the harangue of Athenagoras that the oligarchical party were the usual promoters of war; a fact which we should naturally expect, seeing that the rich and great, in most communities, have accounted the pursuit of military glory more conformable to their dignity than any other career. At Syracuse, the ascendancy of Hermokratês was much increased by the invasion of the Athenians—while Athenagoras does not again appear. The latter was egregiously mistaken in his anticipations respecting the conduct of Athens, though right in his judgement respecting her true political interest. But it is very unsafe to assume that nations will always pursue their true political interest, where present temptations of ambition or vanity intervene. Positive information was in this instance a surer guide than speculations *à priori* founded upon the probable policy of Athens. But that the imputations advanced by Athenagoras against the oligarchical youth, of promoting military organization with a view to their own separate interest, were not visionary—may be seen by the analogous case of Argos, two or three years before. The democracy of Argos, contemplating a more warlike and aggressive policy, had been persuaded to organize and train the select regiment of One Thousand hoplites, chosen from the oligarchical youth: within three years, this regiment subverted the democratical constitution.¹ Now the persons, respecting whose designs Athenagoras expresses so much apprehension, were exactly the class at Syracuse corresponding to the select Thousand at Argos.

Pacific dispositions of Athenagoras.

His general denunciations against the oligarchical youth were well-founded.

The political views, proclaimed in this remarkable speech, are deserving of attention, though we cannot fully understand it without having before us those speeches to which it replies. Not only is democratical constitution forcibly contrasted with oligarchy, but the separate places

¹ See above, chap. lvi.

which it assigns to wealth, intelligence, and multitude, are laid down with a distinctness not unworthy of Aristotle.

Even before the debate here adverted to, the Syracusan generals had evidently acted upon views more nearly approaching to those of Hermokratês than to those of Athenagoras. Already alive to the danger, and apprised by their scouts when the Athenian armament was passing from Korkyra to Rhegium, they pushed their preparations with the utmost activity; distributing garrisons and sending envoys among their Sikel dependencies, while the force within the city was mustered and placed under all the conditions of war.¹

The halt of the Athenians at Rhegium afforded increased leisure for such equipment. That halt was prolonged for more than one reason. In the first place, Nikias and his colleagues wished to negotiate with the Rhegines, as well as to haul ashore and clean their ships: next, they awaited the return of the three scout-ships from Egesta: lastly, they had as yet formed no plan of action in Sicily.

The ships from Egesta returned with disheartening news. Instead of the abundant wealth which had been held forth as existing in that town, and upon which the resolutions of the Athenians as to Sicilian operations had been mainly grounded—it turned out that no more than thirty talents in all could be produced. What was yet worse, the elaborate fraud, whereby the Egestæans had duped the commissioners on their first visit, was now exposed; and these commissioners, on returning to Rhegium from their second visit, were condemned to the mortification of proclaiming their own credulity, under severe taunts and reproaches from the army. Disappointed in the source from whence they had calculated on obtaining money—for it appears that both Alkibiadês and Lamachus had sincerely relied on the pecuniary resources of Egesta, though Nikias was always mistrustful—the generals now discussed their plan of action.

Nikias—availing himself of the fraudulent conduct on the part of the Egestæan allies, now become palpable—wished to circumscribe his range of operations within the rigorous letter of the vote which the Athenian

¹ Thucyd. vi. 45.

assembly had passed. He proposed to sail at once against Selinus; then, formally to require the Egæstæans to provide the means of maintaining the armament, or, at least, of maintaining those sixty triremes which they themselves had solicited. Since this requisition would not be realised, he would only tarry long enough to obtain from the Selinuntines some tolerable terms of accommodation with Egæsta, and then return home; exhibiting, as they sailed along, to all the maritime cities, this great display of Athenian naval force. And while he would be ready to profit by any opportunity which accident might present for serving the Leontines or establishing new alliances, he strongly deprecated any prolonged stay in the island for speculative enterprises—all at the cost of Athens.¹

The Athenian generals discuss their plan of action—opinion of Nikias.

Against this scheme Alkibiadês protested, as narrow, timid, and disgraceful to the prodigious force with which they had been entrusted. He proposed to begin by opening negotiations with all the other Sicilian Greeks—especially Messênê, convenient both as harbour for their fleet and as base of their military operations—to prevail upon them to co-operate against Syracuse and Selinus. With the same view, he recommended establishing relations with the Sikels of the interior, in order to detach such of them as were subjects of Syracuse, as well as to ensure supplies of provisions. As soon as it had been thus ascertained what extent of foreign aid might be looked for, he would open direct attack forthwith against Syracuse and Selinus; unless indeed the former should consent to re-establish Leontini, and the latter to come to terms with Egæsta.²

Opinion of Alkibiadês.

Lamachus, delivering his opinion last, dissented from both his colleagues. He advised, that they should proceed at once, without any delay, to attack Syracuse, and fight their battle under its walls. The Syracusans (he urged) were now in terror and only half-prepared for defence. Many of their citizens, and much property, would be found still lingering throughout the neighbouring lands, not yet removed within the walls—and

Opinion of Lamachus.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 47; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 14.

ρεῖν, ἣν μὴ οἱ μὲν Ἐγεσταίοις συμβαίνωσιν, οἱ δὲ Λεοντίνους ἐὼς κατα-

² Thucyd. vi. 48. Οὕτως ἤδη Συρακοῦσαις καὶ Σελινούντι ἐπιχει-

ρίζειν.

might thus be seized for the subsistence of their army;¹ while the deserted town and harbour of Megara, very near to Syracuse both by land and by sea, might be occupied by the fleet as a naval station. The imposing and intimidating effect of the armament, not less than its real efficiency, was now at the maximum, immediately after its arrival. If advantage were taken of this first impression to strike an instant blow at their principal enemy, the Syracusans would be found destitute of the courage, not less than of the means, to resist: but the longer such attack was delayed, the more this first impression of dismay would be effaced, giving place to a reactionary sentiment of indifference and even contempt, when the much-dreaded armament was seen to accomplish little or nothing. As for the other Sicilian cities, nothing would contribute so much to determine their immediate adhesion, as successful operations against Syracuse.²

But Lamachus found no favour with either of the other two, and being thus compelled to choose between the plans of Alkibiadês and Nikias, gave his support to that of the former—which was the mean term of the three. There can be no doubt—as far as it is becoming to pronounce respecting that which never reached execution—that the plan of Lamachus was far the best and most judicious; at first sight indeed the most daring, but intrinsically the safest, easiest, and speediest, that could be suggested. For undoubtedly the siege and capture of Syracuse was the one enterprise indispensable towards the promotion of Athenian views in Sicily. The sooner that was commenced, the more easily it would be accomplished: and its difficulties were in many ways aggravated, in no way abated, by those preliminary precautions upon which Alkibiadês insisted. Anything like delay tended fearfully to impair the efficiency, real as well as reputed, of an ancient aggressive armament, and to animate as well as to strengthen those who stood on the defensive—a point on which we shall find painful evidence presently. The advice of Lamachus, alike soldier-like and far-sighted, would probably have been approved and executed either by Brasidas or by Demosthenês; while the dilatory policy still advocated

Superior
discern-
ment of
Lamachus
—plan of
Alkibiadês
preferred.

¹ Compare iv. 104—describing the surprise of Amphipolis by Brasidas.

² Thucyd. vi. 49.

by Alkibiadês, even after the suggestion of Lamachus had been started, tends to show that if he was superior in military energy to one of his colleagues, he was not less inferior to the other. Indeed, when we find him talking of besieging Syracuse, *unless* the Syracusans would consent to the re-establishment of Leontini—it seems probable that he had not yet made up his mind peremptorily to besiege the city at all; a fact completely at variance with those unbounded hopes of conquest which he is reported as having conceived even at Athens. It is possible that he may have thought it impolitic to contradict too abruptly the tendencies of Nikias, who, anxious as he was chiefly to find some pretext for carrying back his troops unharmed, might account the proposition of Lamachus too desperate even to be discussed. Unfortunately, the latter, though the ablest soldier of the three, was a poor man, of no political position, and little influence among the hoplites. Had he possessed, along with his own straightforward military energy, the wealth and family ascendancy of either of his colleagues, the achievements as well as the fate of this splendid armament would have been entirely altered, and the Athenians would have entered Syracuse, not as prisoners, but as conquerors.

Alkibiadês, as soon as his plan had become adopted by means of the approval of Lamachus, sailed across the strait in his own trireme from Rhegium to Messênê. Though admitted personally into the city and allowed to address the public assembly, he could not induce them to conclude any alliance, or to admit the armament to anything beyond a market of provisions without the walls. He accordingly returned back to Rhegium, from whence he and one of his colleagues immediately departed with sixty triremes for Naxos. The Naxians cordially received the armament, which then steered southward along the coast of Sicily to Katana. In the latter place the leading men and the general sentiment were at this time favourable to Syracuse, so that the Athenians, finding admittance refused, were compelled to sail farther southward, and take their night-station at the mouth of the river Terias. On the ensuing day they made sail with their ships in single column immediately in front of Syracuse itself, while an advanced squadron of ten triremes were even despatched into the Great Harbour, south of the town, for the purpose of

Alkibiadês
at Messênê
—Naxos
joins the
Athenians.
Empty display of the
armament.

surveying on this side the city with its docks and fortifications, and for the farther purpose of proclaiming from shipboard by the voice of the herald,—“The Leontines now in Syracuse are hereby invited to come forth without apprehension and join their friends and benefactors, the Athenians.” After this empty display, they returned back to Katana.¹

We may remark that this proceeding was completely at variance with the judicious recommendation of Lamachus. It tended to familiarise the Syracusans with the sight of the armament piece-meal, without any instant action—and thus to abate in their minds the terror-striking impression of its first arrival.

At Katana, Alkibiadês personally was admitted into the town, and allowed to open his case before the public assembly, as he had been at Messênê. Accident alone enabled him to carry his point—for the general opinion was averse to his propositions. While most of the citizens were in the assembly listening to his discourse, some Athenian soldiers without, observing a postern-gate carelessly guarded, broke it open, and showed themselves in the market-place. The town was thus in the power of the Athenians, so that the leading men who were friends of Syracuse thought themselves lucky to escape in safety, while the general assembly came to a resolution accepting the alliance proposed by Alkibiadês.² The whole Athenian armament was now conducted from Rhegium to Katana, which was established as head-quarters. Intimation was farther received from a party at Kamarina, that the city might be induced to join them, if the armament showed itself: accordingly the whole armament proceeded thither, and took moorings off the shore, while a herald was sent up to the city. But the Kamarinæans declined to admit the army, and declared that they would abide by the existing treaty; which bound them to receive at any time one single ship—but no more, unless they themselves should ask for it. The Athenians were therefore obliged to return to Katana. Passing by Syracuse both going and returning, they ascertained the

Alkibiadês
at Katana—
the Athe-
nians
masters of
Katana—
they estab-
lish their
station
there.
Refusal of
Kamarina.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 50.

² Polyænus (i. 40, 4) treats this acquisition of Katana as the

result, not of accident, but of a preconcerted plot. I follow the account as given by Thucydides.

falsehood of a report that the Syracusans were putting a naval force afloat; moreover they landed near the city and ravaged some of the neighbouring lands. The Syracusan cavalry and light troops soon appeared, and a skirmish with trifling loss ensued, before the invaders retired to their ships¹—the first blood shed in this important struggle, and again at variance with the advice of Lamachus.

Serious news awaited them on their return to Katana. They found the public ceremonial trireme, called the Salaminian, just arrived from Athens—the bearer of a formal resolution of the assembly, requiring Alkibiadês to come home and stand his trial for various alleged matters of irreligion combined with treasonable purposes. A few other citizens specified by name were commanded to come along with him under the same charge; but the trierarch of the Salaminian was especially directed to serve him only with the summons, without any guard or coercion, so that he might return home in his own trireme.²

This summons, pregnant with momentous results both to Athens and to her enemies, arose out of the mutilation of the Hermæ (described a few pages back) and the inquiries instituted into the authorship of that deed, since the departure of the armament. The extensive and anxious sympathies connected with so large a body of departing citizens, combined with the solemnity of the scene itself, had for the moment suspended the alarm caused by that sacrilege. But it speedily revived, and the people could not rest without finding out by whom the deed had been done. Considerable rewards, 1000 and even 10,000 drachms, were proclaimed to informers; of whom others soon appeared, in addition to the slave Andromachus before mentioned. A metec named Teukrus had fled from Athens, shortly after the event, to Megara, from whence he sent intimation to the senate at Athens that he had himself been a party concerned in the recent sacrilege concerning the mysteries, as well as cognizant of the mutilation of the Hermæ—and that if impunity were guaranteed to him, he would come back and give full information. A vote of the senate was immediately passed to invite him. He denounced by name eleven persons as having been concerned, jointly with him-

Alkibiadês
is sum-
moned
home to
take his
trial.

Feelings
and pro-
ceedings at
Athens
since the
departure
of the arma-
ment.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 52.

² Thucyd. vi. 53–61.

self, in the mock-celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries; and eighteen different persons, himself not being one, as the violators of the *Hermæ*. A woman named *Agaristê*, daughter of *Alkmæonidês*—these names bespeak her great rank and family in the city—deposed farther that *Alkihiadês*, *Axiochus*, and *Adeimantus*, had gone through a parody of the mysteries in a similar manner in the house of *Charmidês*. And lastly *Lydus*, slave of a citizen named *Phereklês*, stated that the like scene had been enacted in the house of his master in the deme *Thêmakus*—giving the names of the parties present, one of whom (though asleep and unconscious of what was passing) he stated to be *Leogoras*, the father of *Andokidês*.¹

Of the parties named in these different depositions, the greater number seem to have fled from the city at once; but all who remained were put into prison to stand future trial.² The informers received the promised rewards, after some debate as to the parties entitled to receive the reward; for *Pythonikus*, the citizen who had produced the slave *Andromachus*, pretended to the first claim, while *Androklês*, one of the senators, contended

¹ *Andokidês de Mysteriis*, sect. 14, 15, 35. In reference to the deposition of *Agaristê*, *Andokidês* again includes *Alkibiadês* among those who fled into banishment in consequence of it. Unless we are to suppose another *Alkibiadês*, not the general in Sicily—this statement cannot be true. There was another *Alkibiadês*, of the deme *Phegus*: but *Andokidês* in mentioning him afterwards (sect. 65), specifies his deme. He was cousin of *Alkibiadês*, and was in exile at the same time with him (*Xenoph. Hellen.* i. 2, 13).

² *Andokidês* (sect. 13—34) affirms that some of the persons, accused by *Teukrus* as mutilators of the *Hermæ*, were put to death upon his deposition. But I contest his accuracy on this point. For *Thucydides* recognises no one as having been put to death except those against whom *Andokidês* himself

informed (see vi. 27, 53, 61). He dwells particularly upon the number of persons, and persons of excellent character, imprisoned on suspicion; but he mentions none as having been put to death except those against whom *Andokidês* gave testimony. He describes it as a great harshness, and as an extraordinary proof of the reigning excitement, that the Athenians should have detained so many persons upon suspicion on the evidence of informers not entitled to credence. But he would not have specified this detention as extraordinary harshness, if the Athenians had gone so far as to put individuals to death upon the same evidence. Besides, to put these men to death would have defeated their own object—the full and entire disclosure of the plot and the conspirators. The ignorance in which they were of their

that the senate collectively ought to receive¹ the money—a strange pretension, which we do not know how he justified. At last however, at the time of the Panathenaic festival, Andromachus the slave received the first reward of 10,000 drachms—Teukrus the metic, the second reward of 1000 drachms.

A large number of citizens, many of them of the first consideration in the city, were thus either lying in prison or had fled into exile. But the alarm, the agony, and the suspicion, in the public mind, went on increasing rather than diminishing. The information hitherto received had been all partial, and with the exception of Agaristê, all the informants had been either slaves or metics, not citizens; while Teukrus, the only one among them who had stated anything respecting the mutilation of the Hermæ, did not profess to be a party concerned, or to know all those who were.² The people had heard only a succession of disclosures—all attesting a frequency of irreligious acts, calculated to insult and banish the local gods who protected their country and constitution—all indicating that there were many powerful citizens bent on prosecuting such designs, interpreted as treasonable—yet none communicating any full or satisfactory idea of the Hermokopid plot, of the real conspirators, or of their farther purposes. The enemy was among themselves, yet

Number of citizens imprisoned on suspicion—increased agony of the public mind.

internal enemies, was among the most agonising of all their sentiments; and to put any prisoner to death until they arrived, or believed themselves to have arrived, at the knowledge of the whole—would tend so far to bar their own chance of obtaining evidence—ὁ δὲ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἄσμενος λαβῶν, ὡς ᾤετο, τὸ σαρξές, καὶ δεινὸν ποιούμεεναι πρότερον εἰ τοῦς ἐπιβουλεύοντας σφῶν τῷ πλήθει μὴ εἰσόντι, &c.

Wachsmuth says (p. 194)—“The bloodthirsty dispositions of the people had been excited by the previous murders: the greater the number of victims to be slaughtered, the better were the people

pleased,” &c. This is an inaccuracy quite in harmony with the general spirit of his narrative. It is contradicted, implicitly, by the very words of Thueydiddēs which he transcribes in his note 10³.

¹ Andokid. de Mysteriis, sect. 27—28. καὶ Ἀνδρομάχης ὑπὲρ τῆς βουλῆς.

² Andokid. de Myst. sect. 36. It seems that Diognētus, who had been commissioner of inquiry at the time when Pythonikus presented the first information of the slave Andromachus, was himself among the parties denounced by Teukrus (And. de Myst. sect. 14, 15).

they knew not where to lay hands upon him. Amidst the gloomy terrors, political blended with religious, which distracted their minds, all the ancient stories of the last and worst oppressions of the Peisistratid despots, ninety-five years before, became again revived. Some new despots, they knew not who, seemed on the point of occupying the acropolis. To detect the real conspirators, was the only way of procuring respite from this melancholy paroxysm: for which purpose the people were willing to welcome questionable witnesses, and to imprison on suspicion citizens of the best character, until the truth could be ascertained.¹

The public distraction was aggravated by Peisander and Chariklês, who acted as commissioners of investigation; furious and unprincipled politicians,² at that time professing exaggerated attachment to the democratical constitution, though we shall find both of them hereafter among the most unscrupulous agents in its subversion. These men loudly proclaimed that the facts disclosed indicated the band of Hermokopid conspirators to be numerous, with an ulterior design of speedily putting down the democracy. They insisted on pressing their investigations until full discovery should be attained. And the sentiment of the people, collectively taken, responded to this stimulus; though individually every man was so afraid of becoming himself the next victim arrested, that when the herald convoked the senate for the purpose of receiving informations, the crowd in the market-place straightway dispersed.

It was amidst such eager thirst for discovery, that a new informer appeared, Diokleidês—who professed to communicate some material facts connected with the mutilation of the Hermæ, affirming that the authors of it were three hundred in number. He recounted that on the night on which that

¹ Thucyd. v. 53—60. οὐ δοκιμάζοντες τοὺς μνηστὰς, ἀλλὰ πάντας ὑπόπτως ἀποδεχόμενοι, διὰ πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων πίστιν πάνυ χρηστοὺς τῶν πολιτῶν ξυλλομβάνοντες κατέδουν, χρησιμώτερον ἡγούμενοι εἶναι βασανίσαι τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ εὐρεῖν, ἢ διὰ

μνηστοῦ πονηρίαν τινὰ καὶ χρηστὸν δοκοῦντα εἶναι αἰτιαθέντα ἀνέλεγκτον διαφυγεῖν. . .

. . . δεῖν ὁνομάζοντες, εἰ τοὺς ἐπιβουλευόντας σφῶν τῷ πλήθει μὴ εἴσονται . . .

² Andokid. de Myst. sect. 36.

incident occurred, he started from Athens to go to the mines of Laureion; wherein he had a slave working on hire, on whose account he was to receive pay. It was full moon, and the night was so bright that he began his journey, mistaking it for day-break.¹ On reaching the propylæum of the temple of Dionysus, he saw a body of men about 300 in number descending from the Odeon towards the public theatre. Being alarmed at such an unexpected sight, he concealed himself behind a pillar, from whence he had leisure to contemplate this body of men, who stood for some time conversing together, in groups of fifteen or twenty each, and then dispersed. The moon was so bright that he could discern the faces of most of them. As soon as they had dispersed, he pursued his walk to Laureion, from whence he returned next day and learnt to his surprise that during the night the Hermæ had been mutilated; also that commissioners of inquiry had been named, and the reward of 10,000 drachms proclaimed for information. Impressed at once with the belief, that the nocturnal crowd whom he had seen were authors of the deed, and happening soon afterwards to see one of them, Euphêmus,

¹ Plutarch (Alkih. c. 20) and Diodorus (xiii. 2) assert that this testimony was glaringly false, since on the night in question it was *new moon*. I presume, at least, that the remark of Diodorus refers to the deposition of Diokleidês, though he never mentions the name of the latter, and even describes the deposition referred to with many material variations as compared with Andokidês. Plutarch's observation certainly refers to Diokleidês, whose deposition (he says), affirming that he had seen and distinguished the persons in question by the light of the moon, on a night when it was *new moon*, shocked all sensible men, but produced no effect upon the blind fury of the people. Wachsmuth (Hellenisch. Alterth. vol. ii. ch. iii. p. 194) copies this remark from Plutarch.

I disbelieve altogether the assertion that it was *new moon* on that

night. Andokidês gives in great detail the deposition of Diokleidês, with a strong wish to show that it was false and perfidiously got up. But he nowhere mentions the fact that it was *new moon* on the night in question—though if we read his report and his comments upon the deposition of Diokleidês, we shall see that he never could have omitted such a means of discrediting the whole tale, if the fact had been so (Andokid. de Myster. sect. 37—43). Besides, it requires very good positive evidence to make us believe, that a suborned informer, giving his deposition not long after one of the most memorable nights that ever passed at Athens, would be so clumsy as to make particular reference to the circumstance that it was *full moon* (ἐπὶ δὲ πανσέληνον), if it had really been *new moon*.

sitting in the workshop of a brazier—he took him aside to the neighbouring temple of Hephæstus, where he mentioned in confidence that he had seen the party at work and could denounce them,—but that he preferred being paid for silence, instead of giving information and incurring private enmities. Euphêmus thanked him for the warning, desiring him to come next day to the house of Leogoras and his son Andokidês, where he would see them as well as the other parties concerned. Andokidês and the rest offered to him, under solemn covenant, the sum of two talents (or 12,000 drachms, thus overbidding the reward of 10,000 drachms proclaimed by the senate to any truthtelling informer) with admission to a partnership in the benefits of their conspiracy, supposing that it should succeed. Upon his reply that he would consider the proposition, they desired him to meet them at the house of Kallias son of Têleklês, brother-in-law of Andokidês: which meeting accordingly took place, and a solemn bargain was concluded in the acropolis. Andokidês and his friends engaged to pay the two talents to Diokleidês at the beginning of the ensuing month, as the price of his silence. But since this engagement was never performed, Diokleidês came with his information to the senate.¹

Such (according to the report of Andokidês) was the story of this informer, which he concluded by designating forty-two individuals, out of the three hundred whom he had seen. The first names whom he specified were those of Mantitheus and Aphepsion, two senators actually sitting among his audience. Next came the remaining forty, among whom were Andokidês and many of his nearest relatives—his father Leogoras, his first or second cousins and brother-in-law, Charmidês, Taureas, Nisæus, Kallias son of Alkmæon, Phrynichus, Eukratês (brother of Nikias the commander in Sicily) and Kritias. But as there were a still greater number of names (assuming the total of three hundred to be correct) which Diokleidês was unable to specify, the commissioner Peisander proposed that Mantitheus and Aphepsion should be at once seized and tortured, in order to force them to disclose their accomplices; the Psephism passed in the archonship of Skamandrius, whereby it was

More prisoners arrested—increased terror in the city—Andokidês among the persons imprisoned.

¹ Andokid. de Myster. sect. 37-42.

unlawful to apply the torture to any free Athenian, being first abrogated. Illegal, not less than cruel, as this proposition was, the senate at first received it with favour. But Mantitheus and Aphepsion, casting themselves as suppliants upon the altar in the senate-house, pleaded so strenuously for their rights as citizens, to be allowed to put in bail and stand trial before the Dikastery, that this was at last granted.¹ No sooner had they provided their sureties, than

¹ Considering the extreme alarm which then pervaded the Athenian mind, and their conviction that there were traitors among themselves whom yet they could not identify—it is to be noted as remarkable that they resisted the proposition of their commissioners for applying torture. We must recollect that the Athenians admitted the principle of the torture, as a good mode of eliciting truth as well as of testing depositions—for they applied it often to the testimony of slaves—sometimes apparently to that of metics. Their attachment to the established law, which forbade the application of it to citizens, must have been very great, to enable them to resist the great, special and immediate temptation to apply it in this case to Mantitheus and Aphepsion, if only by way of exception.

The application of torture to witnesses and suspected persons, handed down from the Roman law, was in like manner recognised, and pervaded nearly all the criminal jurisprudence of Europe until the last century. I could wish to induce the reader, after having gone through the painful narrative of the proceedings of the Athenians concerning the mutilation of the *Hermæ*, to peruse by way of comparison the *Storia della Colonna Infame* by the eminent Alexander Manzoni, author of ‘*I Promessi Sposi*.’ This little volume, including a republication of Verri’s

‘*Osservazioni sulla Tortura*,’ is full both of interest and instruction. It lays open the judicial enormities committed at Milan in 1630, while the terrible pestilence was raging there, by the examining judges and the senate, in order to get evidence against certain suspected persons called *Untori*; that is, men who were firmly believed by the whole population (with very few exceptions) to be causing and propagating the pestilence by means of certain ointment which they applied to the doors and walls of houses. Manzoni recounts with simple, eloquent, and impressive detail the incredible barbarity with which the official lawyers at Milan, under the authority of the senate, extorted, by force of torture, evidence against several persons, of having committed this imaginary and impossible crime. The persons thus convicted were executed under horrible torments: the house of one of them (a barber named Mora) was pulled down, and a pillar with an inscription erected upon the site, to commemorate the deed. This pillar, the *Colonna Infame*, remained standing in Milan until the close of the 18th century. The reader will understand, from Manzoni’s narrative, the degree to which public excitement and alarm can operate to poison and barbarise the course of justice in a Christian city, without a taint of democracy, and with professional lawyers and

they broke their covenant, mounted their horses and deserted to the enemy; without any regard to their sureties, who were exposed by law to the same trial and the same penalties as would have overtaken the offenders themselves. This sudden flight, together with the news that a Bœotian force was assembled on the borders of Attica, exasperated still farther the frantic terror of the public mind. The senate at once took quiet measures for seizing and imprisoning all the remaining forty whose names had been denounced; while by concert with the Strategi, all the citizens were put under arms—those who dwelt in the city, mustering in the market-place—those in and near the long walls, in the Theseium—those in Peiræus, in the square called the market-place of Hippodamus. Even the horsemen of the city were convoked by sound of trumpet in the sacred precinct of the Anakeion. The senate itself remained all night in the acropolis, except the Prytanēs (or fifty senators of the presiding tribe) who passed the night in the public building called the Tholus. Every man in Athens felt the terrible sense of an internal conspiracy on the point of breaking out, perhaps along with an invasion of the foreigner—prevented only by the timely disclosure of Diokleidēs, who was hailed as the saviour of the city, and carried in procession to dinner at the Prytaneium.¹

Miserable as the condition of the city was generally, yet more miserable was that of the prisoners confined. Moreover, worse, in every way, was still to be looked for—since the Athenians would know neither peace nor patience until they could reach, by some means or other, the names of the undisclosed conspirators. The female relatives and children of Andokidēs and his companions were by permission along with them in the prison,² aggravating by their tears and wailings the affliction of the scene—when Charmidēs, one of the parties confined, addressed himself to Andokidēs as his cousin and friend, imploring him to make a voluntary disclosure

Andokidēs is solicited by his fellow-prisoners to stand forward and give information—he complies.

judges to guide the whole procedure secretly—as compared with a pagan city, ultra-democratical, where judicial procedure as well as decision was all oral, public, and

multitudinous.

¹ Andokid. de Myst. sect. 41-46.

² Andokid. de Myst. sect. 48: compare Lysias, Orat. xiii. cont. Agor. rat. sect. 42.

of all that he knew, in order to preserve the lives of so many innocent persons his immediate kinsmen, as well as to rescue the city out of a feverish alarm not to be endured. "*You* know (he said) all that passed about the mutilation of the Hermæ, and your silence will now bring destruction not only upon yourself, but also upon your father and upon all of us; while if you inform whether you have been an actor in the scene or not, you will obtain impunity for yourself and us, and at the same time soothe the terrors of the city." Such instances on the part of Charmidês,¹ aided by the supplications of the other prisoners present, overcame the reluctance of Andokidês to become informer, and he next day made his disclosures to the senate. "Euphilêtus (he said) was the chief author of the mutilation of the Hermæ. He proposed the deed at a convivial party where I was present—but I denounced it in the strongest manner and refused all compliance. Presently I broke my collar-bone and injured my head, by a fall from a young horse, so badly as to be confined to my bed; when Euphilêtus took the opportunity of my absence to assure the rest of the company falsely that I had consented, and that I had agreed to cut the Hermes near my paternal house, which the tribe Ægeïs have dedicated. Accordingly they executed the project while I was incapable of moving, without my knowledge: they presumed that *I* would undertake the mutilation of this particular Hermes—and you see that this is the only one in all Athens which has escaped injury. When the conspirators ascertained that I had not been a party, Euphilêtus and Melêtus threatened me with a terrible revenge unless I observed silence: to which I replied that it was not I, but their own crime, which had brought them into danger."

Having recounted this tale (in substance) to the senate, Andokidês tendered his slaves, both male and female, to be tortured, in order that they might confirm his story that he was in his bed and unable to leave it, on the night when the Hermæ were mutilated. It appears that the torture was actually applied (according to the custom so cruelly frequent at Athens in the case of slaves), and that the senators thus became satisfied of the truth of what Andokidês affirmed. He mentioned twenty-

Andokidês designates the authors of the mutilation of the Hermæ—consequence of his relations.

¹ Plutarch (Alkib. c. 21) states himself to, and persuaded, Andokidês, was named Timeus. From

make out. Nor should we gain much, even if it could be made out—since even at the time neither Thucydidēs nor other intelligent critics could determine how far it was true. The mutilation of the Hermæ remained to them always an unexplained mystery; though they accounted Andokidēs the principal organiser.¹

That which is at once most important and most incontestable, is the effect produced by the revelations of Andokidēs, true or false, on the public mind at Athens. He was a young man of rank and wealth in the city, belonging to the sacred family of the Kerykes—said to trace his pedigree to the hero Odysseus—and invested on a previous occasion with an important naval command; whereas the preceding informers had been metics and slaves. Moreover he was making confession of his own guilt. Hence the people received his communications with implicit confidence. They were so delighted to have got to the bottom of the terrible mystery, that the public mind subsided from its furious terrors into comparative tranquillity. The citizens again began to think themselves in safety and to resume their habitual confidence in each other, while the hoplites everywhere on guard were allowed to return to their homes.² All the prisoners in custody on suspicion, except those against whom Andokidēs informed, were forth-

Belief of the Athenians in his information—its tranquillising effects.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 60. ἐνταῦθα ἀναπείθεται εἰς τῶν δεδεμένων, ὅσπερ ἐδόξει αἰτιώτατος εἶναι, ὑπὸ τῶν συνηδυσμωτῶν τινός, εἴτε ἄρα καὶ τὰ ὄντα μηθεῖναι, εἴτε καὶ οὐ· ἐπ' ὁμωτέρα γὰρ εἰσάχεται· τὸ δὲ σαφές· οὐδαὶς οὕτε τότε οὕτε ὕστερον ἔχει εἰπεῖν περὶ τῶν ὀργασάντων τὸ ἔργον.

If the statement of Andokidēs in the *Oratio de Mysteriis* is correct, the deposition previously given by Teukrus the metie must have been a true one; though this man is commonly denounced among the lying witnesses (see the words of the comic writer, Phrynichus ap. Plutarch. *Alkib.* c. 20).

Thucydidēs refuses even to mention the name of Andokidēs, and expresses himself with more than

usual reserve about this dark transaction—as if he were afraid of giving offence to great Athenian families. The bitter feuds which it left behind at Athens, for years afterwards, are shown in the two orations of Lysias and of Andokidēs. If the story of Didymus be true, that Thucydidēs after his return from exile to Athens died by a violent death (see *Biogr. Thucyd.* p. xvii. ed. Arnold), it would seem probable that all his reserve did not protect him against private enmities arising out of his historical assertions.

² Thucyd. vi. 60. 'Οἱ δὲ θεῖμας ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἄσμενος λαβών, ὡς ἦεντο, τὸ σαφές, &c.: compare Andokid. de *Mysteriis*, sect. 67, 68.

with released: those who had fled out of apprehension, were allowed to return; while those whom he named as guilty, were tried, convicted, and put to death. Such of them as had already fled, were condemned to death in their absence, and a reward offered for their heads.¹ And though discerning men were not satisfied with the evidence upon which these sentences were pronounced, yet the general public fully believed themselves to have punished the real offenders, and were thus inexpressibly relieved from the depressing sense of unexpiated insult to the gods, as well as of danger to their political constitution from the withdrawal of divine protection.² Andokidēs himself was pardoned, and was for the time an object, apparently, even of public gratitude; so that his father Leogoras, who had been among the parties imprisoned, ventured to indict a senator named Speusippus for illegal proceedings towards him, and obtained an almost unanimous verdict from the Dikastery.³ But the character of a statue-breaker and an informer could never be otherwise than odious at Athens. Andokidēs was either banished by the indirect effect of a general disqualifying decree; or at least found that he had made so many enemies, and incurred so much obloquy, by his conduct in this affair, as to make it necessary for him to quit the city. He remained in banishment for many years, and seems never to have got clear of the hatred which his conduct in this nefarious proceeding so well merited.⁴

But the comfort arising out of these disclosures respecting the Hermæ, though genuine and inestimable at the moment, was soon again disturbed. There still remained

¹ Andokid. de Myster. sect. 66; Thucyd. vi. 60; Philochorus, Fragment. 111, ed. Didot.

² Thucyd. vi. 60. ἡ μέντοι ἄλλη πόλις περιφανῶς ὠφέλητο: compare Andokid. de Reditu, sect. 8.

³ See Andokid. de Mysteriis, sect. 17. There are several circumstances not easily intelligible respecting this γραφή πρηνόμων which Andokidēs alleges that his father Leogoras brought against the senator Speusippus, before a Dikastery of 6000 persons (a number very difficult to believe), out of whom he says that Speusippus only obtained

200 votes. But if this trial ever took place at all, we cannot believe that it could have taken place until after the public mind was tranquillised by the disclosures of Andokidēs—especially as Leogoras was actually in prison along with Andokidēs immediately before those disclosures were given in.

⁴ See for evidence of these general positions respecting the circumstances of Andokidēs, the three Orations—Andokidēs de Mysteriis—Andokidēs de Reditu Suo—and Lysias contra Andokidem.

the various alleged profanations of the Eleusinian mysteries, which had not yet been investigated or brought to atonement; profanations the more sure to be pressed home, and worked with a factitious exaggeration of pious zeal, since the enemies of Alkibiadês were bent upon turning them to his ruin. Among all the ceremonies of Attic religion, there was none more profoundly or universally revered than the mysteries of Eleusis; originally enjoined by the goddess Dêmêtêr herself, in her visit to that place, to Eumolpus and the other Eleusinian patriarchs, and transmitted as a precious hereditary privilege in their families.¹ Celebrated annually in the month of September under the special care of the Basileus or second Archon, these mysteries were attended by vast crowds from Athens as well as from other parts of Greece, presenting to the eye a solemn and imposing spectacle, and striking the imagination still more powerfully by the special initiation which they conferred, under pledge of secrecy, upon pious and predisposed communicants. Even the divulgence in words to the uninitiated, of that which was exhibited to the eye and ear of the assembly in the interior of the Eleusinian temple, was accounted highly criminal: much more the actual mimicry of these ceremonies for the amusement of a convivial party. Moreover the individuals who held the great sacred offices at Eleusis (the Hierophant, the Daduch or Torch-bearer, and the Keryx or Herald)—which were transmitted by inheritance in the Eumolpidæ and other great families of antiquity and importance, were personally insulted by such proceedings, and vindicated their own dignity at the same time that they invoked punishment on the offenders in the name of Dêmêtêr and Persephonê. The most appalling legends were current among the Athenian public, and repeated on proper occasions even by the Hierophant himself, respecting the divine judgements which always overtook such impious men.²

Anxiety and alarm revived, respecting the persons concerned in the profanation of the Eleusinian mysteries.

¹ Homer, Hymn. Cerer. 475. Compare the Epigram cited in Lobeck, Eleusinia, p. 47.

² Lysias cont. Andokid. init. et fin.; Andokid. de Myst. scet. 29. Compare the fragment of a lost Oration by Lysias against Kinêsias (Fragm. xxxi. p. 490, Bekker;

Athenaus, xii. p. 551)—where Kinêsias and his friends are accused of numerous impieties, one of which consisted in celebrating festivals on unlucky and forbidden days, "in derision of our gods and our laws"—ὡς κατὰ γέλωτος τῶν θεῶν καὶ τῶν νόμων τῶν ἡμετέρων.

When we recollect how highly the Eleusinian mysteries were venerated by Greeks not born in Athens, and even by foreigners, we shall not wonder at the violent indignation excited in the Athenian mind by persons who profaned or divulged them; especially at a moment when their religious sensibilities had been so keenly wounded, and so tardily and recently healed, in reference to the Hermæ.¹ It was about this same time² that a prosecution was instituted against the Melian philosopher Diagoras for irreligious doctrines. Having left Athens before trial, he was found guilty in his absence, and a reward was offered for his life

Probably the privileged sacred families, connected with the mysteries, were foremost in calling for expiation from the state to the majesty of the Two offended goddesses, and for punishment on the delinquents.³ And the enemies of Alkibiadês, personal as well as political, found the opportunity favourable for reviving that charge against him which they had artfully suffered to drop before his departure to Sicily. The matter of fact alleged against him—the mock-celebra-

Revival of
the accusa-
tion against
Alkibiadês.

The lamentable consequences which the displeasure of the gods had brought upon them are then set forth: the companions of Kinêsias had all miserably perished, while Kinêsias himself was living in wretched health and in a condition worse than death—τὸ δ' οὕτως ἔχοντα τοσούτον χρόνον διατελεῖν, καὶ καθ' ἐλάχιστην ἡμέραν ἀποθνήσκοντα μὴ δύνασθαι τελευτῆσαι τὸν βίον, τοῦτοις μόνοις προσήκει τοῖς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄπερ οὕτως ἐξημαρτηχόσι.

The comic poets Strattis and Plato also marked out Kinêsias among their favourite subjects of derision and libel, and seem particularly to have represented his lean person and constant ill-health as a punishment of the gods for his impiety. See Mcineke, *Fragm. Comic. Græc.* (Strattis), vol. ii. p. 768 (Plato), p. 679.

¹ Lysias cont. Andokid. sect. 50, 51; Cornel. Nepos, Alcib. c. 4. The expressions of Pindar (*Fragm.* 93)

and of Sophoklês (*Fragm.* 58, Brunck.—*Edip. Kolon.* 1058) respecting the value of the Eleusinian mysteries are very striking: also Cicero, *Legg.* ii. 14.

Horace will not allow himself to be under the same roof, or in the same boat, with any one who has been guilty of divulging these mysteries (*Od.* iii. 2, 26), much more than of deriding them.

The reader will find the fullest information about these ceremonies in the *Eleusinia*, forming the first treatise in the work of Lobeck called *Aglaophamus*; and in the Dissertation called *Eleusinia*, in K. O. Müller's *Kleine Schriften*, vol. ii. p. 242 *seqq.*

² Diodor. xiii. 6.

³ We shall find these sacred families hereafter to be the most obstinate in opposing the return of Alkibiadês from banishment (*Thucyd.* viii. 53).

tion of these holy ceremonies—was not only in itself probable, but proved by reasonably good testimony against him and some of his intimate companions. Moreover, the overbearing insolence of demeanour habitual with Alkibiadês, so glaringly at variance with the equal restraints of democracy, enabled his enemies to impute to him not only irreligious acts, but anti-constitutional purposes; an association of ideas which was at this moment the more easily accredited, since his divulcation and parody of the mysteries did not stand alone, but was interpreted in conjunction with the recent mutilation of the Hermæ—as a manifestation of the same anti-patriotic and irreligious feeling, if not part and parcel of the same treasonable scheme. And the alarm on this subject was now renewed by the appearance of a Lacedæmonian army at the isthmus, professing to contemplate some enterprise in conjunction with the Bœotians—a purpose not easy to understand, and presenting every appearance of being a cloak for hostile designs against Athens. So fully was this believed among the Athenians, that they took arms, and remained under arms one whole night in the sacred precinct of the Theseium. No enemy indeed appeared, either without or within: but the conspiracy had only been prevented from breaking out (so they imagined) by the recent inquiries and detection. Moreover the party in Argos connected with Alkibiadês were just at this time suspected of a plot for the subversion of their own democracy; which still farther aggravated the presumptions against him, while it induced the Athenians to give up to the Argeian democratical government the oligarchical hostages taken from that town a few months before,¹ in order that it might put those hostages to death, whenever it thought fit.

Such incidents materially aided the enemies of Alkibiadês in their unremitting efforts to procure his recall and condemnation. Among them were men very different in station and temper: Thessalus son of Kimon, a man of the highest lineage and of hereditary oligarchical politics—as well as Androklês, a leading demagogue or popular orator. It was the former who preferred against him in the senate the memorable impeachment which, fortunately for our information, is recorded verbatim.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 53—61.

Indictment presented by Thessalus, son of Kimon, against Alkibiadês. "Thessalus son of Kimon, of the Deme Lakiadæ, hath impeached Alkibiadês son of Kleinias, of the Deme Skambônidæ, as guilty of crime in regard to the Two Goddesses Dêmêtêr and Persephonê—in mimicking the mysteries and exhibiting them to his companions in his own house—wearing the costume of the Hierophant—applying to himself the name of Hierophant; to Polytion that of Daduch; to Theodôrus, that of Herald—and addressing his remaining companions as Mysts and Epopts; all contrary to the sacred customs and canons, of old established by the Eumolpidæ, the Kerykes, and the Eleusinian priests."¹

Resolution to send for Alkibiadês home from Sicily to be tried. Similar impeachments being at the same time presented against other citizens now serving in Sicily along with Alkibiadês, the accusers moved that he and the rest might be sent for to come home and take their trial. We may observe that the indictment against him is quite distinct and special, making no allusion to any supposed treasonable or anti-constitutional projects. Probably however these suspicions were pressed by his enemies in their preliminary speeches, for the purpose of inducing the Athenians to remove him from the command of the army forthwith, and send for him home. For such a step it was indispensable that a strong case should be made out: but the public was at length thoroughly brought round, and the Salaminian trireme was despatched to Sicily to fetch him. Great care however was taken, in sending this summons, to avoid all appearance of prejudgement, or harshness, or menace. The trierarch was forbidden to seize his person, and had instructions to invite him simply to accompany the Salaminian home in his own trireme; so as to avoid the hazard of offending the Argeian and Mantineian allies serving in Sicily, or the army itself.²

¹ Plutarch, Alkib. c. 22. Θέσσαλος Κίμωνος Λακιάδης, Ἀλκιβιάδην Κλεινίου Σκαμβωνίδην εἰσέγγειλεν ἄδικεῖν περὶ τῷ θεῷ, τὴν Δήμητρα καὶ τὴν Κόρη, ἀπομιμούμενον τὰ μυστήρια, καὶ δεικνύοντα τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἑταίροις ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τῇ αὐτοῦ, ἔχοντα στολὴν, οὐκ ὡς ἱεροφάντης ἔχων δεικνύει τὰ ἱερά, καὶ ὀνομάζοντα αὐτὸ μὲν ἱερο-

φάντην, Πολυτίωνα δὲ δαδούχον, Θεόδωρον δὲ θεοδώρον Φηγεῖαν τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ἑταίρους, μύστις προσαγορεύοντα καὶ ἐπόπτας, παρὰ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ τὰ καθεστότατα ὑπὸ τ' Εὐμολπιδῶν καὶ κηρύκων καὶ τῶν ἱερέων τῶν ἐξ Ἐλευσίνος.

² Thucyd. vi. 61.

It was on the return of the Athenian army—from their unsuccessful attempt at Kamarina, to their previous quarters at Katana—that they found the Salaminian trireme newly arrived from Athens with this grave requisition against the general. We may be sure that Alkibiadês received private intimation from his friends at Athens, by the same trireme, communicating to him the temper of the people; so that his resolution was speedily taken. Professing to obey, he departed in his own trireme on the voyage homeward, along with the other persons accused; the Salaminian trireme being in company. But as soon as they arrived at Thurii in coasting along Italy, he and his companions quitted the vessel and disappeared. After a fruitless search on the part of the Salaminian trierarch, the two triremes were obliged to return to Athens without him. Both Alkibiadês and the rest of the accused (one of whom¹ was his own cousin and namesake) were tried, condemned to death on nonappearance, and their property confiscated; while the Eumolpidæ and the other Eleusinian sacred families pronounced him to be accursed by the gods, for his desecration of the mysteries²—and recorded the condemnation on a plate of lead.

Probably his disappearance and exile were acceptable to his enemies at Athens: at any rate, they thus made sure of getting rid of him; while had he come back, his condemnation to death, though probable, could not be regarded as certain. In considering the conduct of the Athenians towards Alkibiadês, we have to remark, that the people were guilty of no act of injustice. He had committed—at least there was fair reason for believing that he had committed—an act criminal in the estimation of every Greek;—the divulgation and profanation of the mysteries. This act—alleged against him in the indictment very distinctly, divested of all supposed ulterior purpose, treasonable or

Alkibiadês
quits the
army as if
to come
home:
makes his
escape at
Thurii, and
retires to
Peloponne-
sus.

¹ Xenophon. Hellen. i. 2, 13.

² Thucyd. vi. 61; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 22—33; Lysias, Orat. vi. cont. Andokid. sect. 42.

Plutarch says that it would have been easy for Alkibiadês to raise a mutiny in the army at Katana, had he chosen to resist the order

for coming home. But this is highly improbable. Considering what his conduct became immediately afterwards, we shall see good reason to believe that he *would* have taken this step, had it been practicable.

otherwise—was legally punishable at Athens, and* was universally accounted guilty in public estimation; as an offence at once against the religious sentiment of the people and against the public safety, by offending the Two goddesses (Démêtér and Persephonê), and driving them to withdraw their favour and protection. The same demand for legal punishment would have been supposed to exist in a Christian Catholic country, down to a very recent period of history—if instead of the Eleusinian mysteries we suppose the Sacrifice of the Mass to have been the ceremony ridiculed; though such a proceeding would involve no breach of obligation to secrecy. Nor ought we to judge what would have been the measure of penalty formerly awarded to a person convicted of such an offence, by consulting the tendency of penal legislation during the last sixty years. Even down to the last century it would have been visited with something sharper than the draught of hemlock, which is the worst that could possibly have befallen Alkibiadês at Athens—as we may see by the condemnation and execution of the Chevalier de la Barre at Abbeville in 1766. The uniform tendency of Christian legislation,¹ down to a recent period, leaves no room for

¹ To appreciate fairly the violent emotion raised at Athens by the mutilation of the Hermæ and by the profanation of the Mysteries, it is necessary to consider the way in which analogous acts of sacrilege have been viewed in Christian and Catholic penal legislation, even down to the time of the first French Revolution.

I transcribe the following extract from a work of authority on French criminal jurisprudence—*Jousse, Traité de la Justice Criminelle*, Paris 1771, part iv. tit. 27. vol. iii. p. 672:—

“Du Crime de Lèse-Majesté Divine.—Les Crimes de Lèse-Majesté Divine, sont ceux qui attaquent Dieu immédiatement, et qu'on doit regarder par cette raison comme les plus atroces et les plus exécrationnels.—La Majesté de Dieu peut être offensée de plusieurs manières.—1.

En niant l'existence de Dieu. 2. Par le crime de ceux qui attentent directement contre la Divinité: comme quand on profane ou qu'on foule aux pieds les saintes Hosties; ou qu'on frappe les Images de Dieu dans le dessein de l'insulter. C'est ce qu'on appelle *Crime de Lèse-Majesté Divine au premier Chef*.”

Again in the same work, part iv. tit. 46, n. 5, 8, 10, 11. vol. iv. p. 97-99:—

“La profanation des Sacrements et des Mystères de la Religion est un sacrilège des plus exécrationnels. Tel est le crime de ceux qui emploient les choses sacrées à des usages communs et mauvais, en dérision des Mystères; ceux qui profanent la sainte Eucharistie, ou qui en abusent en quelque manière que ce soit; ceux qui, en mépris de la Religion, profanent les Fouts-

reproaching the Athenians with excessive cruelty in their penal visitation of offences against the religious sentiment. On the contrary, the Athenians are distinguished for comparative mildness and tolerance, as we shall find various opportunities for remarking.

Now in reviewing the conduct of the Athenians towards Alkibiadês, we must consider, that this violation of the mysteries, of which he was indicted in good legal form, was an action for which he really deserved punishment—if any one deserved it. Even his enemies did not fabricate this charge, or impute it to him falsely; though they were guilty of insidious and unprincipled manœuvres to exasperate the public mind against him. Their machinations begin with the mutilation of the Hermæ: an act of new and unparalleled wickedness, to which historians of Greece seldom do justice. It was not, like the violations of the mysteries, a piece of indecent pastime committed within four walls, and never intended to become known. It was an outrage essentially public, planned and executed by conspirators for the deliberate

Conduct of the Athenian public in reference to Alkibiadês—how far blameable. Conduct of his enemies.

Baptismaux; qui jettent par terre les saintes Hosties, ou qui les emploient à des usages vils et profanes; ceux qui, en dérision de nos sacrés Mystères, les contrefont dans leurs débauches; ceux qui frappent, mutilent, abattent, les Images consacrées à Dieu, ou à la Sainte Vierge, ou aux Saints, en mépris de la Religion; et enfin, tous ceux qui commettent de semblables impiétés. Tous ces crimes sont des crimes de Lèse-Majesté divine au premier chef, parce qu'ils s'attaquent immédiatement à Dieu, et ne se font à aucun dessein que de l'offenser."

"... La peine du Sacrilège, par l'Ancien Testament, étoit celle du feu, et d'être lapidé.—Par les Loix Romaines, les coupables étoient condamnés au fer, au feu, et aux bêtes farouches, suivant les circonstances.—En France, la peine du sacrilège est arbitraire, et dé-

pend de la qualité et des circonstances du crime, du lieu, du temps, et de la qualité de l'accusé.—Dans le sacrilège au premier chef, qui attaque la Divinité, la Sainte Vierge, et les Saints, v. g. à l'égard de ceux qui foulent aux pieds les saintes Hosties, ou qui les jettent à terre, ou en abusent, et qui les emploient à des usages vils et profanes, la peine est le feu, l'amende honorable, et le poing coupé. Il en est de même de ceux qui profanent les Fonts-Baptismaux: ceux qui, en dérision de nos Mystères, s'en moquent et les contrefont dans leurs débauches: ils doivent être punis de peine capitale, parce que ces crimes attaquent immédiatement la Divinité."

M. Jousse proceeds to cite several examples of persons condemned to death for acts of sacrilege, of the nature above described.

purpose of lacerating the religious mind of Athens, and turning the prevalent terror and distraction to political profit. Thus much is certain; though we cannot be sure who the conspirators were, nor what was their exact or special purpose. That the destruction of Alkibiadês was one of the direct purposes of the conspirators, is highly probable. But his enemies, even if they were not among the original authors, at least took upon themselves half the guilt of the proceeding, by making it the basis of treacherous machinations against his person. How their scheme, which was originally contrived to destroy him before the expedition departed, at first failed, was then artfully dropped, and at length effectually revived, after a long train of calumny against the absent general—has been already recounted. It is among the darkest chapters of Athenian political history, indicating, on the part of the people, strong religious excitability, without any injustice towards Alkibiadês: but indicating, on the part of his enemies, as well as of the Hermokopids generally, a depth of wicked contrivance rarely paralleled in political warfare. It is to these men, not to the people, that Alkibiadês owes his expulsion, aided indeed by the effect of his own previous character. In regard to the Hermæ, the Athenians condemned to death—after and by consequence of the deposition of Andokidês—a small number of men who may perhaps have been innocent victims, but whom they sincerely believed to be guilty; and whose death not only tranquillised comparatively the public mind, but served as the only means of rescue to a far larger number of prisoners confined on suspicion. In regard to Alkibiadês, they came to no collective resolution, except that of recalling him to take his trial: a resolution implying no wrong in those who voted for it, whatever may be the guilt of those who proposed and prepared it by perfidious means.¹

¹ The proceedings in England in 1678 and 1679, in consequence of the pretended Popish Plot, have been alluded to by various authors and recently by Dr. Thirlwall, as affording an analogy to that which occurred at Athens after the mutilation of the Hermæ. But there are many material differences, and

all, so far as I can perceive, to the advantage of Athens.

The "hellish and damnable plot of the Popish Recusants" (to adopt the words of the Houses of Lords and Commons—see Dr. Lingard's *History of England*, vol. xiii. ch. v. p. 88—words, the like of which were doubtless employed at Athens

In order to appreciate the desperate hatred with which the exile Alkibiadês afterwards revenged himself on his

in reference to the Hermokopids) was baseless, mendacious, and incredible, from the beginning. It started from no real fact: the whole of it was a tissue of falsehoods and fabrications proceeding from Oates, Bedloe, and a few other informers of the worst character.

At Athens, there was unquestionably a plot: the Hermokopids were real conspirators, not few in number. No one could doubt that they conspired for other objects besides the mutilation of the Hermæ. At the same time, no one knew what these objects were, nor who the conspirators themselves were.

If before the mutilation of the Hermæ, a man like Oates had pretended to reveal to the Athenian people a fabricated plot implicating Alkibiadês and others, he would have found no credence. It was not until after, and by reason of that terror-striking incident, that the Athenians began to give credence to informers. And we are to recollect that they did not put any one to death on the evidence of these informers. They contented themselves with imprisoning on suspicion, until they got the confession and deposition of Andokidês. Those implicated in *that* deposition were condemned to death. Now Andokidês, as a witness, deserves but very qualified confidence: yet it is impossible to degrade him to the same level even as Teukrus or Diokleidês—much less to that of Oates and Bedloe. We cannot wonder that the people trusted him—and under the peculiar circumstances of the case, it was the least evil that they should trust him. The

witnesses upon whose testimony the prisoners under the Popish Plot were condemned, were even inferior to Teukrus and Diokleidês in presumptive credibility.

The Athenian people have been censured for their folly in believing the democratical constitution in danger, because the Hermæ had been mutilated. I have endeavoured to show, that looking to their religious ideas, the thread of connexion between these two ideas is perfectly explicable. And why are we to quarrel with the Athenians because they took arms, and put themselves on their guard, when a Lacedæmonian or a Bœotian armed force was actually on their frontier?

As for the condemnation of Alkibiadês and others for profaning and divulging the Eleusinian mysteries, these are not for a moment to be put upon a level with the condemnations in the Popish Plot. These were true charges: at least there is strong presumptive reason for believing that they were true. Persons were convicted and punished for having done acts which they really had done, and which they knew to be legal crimes. Whether it be right to constitute such acts legal crimes, or not—is another question. The enormity of the Popish Plot consisted in punishing persons for acts which they had not done, and upon depositions of the most lying and worthless witnesses.

The state of mind into which the Athenians were driven after the cutting of the Hermæ, was indeed very analogous to that of the English people during the circulation of the Popish Plot. The suffering, terror, and dis-

countrymen, it has been necessary to explain to what extent he had just ground of complaint against them. On being informed that they had condemned him to death in his absence, he is said to have exclaimed—"I shall show them that I am alive." He fully redeemed his word.¹

Mischief to Athens from the banishment of Alkibiadês. Languid operations of the Sicilian armament under Nikias.

The recall and consequent banishment of Alkibiadês was mischievous to Athens in several ways. It transferred to the enemy's camp

traction, I apprehend to have been even greater at Athens: but while the cause of it was graver and more real, nevertheless the active injustice which it produced was far less, than in England.

Mr. Fox observes, in reference to the Popish Plot—History of James II., ch. i. p. 33,—

"Although, upon a review of this truly shocking transaction, we may be fairly justified in adopting the milder alternative, and in imputing to the greater part of those concerned in it, rather an extraordinary degree of blind credulity, than the deliberate wickedness of planning and assisting in the perpetration of legal murder; yet the proceedings on the Popish Plot must always be considered as an indelible disgrace upon the English nation, in which king, parliament, judges, juries, witnesses, prosecutors, have all their respective, though certainly not equal, shares. Witnesses—of such a character as not to deserve credit in the most trifling cause, upon the most immaterial facts,—gave evidence so incredible, or, to speak more properly, so impossible to be true, that it ought not to have been believed even if it had come from the mouth of Cato: and upon such evidence, from such witnesses, were innocent men condemned to death and executed. Prosecutors, whether attorneys and solicitors-general, or managers of impeachment, acted with the fury which

in such circumstances might be expected: juries partook naturally enough of the national ferment: and judges, whose duty it was to guard them against such impressions, were scandalously active in confirming them in their prejudices and inflaming their passions."

I have substituted the preceding quotation from Mr. Fox, in place of that from Dr. Lingard, which stood in my first edition. On such a point, it has been remarked that the latter might seem a partial witness, though in reality his judgement is noway more severe than that of Hume, or Mr. Fox, or Lord Macaulay.

It is to be noted that the House of Lords, both acting as a legislative body, and in their judicial character when the Catholic Lord Stafford was tried before them (Lingard, Hist. Engl. ch. vi. p. 231-241), displayed a degree of prejudice and injustice quite equal to that of the judges and juries in the law-courts.

Both the English judicature on this occasion—and the Milanese judicature on the occasion adverted to in a previous note—were more corrupted and driven to greater injustice by the reigning prejudice, than the purely popular Dikastery of Athens in the affair of the Hermæ, and of the other profanations.

¹ Plutarch. Alkib. c. 22.

an angry exile, to make known her weak points, and to rouse the sluggishness of Sparta. It offended a portion of the Sicilian armament—most of all probably the Argeians and Mantineians—and slackened their zeal in the cause.¹ And what was worst of all, it left the armament altogether under the paralysing command of Nikias. For Lamachus, though still equal in nominal authority, and now invested with the command of one-half instead of one-third of the army, appears to have had no real influence except in the field, or in the actual execution of that which his colleague had already resolved.

The armament now proceeded—as Nikias had first suggested—to sail round from Katana to Selinus and Egesta. It was his purpose to investigate the quarrel between the two as well as the financial means of the latter. Passing through the strait and along the north coast of the island, he first touched at Himera, where admittance was refused to him; he next captured a Sikanian maritime town named Hykkara, together with many prisoners; among them the celebrated courtesan Laïs, then a very young girl.² Having handed over this place to the Egestæans, Nikias went in person to inspect their city and condition; but could obtain no more money than the thirty talents which had been before announced on the second visit of the commissioners. He then restored the prisoners from Hykkara to their Sikanian countrymen, receiving a ransom of 120 talents,³ and conducted the Athenian land-force across the centre of the island, through the territory of the friendly Sikels to Katana; making an attack in his way upon the hostile Sikel town of Hybla, in which he was repulsed. At Katana he was rejoined by his naval force.

¹ Thueyd. ii. 65. τὰ τε ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἀμβλύτερον ἐποίησαν, &c.

² The statements respecting the age and life of Laïs appear involved in inextricable confusion. See the note of Göller ad Philisti Fragment. V.

³ Diodor. xiii. 6; Thueyd. vi. 62. Καὶ τὰνδρά-σθα ἀπέδωσαν, καὶ ἐγένετο ἐξ αὐτῶν εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν τάλαντα. The word ἀπέδωσαν seems to mean that the prisoners were

handed over to their fellow-countrymen, the natural persons to negotiate for their release, upon private contract of a definite sum. Had Thueydidēs said ἀπένετο, it would have meant that they were put up to auction for what they would fetch. This distinction is at least possible—and (in my judgement) more admissible than that proposed in the note of Dr. Arnold.

It was now seemingly about the middle of October, and three months had elapsed since the arrival of the Athenian armament at Rhegium; during which period they had achieved nothing beyond the acquisition of Naxos and Katana as allies, except the insignificant capture of Hykkara. But Naxos and Katana, as Chalkidic cities, had been counted upon beforehand even by Nikias; together with Rhegium, which had been found reluctant, to his great disappointment. What is still worse in reference to the character of the general, not only nothing serious had been achieved, but nothing serious had been attempted. The precious moment pointed out by Lamachus for action, when the terrific menace of the untried armament was at its maximum, and preparation as well as confidence was wanting at Syracuse, had been irreparably wasted. Every day the preparations of the Syracusans improved and their fears diminished. The invader, whom they had looked upon as so formidable, turned out both hesitating and timorous,¹ and when he disappeared out of their sight to Hykkara and Eggesta—still more when he assailed in vain the insignificant Sikel post of Hybla—their minds underwent a reaction from dismay to extreme confidence. The mass of Syracusan citizens, now reinforced by allies from Selinus and other cities, called upon their generals to lead them to the attack of the Athenian position at Katana, since the Athenians did not dare to approach Syracuse; while Syracusan horsemen even went so far as to insult the Athenians in their camp, riding up to ask if they were come to settle as peaceable citizens in the island, instead of restoring the Leontines. Such unexpected humiliation, acting probably on the feelings of the soldiers, at length shamed Nikias out of his inaction, and compelled him to strike a blow for the maintenance of his own reputation. He devised a stratagem for approaching Syracuse in such a manner as to elude the opposition of the Syracusan cavalry—informing himself as to the ground near the city through some exiles serving along with him.²

He despatched to Syracuse a Katanæan citizen in his heart attached to Athens, yet apparently neutral and on good terms with the other side, as bearer of a pretended message and proposition from the friends of Syracuse at

¹ Thucyd. vi. 63; vii. 42.

² Thucyd. vi. 63; Diodor. xiii. 6.

Katana. Many of the Athenian soldiers (so the messenger ran) were in the habit of passing the night within the walls apart from their camp and arms. It would be easy for the Syracusans by a vigorous attack at daybreak, to surprise them thus unprepared and dispersed; while the philo-Syracusan party at Katana promised to aid, by closing the gates, assailing the Athenians within and setting fire to the ships. A numerous body of Katænæans (they added) were eager to cooperate in the plan now proposed.

Manœuvre
of Nikias
from Ka-
tana—he
lands his
forces in
the Great
Harbour of
Syracuse.

This communication, reaching the Syracusan generals at a moment when they were themselves elate and disposed to an aggressive movement, found such incautious credence, that they sent back the messenger to Katana with cordial assent and agreement for a precise day. Accordingly, a day or two before, the entire Syracusan force was marched out towards Katana, and encamped for the night on the river Symæthus, in the Leontine territory, within about eight miles of Katana. But Nikias, with whom the whole proceeding originated, choosing this same day to put on shipboard his army, together with his Sikel allies present, sailed by night southward along the coast, rounding the island of Ortygia, into the Great Harbour of Syracuse. Arrived thither by break of day, he disembarked his troops unopposed south of the mouth of the Anâpus, in the interior of the Great Harbour, near the hamlet which stretched towards the temple of Zeus Olympius. Having broken down the neighbouring bridge, where the Helôrine road crossed the Anâpus, he took up a position protected by various embarrassing obstacles—houses, walls, trees, and standing water—besides the steep ground of the Olympieion itself on his left wing: so that he could choose his own time for fighting, and was out of the attack of the Syracusan horse. For the protection of his ships on the shore, he provided a palisade work by cutting down the neighbouring trees; and even took precautions for his rear by throwing up a hasty fence of wood and stones touching the shore at the inner bay called Daskon. He had full leisure for such defensive works, since the enemy within the walls made no attempt to disturb him, while the Syracusan horse only discovered his manœuvre on arriving before the lines at Katana; and though they lost no time in returning, the

march back was a long one.¹ Such was the confidence of the Syracusans, however, that even after so long a march, they offered battle forthwith: but as Nikias did not quit his position, they retreated to take up their night-station on the other side of the Helôrine road—probably a road bordered on each side by walls.

On the next morning, Nikias marched out of his position and formed his troops in order of battle, in two divisions, each eight deep. His front division was intended to attack; his rear division (in hollow square with the baggage in the middle) was held in reserve near the camp to lend aid where aid might be wanted: cavalry there was none. The Syracusan hoplites, seemingly far more numerous than his, presented the levy in mass of the city, without any selection; they were ranged in the deeper order of sixteen, alongside of their Selinuntine allies. On the right wing were posted their horsemen, the best part of their force, not less than 1200 in number; together with 200 horsemen from Gela, 20 from Kamarina, about 50 bowmen, and a company of darters. The hoplites, though full of courage, had little training; and their array, never precisely kept, was on this occasion farther disturbed by the immediate vicinity of the city. Some had gone in to see their families—others, hurrying out to join, found the battle already begun, and took rank wherever they could.²

Thucydîdês, in describing this battle, gives us, according to his practice, a statement of the motives and feelings which animated the combatants on both sides, and which furnished a theme for the brief harangue of Nikias. This appears surprising to one accustomed to modern warfare, where the soldier is under the influence simply of professional honour and disgrace, without any thought of the cause for which he is fighting. In ancient times, such a motive was only one among many others, which, according to the circumstances of the case, contributed to elevate or depress the

Return of
the Syra-
cusan army
from
Katana to
the Great
Harbour—
prepara-
tions for
fighting
Nikias.

Feelings of
the ancient
soldier.—
Harangue
of Nikias.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 65, 66; Diodor. xiii. 6; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 13.

To understand the position of Nikias, as well as it can be made out from the description of Thu-

cydîdês, the reader will consult the plan of Syracuse and its neighbourhood annexed to the present volume.

² Thucyd. vi. 67-69.

soldier's mind at the eve of action. Nikias adverted to the recognised military pre-eminence of chosen Argeians, Mantineians, and Athenians—as compared to the Syracusan levy in mass, who were full of belief in their own superiority, (this is a striking confession of the deplorable change which had been wrought by his own delay,) but who would come short in actual conflict, from want of discipline.¹ Moreover, he reminded them that they were far away from home—and that defeat would render them victims, one and all, of the Syracusan cavalry. He little thought, nor did his prophets forewarn him, that such a calamity, serious as it would have been, was even desirable for Athens—since it would have saved her from the far more overwhelming disasters which will be found to sadden the coming chapters of this history.

While the customary sacrifices were being performed, the slingers and bowmen on both sides became engaged in skirmishing. But presently the trumpets sounded, and Nikias ordered his first division of hoplites to charge at once rapidly, before the Syracusans expected it. Judging from his previous backwardness, they never imagined that he would be the first to give orders for charging; nor was it until they saw the Athenian line actually advancing towards them that they lifted their own arms from the ground and came forward to give the meeting. The shock was bravely encountered on both sides, and for some time the battle continued hand to hand with undecided result. There happened to supervene a violent storm of rain with thunder and lightning, which alarmed the Syracusans, who construed it as an unfavourable augury—while to the more practised Athenian hoplites, it seemed a mere phænomenon of the season,² so that they still farther astonished the Syracusans

Battle near
the Olym-
pieion—vic-
tory of the
Athenians.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 68, 69. ἄλλως δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄνδρας πανδημί τε ἀμυνομένους, καὶ οὐκ ἀπολέκτους ὥσπερ ἡμᾶς καὶ προσέτι Σικελιωτας, οἱ ὑπερβροῦσι μὲν ἡμᾶς, ὑπομέλουσι δὲ οὐ διὰ τὸ τὴν ἐπιστήμην τῆς τόλμης ἥσσω εἶχεν.

This passage illustrates very clearly the meaning of the adverb πανδημί. Compare πανθαμί, πανομίαι, Æschylus, Sept. Theb. 275.

² Thucyd. vi. 70. Τοῖς δ' ἐμπειροτέροις, τὰ μὲν γινόμενα, καὶ ὥρα ἔτους περαιοῖσθαι δοκεῖν, τοῖς δὲ ἀνθεστώτας, πολλὸ μείζω ἐκπλήξιν μὴ νικωμένους παρέχεν.

The Athenians, unfortunately for themselves, were not equally unmoved by eclipses of the moon. The force of this remark will be seen in the next chapter but one. At this moment, too, they were in

by the unabated confidence with which they continued the fight. At length the Syracusan army was broken, dispersed, and fled; first, before the Argeians on the right, next, before the Athenians in the centre. The victors pursued as far as was safe and practicable, without disordering their ranks: for the Syracusan cavalry, which had not yet been engaged, checked all who pressed forward, and enabled their own infantry to retire in safety behind the Helôrine road.¹

So little were the Syracusans dispirited with this defeat, that they did not retire within their city until they had sent an adequate detachment to guard the neighbouring temple and sacred precinct of the Olympian Zeus; wherein there was much deposited wealth which they feared that the Athenians might seize. Nikias, however, without approaching the sacred ground, contented himself with occupying the field of battle, burnt his own dead, and stripped the arms from the dead of the enemy. The Syracusans and their allies lost 250 men, the Athenians 50.²

On the morrow, having granted to the Syracusans their dead bodies for burial and collected the ashes of his own dead, Nikias re-embarked his troops, put to sea, and sailed back to his former station at Katana. He conceived it impossible, without cavalry and a farther stock of money, to maintain his position near Syracuse or to prosecute immediate operations of siege or blockade. And as the winter was now approaching, he determined to take up winter quarters at Katana—though considering the mild

high spirits and confidence; which greatly affected their interpretation of such sudden weather-phenomena: as will be seen also illustrated by melancholy contrast, in that same chapter.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 70.

² Thucyd. vi. 71. Plutarch (Nikias, c. 16) states that Nikias refused from religious scruples to invade the sacred precinct, though his soldiers were eager to seize its contents.

Diodorus (xiii. 6) affirms erro-

neously that the Athenians became masters of the Olympieion. Pausanias too says the same thing (x. 28. 3), adding that Nikias abstained from disturbing either the treasures or the offerings, and left them still under the care of the Syracusan priests.

Plutarch farther states that Nikias stayed some days in his position before he returned to Katana. But the language of Thucydides indicates that the Athenians returned on the day after the battle.

winter at Syracuse, and the danger of marsh fever near the Great Harbour in summer, the change of season might well be regarded as a questionable gain. But he proposed to employ the interval in sending to Athens for cavalry and money, as well as in procuring the like reinforcements from his Sicilian allies, whose numbers he calculated now on increasing by the accession of new cities after his recent victory—and to get together magazines of every kind for beginning the siege of Syracuse in the spring. Despatching a trireme to Athens with these requisitions, he sailed with his forces to Messênê, within which there was a favourable party who gave hopes of opening the gates to him. Such a correspondence had already been commenced before the departure of Alkibiadês: but it was the first act of revenge which the departing general took on his country, to betray the proceedings to the philo-Syracusan party in Messênê. Accordingly these latter, watching their opportunity, rose in arms before the arrival of Nikias, put to death their chief antagonists, and held the town by force against the Athenians; who after a fruitless delay of thirteen days, with scanty supplies and under stormy weather, were forced to return to Naxos, where they established a palisaded camp and station, and went into winter quarters.¹

He determines to take up his winter quarters at Katana, and sends to Athens for reinforcements of horse.

His failure at Messênê through the betrayal by Alkibiadês.

The recent stratagem of Nikias, followed by the movement into the harbour of Syracuse and the battle, had been ably planned and executed. It served to show the courage and discipline of the army, as well as to keep up the spirits of the soldiers themselves and to obviate those feelings of disappointment which the previous inefficiency of the armament tended to arouse. But as to other results, the victory was barren; we may even say, positively mischievous—since it imparted a momentary stimulus which served as an excuse to Nikias for the three months of total inaction which followed—and since it neither weakened nor humiliated the Syracusans, but gave them a salutary lesson which they turned to account while Nikias was in his winter quarters. His apathy during these first eight months after the arrival

Salutary lesson to the Syracusans, arising out of the recent defeat—mischiefs to the Athenians from the delay of Nikias.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 71-74.

of the expedition at Rhegium (from July 415 B.C. to March 414 B.C.), was the cause of very deplorable calamities to his army, his country, and himself. Abundant proofs of this will be seen in the coming events: at present we have only to turn back to his own predictions and recommendations. All the difficulties and dangers to be surmounted in Sicily had been foreseen by himself and impressed upon the Athenians: in the first instance, as grounds against undertaking the expedition—but the Athenians, though unfortunately not allowing them to avail in that capacity, fully admitted their reality, and authorised him to demand whatever force was necessary to overcome them.¹ He had thus been allowed to bring with him a force calculated upon his own ideas, together with supplies and implements for besieging; yet when arrived, he seems only anxious to avoid exposing that force in any serious enterprise, and to find an excuse for conducting it back to Athens. That Syracuse was the grand enemy, and that the capital point of the enterprise was the siege of that city, was a truth familiar to himself as well as to every man at Athens:² upon the formidable cavalry of the Syracusans, Nicias had himself insisted, in the preliminary debates. Yet—after four months of mere trifling, and pretence of action so as to evade dealing with the real difficulty—the existence of this cavalry is made an excuse for a farther postponement of four months until reinforcements can be obtained from Athens. To all the intrinsic dangers of the case, predicted by Nicias himself with proper discernment, was thus superadded the aggravated danger of his own factitious delay; frittering away the first impression of his armament—giving the Syracusans leisure to enlarge their fortifications—and allowing the Peloponnesians time to interfere against Attica as well as to succour Sicily. It was the unhappy weakness of this commander to shrink from decisive resolutions of every kind, and at any rate to postpone them until the necessity became imminent: the consequence of which was (to use an expression of the Corinthian envoy, before the Peloponnesian war, in censuring the dilatory policy of Sparta), that never acting, yet always seeming about to act, he found his enemy in double force instead of single, at the moment of actual conflict.³

¹ Thucyd. vi. 21-26.

² Thucyd. vi. 20.

³ Thucyd. i. 69. ἡσυχάζετε γὰρ μόνοι Ἕλλησιν, ὧ Λακεδαιμονιοῖσι, οὐ

Great indeed must have been the disappointment of the Athenians, when, after having sent forth in the month of June an expedition of unparalleled efficiency, they receive in the month of November a despatch to acquaint them that the general has accomplished little except one indecisive victory; and that he has not even attempted any thing serious—nor can do so unless they send him farther cavalry and money. Yet the only answer which they made was, to grant and provide for this demand without any public expression of discontent or disappointment against him.¹ And this is

Confidence of the Athenians at home in Nikias—their good temper—they send to him the reinforcements demanded.

τῇ δυνάμει τινά ἀλλὰ τῇ μελλήσει ἀμυνόμενοι, καὶ μόνοι οὐκ ἀρχομένην τὴν αὐξήσιν τῶν ἐχθρῶν, ἀλλὰ διπλασιομένην καταλύοντες.

¹ Αἰσχρὸν δὲ βιασθέντας ἀπελθεῖν, ἢ ὕστερον ἐπιμεταπέμπεσθαι, τὸ πρῶτον ἀσκέπτως βουλευσάμενους—“It is disgraceful to be driven out of Sicily by superior force, or to send back here afterwards for fresh reinforcements, through our own fault in making bad calculations at first.” (Thucyd. vi. 21.)

This was a part of the last speech by Nikias himself at Athens, prior to the expedition. The Athenian people in reply had passed a vote that he and his colleagues should fix their own amount of force, and should have everything which they asked for. Moreover, such was the feeling in the city, that every one individually was anxious to put down his name to serve (vi. 26-31). Thucydides can hardly find words sufficient to depict the completeness, the grandeur, the wealth public and private, of the armament.

As this goes to establish what I have advanced in the text—that the actions of Nikias in Sicily stand most of all condemned by his own previous speeches at Athens—so it seems to have been forgotten by

Dr. Arnold when he wrote his note on the remarkable passage, ii. 65, of Thucydides—ἐξ ὧν ἅλλα τε πολλὰ, ὡς ἐν μεγάλῃ πόλει, καὶ ἀρχῇ, ἐχούσῃ, ἡμαρτήθη, καὶ ὁ ἐς Σικελίαν πλοῦς· ὃς οὐ τοσοῦτον γνῶμης ἀμάρτημα ἦν πρὸς οὓς ἐπῆσαν, ὅσον οἱ ἐκπέμφαντες, οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα τοῖς οἰχομένοις ἐπιγινώσκοντες, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας διαβολὰς περὶ τῆς τοῦ δήμου προστασίας, τὰ τε ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἀμβλύτερα ποιοῦν, καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆν πόλιν πρῶτον ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐταράχθησαν.—Upon which Dr. Arnold remarks:—

“Thucydides here expresses the same opinion, which he repeats in two other places (vi. 31; vii. 42), namely, that the Athenian power was fully adequate to the conquest of Syracuse, *had not the expedition been mismanaged by the general, and insufficiently supplied by the government at home.* The words οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα τοῖς οἰχομένοις ἐπιγινώσκοντες signify ‘not voting afterwards the needful supplies to their absent armament:’ for Nikias was prevented from improving his first victory over the Syracusans by the want of cavalry and money; and the whole winter was lost before he could get supplied from Athens. And subsequently the armament was allowed to be reduced to great distress and weak-

the more to be noted, since the removal of Alkibiadēs afforded an inviting and even valuable opportunity for

ness, before the second expedition was sent to reinforce it.”—Göller and Poppo concur in this explanation.

Let us in the first place discuss the explanation here given of the words τὰ πρόσφορα ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες. It appears to me that these words do not signify “*voting the needful supplies.*”

The word ἐπιγιγνώσκειν cannot be used in the same sense with ἐπιπέμπειν—παρασχεῖν (vii. 2-15)—ἐκπορίζειν. As it would not be admissible to say ἐπιγιγνώσκειν ὄπλα, νῆας, ἵππους, χρήματα, &c., so neither can it be right to say ἐπιγιγνώσκειν τὰ πρόσφορα, if this latter word were used only as a comprehensive word for these particulars, meaning “*supplies.*” The words really mean “*taking farther resolutions* (after the expedition was gone) *unsuitable or mischievous to the absent armament.*” Πρόσφορα is used here quite generally—agreeing with βουλευματα or some such word: indeed we find the phrase τὰ πρόσφορα used in the most general sense, for “*what is suitable*”—“*what is advantageous or convenient*”—γυμνάσω τὰ πρόσφορα—πράσσεται τὰ πρόσφορα—τὰ πρόσφορ’ ἡύξατ’—τὰ πρόσφορα δρωῖς ἄν—τὸ ταῖς πρόσφορον. Enripid. Hippol. 112; Alkestis, 148; Iphig. Aul. 160 B; Helen. 1299; Troades, 304.

Thucydides appears to have in view the violent party contests which broke out in reference to the Hermæ and the other irreligious acts at Athens, after the departure of the armament, especially to the mischief of recalling Alkibiadēs, which grew out of those contests. He does not allude to the withholding of the supplies from the armament; nor was it the purpose

of any of the parties at Athens to withhold them. The party-acrimony was directed against Alkibiadēs exclusively—not against the expedition.

Next, as to the main allegation in Dr. Arnold’s note—that *one of the causes* of the failure of the Athenian expedition in Sicily, was, that it was “*insufficiently supplied by Athens.*” Of the two passages to which he refers in Thucydides (vi. 31; vii. 42), the first distinctly contradicts this allegation, by setting forth the prodigious amount of force sent—the second says nothing about it, and indirectly discountenances it, by dwelling upon the glaring blunders of Nikias.

After the Athenians had allowed Nikias in the spring to name and collect the force which he thought requisite, how could they expect to receive a demand for farther reinforcements in the autumn—the army having really done nothing? Nevertheless the supplies *were sent*, as soon as they could be, and as soon as Nikias expected them. If the whole winter was lost, that was not the fault of the Athenians.

Still harder is it in Dr. Arnold, to say—“that the armament *was allowed* to be reduced to great distress and weakness before the second expedition was sent to reinforce it.” The second expedition was sent, the moment that Nikias made known his distress and asked for it; his intimation of distress coming quite suddenly, almost immediately after most successful appearances.

It appears to me that nothing can be more incorrect or inconsistent with the whole tenor of the

proposing to send out a fresh colleague in his room. If there were no complaints raised against Nikias at Athens, so neither are we informed of any such, even among his own soldiers in Sicily; though *their* disappointment must have been yet greater than that of their countrymen at home, considering the expectations with which they had come out. We may remember that the delay of a few days at Eion, under perfectly justifiable circumstances, and while awaiting the arrival of reinforcements actually sent for, raised the loudest murmurs against Kleon in his expedition against Amphipolis, from the hoplites in his own army.¹ The contrast is instructive, and will appear yet more instructive as we advance forward.

Meanwhile the Syracusans were profiting by the lesson of their recent defeat. At the next public assembly which ensued, Hermokratês addressed them in a mingled tone of encouragement and admonition. While praising their bravery, he deprecated their want of tactics and discipline. Considering the great superiority of the enemy in this last respect, he regarded the recent battle as giving good promise for the future; and he appealed with satisfaction to the precautions taken by Nikias in fortifying his camp, as well as to his speedy retreat after the battle. He pressed them to diminish the excessive number of fifteen generals, whom they had hitherto been accustomed to nominate to the command—to reduce

Determined feeling at Syracuse—improved measures of defence—recommendations of Hermokratês.

narrative of Thucydidês, than to charge the Athenians with having starved their expedition. What they are really chargeable with, is—the having devoted to it a disproportionate fraction of their entire strength—perfectly enormous and ruinous. And so Thucydidês plainly conceives it, when he is describing both the armament of Nikias and that of Demosthenês.

Thucydidês is very reserved in saying anything against Nikias, whom he treats throughout with the greatest indulgence and tenderness. But he lets drop quite sufficient to prove that he conceived the mismanagement of the general

as *the cause* of the failure of the armament—not as “one of two causes,” as Dr. Arnold here presents it. Of course I recognise fully the consummate skill, and the aggressive vigour so unusual in a Spartan, of Gylippus—together with the effective influence which this exercised upon the result. But Gylippus would never have set foot in Syracuse had he not been let in, first through the apathy, next through the contemptuous want of precaution, shown by Nikias (vii. 42).

¹ Thucyd. v. 7. See chap. liv. of this History.

the number to three, conferring upon them at the same time fuller powers than had been before enjoyed, and swearing a solemn oath to leave them unfettered in the exercise of such powers—lastly, to enjoin upon these generals the most strenuous efforts, during the coming winter, for training and arming the whole population. Accordingly Hermokratês himself, with Herakleidês and Sikanus, were named to the command. Ambassadors were sent both to Sparta and to Corinth, for the purpose of entreating assistance in Sicily, as well as of prevailing on the Peloponnesians to recommence a direct attack against Attica;¹ so as at least to prevent the Athenians from sending farther reinforcements to Nikias, and perhaps even to bring about the recall of his army.

But by far the most important measure which marked the nomination of the new generals, was, the enlargement of the line of fortifications at Syracuse. They constructed a new wall, enclosing an additional space and covering both their Inner and their Outer City to the westward—reaching from the Outer sea to the Great Harbour, across the whole space fronting the rising slope of the hill of Epipolæ—and stretching far enough westward to enclose the sacred precinct of Apollo Temenites. This was intended as a precaution, in order that if Nikias, resuming operations in the spring, should beat them in the field and confine them to their walls—he might nevertheless be prevented from carrying a wall of circumvallation from sea to sea without covering a great additional extent of ground.² Besides this, the Syracusans fitted up and garrisoned the deserted town of Megara, on the coast to the north of Syracuse; they established a regular fortification and garrison in the Olympieion or temple of Zeus Olympius, which they had already garrisoned after the recent battle with Nikias; and they planted stakes in the sea to obstruct the con-

¹ Thucyd. vi. 72, 73.

² Thucyd. vi. 75. Ἐτείχιζον δὲ οἱ Συρακοῖται ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι πρὸς τε τὴ πόλιν, τὸν Τεμενιτὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς ποιησάμενοι, τεῖχος παρὰ πᾶν το πρὸς Ἐπιπολάς ὄρων, ὅπως μὴ εἰ ἐλάσσονος εὐάποτείχιστοι

ᾧσιν, ἣν ἄρα σφάλλωται, &c.

I reserve the general explanation of topography of Syracuse for the next chapter (when the siege begins), and the Appendix at p. 81 of Vol. VIII.

venient landing-places. All these precautions were useful to them; and we may even say that the new outlying fortification, enclosing the Temenites, proved their salvation in the coming siege—by so lengthening the circumvallation necessary for the Athenians to construct, that Gylippus had time to arrive before it was finished. But there was one farther precaution which the Syracusans omitted at this moment, when it was open to them without any hindrance—to occupy and fortify the Euryalus, or the summit of the hill of Epipolæ. Had they done this now, probably the Athenians could never have made progress with their lines of circumvallation: but they did not think of it until too late—as we shall presently see.

Nevertheless, it is important to remark, in reference to the general scheme of Athenian operations in Sicily, that if Nikias had adopted the plan originally recommended by Lamachus—or if he had begun his permanent besieging operations against Syracuse in the summer or autumn of 415 B.C., instead of postponing them, as he actually did, to the spring of 414 B.C.—he would have found none of these additional defences to contend against, and the line of circumvallation necessary for his purpose would have been shorter and easier. Besides these permanent and irreparable disadvantages, his winter's inaction at Naxos drew upon him the farther insult, that the Syracusans marched to his former quarters at Katana and burned the tents which they found standing—ravaging at the same time the neighbouring fields.¹

Kamarina maintained an equivocal policy which made both parties hope to gain it; and in the course of this winter the Athenian envoy Euphêmus with others was sent thither to propose a renewal of that alliance, between the city and Athens, which had been concluded ten years before. Hermokratês the Syracusan went to counteract his object; and both of them according to Grecian custom, were admitted to address the public assembly.

Hermokratês began by denouncing the views, designs and past history of Athens. He did not (he said) fear her power, provided the Sicilian cities were united and true to each other: even against Syracuse alone, the hasty retreat of the Athenians after the recent battle had shown how

Hermo-
kratês and
Euphêmus
—counter-
envoys at
Kamarina.

¹ Thueyd. vi. 75.

little they confided in their own strength. What he did fear, was, the delusive promises and insinuations of Athens, tending to disunite the island, and to paralyse all joint resistance. Every one knew that her purpose in this expedition was to subjugate all Sicily—that Leontini and Egesta served merely as convenient pretences to put forward—and that she could have no sincere sympathy for Chalkidians in Sicily, when she herself held in slavery the Chalkidians in Eubœa. It was in truth nothing else but an extension of the same scheme of rapacious ambition, whereby she had reduced her Ionian allies and kinsmen to their present wretched slavery, now threatened against Sicily. The Sicilians could not too speedily show her that they were no Ionians, made to be transferred from one master to another—but autonomous Dorians from the centre of autonomy, Peloponnesus. It would be madness to forfeit this honourable position through jealousy or lukewarmness among themselves. Let not the Kamarinæans imagine that Athens was striking her blow at Syracuse alone: they were themselves next neighbours of Syracuse, and would be the first victims if she were conquered. They might wish, from apprehension or envy, to see the superior power of Syracuse humbled: but this could not happen without endangering their own existence. They ought to do for her what they would have asked her to do if the Athenians had invaded Kamarina—instead of lending merely nominal aid, as they had hitherto done. Their former alliance with Athens was for purposes of mutual defence, not binding them to aid her in schemes of pure aggression. To hold aloof, give fair words to both parties, and leave Syracuse to fight the battle of Sicily single-handed—was as unjust as it was dishonourable. If she came off victor in the struggle, she would take care that the Kamarinæans should be no gainers by such a policy. The state of affairs was so plain that he (Hermokratês) could not pretend to enlighten them: but he solemnly appealed to their sentiments of common blood and lineage. The Dorians of Syracuse were assailed by their eternal enemies the Ionians, and ought not to be now betrayed by their own brother Dorians of Kamarina.¹

Euphêmus, in reply, explained the proceedings of Athens in reference to her empire, and vindicated her against the charges of Hermokratês. Though addressing

¹ Thucyd. vi. 77-80.

a Dorian assembly, he did not fear to take his start from the position laid down by Hermokratês, that ^{Speech of} Ionians were the natural enemies of Dorians. ^{Euphêmus.} Under this feeling, Athens, as an Ionian city, had looked about to strengthen herself against the supremacy of her powerful Dorian neighbours in Peloponnesus. Finding herself after the repulse of the Persian king at the head of those Ionians and other Greeks who had just revolted from him, she had made use of her position as well as of her superior navy to shake off the illegitimate ascendancy of Sparta. Her empire was justified by regard for her own safety against Sparta, as well as by the immense superiority of her maritime efforts in the rescue of Greece from the Persians. Even in reference to her allies, she had good ground for reducing them to subjection, because they had made themselves the instruments and auxiliaries of the Persian king in his attempt to conquer her. Prudential views for assured safety to herself had thus led her to the acquisition of her present empire, and the same views now brought her to Sicily. He was prepared to show that the interests of Kamarina were in full accordance with those of Athens. The main purpose of Athens in Sicily was to prevent her Sicilian enemies from sending aid to her Peloponnesian enemies—to accomplish which, powerful Sicilian allies were indispensable to her. To enfeeble or subjugate her Sicilian allies, would be folly: if she did this, they would not serve her purpose of keeping the Syracusans employed in their own island. Hence her desire to re-establish the expatriated Leontines, powerful and free, though she retained the Chalkidians in Eubœa as subjects. Near home she wanted nothing but subjects, disarmed and tribute-paying—while in Sicily, she required independent and efficient allies; so that the double conduct, which Hermokratês reproached as inconsistent, proceeded from one and the same root of public prudence. Pursuant to that motive, Athens dealt differently with her different allies according to the circumstances of each. Thus, she respected the autonomy of Chios and Methymna, and maintained equal relations with other islanders near Peloponnesus; and such were the relations which she now wished to establish in Sicily.

No—it was Syracuse, not Athens, whom the Kamarinæans and other Sicilians had really ground to fear.

Syracuse was aiming at the acquisition of imperial sway over the island; and that which she had already done towards the Leontines showed what she was prepared to do, when the time came, against Kamarina and others. It was under this apprehension that the Kamarinæans had formerly invited Athens into Sicily: it would be alike unjust and impolitic were they now to repudiate her aid, for she could accomplish nothing without them; if they did so on the present occasion, they would repent it hereafter when exposed to the hostility of a constantly encroaching neighbour, and when Athenian auxiliaries could not again be had. He repelled the imputations which Hermokratês had cast upon Athens—but the Kamarinæans were not sitting as judges or censors upon her merits. It was for them to consider whether that meddlesome disposition, with which Athens was reproached, was not highly beneficial as the terror of oppressors, and the shield of weaker states, throughout Greece. He now tendered it to the Kamarinæans as their only security against Syracuse; calling upon them, instead of living in perpetual fear of her aggression, to seize the present opportunity of attacking her on an equal footing, jointly with Athens.¹

In these two remarkable speeches, we find Hermokratês renewing substantially the same line of counsel as he had taken up ten years before at the congress of Gela—to settle all Sicilian differences at home, and above all things to keep out the intervention of Athens; who if she once got footing in Sicily would never rest until she reduced all the cities successively. This was the natural point of view for a Syracusan politician; but by no means equally natural, nor equally conclusive, for an inhabitant of one of the secondary Sicilian cities—especially of the conterminous Kamarina. And the oration of Euphêmus is an able pleading to demonstrate that the Kamarinæans had far more to fear from Syracuse than from Athens. His arguments to this point are at least highly plausible, if not convincing: but he seems to lay himself open to attack from the opposite quarter. If Athens cannot hope to gain any subjects in Sicily, what motive has she for interfering? This Euphêmus meets by contending that if she does not interfere, the Syracusans and their allies will come across and render assistance to the enemies of Athens

¹ Thucyd. vi. 83-7.

in Peloponnesus. It is manifest, however, that under the actual circumstances of the time, Athens could have no real fears of this nature, and that her real motives for meddling in Sicily were those of hope and encroachment, not of self-defence. But it shows how little likely such hopes were to be realised—and therefore how ill-advised the whole plan of interference in Sicily was—that the Athenian envoy could say to the Kamarinæans, in the same strain as Nikias had spoken at Athens when combating the wisdom of the expedition—"Such is the distance of Sicily from Athens, and such the difficulty of guarding cities of great force and ample territory combined, that if we wished to hold you Sicilians as subjects, we should be unable to do it: we can only retain you as free and powerful allies."¹ What Nikias said at Athens to dissuade his countrymen from the enterprise, under sincere conviction—Euphêmus repeated at Kamarina for the purpose of conciliating that city; probably, without believing it himself, yet the anticipation was not on that account the less true and reasonable.

The Kamarinæans felt the force of both speeches, from Hermokratês and Euphemus. Their inclinations carried them towards the Athenians, yet not without a certain misgiving in case Athens should prove completely successful. Towards the Syracusans, on the contrary, they entertained nothing but unqualified apprehension, and jealousy of very ancient date—and even now, their great fear was, of probable suffering if the Syracusans succeeded against Athens without their cooperation. In this dilemma, they thought it safest to give an evasive answer, of friendly sentiment towards both parties, but refusal of aid to either; hoping thus to avoid an inexpiable breach, whichever way the ultimate success might turn.²

For a city comparatively weak and situated like Kamarina, such was perhaps the least hazardous policy. In December 415 B.C., no human being could venture to

¹ Thucyd. vi. 86. ἡμεῖς μὲν γε οὐτε ἐμμεῖναι δυνατοὶ μὴ μὲν' ὁμῶν εἶτε καὶ γενόμενοι κακοὶ καταργησάμεθα, ἀδύνατοι κατασχεῖν, διὰ μῆκος τε πλοῦ καὶ ἀπορία φυλακῆς πόλεων

μεγάλων καὶ παρασκευῇ ἡπειρωτίδων, &c.

This is exactly the language of Nikias in his speech to the Athenians, vi. 12.

² Thucyd. vi. 88.

predict how the struggle between Nikias and the Syracusans in the coming year would turn out; nor were the Kamarinæans prompted by any hearty feeling to take the extreme chances with either party. Matters had borne a different aspect indeed in the preceding month of July 415 B.C., when the Athenians first arrived. Had the vigorous policy urged by Lamachus been then followed up, the Athenians would always have appeared likely to succeed—if indeed they had not already become conquerors of Syracuse: so that waverers like the Kamarinæans would have remained attached to them from policy. The best way to obtain allies (Lamachus had contended) was, to be prompt and decisive in action, and to strike at the capital point at once while the intimidating effect of their arrival was fresh. Of the value of his advice, an emphatic illustration is afforded by the conduct of Kamarina.¹

Throughout the rest of the winter, Nikias did little or nothing. He merely despatched envoys for the purpose of conciliating the Sikels in the interior, where the autonomous Sikels, who dwelt in the central regions of the island, for the most part declared in his favour—especially the powerful Sikel prince Archônidês—sending provisions and even money to the camp at Naxos. Against some refractory tribes, Nikias sent detachments for purposes of compulsion; while the Syracusans on their part did the like to counteract him. Such Sikel tribes as had become dependents of Syracuse, stood aloof from the struggle. As the spring approached, Nikias transferred his position from Naxos to Katana, re-establishing that camp which the Syracusans had destroyed.²

He farther sent a trireme to Carthage, to invite cooperation from that city; and a second to the Tyrrhenian maritime cities on the southern coast of Italy, some of whom had proffered to him their services, as ancient enemies of Syracuse, and now realised their promises. From Carthage nothing was obtained. To the Sikels, Egestæans, and all the other allies of Athens, Nikias also sent orders for bricks, iron bars, clamps and everything suitable for the wall of circumvallation, which was to be commenced with the first burst of spring.

¹ Compare the remarks of Alkibiadês, Thucyd. vi. 91.

² Thucyd. vi. 83.

Winter
proceed-
ings of Ni-
kias from
his quart-
ers at
Katana.

While such preparations were going on in Sicily, debates of portentous promise took place at Sparta. Immediately after the battle near the Olympieion and the retreat of Nikias into winter quarters, the Syracusans had despatched envoys to Peloponnesus to solicit reinforcements. Here again, we are compelled to notice the lamentable consequences arising out of the inaction of Nikias. Had he commenced the siege of Syracuse on his first arrival, it may be doubted whether any such envoys would have been sent to Peloponnesus at all; at any rate, they would not have arrived in time to produce decisive effects.¹ After exerting what influence they could upon the Italian Greeks, in their voyage, the Syracusan envoys reached Corinth, where they found the warmest reception and obtained promises of speedy succour. The Corinthians furnished envoys of their own to accompany them to Sparta, and to back their request for Lacedæmonian aid.

Syracusan
envoys sent
to solicit
aid from
Corinth
and Sparta.

They found at the congress at Sparta another advocate upon whom they could not reasonably have counted—Alkibiadês. That exile had crossed over from Thurii to the Eleian port of Kyllênê in Peloponnesus in a merchant-vessel,² and now

Alkibiadês
at Sparta—
his intense
hostility to
Athens.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 88; vii. 42.

² Plutarch (Alkib. c. 23) says that he went to reside at Argos; but this seems difficult to reconcile with the assertion of Thucydides (vi. 61) that his friends at Argos had incurred grave suspicions of treason.

Cornelius Nepos (Alkib. c. 4) says, with greater probability of truth, that Alkibiadês went from Thurii, first to Elis, next to Thebes.

Isokratês (De Bigis, Orat. xvi. s. 10) says that the Athenians banished him out of all Greece, inscribed his name on a column, and sent envoys to demand his person from the Argæians; so that Alkibiadês *was compelled* to take refuge with the Lacedæmonians. This whole statement of Isokratês is exceedingly loose and untrustworthy, carrying back the commencement

of the conspiracy of the Four Hundred to a time anterior to the banishment of Alkibiadês. But among all the vague sentences, this allegation that the Athenians banished him out of *all Greece* stands prominent. They could only banish him from the territory of Athens and her allies. Whether he went to Argos, as I have already said, seems to me very doubtful; perhaps Plutarch copied the statement from this passage of Isokratês.

But under all circumstances, we are not to believe that Alkibiadês turned against his country, or went to Sparta, *upon compulsion*. The first act of his hostility to Athens (the disappointing her of the acquisition of Messênê) was committed before he left Sicily. Moreover Thucydides represents

appeared at Sparta on special invitation and safe-conduct from the Lacedæmonians; of whom he was at first vehemently afraid, in consequence of having raised against them that Peloponnesian combination which had given them so much trouble before the battle of Mantinea. He now appeared too, burning with hostility against his country, and eager to inflict upon her all the mischief in his power. Having been the chief evil genius to plunge her, mainly for selfish ends of his own, into this ill-starred venture, he was now about to do his best to turn it into her irreparable ruin. His fiery stimulus, and unmeasured exaggerations, supplied what was wanting in Corinthian and Syracusan eloquence, and inflamed the tardy goodwill of the Spartan Ephors into comparative decision and activity.¹ His harangue in the Spartan congress is given to us by Thucydides—who may possibly have heard it, as he was then himself in exile. Like the earlier speech which he puts into the mouth of Alkibiades at Athens, it is characteristic in a high degree; and interesting in another point of view as the latest composed speech of any length which we find in his history. I give here the substance, without professing to translate the words.

“First, I must address you, Lacedæmonians, respecting the prejudices current against me personally, before I can hope to find a fair hearing on public matters. You know it was I, who renewed my public connexion with Sparta, after my ancestors before me had quarrelled with you and renounced it. Moreover, I assiduously cultivated your favour on all points, especially by attentions to your prisoners at Athens: but while I was showing all this zeal towards you, you took the opportunity of the peace which you made with Athens to employ my enemies as your agents—thus strengthening their hands, and dishonouring me. It was this conduct of yours which drove me to unite with the Argeians and Mantinians; nor ought you to be angry with me for mischief which you thus drew upon yourselves. Probably some of you hate me too, without any good reason, as a forward partisan of democracy. My family were always opposed to

him as unwilling indeed to go to Sparta, but only unwilling because he was afraid of the Spartans; in fact waiting for a safe conduct

and invitation from them. Thucydides mentions nothing about his going to Argos (vi. 88).

¹ Thucyd. vi. 88.

the Peisistratid despots; and as all opposition, to a ruling One or Few, takes the name of The People, so from that time forward we continued to act as leaders of the people.¹ Moreover our established constitution was a democracy, so that I had no choice but to obey: though I did my best to maintain a moderate line of political conduct in the midst of the reigning licence. It was not my family, but others, who in former times as well as now, led the people into the worst courses—those same men who sent me into exile. I always acted as leader, not of a party, but of the entire city; thinking it right to uphold that constitution in which Athens had enjoyed her grandeur and freedom, and which I found already existing.² For as to democracy, all we Athenians of common sense well knew its real character. Personally, I have better reason than any one else to rail against it—if one *could* say anything new about such confessed folly; but I did not think it safe to change the government, while you were standing by as enemies.

“So much as to myself personally: I shall now talk to you about the business of the meeting, and tell you something more than you yet know. Our purpose in sailing from Athens, was, first to conquer the Sicilian Greeks—next, the Italian Greeks—afterwards, to make an attempt on the Carthaginian empire and on Carthage herself. If all or most of this succeeded, we were then to attack Peloponnesus. We intended to bring to this enterprise the entire power of the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, besides large numbers of Iberian and other warlike barbaric mercenaries, together with many new triremes built from the abundant forests of Italy, and large supplies both of

¹ Thucyd. vi. 89. Τοῖς γὰρ τυράννοις ἀεὶ ποτὲ διάφοροί ἐσμεν, πᾶν δὲ τὸ ἐναντιούμενον τῷ δυναστεύοντι δῆμος ὠνόμασται· καὶ ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἐμπορέμενεν ἡ προστασία ἡμῖν τοῦ πλῆθους.

It is to be recollected that the Lacedæmonians had been always opposed to τυράννοι or despots, and had been particularly opposed to the Peisistratid τυράννοι, whom they in fact put down. In tracing his democratical tendencies, therefore, to this source, Alkibiadēs took the best means of excusing

them before a Lacedæmonian audience.

² Thucyd. vi. 89. ἡμεῖς δὲ τοῦ ἐμπαντος προέστημεν, δικαιούντες, ἐν ᾧ σχήματι μεγίστη ἡ πόλις ἔτυχε καὶ ἐλευθερωπάτη οὖσα, καὶ ὕπερ ἐδέξατό τις, τοῦτο ξυνοδιασώζειν· ἐπεὶ δημοκρατίαν γε καὶ ἐγινώσκουμεν οἱ φρονοῦντές τι, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐδενὸς ἂν χειρόν, ἔσθω καὶ λοιδορήσοιμι· ἀλλὰ περὶ ὁμολογουμένης ἀνοίας οὐδὲν ἂν καινὸν λέγοιτο· καὶ τὸ μεθιστάναι αὐτῇ, οὐκ ἐδόκει ἡμῖν ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι, ὁμῶν πολέμιων προσκαχόμενων.

treasure and provision. We could thus blockade Peloponnesus all round with our fleet, and at the same time assail it with our land-force; and we calculated, by taking some towns by storm and occupying others as permanent fortified positions, that we should easily conquer the whole peninsula, and then become undisputed masters of Greece. You thus hear the whole scheme of our expedition from the man who knows it best; and you may depend on it that the remaining generals will execute all this, if they can. Nothing but your intervention can hinder them. If indeed the Sicilian Greeks were all united, they might hold out; but the Syracusans standing alone cannot—beaten as they already have been in a general action, and blocked up as they are by sea. If Syracuse falls into the hands of the Athenians, all Sicily and all Italy will share the same fate; and the danger which I have described will be soon upon you.

“It is not therefore simply for the safety of Sicily—it is for the safety of Peloponnesus—that I now urge you to send across, forthwith, a fleet with an army of hoplites as rowers; and what I consider still more important than an army—a Spartan general to take the supreme command. Moreover you must also carry on declared and vigorous war against Athens here, that the Syracusans may be encouraged to hold out, and that Athens may be in no condition to send additional reinforcements thither. You must farther fortify and permanently garrison Dekeleia in Attica:¹ that is the contingency which the Athenians have always been most afraid of, and which therefore you may know to be your best policy. You will thus get into your own hands the live and dead stock of Attica, interrupt the working of the silver mines at Laureion, deprive the Athenians of their profits from judicial fines² as well as of their landed revenue, and dispose the subject-allies to withhold their tribute.

“None of you ought to think the worse of me because I make this vigorous onset upon my country in conjunction

¹ The establishment and permanent occupation of a fortified post in Attica, had been contemplated by the Corinthians even before the beginning of the war (Thucyd. i. 122).

² The occupation of Dekeleia made it necessary for the larger

number of Athenians to be almost incessantly under arms. Instead of a city, Athens became a guard-post, says Thucydides (vii. 28). There was therefore seldom leisure for the convocation of that numerous body of citizens who formed a Dikastery.

with her enemies—I who once passed for a lover of my country.¹ Nor ought you to mistrust my assurances as coming from the reckless passion of an exile. The worst enemies of Athens are not those who make open war like you, but those who drive her best friends into hostility. I loved my country² while I was secure as a citizen—I love her no more, now that I am wronged. In fact, I do not conceive myself to be assailing a country still mine: I am rather trying to win back a country now lost to me. The real patriot is not he, who having unjustly lost his country, acquiesces in patience—but he whose ardour makes him try every means to regain her.

“Employ me without fear, Lacedæmonians, in any service of danger or suffering: the more harm I did you formerly as an enemy, the more good I can now do you as a friend. But above all, do not shrink back from instant operations both in Sicily and in Attica, upon which so much depends. You will thus put down the power of Athens, present as well as future; you will dwell yourselves in safety; and you will become the leaders of undivided Hellas, by free consent and without force.”³

Enormous consequences turned upon this speech—no less masterly in reference to the purpose and the audience, than infamous as an indication of the character of the speaker. If its contents became known at Athens, as they probably did, the enemies of Alkibiadês would be supplied with a justification of their most violent political attacks. That imputation which they had taken so much pains to fasten upon him, citing in proof of it alike his profligate expenditure, overbearing insolence, and derision of the religious ceremonies of the state⁴—that he detested the democracy in his heart, submitted to it only from necessity, and was watching for the first safe opportunity of subverting it—appears here in his own language as matter of avowal and

¹ Thucyd. vi. 92. Καὶ χεῖρων οὐδενὶ ἄξιῳ δοκεῖν ὑμῶν εἶναι, εἰ τῇ ἐμαυτοῦ μετὰ τῶν πολεμικωτάτων, φιλόπολις ποτε δοκῶν εἶναι, νῦν ἐγχρατῶς ἐπέρχομαι.

² Thucyd. vi. 22. Τό τε φιλόπολι οὐκ ἐν ᾧ ἀδικούμαι ἔχω, ἀλλ' ἐν ᾧ ἀσφαλῶς ἐπολιτεύθην. Οὐδ' ἐπὶ πατρίδα οὐσαν ἔτι ἡγούμαι νῦν. ἴενσι,

πολύ δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν οὐκ οὖσαν ἀνταρτᾶσαι. Καὶ φιλόπολις οὗτος ὁρῶς, οὐχ ὅς ἂν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀδίκως ἀπολέσας μὴ ἐπίη, ἀλλ' ὅς ἂν ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν πειραθῇ αὐτὴν ἀνταρτᾶσαι.

³ Thucyd. vi. 89—92.

⁴ Thucyd. vi. 28.

boast. The sentence of condemnation against him would now be unanimously approved, even by those who at the time had deprecated it; while the people would be more firmly persuaded than before of the reality of the association between irreligious manifestations and treasonable designs. Doubtless the inferences so drawn from the speech would be unsound, because it represented, not the actual past sentiments of Alkibiadês, but those to which he now found it convenient to lay claim. As far as so very selfish a politician could be said to have any preference, democracy was, in some respects, more convenient to him than oligarchy. Though offensive to his taste, it held out larger prospects to his love of show, his adventurous ambition, and his rapacity for foreign plunder; while under an oligarchy, the jealous restraints, and repulses imposed on him by a few equals, would be perhaps more galling to his temper than those arising from the whole people.¹ He takes credit in his speech for moderation as opposed to the standing licence of democracy. But this is a pretence absurd even to extravagance, which Athenians of all parties would have listened to with astonishment. Such licence as that of Alkibiadês himself had never been seen at Athens; and it was the adventurous instincts of the democracy towards foreign conquest—combined with their imperfect apprehension of the limits and conditions under which alone their empire could be permanently maintained—which he stimulated up to the highest point, and then made use of for his own power and profit. As against himself, he had reason for accusing his political enemies of unworthy manœuvres; and even of gross political wickedness, if they were authors or accomplices (as seems probable of some) in the mutilation of the Hermæ. But most certainly, their public advice to the commonwealth was far less mischievous than his. And if we are to strike the balance of personal political merit between Alkibiadês and his enemies, we must take into the comparison his fraud upon the simplicity of the Lacedæmonian envoys, recounted in the last preceding chapter but one of this history.

If then that portion of the speech of Alkibiadês,

¹ See a remarkable passage of Thucyd. vii. 89—ἐξόν τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα, ὡς οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων,

ἐλασσόμενός τις φέρει—and the note in explanation of it, in a later chapter of this History, chap. lxii.

wherein he touches upon Athenian politics and his own past conduct, is not to be taken as historical evidence, just as little can we trust the following portion in which he professes to describe the real purposes of Athens in her Sicilian expedition. That any such vast designs as those which he announces were ever really contemplated even by himself and his immediate friends, is very improbable; that they were contemplated by the Athenian public, by the armament, or by Nikias, is utterly incredible. The tardiness and timid movements of the armament (during the first eight months after arriving at Rhegium) recommended by Nikias, partially admitted even by Alkibiadês, opposed only by the unavailing wisdom of Lamachus, and not strongly censured when known at Athens—conspire to prove that their minds were not at first fully made up even to the siege of Syracuse; that they counted on alliances and money in Sicily which they did not find; and that those, who sailed from Athens with large hopes of brilliant and easy conquest, were soon taught to see the reality with different eyes. If Alkibiadês had himself conceived at Athens the designs which he professed to reveal in his speech at Sparta, there can be little doubt that he would have espoused the scheme of Lamachus—or rather would have originated it himself. We find him indeed, in his speech delivered at Athens before the determination to sail, holding out hopes, that by means of conquests in Sicily, Athens might become mistress of all Greece. But this is there put as an alternative and as a favourable possibility—is noticed only in one place, without expansion or amplification—and shows that the speaker did not reckon upon finding any such expectations prevalent among his hearers. Alkibiadês could not have ventured to promise, in his discourse at Athens, the results which he afterwards talked of at Sparta as having been actually contemplated—Sicily, Italy, Carthage, Iberian mercenaries, &c., all ending in a blockading fleet large enough to gird round Peloponnesus.¹ Had he put forth such promises, the charge of juvenile folly which Nikias urged against him would probably have been believed by every one. His speech at Sparta, though it has passed with some as a fragment of true Grecian history,

¹ Thucyd. vi. 12—17.

seems in truth little better than a gigantic romance, dressed up to alarm his audience.¹

Intended for this purpose, it was eminently suitable and effective. The Lacedæmonians had already been partly moved by the representations from Corinth and Syracuse, and were even prepared to send envoys to the latter place

Resolutions of the Spartans.

with encouragement to hold out against Athens.

But the peace of Nikias, and the alliance succeeding it, still subsisted between Athens and Sparta. It had indeed been partially and indirectly

violated in many ways, but both the contracting parties still considered it as subsisting, nor would either of them yet consent to break their oaths openly and avowedly. For this reason—as well as from the distance of Sicily, great even in the estimation of the more nautical Athenians—the Ephors could not yet make up their minds to despatch thither any positive aid. It was exactly in this point of hesitation between the will and the deed, that the energetic and vindictive exile from Athens found them. His flaming picture of the danger impending—brought home to their own doors, and appearing to proceed from the best informed of all witnesses—overcame their reluctance at once; while he at the same time pointed out the precise steps whereby their interference would be rendered of most avail. The transfer of Alkibiadês to Sparta thus reverses the superiority of force between the two contending chiefs of Greece—“*Momentunque fuit mutatus Curio rerum.*”² He had not yet shown his power of doing his country good, as we shall find him hereafter engaged, during the later years of the war: his first achievements were but too successful in doing her harm.

The Lacedæmonians forthwith resolved to send an auxiliary force to Syracuse. But as this could not be done before the spring, they nominated Gylippus commander, directing him to proceed thither without delay, and to take counsel with the Corinthians for operations as speedy as the case admitted.³ We do not know that Gylippus had as yet given any positive evidence of that consummate skill and activity which we shall presently be called upon to describe. He was probably chosen on account of his superior acquaint-

¹ Plutarch, Alkib. c. 17.

² Thucyd. vi. 93 ; Plutarch, Alkib.

³ Lucan, Pharsal. iv. 819.

c. 23; Diol. c. xiii. 7.

ance with the circumstances of the Italian and Sicilian Greeks; since his father Kleandridas, after having been banished from Sparta fourteen years before the Peloponnesian war, for taking Athenian bribes, had been domiciliated as a citizen at Thurii.¹ Gylippus desired the Corinthians to send immediately two triremes for him, to Asinê in the Messenian Gulf, and to prepare as many others as their docks could furnish.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 104.

CHAPTER LIX.

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SIEGE OF SYRACUSE BY NIKIAS—DOWN TO THE SECOND ATHENIAN EXPEDITION UNDER DEMOSTHENES AND THE RESUMPTION OF THE GENERAL WAR.

THE Athenian troops at Katana, probably tired of inaction, were put in motion in the early spring, even before the arrival of the reinforcements from Athens, and sailed to the deserted walls of Megara, not far from Syracuse, which the Syracusans had recently garrisoned. Having in vain attacked the Syracusan garrison, and laid waste the neighbouring fields, they re-embarked, landed again for similar purposes at the mouth of the river Terias, and then, after an insignificant skirmish, returned to Katana. An expedition into the interior of the island procured for them the alliance of the Sikel town of Kentoripa; and the cavalry being now arrived from Athens, they prepared for operations against Syracuse. Nikias had received from Athens 250 horsemen fully equipped, for whom horses were to be procured in Sicily¹—30 horse-bowmen and 300 talents in money. He was not long in furnishing them with horses from Egesta and Katana, from which cities he also received some farther cavalry—so that he was presently able to muster 650 cavalry in all.²

Even before this cavalry could be mounted, Nikias made his first approach to Syracuse. For the Syracusan generals on their side, apprised of the arrival of the reinforcement from Athens, and aware that besieging operations were on the point of being commenced, now thought it

¹ Horses were so largely bred in Sicily, that they even found their way into Attica and Central Greece—Sophoklès, *Œd. Kolon.* 312—
γοναίχ' ὅρῳ

Στείχουσιν ἡμῖν, ἄσπον, Αἰτναίας ἐπὶ Πώλου βεβῶσαν.

If the Scholiast is to be trusted, the Sicilian horses were of unusually great size.

² Thucyd. vi. 95—98.

necessary to take the precaution of occupying and guarding the roads of access to the high ground of Epipolæ which overhung their outer city.

Syracuse consisted at this time of two parts, an inner and outer city. The former was comprised in the island of Ortygia, the original settlement founded by Archias, and within which the modern city is at this moment included: the latter or outer city, afterwards known by the name of Achradina, occupied the high ground of the peninsula north of Ortygia, but does not seem to have joined the inner city, or to have been comprised in the same fortification. This outer city was defended, on the north and east, by the sea, with rocks presenting great difficulties of landing—and by a seawall; so that on these sides it was out of the reach of attack. Its wall on the land-side, beginning from the sea somewhat eastward of the entrance of the cleft now called Santa Bonagia or Panagia, ran in a direction westward of south as far as the termination of the high ground of Achradina, and then turned eastward along the stone quarries now known as those of the Capucins and Novanteris, where the ground is in part so steep, that probably little fortification was needed. This fortified high land of Achradina thus constituted the outer city; while the lower ground, situated between it and the inner city or Ortygia, seems at this time not to have been included in the fortifications of either, but was employed (and probably had been employed even from the first settlement in the island), partly for religious processions, games, and other multitudinous ceremonies—partly for the burial of the dead, which, according to invariable Grecian custom, was performed without the walls of the city. Extensive catacombs yet remain to mark the length of time during which this ancient Nekropolis served its purpose.

Local condition and fortifications of Syracuse, at the time when Nicias arrived—Inner and Outer City.

To the north-west of the outer city-wall in the direction of the port called Trogilus, stood an unfortified suburb which afterwards became enlarged into the distinct walled town of Tychê. West of the southern part of the same outer city-wall (nearly south-west of the outer city itself) stood another suburb—afterwards known and fortified as Neapolis, but deriving its name, in the year 415 B.C., from

Localities without the wall of the outer city—Epipolæ.

having within it the statue and consecrated ground of Apollo Temenitês¹ (which stood a little way up on the ascent of the hill of Epipolæ), and stretching from thence down southward in the direction of the Great Harbour. Between these two suburbs lay a broad open space, the ground rising in gradual acclivity from Achradina to the westward, and diminishing in breadth as it rose higher, until at length it ended in a small conical mound called in modern times the Belvedere. This acclivity formed the eastern ascent of the long ridge of high ground called Epipolæ. It was a triangle upon an inclined plane, of which Achradina was the base: to the north as well as to the south, it was suddenly broken off by lines of limestone cliff (forming the sides of the triangle), about fifteen or twenty feet high, and quite precipitous, except in some few openings made for convenient ascent. From the western point or apex of the triangle, the descent was easy and gradual (excepting two or three special mounds or cliffs) towards the city, the interior of which was visible from this outer slope.³

Possibilities of the siege when Nikias first arrived in Sicily—increase of difficulties through his delay.

According to the warfare of that time, Nikias could only take Syracuse by building a wall of circumvallation so as to cut off its supplies by land, and at the same time blockading it by sea. Now looking at the Inner and Outer city as above described, at the moment when he first reached Sicily, we see that (after defeating the Syracusans and driving them within their walls, which would be of course the first part of the

¹ At the neighbouring city of Gela, also, a little without the walls, there stood a large brazen statue of Apollo—of so much sanctity, beauty, or notoriety, that the Carthaginians in their invasion of the island (seven years after the siege of Syracuse by Nikias) carried it away with them and transported it to Tyre (Diodor. xiii. 108).

² In reference to all these topographical details, the reader is requested to consult the two Plans of Syracuse annexed to volume VI together with the explanatory Appendix on the Operations of the

Siege. The very perspicuous description of Epipolæ, also, given by Mr. Stanley (as embodied in Dr. Arnold's Appendix to the third volume of his *Thucydides*), is especially commended to his attention.

In the Appendix, (see Vol. VIII.) I have been unavoidably compelled to repeat a portion of the matter contained in my general narrative: for which repetition I hope to be pardoned.

In Plan I, given at the end of Vol. VI., the letters A, B, C, D represent the wall of the Outer City as it seems to have stood when Nikias first ar-

process) he might have carried his blockading wall in a direction nearly southerly from the innermost point of the cleft of Santa Bonagia, between the city-wall and the Temenitês so as to reach the Great Harbour at a spot not far westward of the junction of Ortygia with the main land. Or he might have landed in the Great Harbour, and executed the same wall, beginning from the opposite end. Or he might have preferred to construct two blockading walls, one for each city separately: a short wall would have sufficed in front of the isthmus joining Ortygia, while a separate wall might have been carried to shut up the outer city, across the unfortified space constituting the Nekropolis opposite to Ortygia. Such were the possibilities of the case at the time when Nikias first reached Rhegium. But during the many months of inaction which he had allowed, the Syracusans had barred out both these possibilities, and had greatly augmented the difficulties of his intended enterprise. They had constructed a new wall, covering both their inner and their outer city—stretching across the whole front which faced the slope of Epipolæ, from the Great Harbour to the opposite sea near Santa Bonagia—and expanding westward so as to include within it the statue and consecrated ground of Apollo Temenitês, with the cliff near adjoining to it known by the name of the Temenite Cliff. This was done for the express purpose of lengthening the line indispensable for the besiegers to make their wall a good blockade.¹ After it was finished, Nikias could not begin his blockade from the side of the Great Harbour, since he would have been obstructed by the precipitous southern cliff of Epipolæ. He was under the necessity of beginning his wall from a portion of the higher ground of Epipolæ, and of carrying it both along a greater space and higher up on the slope, until he touched the Great Harbour at a point farther removed from Ortygia.

rived in Sicily. The letters E, F represent the wall of the Inner City at the same moment.

¹ Thucyd. v. 75. Ἐταίχιζον δὲ καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι τότε πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, τὸν Τεμενίτην ἐν τὸς ποιητάμενοι, νεῖχος παρὰ πᾶν

τὸ πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολάς ὁρῶν, ὥπως μὴ δι' ἐλάσσονος ἐν ἀποτεριστοῦ ὤσιν, ἣν ἄρα σφάλλονται, &c.

In Plan I., the letters G, H, I represent this additional or advanced fortification.

Syracuse having thus become assailable only from the side of Epipolæ, the necessity so created for carrying on operations much higher up on the slope gave to the summit of that eminence a greater importance than it had before possessed. Nikias, doubtless furnished with good local information by the exiles, seems to have made this discovery earlier than the Syracusan generals, who (having been occupied in augmenting their defences on another point where they were yet more vulnerable) did not make it until immediately before the opening of the spring campaign. It was at that critical moment that they proclaimed a full muster, for break of day, in the low mead on the left bank of the Anapus. After an inspection of arms, and probably final distribution of forces for the approaching struggle, a chosen regiment of 600 hoplites was placed under the orders of an Andrian exile named Diomilus, in order to act as garrison of Epipolæ, as well as to be in constant readiness wherever they might be wanted.¹ These men were intended to occupy the strong ground on the summit of the hill, and thus obstruct all the various approaches to it, seemingly not many in number, and all narrow.

But before they had yet left their muster, to march to the summit, intelligence reached them that the Athenians were already in possession of it. Nikias and Lamachus, putting their troops on board at Katana, had sailed during the preceding night to a landing-place not far from a place called Leon or the Lion, which was only six or seven furlongs from Epipolæ, and seems to have lain between Megara and the peninsula of Thapsus. They here landed their hoplites, and placed their fleet in safety under cover of a palisade across the narrow isthmus of Thapsus, before day and before the Syracusans had any intimation of their arrival. Their hoplites immediately moved forward with rapid step to ascend Epipolæ, mounting seemingly from the north-east, by the side towards Megara and farthest removed from Syracuse; so that they first reached the summit called Euryâlus, near the apex of the triangle above described. From hence they commanded the slope of Epipolæ beneath them and the town of Syracuse to the

¹ Thucyd. vi. 96.

eastward. They were presently attacked by the Syracusans, who broke up their muster in the mead as soon as they heard the news. But as the road by which they had to march, approaching Euryâlus from the south-west, was circuitous, and hardly less than three English miles in length—they had the mortification of seeing that the Athenians were already masters of the position; and when they hastened up to retake it, the rapid pace had so disordered their ranks, that the Athenians attacked them at great advantage, besides having the higher ground. The Syracusans were driven back to their city with loss, Diomilus with half his regiment being slain; while the Athenians remained masters of the high ground of Euryâlus, as well as of the upper portion of the slope of Epipolæ.¹

This was a most important advantage—indeed seemingly essential to the successful prosecution of the siege. It was gained by a plan both well laid and well executed, grounded upon the omission of the Syracusans to occupy a post of which they did not at first perceive the importance—and which in fact only acquired its pre-eminent importance from the new enlargement made by the Syracusans in their fortifications. To that extent, therefore, it depended upon a favourable accident which could not have been reasonably expected to occur. The capture of Syracuse was certain, upon the supposition that the attack and siege of the city had been commenced on the first arrival of the Athenians in the island, without giving time for any improvement in its defensibility. But the moment such delay was allowed, success ceased to be certain, depending more or less upon this favourable turn of accident. The Syracusans actually did a great deal to create additional difficulty to the besiegers, and might have done more, especially in regard to the occupation of the high ground above Epipolæ. Had they taken this precaution, the effective prosecution of the siege would have been rendered extremely difficult—if not completely frustrated.

The success of this surprise was essential to the effective future prosecution of the siege.

On the next morning, Nikias and Lamachus marched their army down the slope of Epipolæ near to the Syracusan walls, and offered battle, which the enemy did not

¹ Thucyd. vi. 97.

accept. They then withdrew the Athenian troops; after which their first operation was to construct a fort on the high ground called Labdalum, near the western end of the upper northern cliffs bordering Epipolæ, on the brink of the cliff, and looking northward towards Megara. This was intended as a place of security wherein both treasures and stores might be deposited, so as to leave the army unencumbered in its motions. The

First operations of the siege—Central work of the Athenians on Epipolæ, called the Circle.

Athenian cavalry being now completed by the new arrivals from Eggesta, Nikias descended from Labdalum to a new position called Sykê, lower down on Epipolæ, seemingly about midway between the northern and southern cliffs. He here constructed, with as much rapidity as possible, a walled enclosure, called the Circle, intended as a centre from whence the projected wall of circumvallation was to start northward towards the sea at Trogilus, southward towards the Great Harbour. This circle appears to have covered a considerable space, and was farther protected by an outwork, the front of which measured one thousand feet.¹ Astounded at the rapidity with which the Athenians executed this construction,² the Syracusans marched their forces out, and prepared to give battle in order to interrupt it. But when the Athenians, relinquishing the work, drew up on their side in battle order—the Syracusan generals were so struck with their manifest superiority in soldier-like array, as compared with the disorderly trim of their own ranks, that they withdrew their soldiers back into the city without venturing to engage; merely leaving a body of horse to harass the operations of the besiegers, and constrain them to keep in masses. The newly-acquired Athenian cavalry, however, were here brought for the first time into effective combat. With the aid of one tribe of their own hoplites, they charged the Syracusan horse, drove them off with some loss, and erected their trophy. This is the only occasion on which we read of the Athenian

¹ Thucyd. vi. 97. ἐχώρουν πρὸς τὴν Συκῇν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἵνα περ καθεζόμενοι ἐτείχιζαν τὸν κύκλον διὰ τῶν ἵππων.

The probable position of this Athenian Κύκλος or Circle will be found on both the Plans in the

Appendix, marked by the letter K.

² The Athenians seem to have surpassed all other Greeks in the diligence and skill with which they executed fortifications: see some examples, Thucyd. v. 75-82; Xenoph. Hellen. iv. 4, 13

cavalry being brought into conflict; though Nikias had made the absence of cavalry the great reason for his prolonged inaction.

Interruption being thus checked, Nikias continued his blockading operations; first completing the Circle,¹ then beginning his wall of circumvallation in a northerly direction from the Circle towards Trogilus: for which purpose a portion of his forces were employed in bringing stones and wood, and depositing them in proper places along the intended line. So strongly did Hermokratês feel the inferiority of the Syracusan hoplites in the field, that he discouraged any fresh general action, and proposed to construct a counter-wall or cross-wall; traversing the space along which the Athenian circumvallation must necessarily be continued, so as to impede its farther progress. A tenable counter-wall, if they could get time to carry it sufficiently far to a defensible terminus, would completely defeat the intent of the besiegers: but even if Nikias should interrupt the work by his attacks, the Syracusans calculated on being able to provide a sufficient force to repel him, during the short time necessary for hastily constructing the palisade or front outwork. Such palisade would serve them as a temporary defence, while they finished the more elaborate cross-wall behind it; and would, even at the worst, compel Nikias to suspend all his proceedings and employ his whole force to dislodge them.²

First counter-wall of the Syracusans.

¹ Dr. Arnold in his note on Thucyd. vi. 98, says that the Circle is spoken of, in one passage of Thucydides, as if it had never been completed. I construe this one passage differently from him (vii. 2, 4)—τῷ ἄλλῳ τοῦ κύκλου πρὸς τὸν Τρώγιλον ἐπὶ τῇ ἐτέρᾳ θάλασσᾳ: where I think τῷ ἄλλῳ τοῦ κύκλου is equivalent to ἐτέρῳ τοῦ κύκλου—as plainly appears from the accompanying mention of Trogilus and the northern sea. I am persuaded that the Circle was finished—and Dr. Arnold himself indicates two passages in which it is distinctly spoken of as having been completed. See Appendix to this volume.

² Thucyd. vi. 99. Ὑποταίχῃς δὲ ἄμεινον, ἐδόκει εἶναι (τοῖς Συρακούσις) ἢ ἐκείνοι (the Athenians) ἐμελλοῖ ἀξίειν τὸ ταίχος· καὶ εἰ φθάσαιαν, ἀποκλήσεις γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ἅμα καὶ ἐν τούτῳ εἰ ἐπιβοηθεῖν, μέρος ἀντιπέμπειν αὐτοῖς τῆς στρατιᾶς, καὶ φθάνειν ἂν τοῖς σταυροῖς προκαταλαμβάνοντες τὰς ἐφόδους· ἐκείνους δὲ ἂν παυομένους τοῦ ἔργου πάντας ἂν πρὸς σφᾶς τρέπεσθαι.—The probable course of this first counter-wall is marked on Plan I. by the letters N, O.

The Scholiast here explains τὰς ἐφόδους to mean τα βόσκια—adding ὀλίγα δὲ τα ἐπιβαλῆναι θανάμεια, δια το ταῖμαστώδες εἶναι το χωρίον. Though he is here followed by the

Accordingly they took their start from the postern gate near the grove of Apollo Temenitês; a gate in the new wall erected four or five months before to enlarge the fortified space of the city. From this point, which was lower down on the slope of Epipolæ than the Athenian Circle, they carried their palisade and counter-wall up the slope, in a direction calculated to intersect the intended line of hostile circumvallation southward of the Circle. The nautical population from Ortygia could be employed in this enterprise, since the city was still completely undisturbed by sea and mistress of the Great Harbour—the Athenian fleet not having yet moved from Thapsus. Besides this active crowd of workmen, the sacred olive-trees in the Temenite grove were cut down to serve as materials; and by such efforts the work was presently finished to a sufficient distance for traversing and intercepting the blockading wall intended to come southward from the Circle. It seems to have terminated at the brink of the precipitous southern cliff of Epipolæ, which prevented the Athenians from turning it and attacking it in flank; while it was defended in

best commentators, I cannot think that his explanation is correct. He evidently supposes that this first counter-wall of the Syracusans was built (as we shall see presently that the second counter-work was) across the marsh, or low ground between the southern cliff of Epipolæ and the Great Harbour. "The ground being generally marshy (τελευτωδες) there were only a few places where it could be crossed." But I conceive this supposition to be erroneous. The first counter-wall of the Syracusans was carried, as it seems to me, up the slope of Epipolæ, between the Athenian Circle and the southern cliff: it commenced at the Syracusan newly-erected advanced wall, enclosing the Temenitês. This was all hard, firm ground, such as the Athenians could march across at any point: there might perhaps be some roughnesses here and there, but they would be mere exceptions to the

general character of the ground.

It appears to me that τὸς ἐπόδους means simply "the attacks of the Athenians"—without intending to denote any special assailable points:—προκαταλαμβάνειν τὰς ἐπόδους means "to get beforehand with the attacks" (see Thucyd. i. 57. v. 30). This is in fact the more usual meaning of ἐπόδος (compare vii. 5; vii. 43; i. 6; v. 35; vi. 63), "attack, approach, visit," &c. There are doubtless other passages in which it means "the way or road through which the attack was made:" in one of these however (vii. 51) all the best editors now read ἐπόδου instead of ἐπόδου.

It will be seen that arguments have been founded upon the inadmissible sense which the Scholiast here gives to the word ἐπόδοι: see Dr. Arnold, Memoir on the Map of Syracuse, Appendix to his ed. of Thucyd. vol. iii. p. 271.

front by a stockade and topped with wooden towers for discharge of missiles. One tribe of hoplites was left to defend it, while the crowd of Syracusans who had either been employed on the work or on guard, returned back into the city.

During all this process, Nikias had not thought it prudent to interrupt them.¹ Employed as he seems to have been on the Circle, and on the wall branching out from the Circle northward, he was unwilling to march across the slope of Epipolæ to attack them with half his forces, leaving his own rear exposed to attack from the numerous Syracusans in the city, and his own Circle only partially guarded. Moreover, by such delay he was enabled to prosecute his own part of the circumvallation without hindrance, and to watch for an opportunity of assaulting the new counter-wall with advantage. Such an opportunity soon occurred, just at the time when he had accomplished the farther important object of destroying the aqueducts which supplied the city, partially, at least, with water for drinking. The Syracusans appear to have been filled with confidence both by the completion of their counter-wall, which seemed an effective bar to the besiegers—and by his inaction. The tribe left on guard presently began to relax in their vigilance: instead of occupying the wall, tents were erected behind it to shelter them from the midday sun; while some even permitted themselves to take repose during that hour within the city walls. Such negligence did not escape the Athenian generals, who silently prepared an assault for midday. Three hundred chosen hoplites with some light troops clothed in panoplies for the occasion, were instructed to sally out suddenly and run across straight to attack the stockade and counter-wall; while the main Athenian force marched in two divisions under Nikias and Lamachus; half towards the city walls to prevent any succour from coming out of the gates—half towards the Temenite postern-gate from whence the stockade and cross-wall commenced. The rapid forward movement of the chosen three hundred was crowned with full success. They captured both the stockade and the counterwall, feebly defended by its guards; who taken by surprise, abandoned their post and fled along behind their wall to enter the city by the

It is storm-
ed, taken,
and destroy-
ed, by the
Athenians.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 100.

Temenite postern-gate. Before all of them could get in, however, both the pursuing three hundred and the Athenian division which marched straight to that point, had partially come up with them: so that some of these assailants even forced their way along with them through the gate into the interior of the Temenite city-wall. Here however the Syracusan strength within was too much for them: these foremost Athenians and Argeians were thrust out again with loss. But the general movement of the Athenians had been completely triumphant. They pulled down the counter-wall, plucked up the palisade, and carried the materials away for the use of their own circumvallation.

As the recent Syracusan counterwork had been carried to the brink of the southern cliff, which rendered it unassailable in flank—Nikias was warned of the necessity of becoming master of this cliff, so as to deprive them of the same resource in future. Accordingly without staying to finish his blockading wall regularly and continuously from the Circle southward, across the slope of Epipolæ—he left the Circle under guard and marched across at once to take possession of the southern cliff, at the point where the blockading wall was intended to reach it. This point of the southern cliff he immediately fortified as a defensive position, whereby he accomplished two objects. First, he prevented the Syracusans from again employing the cliff as a flank defence for a second counter-wall.¹ Next, he acquired the means of providing a safe

¹ Thucyd. vi. 101. Τῇ δ' ὑπερτίξαι ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου ἐπὶ τῆς ὄρει Ἀθηναῖοι τὸν χρημὸν τὸν ὑπὲρ τοῦ Ἐριός, ὅς τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν ταύτῃ πρὸς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα ἦρα, καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῖς βραχύτατον ἐτίξαι, καταβάσει δὲ τοῦ ὁμάλου καὶ τοῦ ἐλεύς ἐς τὸν λιμένα τὸ περιτείχισμα.

I give in the text what I believe to be the meaning of this sentence, though the words ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου are not clear, and have been differently construed. Göller in his first edition had construed them as if it stood ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου: as if the fortifica-

tion now begun on the cliff was continuous and in actual junction with the Circle. In his second edition he seems to relinquish this opinion, and to translate them in a manner similar to Dr. Arnold, who considers them as equivalent to ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου ὁρμώμενοι, but not at all implying that the fresh work performed was continuous with the Circle—which he believes not to have been the fact. If thus construed, the words would imply "starting from the Circle as a base of operations." Agreeing with Dr. Arnold in his

and easy road of communication between the high ground of Epipolæ and the low marshy ground beneath, which divided Epipolæ from the Great Harbour, and across which the Athenian wall of circumvallation must necessarily be presently carried. As his troops would have to carry on simultaneous operations, partly on the high ground above, partly on the low ground beneath, he could not allow them to be separated from each other by a precipitous cliff which would prevent ready mutual assistance. The intermediate space between the Circle and the fortified point of the cliff, was for the time left with an unfinished wall, with the intention of coming back to it (as was in fact afterwards done, and this portion of wall was in the end completed). The Circle, though isolated, was strong enough for the time to maintain itself against attack, and was adequately garrisoned.

By this new movement, the Syracusans were debarred from carrying a second counter-wall on the same side of Epipolæ, since the enemy were masters of the terminating cliff on the southern side of the slope. They now turned their operations to the lower ground or marsh between the southern cliff of Epipolæ and the Great Harbour; being as yet free on that side, since the Athenian fleet was still at Thapsus. Across that marsh—and seemingly as far as the river Anapus, to serve as a flank barrier—they resolved to carry a palisade work with a ditch, so as to intersect the line which the Athenians must next pursue in completing the southernmost portion of their circumvallation. They so pressed the prosecution of this new cross palisade, beginning from the lower portion of their own city-walls, and stretching in a south-westerly direction across the low ground as far as

Second counter-work of the Syracusans—reaching across the marsh, south of Epipolæ, to the river Anapus.

conception of the event signified, I incline, in construing the words, to proceed upon the analogy of two or three passages in Thueyd. i. 7; i. 46; i. 99; vi. 64—*Αἱ δὲ πολεὶς πόλεις διὰ τὴν ληστεῖαν ἐπιπολὶ ἀντισχοῦσαν ἀπὸ θαλάσσης μάλλον ῥχίσθησαν* . . . Ἔστι δὲ λιμὴν, καὶ πολὺς ὑπὲρ οὗτοῦ καίεται ἀπὸ θαλάσσης ἐν τῇ Εὐκατέω τῆς Θεσπρωτίας, Ἐφόρη. In these

passages ἀπὸ is used in the same sense as we find ἀποθεν, iv. 125, signifying “apart from, at some distance from;” but not implying any accompanying idea of motion, or proceeding from, either literal or metaphorical.

“The Athenians began to fortify, at some distance from their Circle, the cliff above the marsh,” &c.

the river Anapus, that by the time the new Athenian fortification of the cliff was completed, the new Syracusan obstacle was completed also,¹ and a stockade with a ditch seemed to shut out the besiegers from reaching the Great Harbour.

Lamachus overcame the difficulty before him with ability and bravery. Descending unexpectedly, one morning before daybreak, from his fort on the cliff at Epipolæ into the low ground beneath—and providing his troops with planks and broad gates to bridge over the marsh where it was scarcely passable—he contrived to reach and surprise the palisade with the first dawn of morning. Orders were at the same time given for the Athenian fleet to sail round from Thapsus into the Great Harbour, so as to divert the attention of the enemy, and get on the rear of the new palisade work. But before the fleet could arrive, the palisade and ditch had been carried, and its defenders driven off. A large Syracusan force came out from the city to sustain them, and retake it; bringing on general action in the low ground between the Cliff of Epipolæ, the Harbour, and the river Anapus. The superior discipline of the Athenians proved successful: the Syracusans were defeated and driven back on all sides, so that their right wing fled into the city, and their left (including the larger portion of their best force, the horsemen), along the banks of the river Anapus, to reach the bridge. Flushed with victory, the Athenians hoped to cut them off from this retreat, and a chosen body of 300 hoplites ran fast in hopes of getting to the bridge first. In this hasty movement they fell into such disorder, that the Syracusan cavalry turned upon them, put them to flight, and threw them back upon the Athenian right wing, to which the fugitives communicated their own panic and disorder. The fate of the battle appeared to be turning against the Athenians, when Lamachus, who was on the left wing, hastened to their aid with the Argeian hoplites and as many bowmen as he could collect. His ardour carried him incautiously forward, so that he crossed a ditch, with very few followers, before the remaining troops could

¹ The course and extent (as I found marked on map L., by the conceive it) of this second counter-work, palisade and ditch, will be letters P, Q.

follow him. He was here attacked and slain,¹ in single combat with a horseman named Kallikratês: but the Syracusans were driven back when his soldiers came up, and had only just time to snatch and carry off his dead body, with which they crossed the bridge and retreated behind the Anapus. The rapid movement of this gallant officer was thus crowned with complete success, restoring the victory to his own right wing; a victory dearly purchased by the forfeit of his own life.²

Meanwhile the visible disorder and temporary flight of the Athenian right wing, and the withdrawal of Lamachus from the left to reinforce it, imparted fresh courage to the Syracusan right, which had fled into the town. They again came forth to renew the contest; while their generals attempted a diversion by sending out a detachment from the north-western gates of the city to attack the Athenian Circle on the mid-slope of Epipolæ. As this Circle lay completely apart and at considerable distance from the battle, they hoped to find the garrison unprepared for attack, and thus to carry it by surprise. Their manœuvre, bold and well-timed, was on the point of succeeding. They carried with little difficulty the covering outwork in front, and the Circle itself, probably stript of part of its garrison to reinforce the combatants in the lower ground, was only saved by the presence of mind and resource of Nikias, who was lying ill within it. He directed the attendants to set fire to a quantity of wood which lay, together with the battering engines of the army in front of the Circle-wall, so that the flames prevented all farther advance on the part of the assailants, and forced them to retreat. The flames also served as a signal to the Athenians engaged in the battle beneath, who immediately sent reinforcements to the relief of their general; while at the same time the Athenian fleet, just arrived from Thapsus, was seen sailing into the Great Harbour. This last event, threatening the Syracusans on a new side, drew off their whole attention to the defence of their city. Their combatants

Danger of the Athenian Circle and of Nikias—victory of the Athenians.

Entrance of the Athenian fleet into the Great Harbour.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 102; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 18. Diodorus erroneously places the battle, in which La-

machus was slain, after the arrival of Gylippus (xii. 8).

² Thucyd. vi. 122.

from the field, and their detachment from the Circle, were each brought back within the walls.¹

Had the recent attempt on the Circle succeeded, carrying with it the death or capture of Nikias, and combined with the death of Lamachus in the field on that same day—it would have greatly brightened the prospects of the Syracusans, and might even have arrested the farther progress of the siege, from the want of an authorised commander. But in spite of such imminent hazard, the actual result of the day left the Athenians completely victorious, and the Syracusans more discouraged than ever. What materially contributed to their discouragement, was, the recent entrance of the Athenian fleet into the Great Harbour, wherein it was henceforward permanently established, in cooperation with the army, in a station near the left bank of the Anapus.

Both army and fleet now began to occupy themselves seriously with the construction of the southernmost part of the wall of circumvallation; beginning immediately below the Athenian fortified point of descent from the southern cliff of Epipolæ and stretching across the lower marshy ground to the Great Harbour. The distance between these two extreme points was about eight stadia or nearly an English mile: the wall was double, with gates, and probably towers, at suitable intervals—inclosing a space of considerable breadth, doubtless roofed over in part, since it served afterwards, with the help of the adjoining citadel on the cliff, as shelter and defence of the whole Athenian army.² The Syracusans could not interrupt this process, nor could they undertake a new counter-wall up the mid-slope of Epipolæ, without coming out to fight a general battle, which they did not feel competent to do. Of course the Circle had now been put into condition to defy a second surprise.

But not only were they thus compelled to look on without hindering the blockading wall towards the Harbour.—It was now, for the first time, that they began to

¹ Thucyd. vi. 102.

² The southern part of the Athenian line of circumvallation is marked both on Plans I. and II.

by the letters K, L, M. In the first Plan, it appears as intended and unfinished; in the second Plan, it appears as completed.

taste the real restraints and privations of a siege.¹ Down to this moment, their communication with the Anapus and the country beyond, as well as with all sides of the Great Harbour, had been open and unimpeded; whereas now, the arrival of the Athenian fleet and the change of position of the Athenian army, had cut them off from both,² so that little or no fresh supplies of provision could reach them except at the hazard of capture from the hostile ships. On the side of Thapsus, where the northern cliff of Epipolæ affords only two or three practicable passages of ascent, they had before been blocked up by the Athenian army and fleet; and a portion of the fleet seems still to have been left at Thapsus. Nothing now remained open, except a portion, especially the northern portion, of the slope of Epipolæ. Of this outlet the besieged, especially their numerous cavalry, doubtless availed themselves, for the purpose of excursions and of bringing in supplies. But it was both longer and more circuitous for such purposes than the plain near the Great Harbour and the Helôrine road: moreover, it had to pass by the high and narrow pass of Euryâlus, and might thus be rendered unavailable to the besieged, whenever Nikias thought fit to occupy and fortify that position. Unfortunately for himself and his army, he omitted this easy, but capital precaution, even at the moment when he must have known Gylippus to be approaching.

The Syracusans offer no farther obstruction—despondency at Syracuse—increasing closeness of the siege.

In regard to the works actually undertaken, the order followed by Nikias and Lamachus can be satisfactorily explained. Having established their fortified post on the centre of the slope of Epipolæ, they were in condition to combat opposition and attack any counter-wall on whichever side the enemy might erect it. Commencing in the first place the execution of the northern portion of the blockading line, they soon desist from this, and turn their attention to the southern portion, because it was here that

Order of the besieging operations successively undertaken by the Athenians.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 103. οἷα δὲ εἰς ὅς ἀνθρώπων ἀπορρόντων καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ πρὶν πολιορκουμένων, &c.

² Diodorus however is wrong in stating (xiii. 7) that the Athenians occupied the temple of Zeus Olym-

pius and the Polichnê or hamlet surrounding it, on the right bank of the Anapus. These posts remained always occupied by the Syracusans, throughout the whole war (Thucyd. vii. 4, 37).

the Syracusans constructed their two first counter-works. In attacking the second counter-work of the Syracusans, across the marsh to the Anapus, they chose a suitable moment for bringing the main fleet round from Thapsus into the Great Harbour, with a view to its cooperation. After clearing the lower ground, they probably deemed it advisable, in order to establish a safe and easy communication with their fleet, that the double wall across the marsh, from Epipolæ to the Harbour, should stand next for execution; for which there was this farther reason—that they thereby blocked up the most convenient exit and channel of supply for Syracuse. There are thus plausible reasons assignable why the northern portion of the line of blockade, from the Athenian camp on Epipolæ to the sea at Trogilus, was left to the last, and was found open—at least the greater part of it—by Gylippus.

Triumphant prospects of the Athenians. Disposition among the Sikels and Italian Greeks to favour them.

While the Syracusans thus began to despair of their situation, the prospects of the Athenians were better than ever; promising certain and not very distant triumph. The reports circulating through the neighbouring cities all represented them as in the full tide of success, so that many Sikel tribes, hitherto wavering, came in to tender their alliance, while three armed pente-konters also arrived from the Tyrrhenian coast. Moreover abundant supplies were furnished from the Italian Greeks generally. Nikias, now sole commander since the death of Lamachus, had even the glory of receiving and discussing proposals from Syracuse for capitulation—a necessity which was openly and abundantly canvassed within the city itself. The ill-success of Hermokratês and his colleagues had caused them to be recently displaced from their functions as generals,—to which Herakleidês, Euklês, and Tellias were appointed. But this change did not inspire the Syracusans with confidence to hazard a fresh battle, while the temper of the city, during such period of forced inaction, was melancholy in the extreme. Though several propositions for surrender, perhaps unofficial, yet seemingly sincere, were made to Nikias, nothing definitive could be agreed upon as to the terms.¹ Had the Syracusan government been oligarchical, the present

¹ Thucyd. vi. 103. πολλὰ ἐλέγξτο πρὸς τοὺς ἑκείνων καὶ πλείον ἔτι κατὰ τὴν πόλιν.

distress would have exhibited a large body of malcontents upon whom he could have worked with advantage; but the democratical character of the government maintained union at home in this trying emergency.¹

We must take particular note of these propositions in order to understand the conduct of Nikias during the present critical interval. He had been from the beginning in secret correspondence with a party in Syracuse;² who, though neither numerous nor powerful in themselves, were now doubtless both more active and more influential than ever they had been before. From them he received constant and not unreasonable assurances that the city was on the point of surrendering and could not possibly hold out. And as the tone of opinion without, as well as within, conspired to raise such an impression in his mind, so he suffered himself to be betrayed into a fatal languor and security as to the farther prosecution of the besieging operations. The injurious consequences of the death of Lamachus now became evident. From the time of the departure from Katana down to the battle in which that gallant officer perished (a period seemingly of about three months, from about March to June 414 B.C.), the operations of the siege had been conducted with great vigour as well as unremitting perseverance; while the building-work, especially, had been so rapidly executed as to fill the Syracusans with amazement. But so soon as Nikias is left sole commander, this vigorous march disappears and is exchanged for slackness and apathy. The wall across the low ground near the harbour might have been expected to proceed more rapidly, because the Athenian position generally was much stronger—the chance of opposition from the Syracusans was much lessened—and the fleet had been brought into the Great Harbour to cooperate. Yet in fact it seems to have proceeded more slowly: Nikias builds it at first as a double wall, though it would have been practicable to complete the whole line of blockade with a single wall before the arrival of Gylippus and afterwards, if necessary, to have doubled it either wholly or partially; instead of employing so much time in completing this one portion, that Gylippus arrived before it was finished,

Conduct of Nikias—his correspondents in the interior of Syracuse.

Confidence of Nikias—comparative languor of his operations.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 55.

² Thucyd. vii. 49—86.

scarcely less than two months after the death of Lamachus. Both the besiegers and their commander now seem to consider success as certain, without any chance of effective interruption from within—still less from without; so that they may take their time over the work, without caring whether the ultimate consummation comes a month sooner or later.

Though such was the present temper of the Athenian troops, Nikias could doubtless have spurred them on and accelerated the operations, had he himself been convinced of the necessity of doing so. Hitherto, we have seen him always overrating the gloomy contingencies of the future, and disposed to calculate as if the worst was to happen which possibly could happen. But a great part, of what passes for caution in his character, was in fact backwardness and inertia of temperament, aggravated by the melancholy addition of a painful internal complaint. If he wasted in indolence the first six months after his arrival in Sicily, and turned to inadequate account the present two months of triumphant position before Syracuse—both these mistakes arose from the same cause; from reluctance to act except under the pressure and stimulus of some obvious necessity. Accordingly he was always behindhand with events: but when necessity became terrible, so as to subdue the energies of other men—then did he come forward and display unwonted vigour, as we shall see in the following chapter. But now, relieved from all urgency of apparent danger, and misled by the delusive hopes held out through his correspondence in the town, combined with the atmosphere of success which exhilarated his own armament—Nikias fancied the surrender of Syracuse inevitable, and became, for one brief moment preceding his calamitous end, not merely sanguine, but even careless and presumptuous in the extreme. Nothing short of this presumption could have let in his destroying enemy Gylippus.¹

That officer—named by the Lacedæmonians commander in Sicily, at the winter meeting which Alki-
 biadês had addressed at Sparta—had employed
 himself in getting together forces for the purpose
 of the expedition. But the Lacedæmonians,
 though so far stimulated by the representations
 of the Athenian exile as to promise aid, were not forward

Approach
 of Gylippus
 —he de-
 spairs of
 relieving
 Syracuse.

¹ Plutarch, Nikias, c. 18.

to perform the promise. Even the Corinthians, decidedly the most hearty of all in behalf of Syracuse, were yet so tardy, that in the month of June, Gylippus was still at Leukas, with his armament not quite ready to sail. To embark in a squadron for Sicily against the numerous and excellent Athenian fleet, now acting there, was a service not tempting to any one, and demanding both personal daring and devotion. Moreover every vessel from Sicily, between March and June 414 B.C., brought intelligence of progressive success on the part of Nikias and Lamachus—thus rendering the prospects of Corinthian auxiliaries still more discouraging.

At length, in the month of June, arrived the news of that defeat of the Syracusans wherein Lamachus was slain, and of its important consequences in forwarding the operations of the besiegers. Great as those consequences were, they were still farther exaggerated by report. It was confidently affirmed, by messenger after messenger, that the wall of circumvallation had been completed, and that Syracuse was now invested on all sides.¹ Both Gylippus and the Corinthians were so far misled as to believe this to be the fact, and despaired, in consequence, of being able to render any effective aid against the Athenians in Sicily. But as there still remained hopes of being able to preserve the Greek cities in Italy, Gylippus thought it important to pass over thither at once with his own little squadron of four sail—two Lacedæmonians and two Corinthians—and the Corinthian captain Pythên; leaving the Corinthian main squadron to follow as soon as it was ready. Intending then to act only in Italy, Gylippus did not fear falling in with the Athenian fleet. He first sailed to Tarentum, friendly and warm in his cause. From hence he undertook a visit to Thurii, where his father Kleandridas, exiled from Sparta, had formerly resided as citizen. After trying to profit by this opening for the purpose of gaining the Thurians, and finding nothing but refusal, he passed on farther southward,

Progress of
Gylippus,
in spite of
dis-
couraging
reports.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 104. ὡς αὐτοῖς αἱ ἀγγελίαι ἐφοίτων δεινὰ καὶ πᾶσαι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐψευσμέναι, ὡς ἤδη παντελῶς ἀποτεταγισμέναι αἱ Συράκουσαι εἰσι, τῆς μὲν Σικελίας οὐκ ἔστι ἐλπίδα οὐδεμίαν εἶχεν ὁ Γύλιππος,

τὴν δὲ Ἰταλίαν βουλόμενος περιποιῆσαι, &c. Compare Plutarch, Nikias, c. 18.

It will be seen from Thucydides, that Gylippus heard this news while he was yet at Leukas.

until he came opposite to the Terinæan Gulf, near the south-eastern cape of Italy. Here a violent gust of wind off the land overtook him, exposed his vessels to the greatest dangers, and drove him out to sea, until at length, standing in a northerly direction, he was fortunate enough to find shelter again at Tarentum.¹ But such was the damage which his ships had sustained, that he was forced to remain here while they were hauled ashore and refitted.²

So untoward a delay threatened to intercept altogether his farther progress. For the Thurians had sent intimation of his visit, as well as of the number of his vessels, to Nikias at Syracuse; treating with contempt the idea of four triremes coming to attack the powerful Athenian fleet. In the present sanguine phase of his character, Nikias sympathised with the flattering tenor of the message and overlooked the gravity of the fact announced. He

¹ Thucyd. vi. 104. Ἄρας (Γύλιππος) παρέπλει τὴν Ἰταλίαν καὶ ἀρπασθεὶς ὑπ' ἀνέμου πατὰ τὸν Τεριναιῶν κόλπον, ὃς ἐκπνεῖ ταύτῃ μέγας, κατὰ Βορέαν ἐστηχῶς ἀποφέρεται ἐς τὸ πέλαγος, καὶ πάλιν χειμασθεὶς ἐς τὰ μάλιστα Τάραντι προσμίσγει.

Though all the commentators here construe the words κατὰ Βορέαν ἐστηχῶς as if they agreed with ὃς or ἄνεμος, I cannot but think that these words really agree with Γύλιππος. Gylippus is overtaken by this violent off-shore wind while he is sailing southward along the eastern shore of what *ts* now called Calabria Ultra: "setting his ship towards the north or *standing to the north* (to use the English nautical phrase), he is carried out to sea, from whence after great difficulties he again gets into Tarentum." If Gylippus was carried out to sea when in this position, and trying to get to Tarentum, he would naturally lay his course northward. What is meant by the words κατὰ Βορέαν ἐστηχῶς, as applied to the wind, I confess I do not understand; nor do the critics throw much

light upon it. Whenever a point of the compass is mentioned in conjunction with any wind, it always seems to mean the point *from whence* the wind blows. Now, that κατὰ Βορέαν ἐστηχῶς means "a wind which blows steadily from the north," as the commentators affirm—I cannot believe without better authority than they produce. Moreover Gylippus could never have laid his course for Tarentum if there had been a strong wind in this direction; while such a wind would have forwarded him to Lokri, the very place whither he wanted to go. The mention of the Terinæan Gulf is certainly embarrassing. If the words are right (which perhaps may be doubted), the explanation of Dr. Arnold in his note seems the best which can be offered. Perhaps indeed—for though improbable, this is not wholly impossible—Thucydides may himself have committed a geographical inadvertence, in supposing the Terinæan Gulf to be on the east side of Calabria. See Appendix to this volume.

² Thucyd. vi. 104.

despised Gylippus as a mere privateer, nor would he even take the precaution of sending four ships from his numerous fleet to watch and intercept the new-comer. Accordingly Gylippus, after having refitted his ships at Tarentum, advanced southward along the coast without opposition to the Epizephyrian Lokri. Here he first learnt, to his great satisfaction, that Syracuse was not yet so completely blockaded, but that an army might still reach and relieve it from the interior, entering it by the Euryâlus and the heights of Epipolæ. Having deliberated whether he should take the chance of running his ships into the harbour of Syracuse, despite the watch of the Athenian fleet—or whether he should sail through the strait of Messina to Himera at the north of Sicily, and from thence levy an army to cross the island and relieve Syracuse by land—he resolved on the latter course, and passed forthwith through the strait, which he found altogether unguarded. After touching both at Rhegium and at Messênê, he arrived safely at Himera. Even at Rhegium, there was no Athenian naval force; though Nikias had indeed sent thither four Athenian triremes, after he had been apprised that Gylippus had reached Lokri—rather from excess of precaution, than because he thought it necessary. But this Athenian squadron reached Rhegium too late: Gylippus had already passed the strait, and fortune, smiting his enemy with blindness, landed him unopposed on the fatal soil of Sicily.

Approach of Gylippus is made known to Nikias. Facility of preventing his farther advance—Nikias despises him, and leaves him to come unobstructed. He lands at Himera in Sicily.

The blindness of Nikias would indeed appear unaccountable, were it not that we shall have worse yet to recount. To appreciate his misjudgment fully—and to be sensible that we are not making him responsible for results which could not have been foreseen—we have only to turn back to what had been said six months before by the exile Alkiabiadês at Sparta:—"Send forthwith an army to Sicily (he exhorted the Lacedæmonians)—but *send at the same time, what will be yet more valuable than an army—a Spartan to take the supreme command.*" It was in fulfilment of such recommendation, the wisdom of which will abundantly appear, that Gylippus had been appointed. And had he even reached Syracuse alone in a fishing-boat, the effect of his presence, carrying the great name of Sparta with full

Blindness of Nikias—egregious mistake of letting in Gylippus.

assurance of Spartan intervention to come, not to mention his great personal ability—would have sufficed to give new life to the besieged. Yet Nikias—having, through a lucky accident, timely notice of his approach, when a squadron of four ships would have prevented his reaching the island—disdains even this most easy precaution, and neglects him as a freebooter of no significance. Such neglect too is the more surprising, since the well-known philo-Laconian tendencies of Nikias would have led us to expect, that he would overvalue, rather than undervalue, the imposing ascendancy of the Spartan name.

Gylippus, on arriving at Himera as commander named by Sparta and announcing himself as forerunner of Peloponnesian reinforcements, met with a hearty welcome. The Himeræans agreed to aid him with a body of hoplites, and to furnish panoplies for the seamen in his vessels. On sending to Selinus, Gela, and some of the Sikel tribes in the interior, he received equally favourable assurances; so that he was enabled in no very long time to get together a respectable force. The interest of Athens among the Sikels had been recently weakened by the death of one of her most active partisans, the Sikel prince Archonidês—a circumstance which both enabled Gylippus to obtain more of their aid, and facilitated his march across the island. He was enabled to undertake this inland march from Himera to Syracuse, at the head of 700 hoplites from his own vessels, seamen and epibatæ taken together—1000 hoplites and light troops, with 100 horse, from Himera—some horse and light troops from Selinus and Gela—and 1000 Sikels.¹ With these forces, some of whom joined him on the march, he reached Euryâlus and the heights of Epipolæ above Syracuse—assaulting and capturing the Sikel fort of Ietæ in his way, but without experiencing any other opposition.

The His arrival was all but too late—and might have been
 Corinthian actually too late, had not the Corinthian admiral
 Gongylus got to Syracuse a little before him.
 reaches The Corinthian fleet of twelve triremes, under
 Syracuse Erasinidês—having started from Leukas later
 before than Gylippus, but as soon as it was ready—was
 Gylippus—just in time to hinder
 just in time to hinder the town
 from capitulating. been detained at Leukas by some accident, so

¹ Thucyd. vii. 1.

that he did not depart until after all the rest. Yet he reached Syracuse the soonest; probably striking a straighter course across the sea, and favoured by weather. He got safely into the harbour of Syracuse, escaping the Athenian guardships; whose watch doubtless partook of the general negligence of the besieging operations.¹

The arrival of Gongylus at that moment was an accident of unspeakable moment—and was in fact nothing less than the salvation of the city. Among all the causes of despair in the Syracusan mind, there was none more powerful than the circumstance, that they had not as yet heard of any relief approaching, or of any active intervention in their favour, from Peloponnesus. Their discouragement increasing from day to day, and the interchange of propositions with Nikias becoming more frequent, matters had at last so ripened that a public assembly was just about to be held to sanction a definitive capitulation.² It was at this critical juncture that Gongylus arrived, apparently a little before Gylippus reached Himera. He was the first to announce that both the Corinthian fleet, and a Spartan commander, were now actually on their voyage, and might be expected immediately—intelligence which filled the Syracusans with enthusiasm and with renewed courage. They instantly threw aside all idea of capitulation, and resolved to hold out to the last.

It was not long before they received intimation that Gylippus had reached Himera (which Gongylus at his arrival could not know) and was raising an army to march across for their relief. After the interval necessary for his preparations and for his march (probably not less than between a fortnight and three weeks), they learnt that he was approaching Syracuse by the way of Euryâlus and Epipolæ. He was presently seen coming, having ascended Epipolæ by Euryâlus; the same way by which the Athenians had come from Katana in the spring, when they commenced the siege. As he descended the slope of Epipolæ, the whole Syracusan force went out in a body to hail his arrival and accompany him into the city.³

Gylippus
with his
new levied
force enters
Syracuse
unopposed.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 2-7.

tarch, Nikias, c. 19.

² Thucyd. vi. 103; vii. 2. Plu-

³ Thucyd. vii. 2.

Few incidents throughout the whole siege of Syracuse appear so unaccountable as the fact, that the proceedings and march of Gylippus, from his landing at Himera to the moment of his entering the town, were accomplished without the smallest resistance on the part of Nikias. After this instant the besiegers pass from incontestable superiority in the field, and apparent certainty of prospective capture of the city—to a state of inferiority, not only excluding all hope of capture, but even sinking step by step into absolute ruin. Yet Nikias had remained with his eyes shut and his hands tied; not making the least effort to obstruct so fatal a consummation. After having despised Gylippus in his voyage along the coast of Italy as a freebooter with four ships, he now despises him not less at the head of an army marching from Himera. If he was taken unawares, as he really appears to have been,¹ the fault was altogether his own, and the ignorance such as we must almost call voluntary. For the approach of Gylippus must have been well-known to him beforehand. He must have learnt from the four ships which he sent to Rhegium, that Gylippus had already touched thither in passing through the strait, on his way to Himera. He must therefore have been well-aware, that the purpose was to attempt the relief of Syracuse by an army from the interior; and his correspondence among the Sikel tribes must have placed him in cognizance of the equipment going on at Himera. Moreover, when we recollect that Gylippus reached that place without either troops or arms—that he had to obtain forces not merely from Himera, but also from Selinus and Gela,—as well as to sound the Sikel towns, not all of them friendly;—lastly, that he had to march all across the island, partly through hostile territory—it is impossible to allow less interval than a fortnight, or three weeks, between his landing at Himera and his arrival at Epipolæ. Farther, Nikias must have learnt, through his intelligence in the interior of Syracuse, the important revolution which had taken place in Syracusan opinion through the arrival of Gongylus, even before the landing of Gylippus in Sicily was known. He was apprised, from that moment, that he had to take measures, not only against renewed obstinate hostility within the

¹ Thucyd. vii. 3. Οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι, αἰφνιδίως τοῦ τε Γυλίππου καὶ τῶν Συρακυσίων εὐρίσιν ἐπιόντων, &c.

town, but against a fresh invading enemy without. Lastly, that enemy had first to march all across Sicily, during which march he might have been embarrassed and perhaps defeated;¹ and could then approach Syracuse only by one road; over the high ground of Euryâlus in the Athenian rear—through passes few in number, easy to defend, by which Nikias had himself first approached, and through which he had only got by a well-laid plan of surprise. Yet Nikias leaves these passes unoccupied and undefended; he takes not a single new precaution; the relieving army enters Syracuse as it were over a broad and free plain.

If we are amazed at the insolent carelessness, with which Nikias disdained the commonest precautions for repelling the foreknown approach, by sea, of an enemy formidable even single-handed—what are we to say of that unaccountable blindness which led him to neglect the same enemy when coming at the head of a relieving army, and to omit the most obvious means of defence in a crisis upon which his future fate turned? Homer would have designated such neglect as a temporary delirium inflicted by the fearful inspiration of Atê: the historian has no such explanatory name to give—and can only note it as a sad and suitable prelude to the calamities too nearly at hand.

At the moment when the fortunate Spartan auxiliary was thus allowed to march quietly into Syracuse, the Athenian double wall of circumvallation between the southern cliff of Epipolæ and the Great Harbour, eight stadia long, was all but completed: a few yards only of the end close to the harbour were wanting. But Gylippus cared not to interrupt its completion. He aimed at higher objects, and he knew (what Nikias unhappily never felt and never lived to learn) the immense advantage of turning to active account that first impression, and full tide of confidence, which his arrival had just infused into the Syracusans. Hardly had he accomplished his junction with them, when he marshalled the united force in order of battle, and

Vigorous
and aggressive
measures of
Gylippus,
immediately
on
arriving.

¹ Compare an incident in the ensuing year, Thucyd. vii. 32. The Athenians, at a moment when they had become much weaker than they were now, had influence enough among the Sikeli tribes to raise

opposition to the march of a corps coming from the interior to the help of Syracuse. This auxiliary corps was defeated and nearly destroyed in its march.

marched up to the lines of the Athenians. Amazed as they were, and struck dumb by his unexpected arrival, they too formed in battle order, and awaited his approach. His first proceeding marked how much the odds of the game were changed. He sent a herald to tender to them a five days' armistice, on condition that they should collect their effects and withdraw from the island. Nikias disdained to return any reply to this insulting proposal; but his conduct showed how much *he* felt, as well as Gylippus, that the tide was now turned. For when the Spartan commander, perceiving now for the first time the disorderly trim of his Syracusan hoplites, thought fit to retreat into more open ground farther removed from the walls, probably in order that he might have a better field for his cavalry—Nikias declined to follow him, and remained in position close to his own fortifications.¹ This was tantamount to a confession of inferiority in the field. It was a virtual abandonment of the capture of Syracuse—a tacit admission that the Athenians could hope for nothing better in the end, than the humiliating offer which the herald had just made to them. So it seems to have been felt by both parties; for from this time forward, the Syracusans become and continue aggressors, the Athenians remaining always on the defensive, except for one brief instant after the arrival of Demosthenès.

After drawing off his troops and keeping them encamped for that night on the Temenite cliff (seemingly within the added fortified enclosure of Syracuse), Gylippus brought them out again the next morning, and marshalled them in front of the Athenian lines, as if about to attack. But while the attention of the Athenians was thus engaged, he sent a detachment to surprise the fort of Labdalum, which was not within view of their lines. The enterprise was completely successful. The fort was taken, and the garrison put to the sword; while the Syracusans gained another unexpected advantage during the day, by the capture of one of the Athenian triremes which was watching their harbour. Gylippus pursued his successes actively, by immediately beginning the construction of a fresh counter-wall, from the outer city-wall in a north-westerly direction aslant up the slope of Epipolæ; so as to traverse

¹ Thucyd. vii. 3.

the intended line of the Athenian circumvallation on the north side of their Circle, and render blockade impossible.¹ He availed himself, for this purpose, of stones laid by the Athenians for their own circumvallation, at the same time alarming them by threatening attack upon their lower wall (between the southern cliff of Epipolæ and the Great Harbour)—which was now just finished, so as to leave their troops disposable for action on the higher ground. Against one part of the wall, which seemed weaker than the rest, he attempted a nocturnal surprise, but finding the Athenians in vigilant guard without, he was forced to retire. This part of the wall was now heightened, and the Athenians took charge of it themselves, distributing their allies along the remainder.²

He begins the construction of a third counter-wall, on the north side of the Athenian Circle.

These attacks however appear to have been chiefly intended as diversions, in order to hinder the enemy from obstructing the completion of the counter-wall. Now was the time for Nikias to adopt vigorous aggressive measures both against this wall and against the Syracusans in the field—unless he chose to relinquish all hope of ever being able to beleaguer Syracuse. And indeed he seems actually to have relinquished such hope, even thus early after he had seemed certain master of the city. For he now undertook a measure altogether new; highly important in itself, but indicating an altered scheme of policy. He resolved to fortify Cape Plemmyrium—the rocky promontory which forms one extremity of the narrow entrance of the Great Harbour, immediately south of the point of Ortygia—and to make it a secure main station for the fleet and stores. The fleet had been hitherto stationed in close neighbourhood of the land-force, in a fortified position at the extremity of the double blockading wall between the southern sliff of Epipolæ and the Great Harbour. From such a station in the interior of the harbour, it was difficult for the Athenian triremes to perform the duties incumbent on them—of watching the two ports of Syracuse (one on each side of the isthmus which joins Ortygia to the main-

Nikias fortifies Cape Plemmyrium.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 4. The probable direction of this third Syracusan counter-wall will be seen in Plan II., marked by the letters S, T, U.

² Thucyd. vii. 4.

land) so as to prevent any exit of ships from within, or ingress of ships from without—and of ensuring the unobstructed admission by sea of supplies for their own army. For both these purposes, the station of Plemmyrium was far more convenient; and Nikias now saw that henceforward his operations would be for the most part maritime. Without confessing it openly, he thus practically acknowledged that the superiority of land-force had passed to the side of his opponents, and that a successful prosecution of the blockade had become impossible.¹

Three forts, one of considerable size and two subsidiary, were erected on the sea-board of Cape Plemmyrium, which became the station for triremes as well as for ships of burthen. Though the situation was found convenient for all naval operations, it entailed also serious disadvantages; being destitute of any spring of water, such as the memorable fountain of Arethusa on the opposite island of Ortygia. So that for supplies of water, and of wood also, the crews of the ships had to range a considerable distance, exposed to surprise from the numerous Syracusan cavalry placed in garrison at the temple of Zeus Olympius. Day after day, losses were sustained in this manner, besides the increased facilities given for desertion, which soon fatally diminished the efficiency of each ship's crew. As the Athenian hopes of success now declined, both the slaves, and the numerous foreigners who served in their navy, became disposed to steal away. And though the ships of war, down to this time, had been scarcely at all engaged in actual warfare, yet they had been for many months continually at sea and on the watch, without any opportunity of hauling ashore to refit. Hence the naval force, now about to be called into action as the chief hope of the Athenians, was found lamentably degenerated from that ostentatious perfection in which it had set sail fifteen months before, from the harbour of Peiræus.

The erection of the new forts at Plemmyrium, while by withdrawing the Athenian forces it left Gylippus unopposed in the prosecution of his counter-wall, at the same time emboldened him by the manifest decline of hope which it implied.

Inconveniences of Plemmyrium as a maritime station—mischief which ensues to the Athenian naval strength.

Operations of Gylippus in the field—his defeat.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 4.

Day after day he brought out his Syracusans in battle-array, planting them near the Athenian lines; but the Athenians showed no disposition to attack. At length he took advantage of what he thought a favourable opportunity to make the attack himself; but the ground was so hemmed in by various walls—the Athenian fortified lines on one side, the Syracusan front or Temenitic fortification on another, and the counter-wall now in course of construction on a third—that his cavalry and darters had no space to act. Accordingly, the Syracusan hoplites, having to fight without these auxiliaries, were beaten and driven back with loss, the Corinthian Gongylus being among the slain.¹ On the next day, Gylippus had the prudence to take the blame of this defeat upon himself. It was a consequence of his own mistake, (he publicly confessed) in having made choice of a confined space wherein neither cavalry nor darters could avail. He would presently give them another opportunity, in a fairer field, and he exhorted them to show their inbred superiority as Dorians and Peloponnesians, by chasing these Ionians with their rabble of islanders out of Sicily. Accordingly, after no long time, he again brought them up in order of battle; taking care, however, to keep in the open space, beyond the extremity of the walls and fortifications.

On this occasion, Nikias did not decline the combat, but marched out into the open space to meet him. He probably felt encouraged by the result of the recent action; but there was a farther and more pressing motive. The counter-wall of intersection, which the Syracusans were constructing, was on the point of cutting the Athenian line of circumvallation—so that it was essential for Nikias to attack without delay, unless he formally abnegated all farther hope of successful siege. Nor could the army endure, in spite of altered fortune, irrevocably to shut themselves out from such hope, without one struggle more. Both armies were therefore ranged in battle order on the open space beyond the walls, higher up the slope of Epipolæ; Gylippus placing his cavalry and darters to the right of his line, on the highest and most open ground. In the midst of the action between the

His decisive victory—the Athenians are shut up within their lines. The Syracusan counter-wall is carried on so far as to cut the Athenian line of blockade.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 5; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 19.

hoplites on both sides, these troops on the right charged the left flank of the Athenians with such vigour, that they completely broke it. The whole Athenian army underwent a thorough defeat, and only found shelter within its fortified lines. And in the course of the very next night, the Syracusan counter-wall was pushed so far as to traverse and get beyond the projected line of Athenian blockade, reaching presently as far as the edge of the northern cliff: so that Syracuse was now safe, unless the enemy should not only recover their superiority in the field, but also become strong enough to storm and carry the newbuilt wall.¹

Farther defence was also obtained by the safe arrival of the Corinthian, Ambrakiotic, and Leukadian fleet of twelve triremes under Erasinidês, which Nikias had vainly endeavoured to intercept. He had sent twenty sail to the southern coast of Italy; but the new-comers were fortunate enough to escape them.

Erasinidês and his division lent their hands to the execution of a work which completed the scheme of defence for the city. Gylippus took the precaution of constructing a fort or redoubt on the high ground of Epipolæ, so as to command the approach to Syracuse from the high ground of Euryâlus; a step which Hermokratês had not thought of until too late, and which Nikias had never thought of at all, during his period of triumph and mastery. He erected a new fort² on a suitable point of the high ground, backed by three fortified positions or encampments at proper distances in the rear of it, intended for bodies of troops to support the advanced post in case it was attacked. A continuous wall was then carried from this advanced post down the slope of Epipolæ, so as to reach and join the counter-wall recently constructed; whereby this counter-wall, already traversing and cutting the Athenian line of circumvallation, became in fact prolonged up the whole slope of Epipolæ, and barred all direct access from the Athenians in their existing lines up to the summit of that eminence, as well as up to the northern cliff. The Syracusans had now one con-

Farther defences provided by Gylippus, joining the higher part of Epipolæ with the city-wall.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 5, 6.

² This new upper fort is marked on Plan II. by the letter V. The

three fortified encampments are marked XXX.

tinuous and uninterrupted line of defence; a long single wall, resting at one extremity on the new-built fort upon the high ground of Epipolæ—at the other extremity, upon the city-wall. This wall was only single; but it was defended along its whole length by the permanent detachments occupying the three several fortified positions or encampments just mentioned. One of these positions was occupied by native Syracusans; a second by Sicilian Greeks; a third by other allies. Such was the improved and systematic scheme of defence which the genius of Gylippus first projected, and which he brought to execution at the present moment:¹ a scheme, the full value of which will be appreciated when we come to describe the proceedings of the second Athenian armament under Demosthenês.

Not content with having placed the Syracusans out of the reach of danger, Gylippus took advantage of their renewed confidence to infuse into them projects of retaliation against the enemy who had brought them so near to ruin. They began to equip their ships in the harbour, and to put their seamen under training, in hopes of qualifying themselves to contend with the Athenians even on their own element; while Gylippus himself quitted the city to visit the various cities of the island, and to get together farther reinforcements, naval as well as military. And as it was foreseen that Nikias on his part would probably demand aid from Athens—envoys, Syracusan as well as Corinthian, were despatched to Peloponnesus, to urge the necessity of forwarding additional troops—even in merchant-vessels, if no triremes could be

Confidence of Gylippus and the Syracusans—aggressive plans against the Athenians, even on the sea.

¹ Thueyd. vii. 7. Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο, αἱ τε τῶν Κορινθίων νῆες καὶ Ἀμπρακιωτῶν καὶ Λευκαδίων ἐπέπλευσαν αἱ ὑπόλοιποι δωδεκά (ἤρχε δὲ αὐτῶν Ἑρασιδής Κορίνθιος), καὶ συνεταιρίσσαν τὸ λοιπὸν τοῖς Συρακουσίοις μέχρι τοῦ ἐγκαρπίσιου τείχους. The new wall of junction thus constructed is marked on Plan II. by the letters V, W, T.

These words of Thucydides are very obscure, and have been explained by different commentators in different ways. The explanation which I here give does not (so far

as I know) coincide with any of them; yet I venture to think that it is the most plausible, and the only one satisfactory. Compare the Memoir of Dr. Arnold on his Map of Syracuse (Arn. Thuc. vol. iii p. 273), and the notes of Poppe and Göller. Dr. Arnold is indeed so little satisfied with any explanation which had suggested itself to him, that he thinks some words must have dropped out. The reader will find a defence of my views in the Appendix annexed to the Plan of Syracuse in this volume.

spared to convey them.¹ Should no reinforcements reach the Athenian camp, the Syracusans well knew that its efficiency must diminish by every month's delay, while their own strength, in spite of heavy cost and effort, was growing with their increased prospects of success.

If such double conviction was present to sustain the ardour of the Syracusans, it was not less painfully felt amidst the Athenian camp, now blocked up like a besieged city, and enjoying no free movement except through their ships and their command of the sea. Nikias saw that if Gylippus should return with any considerable additional force, even the attack upon him by land would become too powerful to resist—besides the increasing disorganization of his fleet. He became convinced that to remain as they were was absolute ruin. As all possibility of prosecuting the siege of Syracuse successfully was now at an end, a sound judgement would have dictated that his position in the harbour had become useless as well as dangerous, and that the sooner it was evacuated the better. Probably Demosthenês would have acted thus, under similar circumstances; but such foresight and resolution were not in the character of Nikias—who was afraid moreover of the blame which it would bring down upon him at home, if not from his own army. Not venturing to quit his position without orders from Athens, he determined to send home thither an undisguised account of his critical position, and to solicit either reinforcements or instructions to return.

It was now indeed the end of September (B.C. 414), so that he could not hope even for an answer before midwinter, nor for reinforcements (if such were to be sent) until the ensuing spring was far advanced. Nevertheless he determined to encounter this risk, and to trust to vigilant precautions for safety during the interval—precautions which, as the result will show, were within a hair's breadth of proving insufficient. But as it was of the last importance to him to make his countrymen at home fully sensible of the grave danger of his position—he resolved to transmit a written despatch; not trusting to the oral statement of a messenger, who might be wanting either in courage, in presence of mind, or in competent

Nikias
sends home
a despatch
to Athens,
soliciting
reinforce-
ments.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 7.

expression, to impress the full and sad truth upon a reluctant audience.¹ Accordingly he sent home a despatch, which seems to have reached Athens about the end of November, and was read formally in the public assembly by the secretary of the city. Preserved by Thucydides verbatim, it stands as one of the most interesting remnants of antiquity, and well deserves a literal translation.

"Our previous proceedings have been already made known to you, Athenians, in many other despatches;² but the present crisis is such as to require your deliberation more than ever, when you shall have heard the situation in which we stand. After we had overcome in many engagements the Syracusans, against whom we were sent, and had built the fortified lines which we now occupy—there came upon us the Lacedæmonian Gylippus, with an army partly Peloponnesian, partly Sicilian. Him too we defeated, in the first action; but in a second we were overwhelmed by a crowd of cavalry and darters, and forced to retire within our lines. And thus the superior number of enemies has compelled us to suspend our circumvallation, and remain inactive: indeed we cannot employ in the field even the full force which we possess, since a portion of our hoplites are necessarily required for the protection of our walls. Meanwhile the enemy have carried out a single intersecting counter-wall beyond our line of circumvallation, so that we can no longer continue the latter to completion, unless we had force enough to attack and storm their counter-wall.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 8.

² Thucyd. vii. 9. ἐν ἄλλαις πολιταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς. The word *despatches*, which I use to translate ἐπιστολαῖς, is not inapplicable to oral, as well as to written messages, and thus retains the ambiguity involved in the original; for ἐπιστολαῖς, though usually implying, does not necessarily imply, *written* communications.

The words of Thucydides (vii. 8) may certainly be construed to imply that Nikias had never on any previous occasion sent a written communication to Athens; and so Dr. Thirlwall understands them, though not without hesitation

(Hist. Gr. ch. xxvi. vol. iii. p. 418). At the same time I think them reconcileable with the supposition, that Nikias may previously have sent written despatches, though much shorter than the present—leaving details and particulars to be supplied by the officer who carried them.

Mr. Mitford states the direct reverse of that which Dr. Thirlwall understands—"Nicias had used the precaution of frequently sending despatches in writing, with an exact account of every transaction" (ch. xviii. sect. v. vol. iv. p. 100).

Certainly the statement of Thucydides does not imply this.

And things have come to such a pass, that we, who profess to besiege others, are ourselves rather the party besieged —by land at least, since the cavalry leave us scarce any liberty of motion. Farther, the enemy have sent envoys to Peloponnesus to obtain reinforcements, while Gylippus in person is going round the Sicilian cities; trying to stir up to action such of them as are now neutral, and to get, from the rest, additional naval and military supplies. For it is their determination (as I understand) not merely to assail our lines on shore with their land-force, but also to attack us by sea with their ships.

“Be not shocked when I tell you, that they intend to become aggressors even at sea. They know well, that our fleet was at first in high condition, with dry ships¹ and excellent crews: but now the ships have rotted, from remaining too long at sea, and the crews are ruined. Nor have we the means of hauling our ships ashore to refit: since the enemy’s fleet, equal or superior in numbers, always appears on the point of attacking us. We see them in constant practice, and they can choose their own moment for attack. Moreover, they can keep their ships high and dry more than we can; for they are not engaged in maintaining watch upon others; while to us, who are obliged to retain all our fleet on guard, nothing less than prodigious superiority of number could ensure the like facility. And were we to relax ever so little in our vigilance, we should no longer be sure of our supplies, which we bring in even now with difficulty close under their walls.

“Our crews, too, have been and are still wasting away, from various causes. Among the seamen who are our own citizens, many, in going to a distance for wood, for water, or for pillage, are cut off by the Syracusan cavalry. Such of them as are slaves, desert, now that our superiority is gone and that we have come to equal chances with our enemy; while the foreigners whom we pressed into our service, make off straight to some of the neighbouring cities. And those who came, tempted by high pay, under the idea of enriching themselves by traffic rather than of fighting, now that they find the enemy in full competence to cope with us by sea as well as by land, either go over

¹ It seems that in Greek ship-building, moist and unseasoned wood was preferred, from the facility of bending it into the proper shape (Theophrastus, *Hist. Plant.* v. 7, 4).

to him as professed deserters, or get away as they can amidst the wide area of Sicily.¹ Nay, there are even some who while trafficking here on their own account, bribe the trierarchs to accept Hykkarian slaves as substitutes, and

¹ Thueyd. vii. 13. Καὶ οἱ ξένοι οἱ μὲν ἀναγκαστοὶ ἐσβάντες, εὐθὺς κατὰ τὰς πόλεις ἀποχωροῦσιν, οἱ δὲ ὑπὸ μεγάλου μισθοῦ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπαρθέντες, καὶ οἰόμενοι χρηματίζεισθαι μᾶλλον ἢ μαχεῖσθαι, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ γνώμην αὐτοῦ τὸν τε δὴ καὶ τᾶλλα ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀνθεστώτα ὁρῶσιν, οἱ μὲν ἐπ' αὐτομολίας προφάσει ἀπέρχονται, οἱ δὲ ὡς ἕκαστοι δύνανται πολλῇ δ' ἢ Σικελία.

All the commentators bestow long notes in explanation of this phrase ἐπ' αὐτομολίας προφάσει ἀπέρχονται: but I cannot think that any of them are successful. There are even some who despair of success so much, as to wish to change αὐτομολίας by conjecture: see the citations in Poppe's long note.

But surely the literal sense of the words is here both defensible and instructive—"Some of them depart under pretence (or profession) of being deserters to the enemy." All the commentators reject this meaning, because they say, it is absurd to talk of a man's announcing beforehand that he intends to desert to the enemy, and giving *that* as an excuse for quitting the camp. Such is not (in my judgement) the meaning of the word προφάσει here. It does not denote what a man said *before* he quitted the Athenian camp (he would of course say nothing of his intention to any one), but the colour which he would put upon his conduct *after he got within* the Syracusan lines. He would present himself to them as a deserter to their cause: he would profess anxiety to take part in the defence: he would pretend to be tired of the oppressive Athenian dominion

—for it is to be recollected, that all or most of these deserters were men belonging to the subject-allies of Athens. Those who passed over to the Syracusan lines would naturally recommend themselves by making profession of such dispositions, even though they did not really feel any such: for their real reason was, that the Athenian service had now become irksome, unprofitable, and dangerous—while the easiest manner of getting away from it was, to pass over as a deserter to Syracuse.

Nikias distinguishes these men from others, "who got away, as they could find opportunity, to some part or other of Sicily." These latter also would of course keep their intention of departing secret, until they got safe away into some Sicilian town; but when once there, they would make no profession of any feeling which they did not entertain. If they said anything, they would tell the plain truth, that they were making their escape from a position which now gave them more trouble than profit.

It appears to me that the words ἐπ' αὐτομολίας προφάσει will bear this sense perfectly well, and that it is the real meaning of Nikias.

Even before the Peloponnesian war was begun, the Corinthian envoy at Sparta affirms that the Athenians cannot depend upon their seamen standing true to them, since their navy was manned with hired foreign seamen rather than with natives—ὧνητῇ γὰρ ἢ Ἀθηναίων δόνημις μᾶλλον ἢ οἰκεῖς (Thueyd. i. 121). The statement of Nikias proves that this remark was to a certain extent well-founded.

thus destroy the strict discipline of our marine. And you know as well as I, that no crew ever continues long in perfect condition, and that the first class of seamen, who set the ship in motion and maintain the uniformity of the oar-stroke, is but a small fraction of the whole number.

“Among all these embarrassments, the worst of all is, that I as general can neither prevent the mischief, from the difficulty of your tempers to govern—nor can I provide supplementary recruits elsewhere; as the enemy can easily do from many places open to him. We have nothing but the original stock which we brought out with us, both to make good losses and to do present duty; for Naxus and Katana, our only present allies, are of insignificant strength. And if our enemy gain but one farther point—if the Italian cities, from whence we now draw our supplies, should turn against us, under the impression of our present bad condition, with no reinforcement arriving from you—we shall be starved out, and he will bring the war to triumphant close, even without a battle.

“Pleasanter news than these I could easily have found to send you; but assuredly nothing so useful, seeing that the full knowledge of the state of affairs here is essential to your deliberations. Moreover I thought it even the safer policy to tell you the truth without disguise; understanding as I do your real dispositions, that you never listen willingly to any but the most favourable assurances, yet are angry in the end, if they turn to unfavourable results. Be thoroughly satisfied, that in regard to the force against which you originally sent us, both your generals and your soldiers have done themselves no discredit. But now that all Sicily is united against us, and that farther reinforcements are expected from Peloponnesus, you must take your resolution with full knowledge that we here have not even strength to contend against our present difficulties. You must either send for us home—or you must send us a second army, land-force as well as naval, not inferior to that which is now here; together with a considerable supply of money. You must farther send a successor to supersede me, as I am incapable of work from a disease in the kidneys. I think myself entitled to ask this indulgence at your hands: for while my health lasted, I did you much good service in various military commands. But whatever you intend, do it at the first opening of spring, without any delay: for the

new succours which the enemy is getting together in Sicily, will soon be here—and those which are to come from Peloponnesus, though they will be longer in arriving, yet if you do not keep watch, will either elude or forestall you as they have already once done.”¹

Such was the memorable despatch of Nikias which was read to the public assembly of Athens about the end of November or beginning of December 414 B.C.—brought by officers who strengthened its effect by their own oral communications, and answered all such inquiries as were put to them.² We have much reason to regret that Thucydides gives no account of the debate which so gloomy a revelation called forth. He tells us merely the result. The Athenians resolved to comply with the second portion of the alternative put by Nikias; not to send for the present armament home, but to reinforce it by a second powerful armament both of land and naval force, in prosecution of the same objects. But they declined his other personal request, and insisted on continuing him in command; passing a vote however, to name Menander and Euthydemus, officers already in the army before Syracuse, joint commanders along with him, in order to assist him in his laborious duties. They sent Eurymedon speedily, about the winter solstice, in command of ten triremes to Syracuse, carrying one hundred and twenty talents of silver, together with assurances of coming aid to the suffering army. And they resolved to equip a new and formidable force, under Demosthenes and Eurymedon, to go thither as reinforcement in the earliest months of the spring. Demosthenes was directed to employ himself actively in getting such larger force ready.³

Resolution of the Athenians to send Demosthenes with a second armament.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 11-15.

² Thucyd. vii. 10.

³ Thucyd. vii. 16. There is here a doubt as to the reading; between 120 talents—or 20 talents.

I agree with Dr. Arnold and other commentators in thinking that the money taken out by Eurymedon was far more probably the larger sum of the two, than the smaller. The former reading seems to deserve the preference. Besides,

Diodorus states that Eurymedon took out with him 140 talents: his authority indeed does not count for much—but it counts for something—in coincidence with a certain force of intrinsic probability (Diodor. xiii. 8).

On an occasion such as this, to send a very small sum such as 20 talents, would produce a discouraging effect upon the armament.

This letter of Nikias—so authentic—so full of matter—and so characteristic of the manners of the time—suggests several serious reflections, in reference both to himself and to the Athenian people. As to himself, there is nothing so remarkable as the sentence of condemnation which it pronounces on his own past proceedings in Sicily. When we find him lamenting the wear and tear of the armament, and treating the fact as notorious, that even the best naval force could only maintain itself in good condition for a short time—what graver condemnation could be passed upon those eight months which he wasted in trifling measures, after his arrival in Sicily, before commencing the siege of Syracuse? When he announces that the arrival of Gylippus with his auxiliary force before Syracuse, made the difference to the Athenian army between triumph and something bordering on ruin—the inquiry naturally suggests itself, whether he had done his best to anticipate, and what precautions he had himself taken to prevent, the coming of the Spartan general. To which the answer must be, that so far from anticipating the arrival of new enemies as a possible danger, he had almost invited them from abroad by his delay—and that he had taken no precautions at all against them, though forewarned and having sufficient means at his disposal. The desertion and demoralization of his naval force, doubtless but too real, was, as he himself points out, mainly the consequence of this turn of fortune, and was also the first commencement of that unmanageable temper of the Athenian soldiery, numbered among his difficulties. For it would be injustice to this unfortunate army not to recognise that they first acquiesced patiently in prolonged inaction, because their general directed it; and next, did their duty most gallantly in the operations of the siege, down to the death of Lamachus.

If even with our imperfect knowledge of the case, the ruin complained of by Nikias be distinctly traceable to his own remissness and oversight, much more must this conviction have been felt by intelligent Athenians, both in the camp and in the city, as we shall see by the conduct of Demosthenês¹ hereafter to be related. Let us conceive the series of despatches, to which Nikias himself alludes as having been transmitted

Remarks
upon the
despatch of
Nikias.

Former
despatches
of Nikias.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 42.

home, from their commencement. We must recollect that the expedition was originally sent from Athens with hopes of the most glowing character, and with a consciousness of extraordinary efforts about to be rewarded with commensurate triumphs. For some months, the despatches of the general disclose nothing but movements either abortive or inglorious; adorned indeed by one barren victory, but accompanied by an intimation that he must wait till the spring, and that reinforcements must be sent to him, before he can undertake the really serious enterprise. Though the disappointment occasioned by this news at Athens must have been mortifying, nevertheless his requisition is complied with; and the despatches of Nikias, during the spring and summer of 414 B.C., become cheering. The siege of Syracuse is described as proceeding successfully, and at length, about July or August, as being on the point of coming to a triumphant close—in spite of a Spartan adventurer named Gylippus, making his way across the Ionian sea with a force too contemptible to be noticed. Suddenly, without any intermediate step to smooth the transition, comes a despatch announcing that this adventurer has marched into Syracuse at the head of a powerful army, and that the Athenians are thrown upon the defensive, without power of proceeding with the siege. This is followed, after a short time, by the gloomy and almost desperate communication above translated.

When we thus look at the despatch, not merely as it stands singly, but as falling in series with its antecedents—the natural effect which we should suppose it likely to produce upon the Athenians would be, a vehement burst of wrath and displeasure against Nikias. Upon the most candid and impartial scrutiny, he deserved nothing less. And when we consider, farther, the character generally ascribed by historians of Greece to the Athenian people; that they are represented as fickle, ungrateful and irritable, by standing habit—as abandoning upon the most trifling grounds those whom they had once esteemed, forgetting all prior services, visiting upon innocent generals the unavoidable misfortunes of war, and impelled by nothing better than demagogic excitements—we naturally expect that the blame really deserved by Nikias would be exaggerated beyond all due measure, and break forth in a storm of violence and fury.

Effect of his
despatch
upon the
Athenians.

Yet what is the actual resolution taken in consequence of his despatch, after the full and free debate of the Athenian assembly? Not a word of blame or displeasure is proclaimed. Doubtless there must have been individual speakers who criticised him as he deserved. To suppose the contrary, would be to think meanly indeed of the Athenian assembly. But the general vote was one not simply imputing no blame, but even pronouncing continued and unabated confidence. The people positively refuse to relieve him from the command, though he himself solicits it in a manner sincere and even touching. So great is the value which they set upon his services, and the esteem which they entertain for his character, that they will not avail themselves of the easy opportunity which he himself provides to get rid of him.

It is not by way of compliment to the Athenians that I make these remarks on their present proceeding. Quite the contrary. The misplaced confidence of the Athenians in Nikias,—on more than one previous occasion, but especially on this,—betrays an incapacity of appreciating facts immediately before their eyes, and a blindness to decisive and multiplied evidences of incompetency, which is one of the least creditable manifestations of their political history. But we do learn from it a clear lesson, that the habitual defects of the Athenian character were very different from what historians commonly impute to them. Instead of being fickle, we find them tenacious in the extreme of confidence once bestowed, and of schemes once embarked upon: instead of ingratitude for services actually rendered, we find credit given for services which an officer ought to have rendered, but has not: instead of angry captiousness, we discover an indulgence not merely generous but even culpable, in the midst of disappointment and humiliation: instead of a public assembly, wherein, as it is commonly depicted, the criminative orators were omnipotent, and could bring to condemnation any unsuccessful general however meritorious,—we see that even grave and well-founded accusations make no impression upon the people in opposition to pre-established personal esteem;—and personal esteem for a man who not only was no demagogue, but in every respect the opposite of a demagogue; an oligarch by taste, sentiment, and position, who yielded to the democracy nothing more than sincere obedience, coupled with gentleness and

Treatment
of Nikias
by the
Athenians.

munificence in his private bearing. If Kleon had committed but a small part of those capital blunders which discredited the military career of Nikias, he would have been irretrievably ruined. So much weaker was *his* hold upon his countrymen, by means of demagogic excellences, as compared with those causes which attracted confidence to Nikias—his great family and position, his wealth dexterously expended, his known incorruptibility against bribes, and even comparative absence of personal ambition, his personal courage combined with reputation for caution, his decorous private life and ultra-religious habits. All this assemblage of negative merits, and decencies of daily life, in a citizen whose station might have enabled him to act with the insolence of Alkibiadês, placed Nikias on a far firmer basis of public esteem than the mere power of accusatory speech in the public assembly or the dikastery could have done. It entitled him to have the most indulgent construction put upon all his short-comings, and spread a fatal varnish over his glaring incompetence for all grave and responsible command.

The incident now before us is one of the most instructive in all history, as an illustration of the usual sentiment, and strongest causes of error, prevalent among the Athenian democracy—and as a refutation of that exaggerated mischief which it is common to impute to the person called a Demagogue. Happy would it have been for Athens had she now had Kleon present, or any other demagogue of equal power, at that public assembly which took the melancholy resolution of sending fresh forces to Sicily and continuing Nikias in the command! The case was one in which the accusatory eloquence of the demagogue was especially called for, to expose the real past mismanagement of Nikias—to break down that undeserved confidence in his ability and caution which had grown into a sentiment of faith or routine—to prove how much mischief he had already done, and how much more he would do if continued. ¹

¹ Plutarch (Nikias, c. 20) tells us that the Athenians had been disposed to send a second armament to Sicily, even before the despatch of Nikias reached them; but that they had been prevented by certain men who were envious

(ἐφθόγῳ) of the glory and good fortune of Nikias.

No judgement can be more inconsistent with the facts of the case than this—facts recounted in general terms even by Plutarch himself.

Unluckily for Athens, she had now no demagogue who could convince the assembly beforehand of this truth, and prevent them from taking the most unwise and destructive resolution ever passed in the Pnyx.

What makes the resolution so peculiarly discreditable, Capital mistake committed by the Athenians. is, that it was adopted in defiance of clear and present evidence. To persist in the siege of Syracuse, under present circumstances, was sad misjudgement; to persist in it with Nikias as commander, was hardly less than insanity. The first expedition, though even *that* was rash and ill-conceived, nevertheless presented tempting hopes which explain, if they do not excuse, the too light estimate of impossibility of lasting possession. Moreover there was at that time a confusion,—between the narrow objects connected with Leontini and Egesta, and the larger acquisitions to be realised through the siege of Syracuse,—which prevented any clear and unanimous estimate of the undertaking in the Athenian mind. But now, the circumstances of Sicily were fully known: the mendacious promises of Egesta had been exposed; the hopes of allies for Athens in the island were seen to be futile; while Syracuse, armed with a Spartan general and Peloponnesian aid, had not only become inexpugnable, but had assumed the aggressive: lastly, the chance of a renewal of Peloponnesian hostility against Attica had been now raised into certainty. While perseverance in the siege of Syracuse, therefore, under circumstances so unpromising and under such necessity for increased exertions at home, was a melancholy imprudence in itself—perseverance in employing Nikias converted that imprudence into ruin, which even the addition of an energetic colleague in the person of Demosthenês was not sufficient to avert. Those who study the conduct of the Athenian people on this occasion, will not be disposed to repeat against them the charge of fickleness which forms one of the standing reproaches against democracy. Their mistake here arose from the very opposite quality; from inability to get clear of two sentiments which had become deeply engraven on their minds—ideas of Sicilian conquest, and confidence in Nikias.

A little more of this alleged fickleness—or easy escape Hostilities from Sparta certain and impending. from past associations and impressibility to actual circumstances—would have been at the present juncture a tutelary quality to Athens.

She would then have appreciated more justly the increased hazards thickening around her both in Sicily and at home. War with Sparta, though not yet actually proclaimed, had become impending and inevitable. Even in the preceding winter, the Lacedæmonians had listened favourably to the recommendation of Alkibiadês¹ that they should establish a fortified post at Dekeleia in Attica. They had not yet indeed brought themselves to execution of this resolve; for the peace between them and Athens, though indirectly broken in many ways, still subsisted in name—and they hesitated to break it openly, partly because they knew that the breach of peace had been on their side at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war; attributing to this fault their capital misfortune at Sphakteria.² Athens on her side had also scrupulously avoided direct violation of the Lacedæmonian territory, in spite of much solicitation from her allies at Argos. But her reserve on this point gave way during the present summer, probably at the time when her prospect of taking Syracuse appeared certain. The Lacedæmonians having invaded and plundered the Argeian territory, thirty Athenian triremes were sent to aid in its defence, under Pythodôrus with two colleagues. This armament disembarked on the eastern coast of Laconia near Prasiæ and committed devastations: which direct act of hostility—coming in addition to the marauding excursions of the garrison of Pylus, and to the refusal of pacific redress at Athens—satisfied the Lacedæmonians that the peace had been now first and undeniably broken by their enemy, so that they might with a safe conscience recommence the war.³

Such was the state of feeling between the two great powers of Central Greece in November 414 B.C., when the envoys arrived from Syracuse—envoys from Nikias on the one part, from Gylippus and the Syracusans on the other—each urgently calling for farther support. The Corinthians and Syracusans vehemently pressed their claim at Sparta; Alkibiadês also renewed his instances for the occupation of Dekeleia. It was in the face of such impending liability to renewed Peloponnesian invasion that the Athenians took their resolution, above commented on, to send a second army to Syracuse and

Resolution of Sparta to invade Attica forthwith, and to send farther reinforcements to Sicily.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 93.² Thucyd. vii. 18.³ Thucyd. vi. 165; vii. 18.

prosecute the siege with vigour. If there were any hesitation yet remaining on the part of the Lacedæmonians, it disappeared so soon as they were made aware of the imprudent resolution of Athens; which not only created an imperative necessity for sustaining Syracuse, but also rendered Athens so much more vulnerable at home, by removing the better part of her force. Accordingly, very soon after the vote passed at Athens, an equally decisive resolution for direct hostilities was adopted at Sparta. It was determined that a Peloponnesian allied force should be immediately prepared, to be sent at the first opening of spring to Syracuse; and that at the same time Attica should be invaded, and the post of Dekeleia fortified. Orders to this effect were immediately transmitted to the whole body of Peloponnesian allies; especially requisitions for implements, materials, and workmen, towards the construction of the projected fort at Dekeleia.¹ .

¹ Thucyd. vii. 18.

CHAPTER LX.

FROM THE RESUMPTION OF DIRECT HOSTILITIES BETWEEN ATHENS AND SPARTA DOWN TO THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT IN SICILY.

THE Syracusan war now no longer stands apart, as an event by itself, but becomes absorbed in the general war rekindling throughout Greece. Never was any winter so actively and extensively employed in military preparations, as the winter of 414-413 B.C., the months immediately preceding that which Thucydidês terms the nineteenth spring of the Peloponnesian war, but which other historians call the beginning of the Dekeleian war.¹ While Eurymedon went with his ten triremes to Syracuse even in midwinter, Demosthenês exerted himself all the winter to get together the second armament for early spring. Twenty other Athenian triremes were farther sent round Peloponnesus to the station of Naupaktus—to prevent any Corinthian reinforcements from sailing out of the Corinthian Gulf. Against these latter, the Corinthians on their side prepared twenty-five fresh triremes, to serve as a convoy to the transports carrying their hoplites.² In Corinth, Sikyon, and Bœotia, as well as at Lacedæmon, levies of hoplites were going on for the armament to Syracuse—at the same time that everything was getting ready for the occupation of Dekeleia. Lastly, Gylippus was engaged with not less activity in stirring up all Sicily to take a more decisive part in the coming year's struggle.

From Cape Tænarus in Laconia, at the earliest moment of spring, embarked a force of 600 Lacedæmonian hoplites (Helots and Neodamodes) under the Spartan Ekkritus—and 300 Bœotian hoplites under the Thebans Xenon and Nikon, with the Thespian Hegesandrus. They were directed to cross the sea southward to Kyrênê

¹ Diodor. xiii. 8.

² Thucyd. vii. 17.

Active war-
like prepa-
rations
throughout
Greece
during the
winter of
414-413 B.C.

B.C. 413.

in Libya, and from thence to make their way along the African coast to Sicily. At the same time a body of 700 hoplites under Alexarchus—partly Corinthians, partly hired Arcadians, partly Sikyonians, under constraint from their powerful neighbours¹—departed from the north-west of Peloponnesus and the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf for Sicily—the Corinthian triremes watching them until they were past the Athenian squadron at Naupaktus.

These were proceedings of importance: but the most important of all was the re-invasion of Attica by Agis and the Peloponnesian force—for-tification of Dekeleia. at the same time by the great force of the Peloponnesian alliance, under the Spartan king Agis, son of Archidamus. Twelve years had elapsed since Attica last felt the hand of the destroyer, a little before the siege of Sphakteria. The plain in the neighbourhood of Athens was now first laid waste, after which the invaders proceeded to their special purpose of erecting a fortified post for occupation at Dekeleia. The work, apportioned among the allies present, who had come prepared with the means of executing it, was completed, during the present summer, and a garrison was established there composed of contingents relieving each other at intervals, under the command of king Agis himself. Dekeleia was situated on an outlying eminence belonging to the range called Parnês, about fourteen miles to the north of Athens—near the termination of the plain of Athens, and commanding an extensive view of that plain as well as of the plain of Eleusis. The hill on which it stood, if not the fort itself, was visible even from the walls of Athens. It was admirably situated both as a central point for excursions over Attica, and for communication with Bœotia; while the road from Athens to Orôpus, the main communication with Eubœa, passed through the gorge immediately under it.²

We read with amazement, and the contemporary world saw with yet greater amazement, that while this important work was actually going on, and while the whole Peloponnesian confederacy was renewing its pressure with redoubled force upon Athens —at that very moment,³ the Athenians sent out, not only a fleet of thirty triremes under Cha-

¹ Thucyd. vii. 19—58. Σιχυώνιοι Arnold's note.
ἀναρχαστοὶ στρατεύοντες.

³ Thucyd. vii. 20. ἄμα τῇ; Δεκε-

² Thucyd. vii. 19—23, with Dr. λεία; τῷ ταχυτμῷ, &c. Compare

riklês to annoy the coasts of Peloponnesus, but also the great armament which they had resolved upon under Demosthenês, to push offensive operations against Syracuse. The force under the latter general consisted of 60 Athenian and 5 Chian triremes; of 1200 Athenian hoplites of the best class, chosen from the citizen muster-roll; with a considerable number of hoplites besides, from the subject-allies and elsewhere. There had been also engaged on hire 1500 peltasts from Thrace, of the tribe called Dii; but these men did not arrive in time, so that Demosthenês set sail without them.¹ Chariklês having gone forward to take aboard a body of allies from Argos, the two fleets joined at Ægina, inflicted some devastations on the coasts of Laconia, and established a strong post on the island of Kythêra to encourage desertion among the Helots. From hence Chariklês returned with the Argeians, while Demosthenês conducted his armament round Peloponnesus to Korkyra.² On the Eleian coast, he destroyed a transport carrying hoplites to Syracuse, though the men escaped ashore: next he proceeded to Zakynthus and Kephallenia, from whence he engaged some additional hoplites—and to Anaktorium, in order to procure darters and slingers from Akarnania. It was here that he was met by Eurymedon with his ten triremes, who had gone forward to Syracuse in the winter with the pecuniary remittance urgently required, and was now returning to act as colleague of Demosthenês in the command.³ The news brought

Isokratês, Orat. viii. De Pace, s. 102. p. 236 Bekk.

¹ Thueyd. vii. 20—27.

² Thueyd. vii. 26.

³ Thueyd. vii. 31. Ὅντι δ' αὐτῷ (Demosthenês) περὶ ταῦτα (Anaktorium) Εὐρυμέδων ἀπαντᾷ, ὅς τότε τοῦ χειμῶνος τὰ χρήματα ἄγων τῇ στρατιᾷ ἀπεπέμψθη, καὶ ἀγγέλλει, &c.

The meaning of this passage appears quite unambiguous, that Eurymedon had been sent to Sicily in the winter to carry the sum of 120 talents to Nikias, and was now on his return (see Thucyd. vii. 11). Nevertheless we read in Mr. Mitford—“At Anaetorium Demosthenês

found Eurymedon *collecting provisions* for Sicily,” &c. Mr. Mitford farther says in a note (quoting the Scholiast—Ἦτοι τὰ πρὸς τροφήν χρήματα, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ συντείνοντα αὐτοῖς, Schol.)—“This is not the only occasion on which Thueydidês uses the term χρήματα for *necessaries in general*. Smith has translated accordingly: but the Latin has *pecuniam*, which does not express the sense intended here” (ch. xviii. sect. vi. vol. iv. p. 118).

There cannot be the least doubt that the Latin is here right. The definite article makes the point quite certain, even if it were true (which I doubt) that Thueydidês

by Eurymedon from Sicily was in every way discouraging. Yet the two admirals were under the necessity of sparing ten triremes from their fleet to reinforce Konon at Naupaktus, who was not strong enough alone to contend against the Corinthian fleet which watched him from the opposite coast. To make good this diminution, Eurymedon went forward to Korkyra, with the view of obtaining from the Korkyræans fifteen fresh triremes and a contingent of hoplites—while Demosthenês was getting together the Akarnanian darters and slingers.¹

Eurymedon not only brought back word of the distressed condition of the Athenians in the harbour of Syracuse, but had also learnt, during his way back, their heavy additional loss by the capture of the fort at Plemmyrium.

Operations
of Gylippus
at Syracuse.
He deter-
mines to
attack the
Athenians
at sea.

Gylippus returned to Syracuse early in the spring, nearly about the time when Agis invaded Attica and when Demosthenês quitted Peiræus. He returned with fresh reinforcements from the interior, and with redoubled ardour for decisive operations against Nikias before aid could arrive from Athens. It was his first care, in conjunction with Hermokratês, to inspire the Syracusans with courage for fighting the Athenians on shipboard. Such was the acknowledged superiority of the latter at sea, that this was a task of some difficulty, calling for all the eloquence and ascendancy of the two leaders: "The Athenians (said Hermokratês to his countrymen) have not been always eminent at sea as they now are: they were once landsmen like you, and more than you—they were only forced on shipboard by the Persian invasion. The only way to deal with bold men like them, is to show a front bolder still. *They* have often by their audacity daunted enemies of greater real force than themselves, and they must now be taught that others can play the same game with them. Go right at them before they expect it—and you will gain more by thus surprising and intimidating them, than you will suffer by their superior science." Such lessons, addressed to men already in the tide of success, were presently efficacious, and a naval attack was resolved.²

sometimes uses the word *χρήματα* to mean "necessaries in general." I doubt still more whether he ever uses *ἄγω* in the sense of "collecting."

¹ Thucyd. vii. 31.

² Thucyd. vii. 21. Among the topics of encouragement dwelt upon by Hermokratês, it is remarkable that he makes no mention

The town of Syracuse had two ports, one on each side of the island of Ortygia. The lesser port (as it was called afterwards, the Portus Lakkius) lay northward of Ortygia, between that island and the low ground or Nekropolis near the outer city: the other lay on the opposite side of the Isthmus of Ortygia, within the Great Harbour.

Naval combat in the harbour of Syracuse—the Athenians victorious.

Both of them (it appears) were protected against attack from without, by piles and stakes planted in the bottom in front of them. But the lesser port was the more secure of the two, and the principal docks of the Syracusans were situated within it; the Syracusan fleet, eighty triremes strong, being distributed between them. The entire Athenian fleet was stationed under the fort of Plemmyrium, immediately opposite to the southern point of Ortygia.

Gylippus laid his plan with great ability, so as to take the Athenians completely by surprise. Having trained and prepared the naval force as thoroughly as he could, he marched out his land-force secretly by night, over Epipolæ and round by the right bank of the Anapus, to the neighbourhood of the fort of Plemmyrium. With the first dawn of morning, the Syracusan fleet sailed out, at one and the same signal, from both the ports: 45 triremes out of the lesser port, 35 out of the other. Both squadrons tried to round the southern point of Ortygia, so as to unite and to attack the enemy at Plemmyrium in concert. The Athenians, though unprepared and confused, hastened to man 60 ships; with 25 of which they met the 35 Syracusans sailing forth from the Great Harbour—while with the other 35 they encountered the 45 from the lesser port, immediately outside of the mouth of the Great Harbour. In the former of these two actions the Syracusans were at first victors; in the second also, the Syracusans from the outside forced their way into the mouth of the Great Harbour, and joined their comrades. But being little accustomed to naval warfare, they presently fell into complete confusion, partly in consequence of their unexpected success; so that the Athenians, recovering from the first shock, attacked them anew, and completely defeated them; sinking or disabling eleven ships, of three of which the

of that which the sequel proved to be the most important of all—the confined space of the harbour, which rendered Athenian ships and tactics unavailing.

crews were made prisoners, the rest being mostly slain.¹ Three Athenian triremes were destroyed also.

But this victory, itself not easily won, was more than counterbalanced by the irreparable loss of Plemmyrium. During the first excitement at the Athenian naval station, when the ships were in course of being manned to meet the unexpected onset from both ports at once, the garrison of Plemmyrium went to the water's edge to watch and encourage their countrymen, leaving their own walls thinly guarded, and little suspecting the presence of their enemy on the land side. This was just what Gylippus had anticipated. He attacked the forts at daybreak, taking the garrison completely by surprise, and captured them after a feeble resistance; first the greatest and most important fort, next the two smaller. The garrison sought safety as they could, on board the transports and vessels of burden at the station, and rowed across the Great Harbour to the landcamp of Nikias on the other side. Those who fled from the greater fort, which was the first taken, ran some risk from the Syracusan triremes, which were at that moment victorious at sea. But by the time that the two lesser forts were taken, the Athenian fleet had regained its superiority, so that there was no danger of similar pursuit in the crossing of the Great Harbour.

This well-concerted surprise was no less productive to the captors than fatal as a blow to the Athenians. Not only were many men slain, and many made prisoners, in the assault—but there were vast stores of every kind, and even a large stock of money found within the fort; partly belonging to the military chest, partly the property of the trierarchs and of private merchants, who had deposited it there as in the place of greatest security. The sails of not less than forty triremes were also found there, and three triremes which had been dragged up ashore. Gylippus caused one of the three forts to be pulled down, and carefully garrisoned the other two.²

Great as the positive loss was here to the Athenians at a time when their situation could ill bear it—the collateral damage and peril growing out of the capture of Plem-

¹ Thucyd. vii. 23; Diodor. xiii. 9; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 20.

² Thucyd. vii. 23, 24.

myrium were yet more serious, besides the alarm and discouragement which they spread among the army. The Syracusans were now masters of the mouth of the harbour on both sides, so that not a single storeship could enter without a convoy and a battle. What was of not less detriment—the Athenian fleet was now forced to take station under the fortified lines of its own land-force, and was thus cramped up on a small space in the innermost portion of the Great Harbour, between the city-wall and the river Anapus; the Syracusans being masters everywhere else, with full communication between their posts all round, hemming in the Athenian position both by sea and by land.

To the Syracusans, on the contrary, the result of the recent battle proved every way encouraging; not merely from the valuable acquisition of Plemmyrium, but even from the sea-fight itself; which had indeed turned out to be a defeat, but which promised at first to be a victory, had they not thrown away the chance by their own disorder. It removed all superstitious fear of Athenian nautical superiority; while their position was so much improved by having acquired the command of the mouth of the harbour, that they began even to assume the aggressive at sea. They detached a squadron of twelve triremes to the coast of Italy, for the purpose of intercepting some merchant-vessels coming with a supply of money to the Athenians. So little fear was there of an enemy at sea, that these vessels seem to have been coming without convoy, and were for the most part destroyed by the Syracusans, together with a stock of ship-timber which the Athenians had collected near Kaulonia. In touching at Lokri on their return, they took aboard a company of Thespian hoplites who had made their way thither in a transport. They were also fortunate enough to escape the squadron of twenty triremes which Nikias detached to lie in wait for them near Megara—with the loss of one ship however, including her crew.¹

One of this Syracusan squadron had gone forward from Italy with envoys to Peloponnesus, to communicate the favourable news of the capture of Plemmyrium, and to accelerate as much as possible the operations against Attica,

Increased
spirits and
confidence
of the Syra-
cusans,
even for
sea-fight.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 25.

in order that no reinforcements might be sent from thence.

Efforts of
the Syra-
cusans to
procure
fartherrein-
forcements
from the
Sicilian
towns.

At the same time, other envoys went from Syracuse—not merely Syracusans, but also Corinthians and Lacedæmonians—to visit the cities in the interior of Sicily. They made known everywhere the prodigious improvement in Syracusan affairs arising from the gain of Plemmyrium, as well as the insignificant character of the recent naval defeat. They strenuously

pleaded for farther aid to Syracuse without delay; since there were now good hopes of being able to crush the Athenians in the harbour completely, before the reinforcements about to be despatched could reach them.¹

While these envoys were absent on their mission, the Great Harbour was the scene of much desultory conflict, though not of any comprehensive single battle. Since the loss of Plemmyrium, the Athenian naval station was in the north-west interior corner of that harbour, adjoining the fortified lines occupied by their land-army. It was enclosed and protected by a row of posts or stakes stuck in the bottom and standing out of the water.² The Syracusans on their side had also planted a stockade in front of the interior port of Ortygia, to defend their ships, their ship-houses, and their docks within. As the two stations were not far apart, each party watched for opportunities of occasional attack or annoyance by missile weapons to the other; and daily skirmishes of this sort took place, in which on the whole the Athenians seem to have had the advantage. They even formed the plan of breaking through the outworks of the Syracusan dockyard and burning the ships within. They brought up a ship of the largest size, with wooden towers and side defences, against the line of posts fronting the dockyard, and tried to force the entrance, either by means of divers who sawed them through at the bottom, or by boat-crews who fastened ropes round them and thus unfixed or plucked them out. All this was done under cover of the great vessel with its towers manned by light-armed, who exchanged showers of missiles with the Syracusan bowmen on the top of the ship-houses, and prevented the latter from coming near enough to interrupt the operation. The Athenians contrived thus to remove

Conflicts
between the
Athenians
and Syra-
cusans in
the Great
Harbour.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 25.

² Thucyd. vii. 38.

many of the posts planted—even the most dangerous among them, those which did not reach to the surface of the water, and which therefore a ship approaching could not see. But they gained little by it, since the Syracusans were able to plant others in their room. On the whole, no serious damage was done either to the dockyard or to the ships within. And the state of affairs in the Great Harbour stood substantially unaltered, during all the time that the envoys were absent on their Sicilian tour—probably three weeks or a month.¹

These envoys had found themselves almost everywhere well received. The prospects of Syracuse were now so triumphant, and those of Nikias with his present force so utterly hopeless, that the waverers thought it time to declare themselves; and all the Greek cities in Sicily, except Agrigentum, which still remained neutral (and of course except Naxos and Katana), resolved on aiding the winning cause. From Kamarina came 500 hoplites, 400 darters, and 300 bowmen; from Gela, 5 triremes, 400 darters, and 200 horsemen. Besides these, an additional force from the other cities was collected, to march to Syracuse in a body across the interior of the island, under the conduct of the envoys themselves. But this part of the scheme was frustrated by Nikias, who was rendered more vigilant by the present desperate condition of his affairs, than he had been in reference to the cross march of Gylippus. At his instance, the Sikel tribes Kentoripes and Halikyæi, allies of Athens, were prevailed upon to attack the approaching enemy. They planned a skilful ambuscade, set upon them unawares, and dispersed them with the loss of 500 men. All the envoys were also slain, except the Corinthian, who conducted the remaining force (about 1500 in number) to Syracuse.²

Defeat of a
Sicilian re-
inforce-
ment
marching to
aid Syra-
cuse.

This reverse—which seems to have happened about the time when Demosthenês with his armament were at Korkyra on the way to Syracuse—so greatly dismayed and mortified the Syracusans, that Gylippus thought it advisable to postpone awhile the attack which he intended to have made immediately on the reinforcement arriving.³ The delay of these few days proved nothing less than the salvation of the Athenian army.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 25.

² Thucyd. vii. 32, 33.

³ Thucyd. vii. 33.

It was not until Demosthenês was approaching Rhegium, within two or three days' sail of Syracuse, that the attack was determined on without farther delay. Preparation in every way had been made for it long before, especially for the most effective employment of the naval force. The captains and ship-masters of Syracuse and Corinth had now become fully aware of the superiority of Athenian nautical manœuvre, and of the causes upon which that superiority depended. The Athenian trireme was of a build comparatively light, fit for rapid motion through the water, and for easy change of direction: its prow was narrow, armed with a sharp projecting beak at the end, but hollow and thin, not calculated to force its way through very strong resistance. It was never intended to meet, in direct impact and collision, the prow of an enemy: such a proceeding passed among the able seamen of Athens for gross awkwardness. In advancing against an enemy's vessel, they evaded the direct shock, steered so as to pass by it—then by the excellence and exactness of their rowing, turned swiftly round, altered their direction, and came back before the enemy could alter his: or perhaps rowed rapidly round him—or backed their ship stern foremost—until the opportunity was found for driving the beak of their ship against some weak part of his—against the midships, the quarter, the stern, or the oarblades without. In such manœuvres the Athenians were unrivalled: but none such could be performed unless there were ample sea-room—which rendered their present naval station the most disadvantageous that could be imagined. They were cooped up in the inmost part of a harbour of small dimensions, close on the station of their enemies, and with all the shore, except their own lines, in possession of those enemies; so that they could not pull round from want of space, nor could they back water because they durst not come near shore. In this contracted area, the only mode of fighting possible was by straight-forward collision, prow against prow; a process, which not only shut out all their superior manœuvring, but was unsuited to the build of their triremes. On the other hand, the Syracusans, under the advice of the able Corinthian steersman Aristo, altered the construction of their triremes

Renewed
attack by
Gylippus
on the
Athenians.

Disadvan-
tages of the
Athenian
fleet in the
harbour.
Their naval
tactics im-
possible in
the narrow
space.

to meet the special exigency of the case, disregarding all idea of what had been generally looked upon as good nautical manœuvring.¹ Instead of the long, thin, hollow, and sharp, advancing beak, striking the enemy considerably above the water-level, and therefore doing less damage—they shortened the prow, but made it excessively heavy and solid—and lowered the elevation of the projecting beak: so that it became not so much calculated to pierce, as to break in and crush by main force all the opposing part of the enemy's ship, not far above the water. What were called the epôtids—"earcaps" or nozzles projecting forwards to the right and left of the beak, were made peculiarly thick and sustained by under-beams let into the hull of the ship. In the Attic build, the beak stood forwards very prominent, and the epôtids on each side of it were kept back, serving the same purpose as what are called Catheads in modern ships, to which the anchors are suspended: but in the Corinthian build, the beak projected less and the epôtids more—so that they served to strike the enemy: instead of having one single beak, the Corinthian ship might be said to have three nozzles.² The Syracusans relied on the narrowness of the space, for shutting out the Athenian evolutions, and bringing the contest to nothing more than a straightforward collision; in which the weaker vessel would be broken and stove in at the prow, and thus rendered unmanageable.

Improvements in Syracusan ships suited to the narrow space.

¹ Thueyd. vii. 36. τῇ δὲ πρότερον ἀμαθίᾳ τῶν κυβερνητῶν δοκούσθ' εἶναι, τοῦ ἀντιπρωρον ξυγκρούσαι, μάλιστα ἂν αὐτοὶ χρήσασθαι πλείστον γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ στήσιν, &c.

Diodor. xiii. 10.

² Compare Thueyd. vii. 34-36; Diodor. xiii. 10; Eurip. Iph. Taur. 1335. See also the notes of Arnold, Poppo, and Didot, on the passages of Thueydides.

It appears as if the ἀντηρίδες or sustaining beams were something new, now provided for the first time—in order to strengthen the epôtid and render it fit to drive in collision against the enemy. The words which Thueydides employs

to describe the position of these ἀντηρίδες, are to me not fully intelligible, nor do I think that any of the commentators clear them up satisfactorily.

It is Diodorus who specifies that the Corinthians lowered the level of their prows, so as to strike nearer to the water—which Thueydides does not mention.

A captive ship, when towed in as a prize, was disarmed by being deprived of her beak (Athenæus, xii. p. 535). Lysander reserved the beaks of the Athenian triremes captured at Ægospotami to grace his triumphal return (Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 8).

Having completed these arrangements, their land-force was marched out under Gylippus to threaten one side of the Athenian lines, while the cavalry and the garrison of the Olympieion marched up to the other side. The Athenians were putting themselves in position to defend their walls from what seemed to be a land-attack, when they saw the Syracusan fleet, 80 triremes strong, sailing out from its dock prepared for action: upon which they too, though at first confused by this unexpected appearance, put their crews on shipboard, and went out of their palisaded station, 75 triremes in number, to meet the enemy. The whole day passed off however in desultory and indecisive skirmish; with trifling advantage to the Syracusans, who disabled one or two Athenian ships, yet merely tried to invite the Athenians to attack, without choosing themselves to force on a close and general action.¹

It was competent to the Athenians to avoid altogether a naval action (at least until the necessity arose for escorting fresh supplies into the harbour) by keeping within their station; and as Demosthenês was now at hand, prudence counselled such reserve. Nikias himself, too, is said to have deprecated immediate fighting, but to have been out-voted by his two newly-appointed colleagues Menander and Euthydemus; who, anxious to show what they could do without Demosthenês, took their stand upon Athenian maritime honour, which peremptorily forbade them to shrink from the battle when offered.²

Though on the next day the Syracusans made no movement, yet Nikias foreseeing that they would speedily recommence, and noway encouraged by the equal manifestations of the preceding day, caused every trierarch to repair what damage his ship had sustained; and even took the precaution of farther securing his naval station by mooring merchant vessels just alongside of the openings in the palisade, about 200 feet apart. The prows of these vessels were provided with dolphins—or beams lifted up on high and armed at the end with massive heads of iron, which

¹ Thucyd. vii. 37, 38.

² Plutarch, Nikias, c. 20. Diodorus (xiii. 10) represents the battle as having been brought on against

the wish and intention of the Athenians generally, not alluding to any difference of opinion among the commanders.

could be so let fall as to crush any ship entering:¹ any Athenian trireme which might be hard-pressed, would thus be enabled to get through this opening where no enemy could follow, and choose her own time for sailing out again. Before night, such arrangements were completed. At the earliest dawn of next day, the Syracusans reappeared, with the same demonstrations both of land-force and naval force as before. The Athenian fleet having gone forth to meet them, several hours were spent in the like indecisive and partial skirmishes, until at length the Syracusan fleet sailed back to the city—again without bringing on any general or close combat. The Athenians, construing such retirement of the enemy as evidence of backwardness and unwillingness to fight,² and supposing the day's duty at an end, retired on their side within their own station, disembarked, and separated to get their dinners at leisure—having tasted no food that day.

But ere they had been long ashore, they were astonished to see the Syracusan fleet sailing back to renew the attack, in full battle order. This was a manœuvre suggested by the Corinthian Aristo, the ablest steersman in the fleet; at whose instance, the Syracusan admirals had sent back an urgent request to the city authorities, that an abundant stock of provisions might for that day be brought down to the sea-shore, and sale be rendered compulsory; so that no time should be lost, when the fleet returned thither, in taking a hasty meal without dispersion of the crews. Accordingly the fleet, after a short, but sufficient interval, allowed for refreshment thus close at hand, was brought back unexpectedly to the enemy's station. Confounded at the sight, the Athenian crews forced themselves again on board, most of them yet without refreshment, and in the midst of murmurs and disorder.³ On sailing out of their station, the indecisive skirmishing again commenced, and continued for some time—until at length the Athenian captains became so impatient of prolonged and exhausting fatigue, that they resolved

Complete
defeat of
the Athe-
nians.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 41. αἱ καρπαῖαι δελε-
φινεσφόροι: compare Pollux, i. 85,
and Fragment vi. of the comedy
of the poet Pherekratēs, entitled
Ἄγριοι—Meineke, Fragm. Comic.
Græc. vol. ii. p. 258, and the Scho-

liast. ad Aristoph. Equit. 759.

² Thucyd. vii. 40. Οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι,
νομίζαντες αὐτοὺς ὡς ἡσυχμένους
σφῶν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἀνακρούσασθαι,
&c.

³ Thucyd. vii. 49.

to begin of themselves, and make the action close as well as general. Accordingly the word of command was given, and they rowed forward to make the attack, which was cheerfully received by the Syracusans. By receiving the attack instead of making it, the latter were better enabled to ensure a straightforward collision of prow against prow, excluding all circuit, backing, or evolutions, on the part of the enemy: at any rate, their steersmen contrived to realise this plan, and to crush, stave in, or damage, the forepart of many of the Athenian triremes, simply by superior weight of material and solidity on their own side. The Syracusan darters on the deck, moreover, as soon as the combat became close, were both numerous and destructive; while their little boats rowed immediately under the sides of the Athenian triremes, broke the blades of their oars, and shot darts in through the oar-holes, against the rowers within. At length the Athenians, after sustaining the combat bravely for some time, found themselves at such disadvantage, that they were compelled to give way and to seek shelter within their own station. The armed merchant-vessels which Nikias had planted before the openings in the palisade were now found of great use in checking the pursuing Syracusans, two of whose triremes, in the excitement of victory, pushed forward too near to them and were disabled by the heavy implements on board—one of them being captured with all her crew. The general victory of the Syracusans, however, was complete: seven Athenian triremes were sunk or disabled, many others were seriously damaged, and numbers of seamen either slain or made prisoners.¹

Overjoyed with the result of this battle, which seems to have been no less skilfully planned than bravely executed, the Syracusans now felt confident of their superiority by sea as well as on land, and contemplated nothing less than the complete destruction of their enemies in the harbour. The generals were already concerting measures for renewed attack both by land and by sea, and a week or two more would probably have seen the ruin of this once triumphant besieging armament, now full of nothing but discouragement. The mere stoppage of supplies, in fact, as the Syracusans were masters of the mouth of the harbour, would be sure to starve it out in no long time, if

Danger of
the Athe-
nian arma-
ment—
arrival of
Demosthe-
nēs with
the second
armament.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 41.

they maintained their superiority at sea. All their calculations were suspended, however, and the hopes of the Athenians for the time revived, by the entry of Demosthenês and Eurymedon with the second armament into the Great Harbour; which seems to have taken place on the very day, or on the second day, after the recent battle.¹ So important were the consequences which turned upon that postponement of the Syracusan attack, occasioned by the recent defeat of their reinforcing army from the interior. So little did either party think, at that moment, that it would have been a mitigation of calamity to Athens, if Demosthenês had *not* arrived in time; if the ruin of the first armament had been actually consummated before the coming of the second!

Demosthenês, after obtaining the required reinforcements at Korkyra, had crossed the Ionian sea to the islands called Choërades on the coast of Iapygia; where he took aboard a band of 150 Messapian darters, through the friendly aid of the native prince Artas, with whom an ancient alliance was renewed. Passing on farther to Metapontum, already in alliance with Athens, he was there reinforced with two triremes and three hundred darters, with which addition he sailed on to Thurii. Here he found himself cordially welcomed; for the philo-Athenian party was in full ascendancy, having recently got the better in a vehement dissension, and passed a sentence of banishment against their opponents.² They not only took a formal resolution to acknowledge the same friends and the same enemies as the Athenians, but equipped a regiment of 700 hoplites and 300 darters to accompany Demosthenês, who remained there long enough to pass his troops in review and verify the completeness of each division. After having held this review on the banks of the river Sybaris, he marched his troops by land through the Thurian territory to the banks of the river Hylis which divided it from Kroton. He was here met by Krotoniate envoys, who forbade the access to their territory: upon which he marched down the river to the sea-shore, got on shipboard, and pursued his voyage southward along the coast of Italy—touching at the various towns, all except the hostile Lokri.³

¹ Thucyd. vii. 42.

² Thucyd. vii. 33-57.

³ Thucyd. vii. 35.

His entry into the harbour of Syracuse¹—accomplished in the most ostentatious trim, with decorations and musical accompaniments—was no less imposing from the magnitude of his force, than critical in respect to opportunity. Taking Athenians, allies, and mercenary forces, together—he conducted 73 triremes, 5000 hoplites, and a large number of light troops of every description; archers, slingers, darters, &c., with other requisites for effective operation. At the sight of such an armament, not inferior to the first which had arrived under Nikias, the Syracusans lost for a moment the confidence of their recent triumph, and were struck with dismay as well as wonder.² That Athens could be rash enough to spare such an armament, at a moment when the full burst of Peloponnesian hostility was reopening upon her, and when Dekeleia was in course of being fortified—was a fact out of all reasonable probability, and not to be credited unless actually seen. And probably, the Syracusans, though they knew that Demosthenês was on his way, had no idea beforehand of the magnitude of his armament.

On the other hand, the hearts of the discomfited and beleaguered Athenians again revived as they welcomed their new comrades. They saw themselves again masters by land as well as by sea; and they displayed their renewed superiority by marching out of their lines forthwith and ravaging the lands near the Anapus; the Syracusans not venturing to engage in a general action, and merely watching the movement with some cavalry from the Olympieion.

But Demosthenês was not imposed upon by this delusive show of power, so soon as he had made himself master of the full state of affairs, and had compared his own means with those of the enemy. He found the army of Nikias not merely worn down with long-continued toil, and disheartened by previous defeat, but also weakened in a terrible degree by the marsh fever general towards the close of summer, in the low ground where they were encamped.³

He saw that the Syracusans were strong in multiplied allies, extended fortifications, a leader of great ability, and

¹ Plutarch, Nikias, c. 21. ² Thucyd. vii. 42. ³ Thucyd. vii. 47-50.

general belief that theirs was the winning cause. Moreover, he felt deeply the position of Athens at home, and her need of all her citizens against enemies within sight of her own walls. But above all, he came penetrated with the deplorable effects which had resulted from the mistake of Nikias, in wasting irreparably so much precious time, and frittering away the first terror-striking impression of his splendid armament. All these considerations determined Demosthenês to act without a moment's delay, while the impression produced by his arrival was yet unimpaired—and to aim one great and decisive blow, such as might, if successful, make the conquest of Syracuse again probable. If this should fail, he resolved to abandon the whole enterprise, and return home with his armament forthwith.¹

By means of the Athenian lines, he had possession of the southernmost portion of the slope of Epipolæ. But all along that slope from east to west, immediately in front or to the north of his position, stretched the counter-wall built by the Syracusans; beginning at the city-wall on the lowest ground, and reaching up first in a north-westerly, next in a westerly direction, until it joined the fort on the upper ground near the cliff, where the road from Euryâlus down to Syracuse passed. The Syracusans as defenders were on the north side of this counter-wall; he and the Athenians on the south side. It was a complete bar to his progress, and he could not stir a step without making himself master of it; towards which end there were only two possible means—either to storm it in front, or to turn it from its western extremity by marching round up to the Euryâlus. He began by trying the first method. But the wall was abundantly manned and vigorously defended; his battering machines were all burnt or disqualified, and every attempt which he made was completely repulsed.² There remained only the second method—to turn the wall, ascending by circuitous roads to the heights of Euryâlus behind it, and then attacking the fort in which it terminated.

But the march necessary for this purpose—first, up the valley of the Anapus, visible from the Syracusan posts above; next, ascending to the Euryâlus by a narrow and winding path—was so difficult, that even Demosthenês,

Position
and plans
of Demos-
thenês.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 42.

² Thucyd. vii. 43.

naturally sanguine, despaired of being able to force his way up in the daylight, against an enemy seeing the attack. He was therefore constrained to attempt a night-surprise, for which, Nikias and his other colleagues consenting, he accordingly made preparations on the largest and most effective scale. He took the command himself, along with Menander and Eurymedon (Nikias being left to command within the lines)¹—conducting hoplites and light troops, together with masons and carpenters, and all other matters necessary for establishing a fortified post—lastly, giving orders that every man should carry with him provisions for five days.

Fortune so far favoured him, that not only all these preliminary arrangements, but even his march itself, was accomplished without any suspicion of the enemy. At the beginning of a moonlight night, he quitted the lines, moved along the low ground on the left bank of the Anapus and parallel to that river for a considerable distance—then following various roads to the right, arrived at the Euryâlus or highest pitch of Epipolæ, where he found himself in the same track by which the Athenians in coming from Katana a year and a half before—and Gylippus in coming from the interior of the island about ten months before—had passed, in order to get to the slope of Epipolæ above Syracuse. He reached, without being discovered, the extreme Syracusan fort on the high ground—assailed it completely by surprise—and captured it after a feeble resistance. Some of the garrison within it were slain; but the greater part escaped, and ran to give the alarm to the three fortified camps of Syracusans and allies, which were placed one below another behind the long continuous wall,² on the

¹ Thucyd. vii. 43. Diodorus tells us that Demosthenès took with him 10,000 hoplites, and 10,000 light troops—numbers which are not at all to be trusted (xiii. 11).

Plutarch (Nikias, c. 21) says that Nikias was extremely averse to the attack on Epipolæ: Thucydides notices nothing of the kind, and the assertion seems improbable.

The course taken by Demosthenès

in his night-march will be found marked on Plan II. annexed to this volume.

² Thucyd. vii. 42, 43. Καὶ (Demosthenès) ὁρῶν τὸ παρατειχισμα τῶν Συρακοσίων, ᾧ ἐκώλυσαν περιτειχίσαι σφᾶς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἀπλοῦν τε ὄν, καὶ εἰ ἐπικρατήσει τις τῶν τε Ἐπιπολῶν τῆς ἀναβάσεως, καὶ αὐθις τοῦ ἐν αὐταῖς στρατοπέδου, ῥαδίως ἂν αὐτὸ ληφθῇεν (οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑπομείναι ἂν

declivity of Epipolæ—as well as to a chosen regiment of six hundred Syracusan hoplites under Hermokratês,¹ who formed a night-watch or bivouac. This regiment hastened up to the rescue, but Demosthenês and the Athenian vanguard, charging impetuously forward, drove them back in disorder upon the fortified positions in their rear. Even Gylippus, and the Syracusan troops advancing upwards out of these positions, were at first carried back by the same retreating movement.

So far the enterprise of Demosthenês had been successful beyond all reasonable hope. He was master not only of the outer fort of the Syracusan position, but also of the extremity of their counter-wall which rested upon that fort: the counter-wall was no longer defensible, now that

Partial success at first—complete and ruinous defeat finally.

οὐδὲνα) ἡπείχετο ἐπιθέσθαι τῇ περᾷ.

vii. 43. καὶ ἡμέρας μὲν ἀδύνατα ἐδόκει εἶναι λαβεῖν προσελθόντας καὶ ἀντὶάντας, &c.

Dr. Arnold and Göller both interpret this description of Thucydides (see their notes on this chapter, and Dr. Arnold's Appendix, p. 275) as if Nikias, immediately that the Syracusan counter-wall had crossed his blockading line, had evacuated his circle and works on the slope of Epipolæ, and had retired down exclusively into the lower ground below. Dr. Thirlwall too is of the same opinion (Hist. Gr. vol. iii. ch. xxvi. p. 432-434).

This appears to me a mistake. What conceivable motive can be assigned to induce Nikias to yield up to the enemy so important an advantage? If he had once relinquished the slope of Epipolæ to occupy exclusively the marsh beneath the southern cliff—Gylippus and the Syracusans would have taken good care that he should never again have mounted that cliff; nor could he ever have got near to the παρατείχεμα. The moment when the Athenians did at

last abandon their fortifications on the slope of Epipolæ (τὰ ἄνω τείχη) is specially marked by Thucydides afterwards—vii. 60: it was at the last moment of desperation, when the service of all was needed for the final maritime battle in the Great Harbour. Dr. Arnold (p. 275) misinterprets this passage, in my judgement, evading the direct sense of it.

The words of Thucydides, vii. 42 —εἰ ἐπικρατήσαι τις τῶν τε Ἐπιπολῶν τῆς ἀναβάσεως καὶ αὐτῆς τοῦ ἐν αὐταῖς στρατοπέδου—are more correctly conceived by M. Firmin Didot in the note to his translation, than by Arnold and Göller. The στρατοπέδου here indicated does not mean the Athenian Circle, and their partially completed line of circumvallation on the slope of Epipolæ. It means the ground higher up than this, which they had partially occupied at first while building the fort of Labdulum, and of which they had been substantially masters until the arrival of Gylippus, who had now converted it into a camp or στρατοπέδον of the Syracusans.

¹ Diodor. xiii. 11.

he had got on the north or Syracusan side of it—so that the men on the parapet, where it joined the fort, made no resistance and fled. Some of the Athenians even began to tear down the parapets, and demolish this part of the counter-wall; an operation of extreme importance, since it would have opened to Demosthenês a communication with the southern side of the counter-wall, leading directly towards the Athenian lines on Epipolæ. At any rate, his plan of turning the counter-wall was already carried—if he could only have maintained himself in his actual position, even without advancing farther—and if he could have demolished two or three hundred yards of the upper extremity of the wall now in his power. Whether it would have been possible for him to maintain himself without farther advance, until day broke, and thus avoid the unknown perils of a night-battle, we cannot say. But both he and his men, too much flushed with success to think of halting, hastened forward to complete their victory, and to prevent the disordered Syracusans from again recovering a firm array. Unfortunately however their ardour of pursuit (as it constantly happened with Grecian hoplites) disturbed the regularity of their own ranks, so that they were not in condition to stand the shock of the Bœotian hoplites, just emerged from their position, and marching up in steady and excellent order to the scene of action. The Bœotians charged them, and after a short resistance, broke them completely, forcing them to take flight. The fugitives of the van were thus driven back upon their own comrades advancing from behind—still under the impression of success—ignorant of what had passed in front—and themselves urged on by the fresh troops closing up in their rear.

In this manner the whole army presently became one scene of clamour and confusion, wherein there was neither command nor obedience, nor could any one discern what was passing. The light of the moon rendered objects and figures generally visible, without being sufficient to discriminate friend from foe. The beaten Athenians, thrown back upon their comrades, were in many cases mistaken for enemies and slain. The Syracusans and Bœotians, shouting aloud and pursuing their advantage, became intermingled with the foremost Athenians, and both armies thus grouped into knots which only distinguished each other by mutual demand

Disorder of
the Athe-
nians—
great loss
in the
flight.

of the watchword. That test also soon failed, since each party got acquainted with the watchword of the other—especially that of the Athenians, among whom the confusion was the greatest, became well-known to the Syracusans, who kept together in larger parties. Above all, the effect of the pæan or war-shout, on both sides, was remarkable. The Dorians in the Athenian army (from Argos, Korkyra, and other places) raised a pæan not distinguishable from that of the Syracusans: accordingly their shout struck terror into the Athenians themselves, who fancied that they had enemies in their own rear and centre. Such disorder and panic presently ended in a general flight. The Athenians hurried back by the same roads which they had ascended: but these roads were found too narrow for terrified fugitives, and many of them threw away their arms in order to scramble or jump down the cliffs, in which most of them perished. Even of those who safely effected their descent into the plain below, many (especially the new-comers belonging to the armament of Demosthenês) lost their way through ignorance, and were cut off the next day by the Syracusan horse. With terrible loss of numbers, and broken spirit, the Athenians at length found shelter within their own lines. Their loss of arms was even greater than that of men, from the throwing away of shields by those soldiers who leaped the cliff.¹

The overjoyed Syracusans erected two trophies, one upon the road to Epipolæ, the other upon the exact and critical spot where the Bœotians had first withstood and first repelled the enemy. By a victory, so unexpected and overwhelming, their feelings were restored to the same pitch of confidence which had animated them before the arrival of Demosthenês. Again now masters of the field, they again indulged the hope of storming the Athenian lines and destroying the armament; to which end, however, it was thought necessary to obtain additional reinforcements, and Gylippus went in person with this commission to the various cities of Sicily—while Sikanus with fifteen triremes was despatched to Agrigentum, then understood to be wavering, and in a political crisis.²

Elate spirits, and renewed aggressive plans of the Syracusans.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 44, 45.

of slain was 2000. Diodorus gives

² Thucyd. vii. 46. Plutarch (Nicias, c. 21) states that the number

it at 2500 (xiii. 11). Thucydidês does not state it at all.

During the absence of Gylippus, the Athenian generals were left to mourn their recent reverse, and to discuss the exigences of their untoward position. The whole armament was now full of discouragement and weariness; impatient to escape from a scene where fever daily thinned their numbers, and where they seemed destined to nothing but dishonour. Such painful evidences of increasing disorganization only made Demosthenês more strenuous in enforcing the resolution which he had taken before the attack on Epipolæ. He had done his best to strike one decisive blow: the chances of war had turned out against him, and inflicted a humiliating defeat; he now therefore insisted on relinquishing the whole enterprise and returning home forthwith. The season was yet favourable for the voyage (it seems to have been the beginning of August), while the triremes recently brought, as yet unused, rendered them masters at sea for the present. It was idle (he added) to waste more time and money in staying to carry on war against Syracuse, which they could not now hope to subdue; especially when Athens had so much need of them all at home, against the garrison of Dekeleia.¹

This proposition, though espoused and seconded by Eurymedon, was peremptorily opposed by Nicias; who contended, first, that their present distress and the unpromising chances for the future, though he admitted the full reality of both, ought not nevertheless to be publicly proclaimed. A formal resolution to retire, passed in the presence of so many persons, would inevitably become known to the enemy, and therefore could never be executed with silence and secrecy²—as such a resolution

These two authors probably both copied from some common authority, not Thucydides; perhaps Philistus.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 47.

² Thucyd. vii. 48. 'Ο δὲ Νικίας ἐνόμιζε μὲν καὶ αὐτὸς πονηρὰ σφῶν τὰ πράγματα εἶναι, τῷ δὲ λόγῳ οὐκ ἐβούλετο αὐτὰ ἀσθενῆ ἀποδεικνύσαι, οὐδ' ἐμφανῶς σφᾶς ψηφίζομένους μετὰ πολλῶν τὴν ἀναχώρησιν τοῖς πολεμίοις καταγγέλλοντας γίνεσθαι·

λαθεῖν γὰρ ἂν, ὅποτε βούλοιντο, τοῦτο ποιοῦντες πολλῶ ἤττον.

It seems probable that some of the taxiarchs and trierarchs were present at this deliberation, as we find in another case afterwards, c. 60. Possibly Demosthenês might even desire that they *should* be present, as witnesses respecting the feeling of the army; and also as supporters, if the matter came afterwards to be debated in the

ought to be. But farthermore, he (Nikias) took a decided objection to the resolution itself. He would never consent to carry back the armament, without specific authority from home to do so. Sure he was, that the Athenian people would never tolerate such a proceeding. When submitted to the public assembly at home, the conduct of the generals would be judged, not by persons who had been at Syracuse and cognisant of the actual facts, but by hearers who would learn all that they knew from the artful speeches of criminative orators. Even the citizens actually serving—though now loud in cries of suffering, and impatient to get home—would alter their tone when they were safe in the public assembly; and would turn round to denounce their generals as having been bribed to bring away the army. Speaking his own personal feelings, he knew too well the tempers of his countrymen to expose himself to the danger of thus perishing under a charge alike unmerited and disgraceful. Sooner would he incur any extremity of risk from the enemy.¹ It must be recollected too (he added) that if *their* affairs were now bad, those of Syracuse were as bad, and even worse. For more than a year, the war had been imposing upon the Syracusans a ruinous cost, in subsistence for foreign allies as well as in keeping up outlying posts—so that they had already spent 2000 talents, besides heavy debts contracted and not paid. They could not continue in this course longer; yet the suspension of their payments would at once alienate their allies, and leave them helpless. The cost of the war (to which Demosthenês had alluded as a reason for returning home) could be much better borne by Athens; while a little farther pressure would utterly break down the Syracusans. He (Nikias) therefore advised to remain where they were and continue the siege;² the more so as their fleet had now become unquestionably the superior.

public assembly at Athens. It is to this fact that the words ἐμψυχῶς μετὰ πολλῶν seem to allude.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 48. Οὐχοῦν βούλεσθαι αὐτός γε, ἐπιστάμενος τὰς Ἀθηναίων φύσεις, ἐπὶ αἰσχυρᾷ γε αἰτίᾳ καὶ ἁδίκῳ ὅπ' Ἀθηναίων ἀπολέσθαι, μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων, εἰ δεῖ, κινδυνεύσας τοῦτο παθεῖν, ἰδίᾳ.

The situation of the last word ἰδίᾳ in this sentence is perplexing,

because it can hardly be construed except either with ἀπολέσθαι or with αὐτός γε: for Nikias could not run any risk of perishing *separately* by the hands of the enemy—unless we are to ascribe to him an absurd rhodomontade quite foreign to his character. Compare Plutarch, Nikias, c. 22.

² Thucyd. vii. 48. τριβεῖν οὖν ἔφη χρῆναι προσκαθημένους, &c.

Both Demosthenês and Eurymedon protested in the strongest language against the proposition of Nikias. Especially they treated the plan of remaining in the Great Harbour as fraught with ruin, and insisted, at the very least, on quitting this position without a moment's delay. Even admitting (for argument) the scruples of Nikias against abandoning the Syracusan war without formal authority from home, they still urged an immediate transfer of their camp from the Great Harbour to Thapsus or Katana. At either of these stations they could prosecute operations against Syracuse, with all the advantage of a wider range of country for supplies, a healthier spot, and above all of an open sea, which was absolutely indispensable to the naval tactics of Athenians; escaping from that narrow basin which condemned them to inferiority even on their own proper element. At all events to remove, and remove forthwith, out of the Great Harbour—such was the pressing requisition of Demosthenês and Eurymedon.¹

But even to the modified motion of transferring the actual position to Thapsus or Katana, Nikias refused to consent. He insisted on remaining as they were;—and it appears that Menander and Euthydemus² (colleagues named by the assembly at home before the departure of the second armament) must have voted under the influence of his authority; whereby the majority became on his side. Nothing less than being in a minority, probably, would have induced Demosthenês and Eurymedon to submit—on a point of such transcendent importance.

It was thus that the Athenian armament remained without quitting the Harbour, yet apparently quite inactive, during a period which cannot have been less than between three weeks and a month, until Gylippus returned to Syracuse with fresh reinforcements. Throughout the army, hope of success appears to have vanished, while anxiety for return had become general. The

¹ Thucyd. vii. 49. 'Ο δὲ Δημοσθένης περὶ μὲν τοῦ προσκαθῆσθαι οὐδ' ὁπωσοῦν ἐνεδέχεται—τό δὲ ἔμπαν εἰπεῖν, οὐδενὶ πρόπῳ οἱ εἴη ἀρέσχειν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔτι

μένειν, ἀλλ' ὅτι τάχιστα ἦδη καὶ μὴ μέλλειν ἐξανίστασθαι. Καὶ ὁ Εὐρυμέδων αὐτῷ τοῦτο ζήτηγόρευεν.

² Thucyd. vii. 69; Diodor. xiii. 12.

opinions of Demosthenês and Eurymedon were doubtless well-known, and orders for retreat were expected, but never came. Nikias obstinately refused to give them, during the whole of this fatal interval; which plunged the army into the abyss of ruin, instead of mere failure in their aggressive enterprise.

So unaccountable did such obstinacy appear, that many persons gave Nikias credit for knowing more than he chose to reveal. Even Thucydidês thinks that he was misled by that party in Syracuse, with whom he had always kept up a secret correspondence, (seemingly apart from his colleagues,) and who still urged him, by special messages, not to go away; assuring him that Syracuse could not possibly go on longer. Without fully trusting these intimations, he could not bring himself to act against them. He therefore hung back from day to day, refusing to pronounce the decisive word.¹

Nothing throughout the whole career of Nikias is so inexplicable as his guilty fatuity—for we can ^{Infatuation of Nikias} call it by no lighter name, seeing that it involved all the brave men around him in one common ruin with himself—at the present critical juncture. How can we suppose him to have really believed that the Syracusans, now in the flood-tide of success, and when Gylippus was gone forth to procure additional forces, would break down and be unable to carry on the war? Childish as such credulity seems, we are nevertheless compelled to admit it as real, to such an extent as to counterbalance all the pressing motives for departure; motives, enforced by discerning colleagues as well as by the complaints of the army, and brought home to his own observation by the

¹ Thucyd. vii. 48. "Ἀ ἐπιστάμενος, τῷ μὲν ἔργῳ ἐτι ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρω ἐχῶν καὶ διττοκοπῶν ἀνείχετο, τῷ εμφανεὶ τότε λόγῳ οὐκ ἐφη ἀπάξειν τὴν στρατιάν.

The insignificance of the party in Syracuse which corresponded with Nikias may be reasonably inferred from Thucyd. vii. 55. It consisted in part of those Leontines who had been incorporated into the Syracusan citizenship (Diodor. xiii. 18).

Polyænus (i. 43, 1) has a tale

respecting a revolt of the slaves or villeins (οἰκέται) at Syracuse during the Athenian siege, under a leader named Sosikratês—a revolt suppressed by the stratagem of Hermokratês. That various attempts of this sort took place at Syracuse during these two trying years, is by no means improbable. In fact, it is difficult to understand how the numerous predial slaves were kept in order during the great pressure and danger, prior to the coming of Gylippus.

experience of the late naval defeat. At any rate, it served as an excuse for that fatal weakness of his character which made him incapable of taking resolutions founded on prospective calculations, and chained him to his actual position until he was driven to act by imminent necessity.

But we discern on the present occasion another motive, which counts for much in dictating his hesitation. The other generals think with satisfaction of going back to their country, and rescuing the force which yet remained, even under circumstances of disappointment and failure. Not so Nikias: he knows too well the reception which he had deserved, and which might possibly be in store for him. Avowedly indeed, he anticipates reproach from the Athenians against the generals, but only unmerited reproach, on the special ground of bringing away the army without orders from home;—adding some harsh criticisms upon the injustice of the popular judgment and the perfidy of his own soldiers. But in the first place, we may remark that Demosthenês and Eurymedon, though as much responsible as he was for this decision, had no such fear of popular injustice; or if they had, saw clearly that the obligation of braving it was here imperative. And in the next place, no man ever had so little reason to complain of the popular judgment as Nikias. The mistakes of the people in regard to him had always been those of indulgence, over-estimate, and over-constancy. But Nikias foresaw too well that he would have more to answer for at Athens than the simple fact of sanctioning retreat under existing circumstances. He could not but remember the pride and sanguine hopes under which he had originally conducted the expedition out of Peiræus, contrasted with the miserable sequel and ignominious close,—even if the account had been now closed, without worse. He could not but be conscious, more or less, how much of all this was owing to his own misjudgment; and under such impressions, the idea of meeting the free criticisms and scrutiny of his fellow citizens (even putting aside the chance of judicial trial) must have been insupportably humiliating. To Nikias,—a perfectly brave man, and suffering withal under an incurable disease,—life at Athens had neither charm nor honour left. Hence, as much as from any other reason, he was induced to withhold the order for departure; clinging to the hope that some

unforeseen boon of fortune might yet turn up—and yielding to the idlest delusions from correspondents in the interior of Syracuse.¹

Nearly a month after the night-battle on Epipolæ,² Gylippus and Sikanus both returned to Syracuse. The latter had been unsuccessful at Agrigentum, where the philo-Syracusan party had been sent into banishment before his arrival; but Gylippus brought with him a considerable force of Sicilian Greeks, together with those Peloponnesian hoplites who had started from Cape Tænarus in the early spring, and who had made their way from Kyrênê first along the coast of Africa and then across to Selinus. Such increase of strength immediately determined the Syracusans to resume the aggressive, both by land and by sea. In the Athenians, as they saw the new allies marching in over Epipolæ, it produced a deeper despondency, combined with bitter regret that they had not adopted the proposition of departing immediately after the battle of Epipolæ, when Demosthenês first proposed it. The late interval of lingering hopeless inaction with continued sickness, had farther weakened their strength, and Demosthenês now again pressed the resolution for immediate departure. Whatever fancies Nikias may have indulged about Syracusan embarrassments, were dissipated by the arrival of Gylippus; nor did he venture to persist in his former peremptory opposition—though even now he seems to have assented against his own conviction.³ He however insisted with good reason, that no formal or public vote should be taken on the occasion—but that the order should be circulated through the camp, as privately as possible, to be ready for departure at a given signal. Intimation was sent to Katana that

Increase of force and confidence in Syracuse —Nikias at length consents to retreat. Orders for retreat privately circulated.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 49. Ἀντικείμενος δὲ τοῦ Νικίου, ὅκνος τις καὶ μέλλουσις ἐνεγένετο, καὶ αἶμα ὑπόνοια μὴ τι καὶ πλέον εἰδώς ὁ Νικίας ἐσχυρίζεται.

The language of Justin respecting this proceeding is just and discriminating—"Nicias, seu pudore male actæ rei, seu metu destitutæ spei civium, seu impellente fato, manere contendit" (Justin. iv. 5).

² This interval may be inferred (see Dodwell, Ann. Thucyd. vii. 50) from the state of the moon at the time of the battle of Epipolæ, compared with the subsequent eclipse.

³ Thucyd. vii. 50. ὡς αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ ὁ Νικίας ἔτι ὁμοίως ἔναντι τοῦ, &c. Diodor. xiii. 12. Ὁ Νικίας ἡναγκάσθη συγχωρῆσαι, &c.

the armament was on the point of coming away—with orders to forward no farther supplies.¹

This plan was proceeding successfully: the ships were made ready—much of the property of the army had already been conveyed aboard without awakening the suspicion of the enemy—the signal would have been hoisted on the ensuing morning—and within a few hours, this fated armament would have found itself clear of the harbour, with comparatively small loss²—when the Gods themselves (I speak in the language and feelings of the Athenian camp) interfered to forbid its departure. On the very night before (the 27th August, 413 B.C.)—which was full moon—the moon was eclipsed. Such a portent, impressive to the Athenians at all times, was doubly so under their present despondency, and many of them construed it as a divine prohibition against departure until a certain time should have elapsed, with expiatory ceremonies to take off the effect. They made known their wish for postponement to Nikias and his colleagues; but their interference was superfluous, for Nikias himself was more deeply affected than any one else. He consulted the prophets, who declared that the army ought not to decamp until thrice nine days, a full circle of the moon, should have passed over.³ And Nikias took upon himself to announce, that until after the interval indicated by them, he would not permit even any discussion or proposition on the subject.

The decision of the prophets, which Nikias thus made his own was a sentence of death to the Athenian army: yet it went along with the general feeling, and was obeyed without hesitation. Even Demosthenês, though if he had commanded alone, he might have tried to overrule it—found himself compelled to yield. Yet according to Philochorus (himself a professional diviner, skilful in construing the

¹ Thucyd. vii. 60.

² Diodor. xiii. 12. Οἱ στρατιῶται τὰ σκεῦη ἐνέστιθεντο, &c. Plutarch, Nikias, c. 23.

³ The moon was totally eclipsed on this night, August 27, 413 B.C., from 27 minutes past 9 to 34 minutes past 10 P.M. (Wurm, De Ponderib. Græcor. sect. xciv. p.

184)—speaking with reference to an observer in Sicily.

Thucydides states that Nikias adopted the injunction of the prophets, to tarry *thrice nine days* (vii. 50). Diodorus says *three days*. Plutarch intimates that Nikias went beyond the injunction of the prophets, who only insisted on

religious meaning of events), it was a decision decidedly wrong; that is, wrong according to the canonical principles of divination. To men planning escape or any other operation requiring silence and secrecy, an eclipse of the moon, as hiding light and producing darkness, was (he affirmed) an encouraging sign, and ought to have made the Athenians even more willing and forward in quitting the harbour. We are told, too, that Nikias had recently lost by death Stilbidês, the ablest prophet in his service; and that he was thus forced to have recourse to prophets of inferior ability.¹ His piety left no means untried of appeasing the gods, by prayer, sacrifice, and expiatory ceremonies, continued until the necessity of actual conflict arrived.²

The impediment thus finally and irreparably intercepting the Athenian departure, was the direct, though unintended consequence, of the delay previously caused by Nikias. We cannot doubt, however, that, when the eclipse first happened, he regarded it as a sign confirmatory of the opinion which he had himself before delivered, and that he congratulated himself upon having so long resisted the proposition for going away. Let us add, that all those Athenians who were predisposed to look upon eclipses as signs from heaven of calamity about to come, would find themselves strengthened in that belief by the unparalleled woes even now impending over this unhappy army.

What interpretation the Syracusans, confident and victorious, put on the eclipse, we are not told. But they knew well how to interpret the fact, which speedily came to their knowledge, that the Athenians had fully resolved to make a furtive escape, and had only been prevented by the eclipse. Such a resolution, amounting to an unequivocal confession of helplessness, emboldened

Renewed attacks of the Syracusans—defeat of the Athenian fleet in the Great Harbour.

three days, while he resolved on remaining for an entire lunar period (Plutarch, Nikias, c. 23).

I follow the statement of Thucydides: there is no reason to believe that Nikias would lengthen the time beyond what the prophets prescribed.

The erroneous statement respecting this memorable event, in so respectable an author as Polybius, is not a little surprising (Polyb. ix. 19).

¹ Plutarch, Nikias, c. 22; Diodor.

xiii. 12; Thucyd. vii. 50. Stilbidês was eminent in his profession of a prophet: see Aristophan. Pac. 1029, with the citations from Eupolis and Philochorus in the Scholia.

Compare the description of the effect produced by the eclipse of the sun at Thebes, immediately prior to the last expedition of Pelopidas into Thessaly (Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 31).

² Plutarch, Nikias, c. 24.

the Syracusans yet farther, to crush them as they were in the harbour, and never to permit them to occupy even any other post in Sicily. Accordingly Gylippus caused his triremes to be manned and practised for several days: he then drew out his land-force, and made a demonstration of no great significance against the Athenian lines. On the morrow, he brought out all his forces, both land and naval; with the former of which he beset the Athenian lines, while the fleet, 76 triremes in number, was directed to sail up to the Athenian naval station. The Athenian fleet, 86 triremes strong, sailed out to meet it, and a close, general, and desperate action took place. The fortune of Athens had fled. The Syracusans first beat the centre division of the Athenians; next, the right division under Eurymedon, who in attempting an evolution to outflank the enemy's left, forgot those narrow limits of the harbour which were at every turn the ruin of the Athenian mariner—neared the land too much—and was pinned up against it, in the recess of Daskon, by the vigorous attack of the Syracusans. He was here slain, and his division destroyed: successively, the entire Athenian fleet was beaten and driven ashore.

Few of the defeated ships could get into their own station. Most of them were forced ashore or grounded on points without those limits; upon which Gylippus marched down his land-force to the water's edge, in order to prevent the retreat of the crews as well as to assist the Syracusan seamen in hauling off the ships as prizes. His march however was so hurried and disorderly, that the Tyrrhenian troops, on guard at the flank of the Athenian station, sallied out against them as they approached, beat the foremost of them, and drove them away from the shore into the marsh called Lysimeleia. More Syracusan troops came to their aid; but the Athenians also, anxious above all things for the protection of their ships, came forth in greater numbers; and a general battle ensued in which the latter were victorious. Though they did not inflict much loss upon the enemy, yet they saved most of their own triremes which had been driven ashore, together with the crews—and carried them into the naval station. Except for this success on land, the entire Athenian fleet would have been destroyed: as it was, the defeat was still complete, and eighteen

Partial success ashore against Gylippus.

triremes were lost, all their crews being slain. This was probably the division of Eurymedon, which having been driven ashore in the recess of Daskon, was too far off from the Athenian station to receive any land assistance. As the Athenians were hauling in their disabled triremes, the Syracusans made a last effort to destroy them by means of a fireship, for which the wind happened to be favourable. But the Athenians found means to prevent her approach, and to extinguish the flames.¹

Here was a complete victory gained over Athens on her own element—gained with inferior numbers—gained even over the fresh, and yet formidable fleet recently brought by Demosthenês. It told but too plainly on which side the superiority now lay—how well the Syracusans had organized their naval strength for the specialties of their own harbour—how ruinous had been the folly of Nikias in retaining his excellent seamen imprisoned within that petty and unwholesome lake, where land and water alike did the work of their enemies. It not only disheartened the Athenians, but belied all their past experience, and utterly confounded them. Sickness of the whole enterprise, and repentance for having undertaken it, now became uppermost in their minds: yet it is remarkable that we hear of no complaints against Nikias separately.² But repentance came too late. The Syracusans, fully alive to the importance of their victory, sailed round the harbour in triumph as again their own,³ and already looked on the enemy within it as their prisoners. They determined to close up and guard the mouth of it, from Plemmyrium to Ortygia, so as to leave no farther liberty of exit.

The Syracusans determine to block up the mouth of the harbour, and destroy or capture the whole Athenian armament.

Nor were they insensible how vastly the scope of the contest was now widened, and the value of the stake before them enhanced. It was not merely to rescue their own city from siege, nor even to repel and destroy the besieging army, that they were now contending. It was to extinguish the entire power of Athens, and liberate the half of Greece from dependence; for Athens could never be expected to survive so terrific a loss as that

Large views of the Syracusans against the power of Athens—new hazards now opened to endanger that power.

¹ Thuc. vii. 52, 53; Diod. xiii. 13.

² Thucyd. vii. 55. Οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν παντί δὲ ἄβουλας ἦσαν, καὶ ὁ πρ-

βάλογος αὐτοῖς μέγας ἦν, καὶ ὁ δὲ μετῴων ἔτι τῆς στρατιᾶς ὁ μεταίματος.

³ Thucyd. vii. 56. Οἱ δὲ Συρακο-

of the entire double armament before Syracuse.¹ The Syracusans exulted in the thought that this great achievement would be theirs; that their city was the field, and their navy the chief instrument, of victory; a lasting source of glory to them, not merely in the eyes of contemporaries, but even in those of posterity. Their pride swelled when they reflected on the Pan-Hellenic importance which the siege of Syracuse had now acquired, and when they counted up the number and variety of Greek warriors who were now fighting, on one side or the other, between Euryâlus and Plemmyrium. With the exception of the great struggle between Athens and the Peloponnesian confederacy, never before had combatants so many and so miscellaneous been engaged under the same banners. Greeks continental and

Vast numbers, and miscellaneous origin, of the combatants now engaged in fighting for or against Syracuse.

insular—Ionic, Doric, and Æolic—autonomous and dependent—volunteers and mercenaries—from Miletus and Chios in the east to Selinus in the west—were all here to be found; and not merely Greeks, but also the barbaric Sikels, Egestæans, Tyrrhenians, and Iapygians. If the Lacedæmonians, Corinthians, and Bœotians, were fighting on the side of Syracuse—the Argeians and Mantineians, not to mention the great insular cities, stood in arms against her. The jumble of kinship among the combatants on both sides, as well as the cross action of different local antipathies, is put in lively antithesis by Thucydidês.² But amidst so vast an assembled number, of which they were the chiefs, the paymasters, and the centre of combination—the Syracusans might well feel a sense of personal aggrandisement, and a consciousness of the great blow which they were about to strike, sufficient to exalt them for the time above the level even of their great Dorian chiefs in Peloponnesus.

It was their first operation, occupying three days, to close up the mouth of the Great Harbour, which was nearly one mile broad, with vessels of every description—triremes, traders, boats, &c.—anchored in an oblique direction, and chained together.³ They at the same time prepared their naval force with redoubled zeal for the desperate struggle

The Syracusans block up the mouth of the harbour.

οἱ τὸν τε λιμένα εὐθὺς παρέπλεον ἰδεῶς, &c.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 56.

² Thucyd. vii. 57, 58.

³ Thucyd. vii. 59; Diodor. xiii. 14.

which they knew to be coming. They then awaited the efforts of the Athenians, who watched their proceedings with sadness and anxiety.

Nikias and his colleagues called together the principal officers to deliberate what was to be done. As they had few provisions remaining, and had counter-ordered their farther supplies, some instant and desperate effort was indispensable; and the only point in debate was, whether they should burn their fleet and retire by land, or make a fresh maritime exertion to break out of the harbour. Such had been the impression left by the recent sea-fight, that many in the camp leaned to the former scheme.¹ But the generals resolved upon first trying the latter, and exhausted all their combinations to give to it the greatest possible effect. They now evacuated the upper portion of their lines, both on the higher ground of Epipolæ, and even on the lower ground, such portion as was nearest to the southern cliff; confining themselves to a limited fortified space close to the shore, just adequate for their sick, their wounded, and their stores; in order to spare the necessity for a large garrison to defend them, and thus leave nearly their whole force disposable for sea-service. They then made ready every trireme in the station, which could be rendered ever so imperfectly seaworthy, constraining every fit man to serve aboard them, without distinction of age, rank, or country. The triremes were manned with double crews of soldiers, hoplites as well as bowmen and darters—the latter mostly Akarnanians; while the hoplites, stationed at the prow with orders to board the enemy as quickly as possible, were furnished with grappling-irons to detain the enemy's ship immediately after the moment of collision, in order that it might not be withdrawn and the collision repeated, with all its injurious effects arising from the strength and massiveness of the Syracusan epôtids. The best consultation was held with the steersmen as to arrangement and manœuvres of every trireme, and no precaution omitted which the scanty means at hand allowed. In the well-known impossibility of obtaining new provisions, every man was anxious to hurry on the struggle.² But Nikias, as he mustered them on the shore immediately before going aboard, saw but

The Athenians resolve to force their way out—preparations made by the generals.

¹ Plutarch, Nikias, c. 24.

² Thucyd. vii. 60.

too plainly that it was the mere stress of desperation which impelled them; that the elasticity, the disciplined confidence, the maritime pride, habitual to the Athenians on shipboard—was extinct, or dimly and faintly burning.

He did his best to revive them, by exhortations unusually emphatic and impressive. "Recollect (he said) that you too, not less than the Syracusans, are now fighting for your own safety and for your country; for it is only by victory in the coming struggle that any of you can ever hope to see his country again. Yield not to despair like raw recruits after a first defeat: you, Athenians and allies, familiar with the unexpected revolutions of war, will hope now for the fair turn of fortune, and fight with a spirit worthy of the great force which you see here around you. We generals have now made effective provision against our two great disadvantages—the narrow circuit of the harbour, and the thickness of the enemy's prows.¹ Sad as the necessity is, we have thrown aside all our Athenian skill and tactics, and have prepared to fight under the conditions forced upon us by the enemy—a land battle on shipboard.² It will be for you to conquer in this last desperate struggle, where there is no friendly shore to receive you if you give way. You, hoplites on the deck, as soon as you have the enemy's trireme in contact, keep him fast, and relax not until you have swept away his hoplites and mastered his deck. You, seamen and rowers, must yet keep up your courage, in spite of this sad failure in our means, and subversion of our tactics. You are better defended on deck above, and you have more triremes to help you, than in the recent defeat. Such of you as are not Athenian citizens, I entreat to recollect the valuable privileges which you have hitherto enjoyed from serving in the navy of Athens. Though not really citizens, you have been reputed and treated as such: you have acquired our dialect, you have copied our habits, and have thus enjoyed the admiration, the imposing station, and the security, arising from our great empire.³ Partaking as

¹ Thucyd. vii. 62. Ἄ δὲ ἀρωγὰ ἐνεῖδμεν ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ λιμένος στενότητι πρὸς τὸν μέλλοντα ὄχλον τῶν νεῶν ἔσεσθαι, &c.

² Thucyd. vii. 62. Ἐς τοῦτο γάρ

δὴ ἡναγκάσμεθα, ὥστε πεζομαχεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν, καὶ τὸ μῆτε αὐτοὺς ἀνακρούεσθαι, μῆτε ἐκείνους ἔχειν, ὡφέλιμον φαίνεται.

³ Thucyd. vii. 63. Τοῖς δὲ ναύταις

you do freely in the benefits of that empire, do not now betray it to these Sicilians and Corinthians whom you have so often beaten. For such of you as *are* Athenians, I again remind you that Athens has neither fresh triremes, nor fresh hoplites, to replace those now here. Unless you are now victorious, her enemies near home will find her defenceless; and our countrymen there will become slaves to Sparta, as you will to Syracuse. Recollect, every man of you, that you now going aboard here are the *all* of Athens—her hoplites, her ships, her entire remaining city, and her splendid name.¹ Bear up then and conquer, every man with his best mettle, in this one last struggle—for Athens as well as yourselves, and on an occasion which will never return."

If, in translating the despatch written home ten months before by Nikias to the people of Athens, we were compelled to remark, that the greater part of it was the bitterest condemnation of his own previous policy as commander—so we are here carried back, when we find him striving to palliate the ruinous effects of that confined space of water which paralysed the Athenian seamen, to his own obstinate improvidence in forbidding the egress of the fleet when

Agony of Nikias—his efforts to encourage the officers.

παραινῶ, καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τῷδ᾽ καὶ δέουμαι, μὴ ἐκπεπληγῆται τι ταῖς συμφοραῖς ἄγαν . . . ἐκείνη, τε τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνθουμείσθαι, ὡς ἀξία ἐστὶ διασωσασθαι, οἱ τέως Ἀθηναῖοι νομιζόμενοι καὶ μὴ ὄντες ὁμῶν, τῆς τε φωνῆς τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τῶν τρόπων τῇ μυχῇσι ἐλαυμάζεσθαι κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς ἡμετέρας οὐκ ἔλασσον κατὰ τὸ ὠφελεῖσθαι, ἔς τε τὸ φοβερόν τοις ὑπηκόοις καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι πολὺ πλεῖον, μεταίχετε, ὥστε κοινωνοὶ μόνον ἐλευθέρως ἡμῖν τῆς ἀρχῆς ὄντες, δικαίως οὐτὴν νῦν μὴ καταπροδίδετε, &c.

Dr. Arnold, (together with Gölter and Poppo), following the Scho-bast, explain these words as having particular reference to the metics in the Athenian naval service. But I cannot think this correct. All persons in that service—who were

freemen, but yet not citizens of Athens—are here designated; partly metics, doubtless, but partly also citizens of the islands and dependent allies—the ξένοι ναοβάται alluded to by the Corinthians and by Periklēs at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. i. 121-143) as the ὠνητὴ δούραμις μᾶλλον ἢ οἰκιστὰς of Athens. Without doubt there were numerous foreign seamen in the warlike navy of Athens, who derived great consideration as well as profit from the service, and often passed themselves off for Athenian citizens when they really were not so.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 64. "Ὅτι οἱ ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν ὁμῶν νῦν ἐσόμενοι, καὶ πέλοι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις εἰσι καὶ νῆες, καὶ ἡ ὑπόλοιπος πόλις, καὶ τὸ μέγα ὄνομα τῶν Ἀθηναίων . . .

insisted on by Demosthenês. His hearers probably were too much absorbed with the terrible present, to revert to irremediable mistakes of the past. Immediately on the conclusion of his touching address, the order was given to go aboard, and the seamen took their places. But when the triremes were fully manned, and the trierarchs, after superintending the embarkation, were themselves about to enter and push off—the agony of Nikias was too great to be repressed. Feeling more keenly than any man the intensity of this last death struggle, and the serious, but inevitable shortcomings of the armament in its present condition—he still thought that he had not said enough for the occasion. He now renewed his appeal personally to the trierarchs,—all of them citizens of rank and wealth at Athens. They were all familiarly known to him, and he addressed himself to every man separately by his own name, his father's name, and his tribe—adjuring him by the deepest and most solemn motives which could touch the human feelings. Some he reminded of their own previous glories, others of the achievements of illustrious ancestors, imploring them not to dishonour or betray these precious titles: to all alike he recalled the charm of their beloved country, with its full political freedom and its unconstrained licence of individual agency to every man: to all alike he appealed in the names of their wives, their children, and their paternal gods. He cared not for being suspected of trenching upon the common-places of rhetoric: he caught at every topic which could touch the inmost affections, awaken the in-bred patriotism, and rekindle the abated courage of the officers, whom he was sending forth to this desperate venture. He at length constrained himself to leave off, still fancying in his anxiety that he ought to say more—and proceeded to marshal the land-force for the defence of the lines, as well as along the shore where they might render as much service and as much encouragement as possible to the combatants on shipboard.¹

Very different was the spirit prevalent, and very opposite the burning words uttered, on the sea-board of the Syracusan station, as the leaders were mustering their men immediately before embarkation. They had been apprised of the grappling irons now about to be employed by

Bold and animated language of Gylippus to the Syracusan fleet.

¹ See the striking chapter of style of Diodorus (xiii. 15) becomes Thucyd. vii. 69. Even the same animated in describing this scene.

the Athenians, and had guarded against them in part by stretching hides along their bows, so that the "iron-hand" might slip off without acquiring any hold. The preparatory movements even within the Athenian station being perfectly visible, Gylippus sent the fleet out with the usual prefatory harangue. He complimented them on the great achievements which they had already performed in breaking down the naval power of Athens, so long held irresistible.¹ He reminded them that the sally of their enemies was only a last effort of despair, seeking nothing but escape, undertaken without confidence in themselves, and under the necessity of throwing aside all their own tactics in order to copy feebly those of the Syracusans.² He called upon them to recollect the destructive purposes which the invaders had brought with them against Syracuse, to inflict with resentful hand the finishing stroke upon this half-ruined armament, and to taste the delight of satiating a legitimate revenge.³

The Syracusan fleet—76 triremes strong, as in the last battle—was the first to put off from shore; Pythen with the Corinthians in the centre, Sikanus and Agatharchus on the wings. A certain proportion of them were placed near the mouth of the harbour, in order to guard the barrier; while the rest were distributed around the harbour, in order to attack the Athenians from different sides as soon as they should approach. Moreover the surface of the harbour swarmed with the light craft of the Syracusans, in many of which embarked youthful volunteers, sons of the best families in the city;⁴ boats of no mean service during the battle, saving

Syracusan
arrange-
ments. Con-
dition of the
Great Har-
bour—sympathising
popu-
lation sur-
rounding it.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 65.

² Thucyd. vii. 66, 67.

³ Thucyd. vii. 68. πρὸς οὖν ἀταξίαν τε τοιαύτην . . . ὀργῇ προσμίζωμεν, καὶ νομίζωμεν ἅμα μὲν νομιμωτάτον εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἐναντίους, οἳ ἂν ὡς ἐπιτιμωρία τοῦ προσπεσόντος δικαίωσιν ἀποπλήσαι τῆς γνώμης τὸ θυμούμενον, ἅμα δὲ ἐχθρόν ἀμύνεσθαι ἐγγενητόμενον ἡμῖν, καὶ (τὸ λεγόμενον πού) ἡδιστόν εἶναι.

This plain and undisguised invocation of the angry and revenge-

ful passions should be noticed, as a mark of character and manners.

⁴ Diodorus, xiii. 14. Plutarch has a similar statement, in reference to the previous battle: but I think he must have confused one battle with the other—for his account can hardly be made to harmonise with Thucydides (Plutarch, Nikias, c. 24).

It is to be recollected that both Plutarch and Diodorus had probably read the description of the

or destroying the seamen cast overboard from disabled ships, as well as annoying the fighting Athenian triremes. The day was one sacred to Hêraklês at Syracuse; and the prophets announced that the god would ensure victory to the Syracusans, provided they stood on the defensive, and did not begin the attack.¹ Moreover the entire shore round the harbour, except the Athenian station and its immediate neighbourhood, was crowded with Syracusan soldiers and spectators; while the walls of Ortygia, immediately overhanging the water, were lined with the feeble population of the city, the old men, women, and children. From the Athenian station presently came forth 110 triremes, under Demosthenês, Menander, and Euthydêmus—with the customary pæan, its tone probably partaking of the general sadness of the camp. They steered across direct to the mouth of the harbour, beholding on all sides the armed enemies ranged along the shore, as well as the unarmed multitudes who were imprecating the vengeance of the gods upon their heads; while for them there was no sympathy, except among the fellow-sufferers within their own lines. Inside of this narrow basin, rather more than five English miles in circuit, 194 ships of war, each manned with more than 200 men, were about to join battle—in the presence of countless masses around, all with palpitating hearts, and near enough both to see and hear; the most picturesque battle (if we could abstract our minds from its terrible interest) probably in history, without smoke or other impediments to vision, and in the clear atmosphere of Sicily—a serious and magnified realization of those Naumachiæ which the Roman emperors used to exhibit with gladiators on the Italian lakes, for the recreation of the people.

The Athenian fleet made directly for that portion of the barrier where a narrow opening (perhaps closed by a moveable chain) had been left for merchant-vessels. Their first impetuous attack broke through the Syracusan squadron defending it, and they were already attempting to sever its connecting bonds, when the enemy from all

Attempt of the Athenian fleet to break out—battle in the Great Harbour.

battles in the Great Harbour of Syracuse, contained in Philistus; a better witness, if we had his account before us, even than Thucydides; since he was probably at this time

in Syracuse, and was perhaps actually engaged.

¹ Plutarch, Nikias, c. 24, 25. Timæus reckoned the aid of Heraklês as having been one of the great

sides crowded in upon them and forced them to desist. Presently the battle became general, and the combatants were distributed in various parts of the harbour. On both sides a fierce and desperate courage was displayed, even greater than had been shown on any of the former occasions. At the first onset, the skill and tactics of the steersmen shone conspicuous, well-seconded by zeal on the part of the rowers and by their ready obedience to the voice of the Keleustês. As the vessels neared, the bowmen, slingers and throwers on the deck hurled clouds of missiles against the enemy—next was heard the loud crash of the two impinging metallic fronts, resounding all along the shore.¹ When the vessels were thus once in contact, they were rarely allowed to separate: a strenuous hand-fight then commenced by the hoplites in each, trying respectively to board and master their enemy's deck. It was not always however that each trireme had its own single and special enemy: sometimes one ship had two or three enemies to contend with at once—sometimes she fell aboard of one unsought, and became entangled. After a certain time, the fight still obstinately continuing, all sort of battle order became lost; the skill of the steersman was of little avail, and the voice of the Keleustês was drowned amidst the universal din and mingled cries from victors as well as vanquished. On both sides emulous exhortations were poured forth, together with reproach and sarcasm addressed to any ship which appeared flinching from the contest;

causes of Syracusan victory over the Athenians. He gave several reasons why the god was provoked against the Athenians: see Timæus, *Fragm.* 104, ed. Didot.

¹ The destructive impact of these metallic masses at the heads of the ships of war, as well as the perilousness practised by a lighter ship to avoid direct collision against a heavier—is strikingly illustrated by a passage in Plutarch's *Life of Lucullus*, where a naval engagement between the Roman general, and Neoptolemus the admiral of Mithridates, is described. "Lucullus was on board a Rhodian quinquereme, commanded by Damago-

ras, a skilful Rhodian pilot; while Neoptolemus was approaching with a ship much heavier, and driving forward to a direct collision: upon which Damagoras evaded the blow, rowed rapidly round, and struck the enemy in the stern." . . . δεισας ὁ Δαμαγόρας τὸ βάρος τῆς βασιλικῆς, καὶ τὴν τραχύτητα τοῦ χαλκωματος, οὐκ ἐτόλμησε συμπέσειν ἀντίπρωτος, ἀλλ' ὁξέως ἐκ περιχωγῆς ἀποστρέψας ἐκέλευσεν ἐπὶ πρόμῳ ὤσανθαι καὶ πεσθεῖσθαι ἐνταῦθα τῆς νέας ἐδέξατο τὴν πληγὴν ἀβλαβῆ γινόμενην, ὅτε δὴ τοῖς θαλαττεύουσι τῆς νέας μέρεσι προσπεσούσαν.—Plutarch, *Lucull.* c. 3.

though factitious stimulus of this sort was indeed but little needed.

Such was the heroic courage on both sides, that for a long time victory was altogether doubtful, and the whole harbour was a scene of partial encounters, wherein sometimes Syracusans, sometimes Athenians, prevailed. According as success thus fluctuated, so followed the cheers or wailings of the spectators ashore. At one and the same time, every variety of human emotion might be witnessed; according as attention was turned towards a victorious or a defeated ship. It was among the spectators in the Athenian station, above all, whose entire life and liberty were staked in the combat, that this emotion might be seen exaggerated into agony, and overpassing the excitement even of the combatants themselves.¹ Those among them who looked towards a portion of the harbour where their friends seemed winning, were full of joy and thanksgiving to the gods: such of their neighbours as contemplated an Athenian ship in difficulty, gave vent to their feelings in shrieks and lamentation; while a third group, with their eyes fixed on some portion of the combat still disputed, were plunged in all the agitations of doubt, manifested even in the tremulous swing of their bodies, as hope or fear alternately predominated. During all the time that the combat remained undecided, the Athenians on shore were distracted by all these manifold varieties of intense sympathy. But at length the moment came, after a long-protracted struggle, when victory began to declare in favour of the Syracusans, who, perceiving that their enemies were slackening, redoubled their efforts as well as their shouts, and pushed them back towards the land. All the Athenian triremes, abandoning farther resistance, were thrust ashore like shipwrecked vessels in or near their own station; a few being even captured before they could arrive there. The diverse manifestations of sympathy among the Athenians in the station itself were now exchanged for one unanimous shriek of agony and despair. The boldest of them rushed to rescue the ships and their crews from pursuit, others to man their walls in case of attack from land: many were even paralysed at the sight, and absorbed with the thoughts of their own irretrievable ruin. Their

Long continued and desperate struggle—intense emotion—total defeat of the Athenians.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 71.

souls were doubtless still farther subdued by the wild and enthusiastic joy which burst forth in maddening shouts from the hostile crowds around the harbour, in response to their own victorious comrades on shipboard.

Such was the close of this awful, heart-stirring, and decisive combat. The modern historian strives in vain to convey the impression of it which appears in the condensed and burning phrases of Thucydîdês. We find in his description of battles generally, and of this battle beyond all others, a depth and abundance of human emotion which has now passed out of military proceedings. The Greeks who fight, like the Greeks who look on, are not soldiers withdrawn from the community, and specialized as well as hardened by long professional training—but citizens with all their passions, instincts, sympathies, joys, and sorrows, of domestic as well as political life. Moreover the non-military population in ancient times had an interest of the most intense kind in the result of the struggle; which made the difference to them, if not of life and death, at least of the extremity of happiness and misery. Hence the strong light and shade, the Homeric exhibition of undisguised impulse, the tragic detail of personal motive and suffering, which pervades this and other military descriptions of Thucydîdês. When we read the few but most vehement words which he employs to depict the Athenian camp under this fearful trial, we must recollect that these were not only men whose all was at stake, but that they were moreover citizens full of impressibility—sensitive and demonstrative Greeks, and indeed the most sensitive and demonstrative of all Greeks. To repress all manifestations of strong emotion was not considered, in ancient times, essential to the dignity of the human character.

Amidst all the deep pathos, however, which the great historian has imparted to the final battle at Syracuse, he has not explained the causes upon which its ultimate issue turned. Considering that the Athenians were superior to their enemies in number, as 110 to 76 triremes—that they fought with courage not less heroic—and that the action was on their own element; we might have anticipated for them, if not a victory, at least a drawn battle, with equal loss on

Military operations of ancient times—strong emotions which accompanied them.

Causes of the defeat of the Athenians.

both sides. But we may observe—1. The number of 110 triremes was formed by including some hardly seaworthy.¹ 2. The crews were composed partly of men not used to sea-service; and the Akarnanian darters especially, were for this reason unhandy with their missiles.² 3. Though the water had been hitherto the element favourable to Athens, yet her superiority in this respect was declining, and her enemies approaching nearer to her, even in the open sea. But the narrow dimensions of the harbour would have nullified her superiority at all times, and placed her even at great disadvantage—without the means of twisting and turning her triremes so as to strike only at a vulnerable point of the enemy—compared with the thick, heavy, straightforward butting of the Syracusans; like a nimble pugilist of light weight contending, in a very confined ring, against superior weight and muscle.³ For the mere land-fight on ship-board, Athenians had not only no advantage, but had on the contrary the odds against them. 4. The Syracusans enjoyed great advantage from having nearly the whole harbour lined round with their soldiers and friends; not simply from the force of encouraging sympathy, no mean auxiliary—but because any of their triremes, if compelled to fall back before an Athenian, found protection on the shore, and could return to the fight at leisure; while an Athenian in the same predicament had no escape. 5. The numerous light craft of the Syracusans doubtless rendered great service in this battle, as they had done in the preceding—though Thucydidēs does not again mention them. 6. Lastly, both in the Athenian and Syracusan characters—the pressure of necessity was less potent, as a stimulus to action, than hopeful confidence and elation, with the idea of a flood-tide yet mounting.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 60. τὰς ναῦς ἀπάσας ὅσαι ἦσαν καὶ θυνταὶ καὶ ἀπλοῦτεραι.

² Thucyd. vii. 60. πάντα τινὰ ἐσβιβάζοντες πληρῶσαι—ἀναγκάσαντες ἐσβιβῆναι ὅστις καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ἐδόκει ἡλικίᾳς μετέχων ἐπιτήδειος εἶναι. Compare also the speech of Gylippus, c. 67.

³ The language of Theokritus, in describing the pugilistic contest between Pollux and the Bebrykian Amykus, is not inapplicable to

the position of the Athenian ships and seamen when cramped up in this harbour (Idyll. xxii, 91):—

..... ἐκ δ' ἐτέρωθεν
 Ἥρωες κρατερὸν Πολυδεύχεα θαρσύνεσκον,
 Δαιδυότες μὴ πως μιν ἐπιβρίσας
 δαμάσειν,
 Χωρῶς ἐνὶ στείνω, Τίτωφ ἐναλίκιος ἀνὴρ.

Compare Virgil's picture of Entellus and Darēs, *Æneid*, v. 430.

In the character of some other races, the Jews for instance, the comparative force of these motives appears to be reversed.

About 60 Athenian triremes, little more than half of the fleet which came forth, were saved as the wreck from this terrible conflict. The Syracusans on their part had also suffered severely; only 50 triremes remaining out of 76. The triumph with which, nevertheless, on returning to the city, they erected their trophy, and the exultation which reigned among the vast crowds encircling the harbour, was beyond all measure or precedent. Its clamorous manifestations were doubtless but too well heard in the neighbouring camp of the Athenians, and increased, if anything could increase, the soul-subduing extremity of distress which paralysed the vanquished. So utterly did the pressure of suffering, anticipated as well as actual, benumb their minds and extinguish their most sacred associations, that no man among them, not even the ultra-religious Nikias, thought of picking up the floating bodies or asking for a truce to bury the dead. This obligation, usually so serious and imperative upon the survivors after a battle, now passed unheeded amidst the sorrow, terror, and despair, of the living man himself.

Such despair, however, was not shared by the generals; to their honour be it spoken. On the afternoon of this terrible defeat, Demosthenês proposed to Nikias that at daybreak the ensuing morning they should man all the remaining ships—even now more in number than the Syracusan—and make a fresh attempt to break out of the harbour. To this Nikias agreed, and both proceeded to try their influence in getting the resolution executed. But so irreparably was the spirit of the seamen broken, that nothing could prevail upon them to go again on ship-board: they would hear of nothing but attempting to escape by land.¹ Preparations were therefore made for commencing their march in the darkness of that very night. The roads were still open, and had they so marched, a portion of them, at least, might even yet have been saved.² But there occurred one more

Feelings of the victors and vanquished after the battle.

Resolution of Demosthenês and Nikias to make a second attempt—the armament are too much discouraged to obey.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 72.

² Diodor. xiii. 18.

mistake—one farther postponement—which cut off the last hopes of this gallant and fated remnant.

The Syracusan Hermokratês, fully anticipating that the Athenians would decamp that very night, was eager to prevent their retreat, because of the mischief which they might do if established in any other part of Sicily. He pressed Gylippus and the military authorities to send out forthwith, and block up the principal roads, passes, and fords, by which the fugitives would get off. Though sensible of the wisdom of his advice, the generals thought it wholly unexecutable. Such was the universal and unbounded joy which now pervaded the city, in consequence of the recent victory, still farther magnified by the circumstance that the day was sacred to Hêraklês—so wild the jollity, the feasting, the intoxication, the congratulations, amidst men rewarding themselves after their recent effort and triumph, and amidst the necessary care for the wounded—that an order to arm and march out would have been as little heeded as the order to go on ship-board was by the desponding Athenians. Perceiving that he could get nothing done until the next morning, Hermokratês resorted to a stratagem in order to delay the departure of the Athenians for that night. At the moment when darkness was beginning, he sent down some confidential friends on horseback to the Athenian wall. These men, riding up near enough to make themselves heard, and calling for the sentries, addressed them as messengers from the private correspondents of Nikias in Syracuse, who had sent to warn him (they affirmed) not to decamp during the night, inasmuch as the Syracusans had already beset and occupied the roads; but to begin his march quietly the next morning after adequate preparation.¹

This fraud (the same as the Athenians had themselves practised two years before,² in order to tempt the Syracusans to march out against Katana) was perfectly successful: the sincerity of the information was believed, and the advice adopted. Had Demosthenês been in command alone, we may doubt whether he would have been so easily duped; for granting the accuracy of the fact

The Athenians determine to retreat by land—they postpone their retreat, under false communications from Syracuse.

The Syracusans block up the roads, to intercept their retreat.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 73; Diodor. xiii. 18.

² Thucyd. vi. 64.

asserted, it was not the less obvious that the difficulties, instead of being diminished, would be increased tenfold on the following day. We have seen, however, on more than one previous occasion, how fatally Nikias was misled by his treacherous advices from the philo-Athenians at Syracuse. An excuse for inaction was always congenial to his character; and the present recommendation, moreover, fell in but too happily with the temper of the army—now benumbed with depression and terror, like those unfortunate soldiers, in the Retreat of the Ten Thousand Greeks, who were yielding to the lethargy of extreme cold on the snows of Armenia, and whom Xenophon vainly tried to arouse.¹ Having remained over that night, the generals determined also to stay the next day,—in order that the army might carry away with them as much of their baggage as possible—sending forward a messenger to the Sikels in the interior to request that they would meet the army, and bring with them a supply of provisions.² Gylippus and Hermokratês had thus ample time, on the following day, to send out forces and occupy all the positions convenient for obstructing the Athenian march. They at the same time towed into Syracuse as prizes all the Athenian triremes which had been driven ashore in the recent battle, and which now lay like worthless hulks, unguarded and unheeded³—seemingly even those within the station itself.

It was on the next day but one after the maritime defeat that Nikias and Demosthenês put their army in motion to attempt retreat. The camp had long been a scene of sickness and death from the prevalence of marsh fever; but since the recent battle, the number of wounded men and the unburied bodies of the slain, had rendered it yet more pitiable. Forty thousand miserable men (so prodigious was the total, including all ranks and functions) now set forth to quit it, on a march of which few could hope to see the end; like the pouring forth of the population of a large city starved out by blockade. Many had little or no provisions to carry—so low had the stock become reduced; but of those who had, every man carried his own—even the horsemen and hoplites, now for the first time either already left

Retreat of
the Athe-
nians—
miserable
condition of
the army.

¹ Xenophon, *Anab.* iv. 5, 15, 19;
v. 8, 15.

² Thucyd. vii. 77.

³ Thucyd. vii. 74.

without slaves by desertion, or knowing that no slave could now be trusted. But neither such melancholy equality of suffering, nor the number of sufferers, counted for much in the way of alleviation. A downcast stupor and sense of abasement possessed every man; the more intolerable, when they recollected the exit of the armament from Peiræus two years before, with prayers, and solemn pæans, and all the splendid dreams of conquest—set against the humiliation of the closing scene now before them, without a single trireme left out of two prodigious fleets.

But it was not until the army had actually begun its march that the full measure of wretchedness was felt and manifested. It was then that the necessity first became proclaimed, which no one probably spoke out beforehand, of leaving behind not merely the unburied bodies, but also the sick and the wounded. The scenes of woe, which marked this hour, passed endurance or description. The departing soldier sorrowed and shuddered, with the sentiment of an unperformed duty, as he turned from the unburied bodies of the slain; but far more terrible was the trial, when he had to tear himself from the living sufferers, who implored their comrades, with wailings of agony and distraction, not to abandon them. Appealing to all the claims of pious friendship, they clung round their knees, and even crawled along the line of march until their strength failed. The silent dejection of the previous day was now exchanged for universal tears and groans, and clamorous outbursts of sorrow, amidst which the army could not without the utmost difficulty be disengaged and put in motion.

After such heart-rending scenes, it might seem that their cup of bitterness was exhausted; but worse was yet in store—and the terrors of the future dictated a struggle against all the miseries of past and present. The generals did their best to keep up some sense of order as well as courage; and Nikias, particularly, in this closing hour of his career, displayed a degree of energy and heroism which he had never before seemed to possess. Though himself among the greatest personal sufferers of all, from his incurable complaint, he was seen everywhere in the ranks, marshalling the troops, heartening up their dejection, and addressing

Wretched-
ness arising
from aban-
doning the
sick and
wounded.

Attempt of
the generals
to maintain
some order
—energy of
Nikias.

them with a voice louder, more strenuous, and more commanding than was his wont.

"Keep up your hope still, Athenians (he said), even as we are now: others have been saved out of circumstances worse than ours. Be not too much humiliated, either with your defeats or with your present unmerited hardship. I too, having no advantage over any of you in strength (nay, you see the condition to which I have been brought by my disease), and accustomed even to superior splendour and good fortune in private as well as public life—I too am plunged in the same peril with the humblest soldier among you. Nevertheless my conduct has been constantly pious towards the gods, as well as just and blameless towards men; in recompense for which, my hope for the future is yet sanguine, at the same time that our actual misfortunes do not appal me in proportion to their intrinsic magnitude.¹

¹ Thueyd. vii. 77. Καίτοι πολλὰ μὲν ἐς θεοὺς νόμιμα δεδιήτημαι, πολλὰ δὲ ἐς ἀνθρώπους δίκαια καὶ ἀνεπίφθονα. Ἄνθ' ὧν ἡ μὲν ἐλπίς ὁμῶς ἡρασσεῖα τοῦ μέλλοντος, αὐτὸς δὲ ξυμφοραὶ οὐ κατ' ἀξίαν δὴ φοβοῦσι. Τάχην δ' ἂν καὶ λωφῆσαι· ἵκανά γάρ τοις τε πολεμίοις εὐτόγηται, καὶ εἰ τῶν θεῶν ἐπιφθόνοι ἐστρωτεύσαμεν, ἀρχοῦντως ἤδη τετιμωρόμεθα.

I have translated the words οὐ κατ' ἀξίαν, and the sentence of which they form a part, differently from what has been hitherto sanctioned by the commentators, who construe κατ' ἀξίαν as meaning "according to our desert"—understand the words αἱ ξυμφοραὶ οὐ κατ' ἀξίαν as bearing the same sense with the words ταῖς παρὰ τῇ ἀξίαν χαροπραγίαις some lines before—and likewise construe οὐ, not with φοβοῦσι, but with κατ' ἀξίαν, assigning to φοβοῦσι an affirmative sense. They translate—"Quare, *quamvis nostra fortuna prorsus afflicta videatur* (these words have no parallel in the original), *rerum tamen futurarum spes est audax:*

sed elades, quas nullo nostro merito acceperimus, nos jam terrent. At fortasse cessabunt," &c. M. Didot translates—"Aussi j'ai un ferme espoir dans l'avenir *malgré l'effroi* que des *malheurs non mérités* nous causent." Dr. Arnold passes the sentence over without notice.

This manner of translating appears to me not less unsuitable in reference to the spirit and thread of the harangue, than awkward as regards the individual words. Looking to the spirit of the harangue, the object of encouraging the dejected soldiers would hardly be much answered by repeating (what in fact had been glanced at in a manner sufficient and becoming, before) that "the unmerited reverses terrified either Nikias, or the soldiers." Then as to the words—the expressions ἀνθ' ὧν, ὁμῶς, μὲν and ὅτι, seem to me to denote, not only that the two halves of the sentence apply both of them to Nikias—but that the first half of the sentence is in harmony, not in opposition, with the second. Matthiæ (in my

Perhaps indeed they may from this time forward abate; for our enemies have had their full swing of good fortune,

judgement, erroneously) refers (Gr. Gr. §. 623) *ὁμως* to some words which have preceded; I think that *ὁμως* contributes to hold together the first and the second affirmation of the sentence. Now the Latin translation refers the first half of the sentence to *Nikias*, and the last half to the soldiers whom he addresses; while the translation of M. Didot, by means of the word *malgré*, for which there is nothing corresponding in the Greek, puts the second half in antithesis to the first.

I cannot but think that οὐ ought to be construed with φοβοῦσι, and that the words κατ' ἀξίαν do not bear the meaning assigned to them by the translators. Ἀξίαν not only means, "desert, merit, the title to that which a man has earned by his conduct"—as in the previous phrase παρά τὴν ἀξίαν—but it also means "price, value, title to be cared for, capacity of exciting more or less desire or aversion"—in which last sense it is predicated as an attribute, not only of moral beings, but of other objects besides. Thus Aristotle says (*Ethic. Nikom.* iii. 11)—ὁ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχων, μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾷ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς τῆς ἀξίας· ὁ δὲ σώφρων οὐ τοιούτος, &c. Again, *ibid.* iii. 5. Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀ δεῖ καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα, ὑπομένων καὶ φοβόμενος, καὶ ὥς δεῖ, καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρεῖος· κατ' ἀξίαν γάρ, καὶ ὥς ἂν ὁ λόγος, πάσχει καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρεῖος. Again, *ibid.* iv. 2. Διὰ τοῦτό ἐστι τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, ἐν ᾧ ἂν ποιῇ γένηι, μεγαλοπρεπῶς ποιεῖν· τὸ γὰρ τοιούτον οὐχ εὐυπέρβλητον, καὶ ἔχον κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦ δαπανήματος. Again, *ibid.* viii. 14. Ἀχρεῖον γὰρ ὄντα οὐ φασὶ δεῖν ἴσον ἔχειν· λειτουργίαν τε γὰρ γίνεσθαι, καὶ οὐ φιλίαν, εἰ μὴ

κατ' ἀξίαν τῶν ἔργων ἔσται τὰ ἐκ τῆς φιλίας. Compare also *ib.* viii. 13.

Xenophon, *Cyrop.* viii. 4, 32. τὸ γὰρ πολλὰ δοκοῦντα ἔχειν μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν τῆς οὐσίας φαίνεσθαι ὡφελοῦντα τοὺς φίλους, ἀνελυθερίαν ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ περιάπτειν. Compare Xenophon, *Memorab.* ii. 5, 2. ὥσπερ τῶν οἰκετῶν, οὕτω καὶ τῶν φίλων, εἰσὶν ἀξία; also *ibid.* i. 6, 11. and *Isokratēs cont. Lochit.* Or. xx. s. 8; Plato, *Legg.* ix. p. 876 E.

The words κατ' ἀξίαν in Thucydides appear to me to bear the same meaning as in these passages of Xenophon and Aristotle—"in proportion to their value," or to their real magnitude. If we so construe them, the words ἀνθ' ὧν, ὁμως μὲν, and δὲ, all fall into their proper order: the whole sentence after ἀνθ' ὧν applies to *Nikias* personally, is a corollary from what he had asserted before, and forms a suitable point in an harangue for encouraging his dispirited soldiers—"Look how I bear up, who have as much cause for mourning as any of you. I have behaved well both towards gods and towards men: in return for which, I am comparatively comfortable both as to the future and as to the present: as to the future, I have strong hopes—at the same time that as to the present I am not overwhelmed by the present misfortunes in proportion to their prodigious intensity."

This is the precise thing for a man of resolution to say upon so terrible an occasion.

The particle δὴ has its appropriate meaning—αἱ δὲ συμφοραὶ οὐ κατ' ἀξίαν δὴ φοβοῦσι—"and the present distresses, though they do

and if at the moment of our starting we were under the jealous wrath of any of the gods, we have already undergone chastisement amply sufficient. Other people before us have invaded foreign lands, and by thus acting under common human impulse, have incurred sufferings within the limit of human endurance. We too may reasonably hope henceforward to have the offended god dealing with us more mildly—for we are now objects fitter for his compassion than for his jealousy.¹ Look moreover at your own ranks, hoplites so numerous and so excellent: let that guard you against excessive despair, and recollect that wherever you may sit down, you are yourselves at once a city; there is no city in Sicily that can either repulse your attack or expel you if you choose to stay. Be careful yourselves to keep your march firm and orderly, every man of you with this conviction—that whatever spot he may be forced to fight in, that spot is his country and his fortress, and must be kept by victorious effort. As our provisions are very scanty, we shall hasten on night and day alike; and so soon as you

appal me, do not appal me *assuredly* in proportion to their actual magnitude." Lastly, the particle καὶ (in the succeeding phrase τάχα δ' ἂν καὶ λωφῆσαιαν) does not fit on to the preceding passage as usually construed: accordingly the Latin translator, as well as M. Didot, leave it out and translate—"At fortasse cessabunt." "Mais peut-être vont-ils cesser." It ought to be translated—"And perhaps they may even abate," which implies that what had been asserted in the preceding sentence is here intended not to be contradicted, but to be carried forward and strengthened: see Kühner, Griech. Gramm. sect. 725-728. Such would not be the case as the sentence is usually construed.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 77. Ἰκανὰ γὰρ τοῖς τε πολεμίοις εὐτόχῃται, καὶ εἴ τῃ θεῶν ἐπιφθονοὶ ἐστρατεύσαμεν, ἀποχρώντως ἤδη τετιμωρῆμεθα· ἡλθον γὰρ πού καὶ ἄλλοι τι, ἐς ἣν ἐφ' ἑτέρους, καὶ ἀνθρώπεια δράσαντες ἀνεκτὰ ἐπαθον. Καὶ ἡμᾶς εἰκὸς νῦν

τά τε ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐλπίζειν ἡπιώτερα ἔξειν· οἴκτου γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀξιώτεροι ἤδη ἐσμέν ἢ φθόρου.

This is a remarkable illustration of the doctrine, so frequently set forth in Herodotus, that the gods were jealous of any man or any nation who was pre-eminently powerful, fortunate, or prosperous. Nikias, recollecting the immense manifestation and promise with which his armament had started from Peiræus, now believed that this had provoked the jealousy of some of the gods, and brought about the misfortunes in Sicily. He comforts his soldiers by saying that the enemy is now at the same dangerous pinnacle of exaltation, whilst *they* have exhausted the sad effects of the divine jealousy.

Compare the story of Amasis and Polykratēs in Herodotus (iii. 39), and the striking remarks put into the mouth of Paulus Æmilii by Plutarch (Vit. Paul. Æmil. c. 36).

reach any friendly village of the Sikels, who still remain constant to us from hatred to Syracuse, then consider yourselves in security. We have sent forward to apprise them, and entreat them to meet us with supplies. Once more, soldiers, recollect that to act like brave men is now a matter of necessity to you—and that if you falter, there is no refuge for you anywhere. Whereas if you now get clear of your enemies, such of you as are not Athenians will again enjoy the sight of home, while such of you as *are* Athenians will live to renovate the great power of our city, fallen though it now be. *It is men that make a city—not walls, nor ships without men.*"¹

The efforts of both commanders were in full harmony with these strenuous words. The army was distributed into two divisions; the hoplites marching in a hollow oblong, with the baggage and unarmed in the interior. The front division was commanded by Nikias, the rear by Demosthenês. Directing their course towards the Sikel territory, in the interior of the island, they first marched along the left bank of the Anapus until they came to the ford of that river which they found guarded by a Syracusan detachment. They forced the passage however without much resistance, and accomplished on that day a march of about five miles, under the delay arising from the harassing of the enemy's cavalry and light troops. Encamping for that night on an eminence, they recommenced their march with the earliest dawn, and halted, after about two miles and a half, in a deserted village on a plain. They were in hopes of finding some provisions in the houses, and were even under the necessity of carrying along with them some water from this spot; there being none to be found farther on. As their intended line of march had now become evident, the Syracusans profited by this halt to get on before them, and to occupy in force a position on the road, called the Akraean cliff. Here the road, ascending a high hill, formed a sort of ravine bordered on each side by steep cliffs. The Syracusans erected a wall or barricade across the whole breadth of the road, and occupied the high ground on each side. But even to reach this pass was beyond the competence of the Athenians; so impracticable was it to get over the ground in the face of

Commence-
ment of the
retreat—ha-
rassed and
impeded
by the
Syracusans.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 77. Ἀδρες γὰρ πόλις, καὶ οὐ ταίχη, οὐδὲ νῆες ἀνδρῶν κενεῖ.

overwhelming attacks from the enemy's cavalry and light troops. They were compelled, after a short march, to retreat to their camp of the night before.¹

Every hour added to the distress of their position; for their food was all but exhausted, nor could any man straggle from the main body without encountering certain destruction from the cavalry. Accordingly, on the next morning, they tried one more desperate effort to get over the hilly ground into the interior. Starting very early, they arrived at the foot of the hill called the Akraean cliff, where they found the barricades placed across the road, with deep files of Syracusan hoplites behind them, and crowds of light troops lining the cliffs on each border. They made the most strenuous and obstinate efforts to force this inexpugnable position, but all their struggles were vain, while they suffered miserably from the missiles of the troops above. Amidst all the discouragement of this repulse, they were yet farther disheartened by storms of thunder and lightning, which occurred during the time, and which they construed as portents significant of their impending ruin.²

Continued conflict—no progress made by the retreating army.

This fact strikingly illustrates both the change which the last two years had wrought in the contending parties—and the degree to which such religious interpretations of phenomena depended for their efficacy on predisposing temper, gloomy or cheerful. In the first battle between Nikias and the Syracusans, near the Great Harbour, some months before the siege was begun, a similar thunder-storm had taken place: on that occasion, the Athenians soldiers had continued the battle unmoved, treating it as a natural event belonging to the season,—and such indifference on their part had still farther imposed upon the alarmed Syracusans.³ Now, both the self-confidence and the religious impression had changed sides.⁴

Violent storm—effect produced on both parties—change of feeling in the last two years.

Exhausted by their fruitless efforts, the Athenians fell back a short space to repose, when Gylippus tried to surround them by sending a detachment to block up the narrow road in their rear. This however they prevented,

¹ Thucyd. vii. 78.

ταῦτα πάντα γιγνεσθαι.

² Thucyd. vii. 79. ἀπ' ὧν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι μάλλον ἐπιγῆρύουσιν, καὶ ἐνομιζόντες ἐπὶ τῷ σφαιτέρῳ ὀλέθρῳ καὶ

³ Thucyd. vi. 70.

⁴ See above, c. lviii.

effecting their retreat into the open plain, where they passed the night, and on the ensuing day, attempted once more the hopeless march over the Akræan cliff. But they were not allowed even to advance so far as the pass and the barricade. They were so assailed and harassed by the cavalry and darters, in flank and rear, that in spite of heroic effort and endurance, they could not accomplish a progress of so much as one single mile. Extenuated by fatigue, half-starved, and with numbers of wounded men, they were compelled to spend a third miserable night in the same fatal plain.

As soon as the Syracusans had retired for the night to their camp, Nikias and Demosthenês took counsel. They saw plainly that the route which they had originally projected, over the Akræan cliff into the Sikel regions of the interior and from thence to Katana had become impracticable; and that their unhappy troops would be still less in condition to force it on the morrow than they had been on the day preceding. Accordingly they resolved to make off during the night, leaving numerous fires burning to mislead the enemy; but completely to alter the direction, and to turn down towards the southern coast on which lay Kamarina and Gela. Their guides informed them that if they could cross the river Kakyparis, which fell into the sea south of Syracuse, on the south-eastern coast of Sicily—or a river still farther on called the Erineus—they might march up the right bank of either into the regions of the interior. Accordingly they broke up in the night, amidst confusion and alarm; in spite of which the front division of the army under Nikias got into full march, and made considerable advance. By day-break this division reached the south-eastern coast of the island not far south of Syracuse and fell into the track of the Helôrîne road, which they pursued until they arrived at the Kakyparis. Even here, however, they found a Syracusan detachment beforehand with them, raising a redoubt, and blocking up the ford; nor could Nikias pass it without forcing his way through them. He marched straight forward to the Erineus, which he crossed on the same day, and encamped his troops on some high ground on the other side.¹

Night
march of
the Athe-
nians in an
altered di-
rection,
towards the
southern
sea.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 80-92.

Except at the ford of the Kakyparis, his march had been all day unobstructed by the enemy. He thought it wiser to push his troops as fast as possible in order to arrive at some place both of safety and subsistence, without concerning himself about the rear division under Demosthenês. That division, the larger half of the army, started both later and in greater disorder. Unaccountable panics and darkness made them part company or miss their way, so that Demosthenês, with all his efforts to keep them together, made little progress, and fell much behind Nikias. He was overtaken by the Syracusans during the forenoon, seemingly before he reached the Kakyparis,¹ and at a moment when the foremost division was nearly six miles ahead, between the Kakyparis and the Erineus.

Separation of the two divisions under Nikias and Demosthenês. The first division under Nikias gets across the river Erineus.

When the Syracusans discovered at dawn that their enemy had made off in the night, their first impulse was to accuse Gylippus of treachery in having permitted the escape. Such ungrateful surmises, however, were soon dissipated, and the cavalry set forth in rapid pursuit, until they overtook the rear division, which they immediately began to attack and impede. The advance of Demosthenês had been tardy before, and

The rear division under Demosthenês is pursued, overtaken, and forced to surrender.

¹ Dr. Arnold (Thucyd. vol. iii. p. 280, copied by Gölner ad vii. 81) thinks that the division of Demosthenês reached and passed the river Kakyparis; and was captured between the Kakyparis and the Erineus. But the words of Thucyd. vii. 80, 81, do not sustain this. The division of Nikias was in advance of Demosthenês from the beginning, and gained upon it principally during the early part of the march, before daybreak; because it was then that the disorder of the division of Demosthenês was the most inconvenient: see e. 81—ὡς τῆς πλεονεξίας τότε ξυνεπαραχθήσαν, &c. When Thucydides therefore says that "at daybreak they arrived at the sea" (ἀμὰ δὲ τῆς ἡμέρας αὐτῆς εὐχρησάμενοι ἐς τὴν θάλατταν, c. 80), this cannot be true both of

Nikias and Demosthenês. If the former arrived there at daybreak, the latter cannot have come to the same point till some time after daybreak. Nikias must have been beforehand with Demosthenês when he reached the sea—and considerably more beforehand when he reached the Kakyparis: moreover we are expressly told that Nikias did not wait for his colleague—that he thought it for the best to get on as fast as possible with his own division.

It appears to me that the words ἀφικνοῦνται, &c. (c. 81) are not to be understood both of Nikias and Demosthenês, but that they refer back to the word αὐτοῖς, two or three lines behind: "the Athenians (taken generally) reached the sea"

his division disorganised; but he was now compelled to turn and defend himself against an indefatigable enemy, who presently got before him, and thus stopped him altogether. Their numerous light troops and cavalry assailed him on all sides and without intermission; employing nothing but missiles, however, and taking care to avoid any close encounter. While this unfortunate division were exerting their best efforts both to defend themselves, and if possible to get forward, they found themselves enclosed in a walled olive-ground, through the middle of which the road passed; a farm bearing the name, and probably once the property, of Polyzêlus, brother of the despot Gelon.¹ Entangled and huddled up in this enclosure, from whence exit at the farther end in the face of an enemy was found impossible, they were now overwhelmed with hostile missiles from the walls on all sides.² Though unable to get

—no attention being at that moment paid to the difference between the front and the rear divisions. The *Athenians* might be said, not improperly, to reach the sea—at the time when the division of Nikias reached it.

¹ Plutarch, Nikias, c. 27.

² Thucyd. vii. 81. Καὶ τότε γνοῦς (sc. Demosthenês) τοὺς Συρακοσίους διωκοντας οὐ προῦχώρει μᾶλλον ἢ ἐς μάχην ξυνετάσσετο, ἕως ἐνδιατρίβων κυκλοῦται τε ὑπ' αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐν πολλῷ θορόβῳ αὐτὸς τε καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι ἦσαν· ἀνελιγθέντες γὰρ ἐς τι χωρίον, ᾧ κύκλῳ μὲν τειχίον περιῆν, ὁδὸς δὲ ἔνθεν τε καὶ ἔνθεν, ἐλάσας δὲ οὐκ ὀλίγας εἶχεν, ἐβάλλοντο περισταθόν.

I translate ὁδὸς δὲ ἔνθεν τε καὶ ἔνθεν differently from Dr. Arnold, from Mitford, and from others. These words are commonly understood to mean that this walled plantation was bordered by two roads, one on each side. Certainly the words *might* have that signification; but I think they also may have the signification (compare ii. 76) which I have given in the text, and which seems more plausible.

It certainly is very improbable that the Athenians should have gone out of the road, in order to shelter themselves in the plantation; since they were fully aware that there was no safety for them except in getting away. If we suppose that the plantation lay exactly in the road, the word ἀνελιγθέντες becomes perfectly explicable, on which I do not think that Dr. Arnold's comment is satisfactory. The pressure of the troops from the rear into the hither opening, while those in the front could not get out by the farther opening, would naturally cause this crowd and *huddling* inside. A road which passed right through the walled ground, entering at one side and coming out at the other, might well be called ὁδὸς ἔνθεν τε καὶ ἔνθεν. Compare Dr. Arnold's Remarks on the Map of Syracuse, vol. iii. p. 281; as well as his note on vii. 81.

I imagine the olive-trees to be here named, not for either of the two reasons mentioned by Dr. Arnold, but because they hindered the Athenians from seeing before-

at the enemy, and deprived even of the resources of an active despair, they endured incessant harassing for the greater part of the day, without refreshment or repose, and with the number of their wounded continually increasing; until at length the remaining spirit of the unhappy sufferers was thoroughly broken. Perceiving their condition, Gylippus sent to them a herald with a proclamation; inviting all the islanders among them to come forth from the rest, and promising them freedom if they did so. The inhabitants of some cities, yet not many—a fact much to their honour—availed themselves of this offer, and surrendered. Presently, however, a larger negotiation was opened, which ended by the entire division capitulating upon terms, and giving up their arms. Gylippus and the Syracusans engaged that the lives of all should be spared; that is, that none should be put to death either by violence, or by intolerable bonds, or by starvation. Having all been disarmed, they were forthwith conveyed away as prisoners to Syracuse—6000 in number. It is a remarkable proof of the easy and opulent circumstances of many among these gallant sufferers, when we are told that the money which they had about them, even at this last moment of pressure, was sufficient to fill the concavities of four shields.¹ Disdaining either to surrender or to make any stipulation for himself personally, Demosthenês was on the point of killing himself with his own sword the moment that the capitulation was concluded; but his intention was prevented and he was carried off a disarmed prisoner, by the Syracusans.²

On the next day, Gylippus and the victorious Syracusans overtook Nikias on the right bank of the Erineus, apprised him of the capitulation of Demosthenês, and summoned him to capitulate also. He demanded leave to send a horseman, for the purpose of verifying the statement; and on the return of the horseman, he made a proposition to Gylippus—that his army should be permitted to return home, on condition of Athens reimbursing to Syracuse the whole

Gylippus
overtakes
and attacks
the division
of Nikias.

hand distinctly the nature of the enclosure into which they were hastening, and therefore prevented any precautions from being taken—such as that of forbidding too many troops from entering at once, &c.

¹ Plutarch, Nikias, c. 27; Thueyd. vii. 82.

² This statement depends upon the very good authority of the contemporary Syracusan Philistus: see Pausanias, i. 29, 9; Philisti Fragm. 46, ed. Didot.

expense of the war, and furnishing hostages until payment should be made; one citizen against each talent of silver. These conditions were rejected; but Nikias could not yet bring himself to submit to the same terms for his division as Demosthenês. Accordingly the Syracusans recommenced their attacks, which the Athenians, in spite of hunger and fatigue, sustained as they best could until night. It was the intention of Nikias again to take advantage of the night for the purpose of getting away. But on this occasion the Syracusans were on the watch, and as soon as they heard movement in the camp, they raised the pæan or war-shout; thus showing that they were on the look-out, and inducing the Athenians again to lay down the arms which they had taken up for departure. A detachment of 300 Athenians, nevertheless, still persisting in marching off, apart from the rest, forced their way through the posts of the Syracusans. These men got safely away, and nothing but the want of guides prevented them from escaping altogether.¹

During all this painful retreat, the personal resolution displayed by Nikias was exemplary. His sick and feeble frame was made to bear up, and even to hearten up stronger men, against the extremity of hardship, exhausting the last fragment of hope or even possibility. It was now the sixth day of the retreat—six days² of constant privation, suffering, and endurance of attack—yet Nikias early in the morning attempted a fresh march, in order to get to the river Asinarus, which falls into the same sea, south of the Erineus, but is a more considerable stream, flowing deeply imbedded between lofty banks. This was a last effort of despair, with little hope of final escape, even if they did reach it. Yet the march was accomplished, in spite of renewed and incessant attacks all the way, from the Syracusan cavalry; who even got to the river before the Athenians, occupying the ford, and lining the high banks near it. Here the resolution of the unhappy fugitives at length gave way: when they reached the river, their strength, their patience, their spirit, and their hopes for the future, were all extinct. Tormented with raging thirst, and compelled by the attacks of the cavalry to march in one compact mass, they rushed into

Nikias gets to the river Asinarus—intolerable thirst and suffering of the soldiers—he and his division become prisoners.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 83.

² Plutarch (Nikias, c. 27) says *eight* days, inaccurately.

the ford all at once, treading down and tumbling over each other in the universal avidity for drink. Many thus perished from being pushed down upon the points of the spears; or lost their footing among the scattered articles of baggage, and were thus borne down under water.¹ Meanwhile the Syracusans from above poured upon the huddled mass showers of missiles, while the Peloponnesian hoplites even descended into the river, came to close quarters with them, and slew considerable numbers. So violent nevertheless was the thirst of the Athenians, that all other suffering was endured in order to taste relief by drinking. And even when dead and wounded were heaped in the river—when the water was tainted and turbid with blood, as well as thick with the mud trodden up—still the new-comers pushed their way in and swallowed it with voracity.²

Wretched, helpless, and demoralised as the army now was, Nikias could think no farther of resistance. He accordingly surrendered himself to Gylippus, to be dealt with at the discretion of that general and of the Lacedæmonians;³ earnestly imploring that the slaughter of the defenceless soldiers might be arrested. Accordingly Gylippus gave orders that no more should be killed, but that the rest should be secured as captives. Many were slain before this order was understood; but of those who remained, almost all were made captive, very few escaping. Nay, even the detachment of 300, who had broken out in the night, having seemingly not known whither to go, were captured and brought in by troops sent forth for the purpose.⁴ The triumph of the Syracusans was in every way complete: they hung the trees on the banks of the Asinarus with Athenian panoplies as trophy, and carried back their prisoners in joyous procession to the city.

The number of prisoners thus made is not positively specified by Thucydidês, as in the case of the division of Demosthenês, which had capitulated and laid down their arms in a mass within the walls of the olive-ground. Of the captives from the division of Nikias, the larger

¹ Thucyd. vii. 85; see Dr. Arnold's note.

² Thucyd. vii. 84. . . . ἐβαλλοῖ ἀνωθεν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, πίνοντάς τε τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀσμένους, καὶ ἐν κοίλῳ ὄντι τῷ ποτάμῳ ἐν

σφίσιν αὐτοῖς παρασσομένους.

³ Thucyd. vii. 85, 86; Philistus, Fragm. 46, ed. Didot; Pausanias, i. 29, 9.

⁴ Thucyd. vii. 85; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 27.

proportion were seized by private individuals, and fraudulently secreted for their own profit; the number obtained for the state being comparatively small, seemingly not more than 1000.¹ The various Sicilian towns became soon full of these prisoners, sold as slaves for private account.

Not less than 40,000 persons in the aggregate had started from the Athenian camp to commence the retreat, six days before. Of these probably many, either wounded or otherwise incompetent even when the march began, soon found themselves unable to keep up, and were left behind to perish. Each of the six days was a day of hard fighting and annoyance from an indefatigable crowd of light troops, with little, and at last seemingly nothing, to eat. The number was thus successively thinned, by wounds, privations, and straggling; so that the 6000 taken with Demosthenês, and perhaps 3000 or 4000 captured with Nikias, formed the melancholy remnant. Of the stragglers during the march, however, we are glad to learn that many contrived to escape the Syracusan cavalry and get to Katana—where also those who afterwards ran away from their slavery under private masters, found a refuge.² These fugitive Athenians served as auxiliaries to repel the attacks of the Syracusans upon Katana.³

It was in this manner, chiefly, that Athens came to receive again within her bosom a few of those ill-fated sons whom she had drafted forth in two such splendid divisions to Sicily. For of those who were carried as prisoners to Syracuse, fewer yet could ever have got home. They were placed, for safe custody, along with the other prisoners, in the stone-quarries of Syracuse—of which there were several, partly on the southern descent of the outer city

Hard treatment and sufferings of the Athenian prisoners at Syracuse.

¹ Thucydides states, roughly and without pretending to exact means of knowledge, that the total number of captives brought to Syracuse under public supervision, was not less than 7000—ἐλήφθησαν δὲ οἱ ἑξήκοντα, ἀκριβεῖα μὲν χαλεπὸν ἐξεῖναι, ὅμως δὲ οὐκ ἐλάττωτος ἐπαχισχυλίων (vii. 87). As the number taken with Demosthenês was 6000 (vii. 82), this leaves 1000

as having been obtained from the division of Nikias.

² Thucyd. vii. 85. πολλοὶ δὲ ὅμως καὶ διέφυγον, οἱ μὲν καὶ παρρυτίχα, οἱ δὲ καὶ δουλεύσαντες καὶ διαδιδράσκοντες ὕστερον. The word παρρυτίχα means, during the retreat.

³ Lysias pro Polystrato, Orat. xx. sect. 26—24, c. 6. p. 686 R.

towards the Nekropolis, or from the higher level to the lower level of Achradina—partly in the suburb afterwards called Neapolis, under the southern cliff of Epipolæ. Into these quarries—deep hollows, of confined space, with precipitous sides, and open at the top to the sky—the miserable prisoners were plunged, lying huddled one upon another, without the smallest protection or convenience. For subsistence they received each day a ration of one pint of wheaten bread (half the daily ration of a slave) with no more than half a pint of water, so that they were not preserved from the pangs either of hunger or of thirst. Moreover the heat of the midday sun, alternating with the chill of the autumn nights, was alike afflicting and destructive; while the wants of life having all to be performed where they were, without relief—the filth and stench presently became insupportable. Sick and wounded even at the moment of arrival, many of them speedily died; and happiest was he who died the first, leaving an unconscious corpse, which the Syracusans would not take the trouble to remove, to distress and infect the survivors. Under this condition and treatment they remained for seventy days; probably serving as a spectacle for the triumphant Syracusan population, with their wives and children, to come and look down upon, and to congratulate themselves on their own narrow escape from sufferings similar in kind at least, if not in degree. After that time, the novelty of the spectacle had worn off; while the place must have become a den of abomination and a nuisance intolerable even to the citizens themselves. Accordingly they now removed all the surviving prisoners, except the native Athenians and the few Italian or Sicilian Greeks among them. All those so removed were sold for slaves.¹ The

¹ Thucyd. vii. 87. Diodorus (xiii. 20—32) gives two long orations purporting to have been held in the Syracusan assembly, in discussing how the prisoners were to be dealt with. An old citizen, named Nikolaus, who has lost his two sons in the war, is made to advocate the side of humane treatment; while Gylippus is introduced as the orator recommending harshness and revenge.

From whom Diodorus borrowed this, I do not know; but his whole account of the matter appears to me untrustworthy.

One may judge of his accuracy when one finds him stating that the prisoners received each two *chœnikes* of barleymeal—instead of two *kotylæ*; the *chœnix* being four times as much as the *kotylê* (Diodor. xiii. 19).

dead bodies were probably at the same time taken away, and the prison rendered somewhat less loathsome. What became of the remaining prisoners, we are not told. It may be presumed that those who could survive so great an extremity of suffering might after a certain time be allowed to get back to Athens on ransom. Perhaps some of them may have obtained their release—as was the case (we are told) with several of those who had been sold to private masters—by the elegance of their accomplishments and the dignity of their demeanour. The dramas of Euripidês were so peculiarly popular throughout all Sicily, that those Athenian prisoners who knew by heart considerable portions of them, won the affections of their masters. Some even of the stragglers from the army are affirmed to have procured for themselves, by the same attraction, shelter and hospitality during their flight. Euripidês, we are informed, lived to receive the thanks of several among these unhappy sufferers, after their return to Athens.¹ I cannot refrain from mentioning this story, though I fear its trustworthiness as matter of fact is much inferior to its pathos and interest.

Upon the treatment of Nikias and Demosthenês, not merely the Syracusans, but also the allies present, were consulted, and much difference of opinion was found. To keep them in confinement simply, without putting them to death, was apparently the opinion advocated by Hermodkratês.² But Gylippus, then in full ascendancy and an object of deep gratitude for his invaluable services, solicited as a reward to himself to be allowed to conduct them back as prisoners to Sparta. To achieve this would have earned for him signal honour in the eyes of his countrymen; for while Demosthenês, from his success at Pylus, was their hated enemy—Nikias had always shown himself their friend, as far as an Athenian could do so. It was to him that they owed the release of their prisoners taken at Sphakteria; and he had calculated upon this obligation when he surrendered himself prisoner to Gylippus, and not to the Syracusans.

¹ Plutarch, Nikias, c. 29; Diodor. xiii. 33. The reader will see how the Carthaginians treated the Grecian prisoners whom they took

in Sicily—in Diodor. xiii. 111.

² Plutarch, Nikias, c. 28; Diodor. xiii. 19.

In spite of all his influence, however, Gylippus could not carry this point. First, the Corinthians both strenuously opposed him themselves, and prevailed on the other allies to do the same. Afraid that the wealth of Nikias would always procure for him the means of escaping from imprisonment, so as to do them farther injury—they insisted on his being put to death. Next, those Syracusans, who had been in secret correspondence with Nikias during the siege, were yet more anxious to get him put out of the way; being apprehensive that, if tortured by their political opponents, he might disclose their names and intrigues. Such various influences prevailed, so that Nikias, as well as Demosthenês, was ordered to be put to death by a decree of the public assembly, much to the discontent of Gylippus. Hermokratês vainly opposed the resolution, but perceiving that it was certain to be carried, he sent to them a private intimation before the discussion closed; and procured for them, through one of the sentinels, the means of dying by their own hands. Their bodies were publicly exposed before the city gates to the view of the Syracusan citizens;¹ while the day on which the final capture of Nikias and his army was accomplished, came to be celebrated as an annual festival, under the title of the *Asinaria*, on the twenty-sixth day of the Dorian month *Karneius*.²

Influence of the Corinthians—efforts of Gylippus—both the generals are slain.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 86; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 28. The statement which Plutarch here cites from Timæus respecting the intervention of Hermokrates, is not in any substantial contradiction with Philistus and Thucydides. The word *καλευσθέντας* seems decidedly preferable to *καταλευσθέντας*, in the text of Plutarch.

² Plutarch, Nikias, c. 28. Though Plutarch says that the month *Karneius* is "that which the Athenians call *Metageitnion*," yet it is not safe to affirm that the day of the slaughter of the *Asinarius* was the 16th of the Attic month *Metageitnion*. We know that the civil months of different cities seldom or never exactly coincided. See the remarks of Franz on this point

in his comment on the valuable Inscriptions of *Tauromenium*, Corp. Inscr. Gr. No. 5640, part xxxii. sect. 3. p. 640.

The surrender of Nikias must have taken place, I think, not less than twenty-four or twenty-five days after the eclipse (which occurred on the 27th of August)—that is about Sept. 21. Mr. Fynes Clinton (*F. H.* ad ann. 413 B.C.) seems to me to compress too much the interval between the eclipse and the retreat; considering that the interval included two great battles, with a certain space of time, before, between, and after.

The *μετόπωρον* noticed by Thucyd. vii. 79 suits with Sept. 21: compare Plutarch, Nikias, c. 22.

Such was the close of the expedition, or rather of the two expeditions, undertaken by Athens against Syracuse. Never in Grecian history had a force so large, so costly, so efficient, and full of promise and confidence, been sent forth; never in Grecian history had ruin so complete and sweeping, or victory so glorious and unexpected, been witnessed.¹ Its consequences were felt from one end of the Grecian world to the other, as will appear in the coming chapters.

The esteem and admiration felt at Athens towards Nikias had been throughout lofty and unshaken: after his death it was exchanged for disgrace. His name was omitted, while that of his colleague Demosthenês was engraved, on the funeral pillar erected to commemorate the fallen warriors. This difference Pausanias explains by saying that Nikias was conceived to have disgraced himself as a military man by his voluntary surrender, which Demosthenês had disdained.²

The opinion of Thucydidês deserves special notice, in the face of this judgement of his countrymen. While he says not a word about Demosthenês, beyond the fact of his being put to death, he adds in reference to Nikias a few words of marked sympathy and commendation. "Such, or nearly such, (he says) were the reasons why Nikias was put to death; though *he* assuredly, among all Greeks of my time, least deserved

¹ Thucyd. vii. 87.

² Pausan. i. 29, 9; Philist. Fragm. 46, ed. Didot.

Justin erroneously says that Demosthenês actually did kill himself, rather than submit to surrender—before the surrender of Nikias; who (he says) did not choose to follow the example:—

"Demosthenês, a misso exercitu, a captivitate gladio et voluntariâ morte se vindicat: Nicias autem, ne Demosthenis quidem exemplo, ut sibi consuleret, admonitus, cladem suorum auxit dedecore captivitatis" (Justin, iv. 5).

Philistus, whom Pausanias announces himself as following, is

an excellent witness for the actual facts in Sicily; though not so good a witness for the impression at Athens respecting those facts.

It seems certain, even from Thucydidês, that Nikias, in surrendering himself to Gylippus, thought that he had considerable chance of saving his life—Plutarch too so interprets the proceeding, and condemns it as disgraceful (see his comparison of Nikias and Crassus, near the end). Demosthenês could not have thought the same for himself: the fact of his attempted suicide appears to me certain, on the authority of Philistus, though Thucydidês does not notice it.

to come to so extreme a pitch of ill-fortune, considering his exact performance of established duties to the divinity."¹

If we were judging Nikias merely as a private man, and setting his personal conduct in one scale, against his personal suffering on the other, the remark of Thucydidēs would be natural and intelligible. But the general of a great expedition, upon whose conduct the lives of thousands of brave men as well as the most momentous interests of his country, depend, cannot be tried by any such standard. His private merit becomes a secondary point in the case, as compared with the discharge of his responsible public duties, by which he must stand or fall.

Tried by this more appropriate standard, what are we to say of Nikias? We are compelled to say, that if his personal suffering could possibly be re- How far
that opinion
is just. garded in the light of an atonement, or set in an equation against the mischief brought by himself both on his army and his country—it would not be greater than his deserts. I shall not here repeat the separate points in

¹ Thucyd. vii. 86. Καὶ ὁ μὲν τοιαύτη ᾗ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τούτων αἰτία ἐπεβλήκει, ἥκιστα δὲ ἄξιός ὢν τῶν γε ἐπ' ἐμοῦ Ἑλλήνων ἐς τοῦτο δυστυχίας ἀφικέσθαι, διὰ τὴν νενομισμένην ἐς τὸ θεῖον ἐπιτήδευσιν.

So stood the text of Thucydidēs, until various recent editors changed the last words, on the authority of some MSS., to διὰ τὴν πᾶσαν ἐς ἀρετὴν νενομισμένην ἐπιτήδευσιν.

Though Dr. Arnold and some of the best critics prefer and adopt the latter reading, I confess it seems to me that the former is more suitable to the Greek vein of thought, as well as more conformable to truth about Nikias.

A man's good or bad fortune, depending on the favourable or unfavourable disposition of the gods towards him, was understood to be determined more directly by his piety and religious observances, rather than by his virtue (see passages in Isokratēs de Permutation. Orat. xv. sect. 301; Lysias, cont.

Nikomach. c. 5. p. 854)—though undoubtedly the two ideas went to a certain extent together. Men might differ about the virtue of Nikias; but his piety was an incontestable fact; and his "good fortune" also (in times prior to the Sicilian expedition) was recognised by men like Alkibiadēs, who most probably had no very lofty opinion of his virtue (Thucyd. vi. 17). The contrast between the remarkable piety of Nikias, and that extremity of ill-fortune which marked the close of his life—was very likely to shock Grecian ideas generally, and was a natural circumstance for the historian to note. Whereas if we read, in the passage, πᾶσαν ἐς ἀρετὴν—the panegyric upon Nikias becomes both less special and more disproportionate—beyond what even Thucydidēs (as far as we can infer from other expressions, see v. 16) would be inclined to bestow upon him—more in fact than he says in commendation even of Periklēs.

his conduct which justify this view, and which have been set forth as they occurred, in the preceding pages. Admitting fully both the good intentions of Nikias, and his personal bravery, rising even into heroism during the last few days in Sicily—it is not the less incontestable, that first, the failure of the enterprise—next, the destruction of the armament—is to be traced distinctly to his lamentable misjudgment. Sometimes petty trifling—sometimes apathy and inaction—sometimes presumptuous neglect—sometimes obstinate blindness even to urgent and obvious necessities—one or other of these his sad mental defects, will be found operative at every step whereby this fated armament sinks down from exuberant efficiency into the last depth of aggregate ruin and individual misery. His improvidence and incapacity stand proclaimed, not merely in the narrative of the historian, but even in his own letter to the Athenians, and in his own speeches both before the expedition and during its closing misfortunes, when contrasted with the reality of his proceedings. The man whose flagrant incompetency could bring such wholesale ruin upon two fine armaments entrusted to his command, upon the Athenian maritime empire, and ultimately upon Athens herself—must appear on the tablets of history under the severest condemnation, even though his personal virtues had been loftier than those of Nikias.

And yet our great historian—after devoting two immortal books to this expedition—after setting forth emphatically both the glory of its dawn and the wretchedness of its close, with a dramatic genius parallel to the *Œdipus Tyrannus* of Sophoklês—when he comes to recount the melancholy end of the two commanders, has no words to spare for Demosthenês (far the abler officer of the two, who perished by no fault of his own), but reserves his flowers to strew on the grave of Nikias, the author of the whole calamity—"What a pity! Such a respectable and religious man!"

Thucydidês is here the more instructive, because he exactly represents the sentiment of the general Athenian public towards Nikias during his life-time. They could not bear to condemn, to mistrust, to dismiss, or to do without, so respectable and religious a citizen. The private qualities of Nikias were not only held to entitle him to the most indulgent construction of all his public short-comings, but

also ensured to him credit for political and military competence altogether disproportionate to his deserts. When we find Thucydidês, after narrating so much improvidence and mismanagement on the grand scale, still keeping attention fixed on the private morality and decorum of Nikias, as if it constituted the main feature of his character—we can understand how the Athenian people originally came both to over-estimate this unfortunate leader, and continued over-estimating him with tenacious fidelity even after glaring proof of his incapacity. Never in the political history of Athens did the people make so fatal a mistake in placing their confidence.

Opinion of the Athenians about Nikias—their steady over-confidence and over-estimate for him, arising from his respectable and religious character.

In reviewing the causes of popular misjudgement, historians are apt to enlarge prominently, if not exclusively, on demagogues and the demagogic influences. Mankind being usually considered in the light of governable material, or as instruments for exalting, arming, and decorating their rulers—whatever renders them more difficult to handle in this capacity, ranks first in the category of vices. Nor can it be denied that this was a real and serious cause. Clever crimination speakers often passed themselves off for something above their real worth: though useful and indispensable as a protection against worse, they sometimes deluded the people into measures impolitic or unjust. But, even if we grant, to the cause of misjudgment here indicated, a greater practical efficiency than history will fairly sanction—still it is only one among others more mischievous. Never did any man at Athens, by mere force of demagogic qualities, acquire a measure of esteem at once so exaggerated and so durable, combined with so much power of injuring his fellow-citizens, as the anti-demagogic Nikias. The man who, over and above his shabby manœuvre about the expedition against Sphacteria, and his improvident sacrifice of Athenian interests in the alliance with Sparta, ended by bringing ruin on the greatest armament ever sent forth by Athens, as well as upon her maritime empire—was not a leather-seller of impudent and abusive eloquence, but a man of ancient family and hereditary wealth—munificent and affable, having credit not merely for the largesses which he bestowed, but

Over-confidence in Nikias was the greatest personal mistake which the Athenian public ever committed

also for all the insolences, which as a rich man he might have committed, but did not commit—free from all pecuniary corruption—a brave man, and above all, an ultra-religious man, believed therefore to stand high in the favour of the gods, and to be fortunate. Such was the esteem which the Athenians felt for this union of good qualities purely personal and negative, with eminent station, that they presumed the higher aptitudes of command,¹ and presumed them unhappily after proof that they did not exist—after proof that what they had supposed to be caution was only apathy and mental weakness. No demagogic arts or eloquence would ever have created in the people so deep-seated an illusion as the imposing respectability of Nikias. Now it was against the overweening ascendancy of such decorous and pious incompetence, when aided by wealth and family advantages, that the demagogic accusatory eloquence ought to have served as a natural bar and corrective. Performing the functions of a constitutional opposition, it afforded the only chance of that tutelary exposure whereby blunders and short-comings might be arrested in time. How insufficient was the check which it provided—even at Athens, where everyone denounces it as having prevailed in devouring excess—the history of Nikias is an ever-living testimony.

¹ A good many of the features depicted by Tacitus (Hist. i. 49) in Galba, suit the character of Nikias—much more than those of the rapacious and unprincipled Crassus, with whom Plutarch compares the latter:—

“Vetus in familiâ nobilitas, magnæ opes: ipsi medium ingenium, magis extra vitia, quam cum virtutibus. Sed claritas natalium,

et metus temporum, obtentui fuit, ut quod segnitia fuit, sapientia vocaretur. Dum vigeat ætas, militari laude apud Germanias floruit: proconsul, Africam moderate; jam senior, citeriorem Hispaniam, pari justitiâ continuit. Major privato visus, dum privatus fuit, et omnium consensu capax imperii, nisi imperasset.”

CHAPTER LXI.

FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT IN SICILY, DOWN TO THE OLIGARCHICAL CONSPIRACY OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AT ATHENS.

IN the preceding chapter, we followed to its melancholy close the united armament of Nikias and Demosthenês, first in the harbour and lastly in the neighbourhood of Syracuse, towards the end of September 413 B.C.

The first impression which we derive from the perusal of that narrative is, sympathy for the parties directly concerned—chiefly for the number of gallant Athenians who thus miserably perished, partly also for the Syracusan victors, themselves a few months before on the verge of apparent ruin. But the distant and collateral effects of the catastrophe throughout Greece were yet more momentous than those within the island in which it occurred.

Consequences of the ruin of the Athenian armament in Sicily.

I have already mentioned, that even at the moment when Demosthenês with his powerful armament left Peiræus to go to Sicily, the hostilities of the Peloponnesian confederacy against Athens herself had been already recommenced. Not only was the Spartan king Agis ravaging Attica, but the far more important step of fortifying Dekeleia, for the abode of a permanent garrison, was in course of completion. That fortress, having been begun about the middle of March, was probably by the month of June in a situation to shelter its garrison, which consisted of contingents periodically furnished, and relieving each other alternately, from all the different states of the confederacy, under the permanent command of king Agis himself.

Occupation of Dekeleia by the Lacedæmonians—its ruinous effects upon Athens.

And now began that incessant marauding of domiciliated enemies—destined to last for nine years until the final capture of Athens—partially contemplated even at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war—and recently

enforced, with full comprehension of its disastrous effects, by the virulent antipathy of the exile Alkibiadês.¹ The earlier invasions of Attica had been all temporary, continuing for five or six weeks at the farthest, and leaving the country in repose for the remainder of the year. But the Athenians now underwent from henceforward the fatal experience of a hostile garrison within fifteen miles of their city; an experience peculiarly painful this summer, as well from its novelty, as from the extraordinary vigour which Agis displayed in his operations. His excursions were so widely extended, that no part of Attica was secure or could be rendered productive. Not only were all the sheep and cattle destroyed, but the slaves too, especially the most valuable slaves or artisans, began to desert to Dekeleia in great numbers: more than 20,000 of them soon disappeared in this way. So terrible a loss of income both to proprietors of land and to employers in the city, was farther aggravated by the increased cost and difficulty of import from Eubœa. Provisions and cattle from that island had previously come over land from Orôpus, but as that road was completely stopped by the garrison of Dekeleia, they were now of necessity sent round Cape Sunium by sea; a transit more circuitous and expensive, besides being open to attack from the enemy's privateers.² In the midst of such heavy privations, the demands on citizens and metics for military duty were multiplied beyond measure. The presence of the enemy at Dekeleia forced them to keep watch day and night throughout their long extent of wall, comprising both Athens and Peiræus: in the daytime the hoplites of the city relieved each other on guard, but at night, nearly all of them were either on the battlements or at the various military stations in the city. Instead of a city, in fact, Athens was reduced to the condition of some-

¹ Thucyd. i. 122-142; vi. 90.

² Thucyd. viii. 4. About the extensive ruin caused by the Lacedæmonians to the olive-grounds in Attica, see Lysias, Or. vii. De Oleâ Sacrà, sect. 6, 7.

An inscription preserved in M. Boeckh's Corp. Inscr. (Part ii. No. 93. p. 132) gives some hint how landlords and tenants met this in-

evitable damage from the hands of the invaders. The Deme Æxôneis lets a farm to a certain tenant for forty years, at a fixed rent of 140 drachmæ; but if an invading enemy shall drive him out or injure his farm, the Deme is to receive one half of the year's produce, in place of the year's rent.

thing like a military post.¹ Moreover the rich citizens of the state, who served as horsemen, shared in the general hardship; being called on for daily duty in order to restrain at least, since they could not entirely prevent, the excursions of the garrison of Dekeleia: their efficiency was however soon impaired by the laming of their horses on the hard and stony soil.²

Besides the personal efforts of the citizens, such exigences pressed heavily on the financial resources of the state. Already the immense expense incurred, in fitting out the two large armaments for Sicily, had exhausted all the accumulations laid by in the treasury during the interval since the peace of Nikias; so that the attacks from Dekeleia, not only imposing heavy additional cost, but at the same time abridging the means of paying, brought the finances of Athens into positive embarrassment. With the view of increasing her revenues, she altered the principle on which her subject-allies had hitherto been assessed. Instead of a fixed sum of annual tribute, she now required from them payment of a duty of 5 per cent. on all imports and exports by sea.³ How this new principle of assessment worked, we have unfortunately no information. To collect the duty, and take precautions against evasion, an Athenian custom-house officer must have been required in each allied city. Yet it is difficult to understand how Athens could have enforced a system at once novel, extensive, vexatious, and more burdensome to the payers—when we come to see how much her hold over those payers, as well as her naval force, became enfeebled, before the close even of the actual year.⁴

¹ Thucyd. vii. 28, 29.

² Thucyd. vii. 27.

³ Thucyd. vii. 28.

⁴ Upon this new assessment on the allies, determined by the Athenians, Mr. Mitford remarks as follows:—

“Thus light, in comparison of what we have laid upon ourselves, was the heaviest tax, as far as we learn from history, at that time known in the world. Yet it caused much discontent among the dependent commonwealths; the arbitrary power by which it was imposed

being indeed reasonably execrated, though the burden itself was comparatively a nothing.”

This admission is not easily reconciled with the frequent invectives in which Mr. Mitford indulges against the empire of Athens, as practising a system of extortion and oppression ruinous to the subject-allies.

I do not know, however, on what authority he affirms that this was “the heaviest tax then known in the world;” and that “it caused much discontent among the subject

Her impoverished finances also compelled her to dismiss a body of Thracian mercenaries, whose aid would have been very useful against the enemy at Dekeleia. These Thracian peltasts, 1300 in number, had been hired at a drachma per day each man, to go with Demosthenês to Syracuse, but had not reached Athens in time. As soon as they came thither, the Athenians placed them under the command of Diitrephês, to conduct them back to their native country—with instructions to do damage to the Bœotians, as opportunity might occur, in his way through the Euripus. Accordingly Diitrephês, putting them on shipboard, sailed round Sunium and northward along the eastern coast of Attica. After a short disembarkation near Tanagra, he passed on to Chalkis in Eubœa in the narrowest part of the strait, from whence he crossed in the night to the Bœotian coast opposite, and marched up some distance from the sea to the neighbourhood of the Bœotian town Mykalêssus. He arrived here unseen—lay in wait near a temple of Hermês about two miles distant—and fell upon the town unexpectedly at break of day. To the Mykalessians—dwelling in the centre of Bœotia, not far from Thebes and at a considerable distance from the sea—such an assault was not less unexpected than formidable. Their fortifications were feeble—in some parts low, in other parts even tumbling down; nor had they even taken the precaution to close their gates at night: so that the barbarians under Diitrephês, entering the town without the smallest difficulty, began at once the work of pillage and destruction. The scene which followed was something alike novel and revolting to Grecian eyes. Not only were all the houses, and even the temples, plundered—but the Thracians farther manifested that raging thirst of blood which seemed inherent in their race. They slew every living thing that came in their way; men, women, children, horses, cattle, &c. They burst into a school, wherein many commonwealths.” The latter assertion would indeed be sufficiently probable, if it be true that the tax ever came into operation: but we are not entitled to affirm it.

Considering how very soon the terrible misfortunes of Athens came on, I cannot but think it a matter of uncertainty whether the new assessment ever became a reality throughout the Athenian empire. And the fact that Thucydides does not notice it as an additional cause of discontent among the allies, is one reason for such doubts.

Athens dismisses her Thracian mercenaries—massacre at Mykalêssus.

boys had just been assembled, and massacred them all. This scene of bloodshed, committed by barbarians who had not been seen in Greece since the days of Xerxes, was recounted with horror and sympathy throughout all Grecian communities, though Mykalëssus was in itself a town of second-rate or third-rate magnitude.¹

The succour brought from Thebes, by Mykalessian fugitives, arrived unhappily only in time to avenge, not to save, the inhabitants. The Thracians were already retiring with the booty which they could carry away, when the Bœotarch Skirphondas overtook them both with cavalry and hoplites; after having put to death some greedy plunderers who tarried too long in the town. He compelled them to relinquish most of their booty, and pursued them to the sea-shore; not without a brave resistance from these peltasts, who had a peculiar way of fighting which disconcerted the Thebans. But when they arrived at the sea-shore, the Athenian ships did not think it safe to approach very close, so that not less than 250 Thracians were slain before they could get aboard;² and the Athenian commander Diitrephês was so severely wounded that he died shortly afterwards. The rest pursued their voyage homeward.

The Thracians driven back with slaughter by the Thebans.

Meanwhile the important station of Naupaktus and the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf again became the theatre of naval encounter. It will be recollected that this was the scene of the memorable victories gained by the Athenian admiral Phormion in the second year of the Peloponnesian war,³ wherein the nautical superiority of Athens over her enemies, as to ships, crews, and admiral, had been so transcendently manifested. In that respect, matters had now considerably changed. While the navy of Athens had fallen

Athenian station at Naupaktus—decline of the naval superiority of Athens.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 29, 30, 31. I conceive that οὗτοι οὗ μεγάλῃ is the right reading—and not οὗτοι μεγάλῃ—in reference to Mykalëssus. The words ὡς ἐπὶ μεγέθει in c. 31 refer to the size of the city.

The reading is however disputed among critics. It is evident from the language of Thucydides that

the catastrophe at Mykalëssus made a profound impression throughout Greece.

² Thucyd. vii. 30; Pausanias, i. 23, 3. Compare Meineke, ad Aristophanis Fragment. "Ἡρώεα, vol. ii. p. 1069.

³ See above, ch. xlix. of this History.

off since the days of Phormion, that of her enemy had improved: Ariston and other skilful Corinthian steersmen, not attempting to copy Athenian tactics, had studied the best mode of coping with them, and had modified the build of their own triremes accordingly,¹ at Corinth as well as at Syracuse. Seventeen years before, Phormion with eighteen Athenian triremes would have thought himself a full match for twenty-five Corinthian. But the Athenian admiral of this year, Konon, also a perfectly brave man, now judged so differently, that he constrained Demosthenês and Eurymedon to reinforce his eighteen triremes with ten others—out of the best of their fleet, at a time when they had certainly none to spare—on the ground that the Corinthian fleet opposite of 25 sail was about to assume the offensive against him.²

Soon afterwards Diphilus came to supersede Konon with some fresh ships from Athens which made the total number of triremes 33. The Corinthian fleet, reinforced so as to be nearly of the same number, took up a station on the coast of Achaia opposite Naupaktus, at a spot called Erineus, in the territory of Rhypes. They ranged themselves across the mouth of a little indentation of the coast, or bay in the shape of a crescent, with two projecting promontories as horns: each of these promontories was occupied by a friendly land-force, thus supporting the line of triremes at both flanks. This was a position which did not permit the Athenians to sail through the line, or manœuvre round it and in the rear of it. Accordingly, when the fleet of Diphilus came across from Naupaktus, it remained for some time close in front of the Corinthians, neither party venturing to attack; for the straightforward collision was destructive to the Athenian ships with their sharp, but light and feeble beaks—while it was favourable to the solid bows, and thick epôtids or ear-projections, of the Corinthian trireme. After considerable delay, the Corinthians at length began the attack on their side—yet not advancing far enough out to sea, to admit of the manœuvring and evolutions of the Athenians. The battle lasted some time, terminating with no decisive advantage to either party. Three Corinthian triremes were completely disabled,

¹ See the preceding chapter.

² Thucyd. vii. 31. Compare the language of Phormion, ii. 83, 89.

though the crews of all escaped by swimming to their friends ashore: on the Athenian side, not one trireme became absolutely water-logged, but seven were so much damaged, by straightforward collision with the stronger bows of the enemy, that they became almost useless after they got back to Naupaktus. The Athenians had so far the advantage, that they maintained their station, while the Corinthians did not venture to renew the fight: moreover both the wind and the current set towards the northern shore, so that the floating fragments and dead bodies came into possession of the Athenians. Each party thought itself entitled to erect a trophy; but the real feeling of victory lay on the side of Corinth, and that of defeat on the side of Athens. The reputed maritime superiority of the latter was felt by both parties to have sustained a diminution; and such assuredly would have been the impression of Phormion, had he been alive to witness the conflict.¹

This battle appears to have taken place, so far as we can make out, a short time before the arrival of Demosthenês at Syracuse, about the close of the month of May. We cannot doubt that the Athenians most anxiously expected news from that officer, with some account of victories obtained in Sicily, to console them for having sent him away at a moment when his services were so cruelly wanted at home. Perhaps they may even have indulged hopes of the near capture of Syracuse, as a means of restoring their crippled finances. Their disappointment would be all the more bitter when they came to receive, towards the end of June or beginning of July, despatches announcing the capital defeat of Demosthenês in his attempt upon Epipolæ, and the consequent extinction of all hope that Syracuse could ever be taken. After these despatches, we may perhaps doubt whether any others subsequently reached Athens. The generals would not write home during the month of indecision immediately succeeding, when Demosthenês was pressing for retreat, and Nikias resisting it. They might possibly, however, write immediately on taking their resolution to retreat, at the time when they sent to Katana to forbid farther supplies of provisions:—but this was the last practicable opportunity

Last news of the Athenians from Syracuse—ruin of the army there not officially made known to them.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 34.

—for closely afterwards followed their naval defeat, and the blocking up of the mouth of the Great Harbour. The mere absence of intelligence would satisfy the Athenians that their affairs in Sicily were proceeding badly. But the closing series of calamities, down to the final catastrophe, would only come to their knowledge indirectly; partly through the triumphant despatches transmitted from Syracuse to Sparta, Corinth, and Thebes—partly through individual soldiers of their own armament who escaped.

According to the tale of Plutarch, the news was first made known at Athens through a stranger, who, arriving at Peiræus, went into a barber's shop, and began to converse about it as upon a theme which must of course be uppermost in every one's mind. The astonished barber, hearing for the first time such fearful tidings, ran up to Athens to communicate it to the archons as well as to the public in the market-place. The public assembly being forthwith convoked, he was brought before it, and called upon to produce his authority, which he was unable to do, as the stranger had disappeared. He was consequently treated as a fabricator of uncertified rumours for the disturbance of the public tranquillity, and even put to the torture.¹ How much of this improbable tale may be true, we cannot determine; but we may easily believe that neutrals, passing from Corinth or Megara to Peiræus, were the earliest communicants of the misfortunes of Nikias and Demosthenês in Sicily during the months of July and August. Presently came individual soldiers of the armament, who had got away from the defeat and found a passage home; so that the bad news was but too fully confirmed. But the Athenians were long before they could bring themselves to believe, even upon the testimony of these fugitives, how entire had been the destruction of their two splendid armaments, without even a feeble remnant left to console them.²

As soon as the full extent of their loss was at length forced upon their convictions, the city presented a scene of the deepest affliction, dismay and terror. Over and above the extent of private mourning, from the loss of friends and relatives, which overspread nearly the whole city—there prevailed utter

¹ Plutarch, Nikias, c. 30. He gives the story without much confidence—'Αθήναιους δὲ φασσι, &c.

² Thucyd. viii. 1.

despair as to the public safety. Not merely was the empire of Athens apparently lost, but Athens herself seemed utterly defenceless. Her treasury was empty, her docks nearly destitute of triremes, the flower of her hoplites as well as of her seamen had perished in Sicily without leaving their like behind, and her maritime reputation was irretrievably damaged; while her enemies, on the contrary, animated by feelings of exuberant confidence and triumph, were farther strengthened by the accession of their new Sicilian allies. In these melancholy months (October, November, 413 B.C.) the Athenians expected nothing less than a vigorous attack, both by land and sea, from the Peloponnesian and Sicilian forces united, with the aid of their own revolted allies—an attack which they knew themselves to be in no condition to repel.¹

Amidst so gloomy a prospect, without one ray of hope to cheer them on any side, it was but poor satisfaction to vent their displeasure on the chief speakers who had recommended their recent disastrous expedition, or on those prophets and reporters of oracles who had promised them the divine blessing upon it.² After this first burst both of grief and anger, however, they began gradually to

Energetic
resolutions
adopted by
the Athe-
nians—
Board of
Proboli.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 1. Πάντα δὲ πανταγόθεν αὐτοὺς ἐλόπει, &c.

² Thucyd. viii. 1. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἔγνωσαν, χαλεποὶ μὲν ἦσαν τοῖς ξυμ-προβουμηθεῖσι τῶν ῥητόρων τὸν ἔκ-πλουν, ὥσπερ οὐκ αὐτοὶ ψηφισάμενοι, &c.

From these latter words, it would seem that Thucydides considered the Athenians, after having adopted the expedition by their votes, to have debarred themselves from the right of complaining of those speakers who had stood forward prominently to advise the step. I do not at all concur in his opinion. The adviser of any important measure always makes himself morally responsible for its justice, usefulness, and practicability; and he very properly incurs disgrace, more or less according to the case, if it turns out

to present results totally contrary to those which he had predicted. We know that the Athenian law often imposed upon the mover of a proposition not merely *moral*, but even *legal*, responsibility; a regulation of doubtful propriety under other circumstances, but which I believe to have been useful at Athens.

It must be admitted however to have been hard upon the advisers of this expedition, that—from the total destruction of the armament, neither generals nor soldiers returning—they were not enabled to show how much of the ruin had arisen from faults in the execution, not in the plan conceived. The speaker in the Oration of Lysias—περὶ δημεύσεως τοῦ Νικίου ἀδελφεῶ (Or. xviii. sect. 2)—attempts to transfer the blame from Nikias

look their actual situation in the face; and the more energetic speakers would doubtless administer the salutary lesson of reminding them how much had been achieved by their forefathers, sixty-seven years before, when the approach of Xerxes threatened them with dangers not less overwhelming. Under the peril of the moment, the energy of despair revived in their bosoms: they resolved to get together, as speedily as they could, both ships and money—to keep watch over their allies, especially Eubœa—and to defend themselves to the last. A Board of ten elderly men, under the title of Probûli, was named to review the expenditure, to suggest all practicable economies, and propose for the future such measures as occasion might seem to require. The propositions of these Probûli were for the most part adopted, with a degree of unanimity and promptitude rarely seen in an Athenian assembly—springing out of that pressure and alarm of the moment which silenced all criticism.¹ Among other economies, the Athenians abridged the costly splendour of their choric and liturgic ceremonies at home, and brought back the recent garrison which they had established on the Laconian coast. They at the same time collected timber, commenced the construction of new ships, and fortified Cape Sunium in order to protect their numerous transport ships in the passage from Eubœa to Peiræus.²

upon the advisers of the expedition—a manifest injustice.

Demosthenès (in the Oration de Coronâ, c. 73) gives an emphatic and noble statement of the responsibility which he cheerfully accepts for himself as a political speaker and adviser—responsibility for seeing the beginnings and understanding the premonitory signs, of coming events, and giving his countrymen warning beforehand: ἰδεῖν τὰ πράγματα ἀρχόμενα καὶ προαισθῆσθαι καὶ προειπεῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις. This is the just view of the subject; and applying the measure proposed by Demosthenès, the Athenians had ample ground to be displeased with their orators.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 1: πάντα δὲ πρὸς τὸ παραχρῆμα περιδεές, ὥστε φιλεῖ δῆμος ποιεῖν, ἑτοίμοι ἦσαν εὐτα-

τεῖν: compare Xenoph. Mem. iii. 5, 5.

² Thucyd. viii. 1—4. About the functions of this Board of Probûli, much has been said for which there is no warrant in Thucydides—τῶν τε κατὰ τὴν πόλιν τι ἐς εὐτέλειαν σωφρονίσαι, καὶ ἀρχὴν τινα πρεσβυτέρων ἀνδρῶν ἐλέσθαι, οἵτινες περὶ τῶν παρόντων ὥς ἂν καιρὸς ἢ προβουλεύουσιν. Πάντα δὲ πρὸς τὸ παραχρῆμα περιδεές, ὥστε φιλεῖ δῆμος ποιεῖν, ἑτοίμοι ἦσαν εὐταχτεῖν.

Upon which Dr. Arnold remarks—"That is, no measure was to be submitted to the people, till it had first been approved by this Council of Elders." And such is the general view of the commentators.

No such meaning as this, however, is necessarily contained in

While Athens was thus struggling to make head against her misfortunes, all the rest of Greece was full of excitement and aggressive scheming against her. So grave an event as the destruction of this great armament had never happened since the expedition of Xerxes against Greece. It not only roused the most distant cities of the Grecian world, but also the Persian satraps and the court of Susa. It stimulated the enemies of Athens to redoubled activity; it emboldened her subject-allies to revolt; it pushed the neutral states, who all feared what she would have done if successful against Syracuse, now to declare war against her, and put the finishing stroke to her power as well as to her ambition. All of them, enemies, subjects, and neutrals, alike believed that the doom of Athens was sealed, and that the coming spring would see her captured. Earlier

Prodigious effect of the catastrophe upon all Greeks—enemies and allies of Athens as well as neutrals—and even on the Persians.

the word *Πρόβουλοι*. It is indeed conceivable that persons so denominated might be invested with such a control; but we cannot infer it, or affirm it, simply from the name. Nor will the passages in Aristotle's *Politics*, wherein the *Πρόβουλοι* occurs, authorise any inference with respect to this Board in the special case of Athens (Aristotel. *Politie*. iv. 11, 9; iv. 12, 8; vi. 5, 10—13).

The Board only seems to have lasted for a short time at Athens, being named for a temporary purpose, at a moment of peculiar pressure and discouragement. During such a state of feeling, there was little necessity for throwing additional obstacles in the way of new propositions to be made to the people. It was rather of importance to encourage the suggestion of new measures, from men of sense and experience. A Board destined merely for control and hindrance, would have been mischievous instead of useful under the reigning melancholy at Athens.

The Board was doubtless merged in the Oligarchy of Four Hundred, like all the other magistracies of the state, and was not reconstituted after their deposition.

I cannot think it admissible to draw inferences as to the functions of this Board of *Probuli* now constituted, from the proceedings of the *Probulus* in Aristophanis *Lysistrata*, as is done by Wachsmuth (*Hellenische Alterthumskunde*, i. 2. p. 198), and by Wattenbach (*De Quadringentorum Athenis Factione*, p. 17—21, Berlin 1842).

Schömann (*Ant. Jur. Pub. Græcor*. v. xii. p. 151) says of these *Πρόβουλοι*—"Videtur autem eorum potestas fere annua fuisse." I do not distinctly understand what he means by these words; whether he means that the Board continued permanent, but that the members were annually changed. If this be his meaning, I dissent from it. I think that the Board lasted until the time of the Four Hundred, which would be about a year and a half from its first institution.

than the ensuing spring, the Lacedæmonians did not feel disposed to act; but they sent round their instructions to the allies for operations both by land and sea to be then commenced; all these allies being prepared to do their best, in hopes that this effort would be the last required from them, and the most richly rewarded. A fleet of 100 triremes was directed to be prepared against the spring; 50 of these being imposed in equal proportion on the Lacedæmonians themselves and the Bœotians—15 on Corinth—15 on the Phocians and Lokrians—10 on the Arcadians, with Pellênê and Sikyon—10 on Megara, Trœzen, Epidaurus, and Hermionê. It seems to have been considered that these ships might be built and launched during the interval between September and March.¹ The same large hopes, which had worked upon men's minds at the beginning of the war, were now again rife in the bosoms of the Peloponnesians;² the rather as that powerful force from Sicily, which they had then been disappointed in obtaining, might now be anticipated with tolerable assurance as really forthcoming.³

From the smaller allies, contributions in money were exacted for the intended fleet by Agis, who moved about during this autumn with a portion of the garrison of Dekeleia. In the course of his circuit, he visited the town of Herakleia, near the Maliac Gulf, and levied large contributions on the neighbouring Etæans, in reprisal for the plunder which they had taken from that town, as well as from the Phthiot Achæans and other subjects of the Thessalians, though the latter vainly entered their protest against his proceedings.⁴

It was during the march of Agis through Bœotia that the inhabitants of Eubœa (probably of Chalkis and Eretria) applied to him, entreating his aid to enable them to revolt from Athens: which he readily promised, sending for Alkamenês at the head of 300 Neodamode hoplites from Sparta, to be despatched across to the island as Harmost. Having a force permanently at his disposal, with full liberty of military action. the Spartan king

The Eubœans apply to Agis for aid in revolting from Athens—the Lesbians also apply, and are preferred.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 2, 3. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τὴν πρόσταξιν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἔχοντων νεῶν τῆς ναυπηγίας ἐποιούοντο, &c.: compare also c. 4—παρεσκευάζοντο τὴν ναυπηγίαν, &c.

² Thucyd. viii. 5. ὁντων, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ὥσπερ ἀρχομένων ἐν κατασκευῇ τοῦ πολέμου: compare ii. 7.

³ Thucyd. viii. 2: compare ii. 7; iii. 86.

⁴ Thucyd. viii. 3.

at Dekeleia was more influential even than the authorities at home, so that the disaffected allies of Athens addressed themselves in preference to him. It was not long before envoys from Lesbos visited him for this purpose. So powerfully was their claim enforced by the Bœotians (their kinsmen of the Æolic race), who engaged to furnish ten triremes for their aid, provided Agis would send ten others—that he was induced to postpone his promise to the Eubœans, and to direct Alkamenês as harmost to Lesbos instead of Eubœa,¹ without at all consulting the authorities at Sparta.

The threatened revolt of Lesbos and Eubœa, especially the latter, was a vital blow to the empire of Athens. But this was not the worst. At the same time that these two islands were negotiating with Agis, envoys from Chios, the first and most powerful of all Athenian allies, had gone to Sparta for the same purpose. The government of Chios—an oligarchy, but distinguished for its prudent management and caution in avoiding risks—considering Athens to be now on the verge of ruin, even in the estimation of the Athenians themselves, thought itself safe, together with the opposite city of Erythræ, in taking measures for achieving independence.²

Besides these three great allies, whose example in revolting was sure to be followed by others, Athens was now on the point of being assailed by other enemies yet more unexpected—the two Persian satraps of the Asiatic seaboard, Tissaphernês and Pharnabazus. No sooner was the Athenian catastrophe in Sicily known at the court of Susa, than the Great King claimed from these two satraps the tribute due from the Asiatic Greeks on the coast: for which they had always stood enrolled in the tribute records, though it had never been actually levied since the complete establishment of the Athenian empire. The only way to realise this tribute, for which the satraps were thus made debtors, was to detach the towns from Athens, and break up her empire;³ for

The Chians, with the same view, make application to Sparta.

Envoys from Tissaphernês and Pharnabazus come to Sparta at the same time.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 5.

² Thucyd. viii. 7—24.

³ Thucyd. viii. 5. Ὑπὸ βασιλείᾳ γὰρ νειωσσι ἐ-ὄγγχονε πεπραγμένον (Tissaphernes) τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχῆς πόρους, οὗς δὲ Ἀθηναίους ἀποτῶν Ἑλλήνων πόλεων οὗ δυνάμενος πράσσειν ἐπωρεῖλησε. Τους τε

which purpose Tissaphernês sent an envoy to Sparta, in conjunction with those of the Chians and Erythræans. He invited the Lacedæmonians to conclude an alliance with the Great King, for joint operations against the Athenian empire in Asia; promising to furnish pay and maintenance for any forces which they might send, at the rate of one drachma per day for each man of the ships' crews.¹ He farther hoped by means of this aid to reduce Amorgês, the revolted son of the late satrap Pissuthnês, who was established in the strong maritime town of Iasus, with a Grecian mercenary force and a considerable treasure, and was in alliance with Athens. The Great King had sent down a peremptory mandate, that Amorgês should either be brought prisoner to Susa or slain.

At the same moment, though without any concert, there arrived at Sparta Kalligeitus and Timagoras—two Grecian exiles in the service of Pharnabazus, bringing propositions of a similar character from that satrap, whose government² comprehended Phrygia and the coast lands north of Æolis, from the Propontis to the northeast corner of the Elæatic Gulf. Eager to have the assistance of a Lacedæmonian fleet in order to detach the Hellespontine Greeks from Athens, and realise the tribute required by the court of Susa, Pharnabazus was at the same time desirous of forestalling Tissaphernês as the medium of alliance between Sparta and the Great King. The two missions having thus arrived simultaneously at Sparta, a strong competition arose between them—one striving to attract the projected expedition to Chios, the other to the Hellespont:³ for which latter purpose, Kalligeitus had brought twenty-five talents, which he tendered as a first payment in part.

οὖν φόρους μᾶλλον ἐνόμιζε κομίσεσθαι κακῶσας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, &c.

I have already discussed this important passage at some length, in its bearing upon the treaty concluded thirty-seven years before this time between Athens and Persia. See note to chap. xlv. of this History.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 29. Καὶ μὴνός μὲν

τροφὴν, ὥσπερ ὑπέσθη ἐν τῇ Λακεδαιμονίᾳ, ἐς δραχμὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐκάστω πάσαις ταῖς ναυσὶ διέδωκε, τοῦ δὲ λοιποῦ χρόνου ἐβούλετο τριῶβον διδόναι, &c.

² The satrapy of Tissaphernes extended as far north as Antandrus and Adramyttium (Thucyd. viii. 10³).

³ Thucyd. viii. 6.

From all quarters, new enemies were thus springing up against Athens in the hour of her distress, so that the Lacedæmonians had only to choose which they would prefer; a choice in which they were much guided by the exile Alkibiadês. It so happened that his family friend Endius was at this moment one of the Board of Ephors; while his personal enemy King Agis, with whose wife Timæa he carried on an intrigue,¹ was absent in command at Dekeleia. Knowing well the great power and importance of Chios, Alkibiadês strenuously exhorted the Spartan authorities to devote their first attention to that island. A Pericæus named Phrynis, being sent thither to examine whether the resources alleged by the envoys were really forthcoming, brought back a satisfactory report, that the Chian fleet was not less than sixty triremes strong: upon which the Lacedæmonians concluded an alliance with Chios and Erythræ, engaging to send a fleet of forty sail to their aid. Ten of these triremes, now ready in the Lacedæmonian ports (probably at Gythium), were directed immediately to sail to Chios, under the admiral Melanchridas. It seems to have been now midwinter—but Alkibiadês, and still more the Chian envoys, insisted on the necessity of prompt action, for fear that the Athenians should detect the intrigue. However, an earthquake just then intervening, was construed by the Spartans as a mark of divine displeasure, so that they would not persist in sending either the same commander or the same ships. Chalkideus was named to supersede Melanchridas; while five new ships were directed to be equipped, so as to be ready to sail in the early spring along with the larger fleet from Corinth.²

Alkibiadês at Sparta—his recommendations determine the Lacedæmonians to send aid to Chios.

As soon as spring arrived, three Spartan commissioners were sent to Corinth (in compliance with the pressing instances of the Chian envoys) to transport across the isthmus from the Corinthian to the Saronic Gulf, the thirty-nine triremes now in the Corinthian port of Lechæum. It was at first proposed to send off all, at one and the same time, to Chios—even those which Agis had been equipping for the assistance of Lesbos; although Kalligeitus declined

Synod of the Peloponnesian allies at Corinth—measures resolved.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 6-12; Plutarch, Nepos, Alkib. c. 3. Alkibiad. c. 23, 24; Cornelius

² Thucyd. viii. 6.

any concern with Chios, and refused to contribute for this purpose any of the money which he had brought. A general synod of deputies from the allies was held at Corinth, wherein it was determined, with the concurrence of Agis, to despatch the fleet first to Chios under Chalkideus—next, to Lesbos under Alkamenês—lastly, to the Hellespont, under Klearchus. But it was judged expedient to divide the fleet, and bring across twenty-one triremes out of the thirty-nine, so as to distract the attention of Athens, and divide her means of resistance. So low was the estimate formed of these means, that the Lacedæmonians did not scruple to despatch their expedition openly from the Saronic Gulf, where the Athenians would have full knowledge both of its numbers and of its movements.¹

Hardly had the twenty-one triremes, however, been brought across to Kenchreæ, when a fresh obstacle arose to delay their departure. The Isthmian festival—scruples of the Corinthians—delay about Chios—suspensions of Athens. Isthmian festival, celebrated every alternate year, and kept especially holy by the Corinthians, was just approaching. They would not consent to begin any military operations until it was concluded, though Agis tried to elude their scruples by offering to adopt the intended expedition as his own. It was during the delay which thus ensued that the Athenians were first led to conceive suspicions about Chios, whither they despatched Aristokratês, one of the generals of the year. The Chian authorities strenuously denied all projects of revolt, and being required by Aristokratês to furnish some evidence of their good faith, sent back along with him seven triremes to the aid of Athens. It was much against their own will that they were compelled thus to act. But being aware that the Chian people were in general averse to the idea of revolting from Athens, they did not feel confidence enough to proclaim their secret designs without some manifestation of support from Peloponnesus, which had been so much delayed that they knew not when it would arrive. The Athenians, in their present state of weakness, perhaps thought it prudent to accept insufficient assurances, for fear of driving this powerful island to open revolt. Nevertheless, during the Isthmian festival, to which they were invited along with other Greeks—they discovered farther evidences of the plot which was going on, and re-

¹ Thucyd. viii. 8.

solved to keep strict watch on the motions of the fleet now assembled at Kenchreæ, suspecting that this squadron was intended to second the revolting party in Chios.¹

Shortly after the Isthmian festival, the squadron actually started from Kenchreæ to Chios, under Alkamenês; but an equal number of Athenian ships watched them as they sailed along the shore, and tried to tempt them farther out to sea, with a view to fight them. Alkamenês however, desirous of avoiding a battle, thought it best to return back; upon which the Athenians also returned to Peiræus, mistrusting the fidelity of the seven Chian triremes which formed part of their fleet. Reappearing presently with a larger squadron of 37 triremes, they pursued Alkamenês (who had again begun his voyage along the shore southward) and attacked him near the uninhabited harbour called Peiræum, on the frontiers of Corinth and Epidaurus. They here gained a victory, captured one of his ships, and damaged or disabled most of the remainder. Alkamenês himself was slain, and the ships were run ashore, where on the morrow the Peloponnesian land-force arrived in sufficient numbers to defend them. So

Peloponnesian fleet from Corinth to Chios—it is defeated by the Athenians.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 10. Ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τὰ Ἰσθμία ἐγένετο· καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι (ἐπηγγέλθησαν γάρ) ἐθεώρουν ἐς αὐτά· καὶ καταδῆλα μᾶλλον αὐτοῖς τὰ τῶν Χίων ἐφάνη.

The language of Thucydides in this passage deserves notice. The Athenians were now at enmity with Corinth: it was therefore remarkable, and contrary to what would be expected among Greeks, that they should be present with their Theôry or solemn sacrifice at the Isthmian festival. Accordingly Thucydides, when he mentions that they went thither, thinks it right to add the explanation—ἐπηγγέλθησαν γάρ—"for they had been invited"—"for the festival truce had been formally signified to them." That the heralds who proclaimed the truce should come and proclaim it to a state in hostility with Corinth, was something unusual,

and meriting special notice: otherwise, Thucydides would never have thought it worth while to mention the proclamation—it being the uniform practice.

We must recollect that this was the first Isthmian festival which had taken place since the resumption of the war between Athens and the Peloponnesian alliance. The habit of leaving out Athens from the Corinthian herald's proclamation had not yet been renewed. In regard to the Isthmian festival, there was probably greater reluctance to leave her out, because that festival was in its origin half Athenian—said to have been established, or revived after interruption, by Theseus; and the Athenian Theôry enjoyed a προεδρία or privileged place at the games (Plutarch, Theseus, c. 25; Argument. ad Pindar. Isthm. Schol.).

inconvenient, however, was their station on this desert spot, that they at first determined to burn the vessels and depart. It was not without difficulty that they were induced, partly by the instances of King Agis, to guard the ships until an opportunity could be found for eluding the blockading Athenian fleet; a part of which still kept watch off the shore, while the rest were stationed at a neighbouring islet.¹

The Spartan Ephors had directed Alkamenês, at the moment of his departure from Kenchreæ, to despatch a messenger to Sparta, in order that the five triremes under Chalkideus and Alkibiadês might leave Laconia at the same moment. And these latter appear to have been actually under way, when a second messenger brought the news of the defeat and death of Alkamenês at Peiræum. Besides the discouragement arising from such a check at the outset of their plans against Ionia, the Ephors thought it impossible to begin operations with so small a squadron as five triremes, so that the departure of Chalkideus was for the present countermanded. This resolution, perfectly natural to adopt, was only reversed at the strenuous instance of the Athenian exile Alkibiadês, who urged them to permit Chalkideus and himself to start forthwith. Small as the squadron was, yet as it would reach Chios before the defeat at Peiræum became public, it might be passed off as the precursor of the main fleet; while he (Alkibiadês) pledged himself to procure the revolt of Chios and the other Ionic cities, through his personal connexion with the leading men—who would repose confidence in his assurances of the helplessness of Athens, as well as of the thorough determination of Sparta to stand by them. To these arguments, Alkibiadês added an appeal to the personal vanity of Endius; whom he instigated to assume for himself the glory of liberating Ionia as well as of first commencing the Persian alliance, instead of leaving this enterprise to King Agis.²

By these arguments,—assisted doubtless by his personal influence, since his advice respecting Gylipus and respecting Dekeleia had turned out so successful—Alkibiadês obtained the consent of the Spartan Ephors, and sailed along with Chalkideus in the five triremes to Chios. Nothing less

Small squadron starts from Sparta under Chalkideus and Alkibiadês, to go to Chios.

Energetic advice of Alkibiadês—his great usefulness to Sparta.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 11.

² Thucyd. viii. 12.

than his energy and ascendancy could have extorted, from men both dull and backward, a determination apparently so rash, yet in spite of such appearance, admirably conceived, and of the highest importance. Had the Chians waited for the fleet now blocked up at Peiræum, their revolt would at least have been long delayed, and perhaps might not have occurred at all: the accomplishment of that revolt by the little squadron of Alkibiadês was the proximate cause of all the Spartan successes in Ionia, and was ultimately the means even of disengaging the fleet at Peiræum, by distracting the attention of Athens. So well did this unprincipled exile, while playing the game of Sparta, know where to inflict the dangerous wounds upon his country!

There was indeed little danger in crossing the Ægean to Ionia, with ever so small a squadron; for Athens in her present destitute condition had no fleet there, and although Strombichidês was detached with eight triremes from the blockading fleet off Peiræum, to pursue Chalkideus and Alkibiadês as soon as their departure was known, he was far behind them, and soon returned without success. To keep their voyage secret, they detained the boats and vessels which they met, and did not liberate them until they reached Korykus in Asia Minor, the mountainous land southward of Erythræ. They were here visited by their leading partisans from Chios, who urged them to sail thither at once before their arrival could be proclaimed. Accordingly they reached the town of Chios (on the eastern coast of the island, immediately opposite to Erythræ on the continent) to the astonishment and dismay of every one, except the oligarchical plotters who had invited them. By the contrivance of these latter, the Council was found just assembling, so that Alkibiadês was admitted without delay, and invited to state his case. Suppressing all mention of the defeat at Peiræum, he represented his squadron as the foremost of a large Lacedæmonian fleet actually at sea and approaching—and affirmed Athens to be now helpless by sea as well as by land, incapable of maintaining any farther hold upon her allies. Under these impressious, and while the population were yet under their first impulse of surprise and alarm, the oligarchical Council took the resolution of revolting. The example was followed by Erythræ, and soon

Arrival of
Alkibiadês
at Chios—
revolt of
the island
from
Athens.

afterwards by Klazomenæ, determined by three triremes from Chios. The Klazomenians had hitherto dwelt upon an islet close to the continent; on which latter, however, a portion of their town (called Polichnê) was situated, which they now resolved, in anticipation of attack from Athens, to fortify as their main residence. Both the Chians and Erythræans also actively employed themselves in fortifying their towns and preparing for war.¹

In reviewing this account of the revolt of Chios, we find occasion to repeat remarks already suggested by previous revolts of other allies of Athens —Lesbos, Akanthus, Torônê, Mendê, Amphipolis, &c. Contrary to what is commonly intimated by historians, we may observe, first, that Athens did not systematically interfere to impose her own democratical government upon her allies —next, that the empire of Athens, though upheld mainly by an established belief in her superior force, was nevertheless by no means odious, nor the proposition of revolting from her acceptable, to the general population of her allies. She had at this moment no force in Ionia; and the oligarchical government of Chios, wishing to revolt, was only prevented from openly declaring its intention by the reluctance of its own population—a reluctance which it overcame partly by surprise arising from the sudden arrival of Alkibiadês and Chalkideus, partly by the fallacious assurance of a still greater Peloponnesian force approaching.² Nor would the Chian oligarchy themselves have determined to revolt, had they not been persuaded that such was now the safer course, inasmuch as Athens was ruined, and her power to protect, not less than her power to oppress, at an end.³ The envoys of Tissaphernês had accompanied those

¹ Thucyd. viii. 14.

² Thucyd. viii. 9. Αἴτιον δ' ἐγένετο τῆς ἀποστολῆς τῶν νεῶν, οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τῶν Χίων οὐκ εἰδότες τὰ πρᾶσσόμενα, οἱ δ' ὀλίγον ξυνειδότες, τό τε πλήθος οὐ βουλευόμενοι πῶ πολέμιον ἔχειν, πρὶν τι καὶ ἰσχυρόν λάβωσι, καὶ τοὺς Πελοποννησίους οὐκέτι προσδεχόμενοι ᾗσειν, ἔτι διέτριβον.

Also viii. 4. 'Ο δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδης καὶ ὁ Χαλκιδεύς προϋγγεγνημένοι τῶν συμπρασσόντων, Χίων τισί, καὶ

καλεούντων καταπλεῖν μὴ προειπόντας ἐς τὴν πόλιν, ἀφικοῦνται αἰφνίδισι τοῖς Χίοις. Καὶ οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ἐν θαύματι ἦσαν καὶ ἐκπλήττει τοῖς δὲ ὀλίγοις παρεσκεύαστο ὥστε βουλὴν τε τυχαίᾳ συλλεγομένην, καὶ γενομένων λόγων, ἀπὸ τε τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου, ὡς ἄλλαι τε νῆες πολλὰὶ προσπλέουσι, καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς πολιουρίας τῶν ἐν Πειραιῶι νεῶν οὐ δηλωσάντων, ἀφίστανται Χίοι, καὶ αὐθις Ἐρυθραίοι, Ἀθηναῖων.

³ See the remarkable passage of

of Chios to Sparta, so that the Chian government saw plainly that the misfortunes of Athens had only the effect of reviving the aggressions and pretensions of their former foreign master, against whom Athens had protected them for the last fifty years. We may well doubt therefore whether this prudent government looked upon the change as on the whole advantageous. But they had no motive to stand by Athens in her misfortunes, and good policy seemed now to advise a timely union with Sparta as the preponderant force. The sentiment entertained towards Athens by her allies (as I have before observed) was more negative than positive. It was favourable rather than otherwise, in the minds of the general population, to whom she caused little actual hardship or oppression; but averse, to a certain extent, in the minds of their leading men—since she wounded their dignity, and offended that love of town autonomy which was instinctive in the Grecian political mind.

The revolt of Chios, speedily proclaimed, filled every man at Athens with dismay. It was the most fearful symptom, as well as the heaviest aggravation, of their fallen condition; especially as there was every reason to apprehend that the example of this first and greatest among the allies would be soon followed by the rest. The Athenians had no fleet or force even to attempt its reconquest: but they now felt the full importance of that reserve of 1000 talents, which Periklês had set aside in the first year of the war against the special emergency of a hostile fleet approaching Peiræus. The penalty of death had been decreed against any one who should propose to devote this fund to any other purpose; and in spite of severe financial pressure, it had remained untouched for twenty years. Now, however, though the special contingency foreseen had not yet arisen, matters were come to such an extremity, that the only chance of saving the remaining empire was by the appropriation of this money. An unanimous vote was accordingly passed to abrogate the penal enactment (or standing order) against proposing any other mode of appropriation; after which the resolution was taken to devote this money to present necessities.¹

Dismay occasioned at Athens by the revolt of Chios—the Athenians set free and appropriate their reserved fund.

Thucyd. viii. 24, about the calculations of the Chian government.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 15.

By means of this new fund, they were enabled to find pay and equipment for all the triremes ready or nearly ready in their harbour, and thus to spare a portion from their blockading fleet off Peiræum; out of which Strombichidês with his squadron of eight triremes was despatched immediately to Ionia—followed, after a short interval, by Thrasyklês with twelve others. At the same time, the seven Chian triremes which also formed part of this fleet, were cleared of their crews; among whom such as were slaves were liberated, while the freemen were put in custody. Besides fitting out an equal number of fresh ships to keep up the numbers of the blockading fleet, the Athenians worked with the utmost ardour to get ready thirty additional triremes. The extreme exigency of the situation, since Chios had revolted, was felt by every one: yet with all their efforts, the force which they were enabled to send was at first lamentably inadequate. Strombichidês, arriving at Samos, and finding Chios, Erythræ, and Klazomenæ already in revolt, reinforced his little squadron with one Samian trireme, and sailed to Teos (on the continent, at the southern coast of that isthmus, of which Klazomenæ is on the northern) in hopes of preserving that place. But he had not been long there when Chalkideus arrived from Chios with twenty-three triremes, all or mostly Chian; while the forces of Erythræ and Klazomenæ approached by land. Strombichidês was obliged to make a hasty flight back to Samos, vainly pursued by the Chian fleet. Upon this evidence of Athenian weakness, and the superiority of the enemy, the Teians admitted into their town the land-force without; by the help of which, they now demolished the wall formerly built by Athens to protect the city against attack from the interior. Some of the troops of Tissaphernês lending their aid in the demolition, the town was laid altogether open to the satrap; who moreover came himself shortly afterwards to complete the work.¹

Having themselves revolted from Athens, the Chian government were prompted by considerations of their own safety to instigate revolt in all other Athenian dependencies; and Alkibiadês now took advantage of their forwardness in the cause to make an attempt on Milêtus.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 16.

He was eager to acquire this important city, the first among all the continental allies of Athens—by his own resources and those of Chios, before the fleet could arrive from Peiræum; in order that the glory of the exploit might be ensured to Endius, and not to Agis. Accordingly he and Chalkideus left Chios with a fleet of twenty-five triremes, twenty of them Chian, together with the five which they themselves had brought from Laconia; these last five had been re-manned with Chian crews, the Peloponnesian crews having been armed as hoplites and left as garrison in the island. Conducting his voyage as secretly as possible, he was fortunate enough to pass unobserved by the Athenian station at Samos, where Strombichidês had just been reinforced by Thrasyklês with the twelve fresh triremes from the blockading fleet at Peiræum. Arriving at Milêtus, where he possessed established connexions among the leading men, and had already laid his train, as at Chios, for revolt—Alkibiadês prevailed on them to break with Athens forthwith: so that when Strombichidês and Thrasyklês, who came in pursuit the moment they learnt his movements, approached, they found the port shut against them, and were forced to take up a station on the neighbouring island of Ladê. So anxious were the Chians for the success of Alkibiadês in this enterprise, that they advanced with ten fresh triremes along the Asiatic coast as far as Anæa, (opposite to Samos) in order to hear the result and to tender aid if required. A message from Chalkideus apprised them that he was master of Milêtus, and that Amorgês (the Persian ally of Athens, at Iasus) was on his way at the head of an army: upon which they returned to Chios—but were unexpectedly seen in the way (off the temple of Zeus, between Lebedos and Kolophon) and pursued, by sixteen fresh ships just arrived from Athens, under the command of Diomedon. Of the ten Chian triremes, one found refuge at Ephesus, and five at Teos: the remaining four were obliged to run ashore and became prizes, though the crews all escaped. In spite of this check, however, the Chians had come again with fresh ships and some land-forces, as soon as the Athenian fleet had gone back to Samos—and procured the revolt both of Lebedos and Eræ from Athens.¹

Activity of the Chians in promoting revolt among the other Athenian allies —Alkibiadês determines Milêtus to revolt.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 17-19.

It was at Milêtus, immediately after the revolt, that the first treaty was concluded between Tissaphernês, on behalf of himself and the Great King—and Chalkideus, for Sparta and her allies. Probably the aid of Tissaphernês was considered necessary to maintain the town, when the Athenian fleet was watching it so closely on the neighbouring island: at least it is difficult to explain otherwise an agreement so eminently dishonourable as well as disadvantageous to the Greeks:—

“The Lacedæmonians and their allies have concluded alliance with the Great King and Tissaphernês, on the following conditions. The king shall possess whatever territory and cities he himself had, or his predecessors had before him. The king, and the Lacedæmonians with their allies, shall jointly hinder the Athenians from deriving either money or other advantages from all those cities which have hitherto furnished to them any such. They shall jointly carry on war against the Athenians, and shall not renounce the war against them, except by joint consent. Whoever shall revolt from the king, shall be treated as an enemy by the Lacedæmonians and their allies; whoever shall revolt from the Lacedæmonians, shall in like manner be treated as an enemy by the king.”¹

As a first step to the execution of this treaty, Milêtus was handed over to Tissaphernês, who immediately caused a citadel to be erected and placed a garrison within it². If fully carried out, indeed, the terms of the treaty would have made the Great King master not only of all the Asiatic Greeks and all the islanders in the Ægean, but also of all Thessaly and Bœotia and the full ground which had once been covered by Xerxes.³ Besides this monstrous stipulation, the treaty farther bound the Lacedæmonians to aid the king in keeping enslaved any Greeks who might be under his dominion. Nor did it, on the other hand, secure to them any pecuniary aid from him for the payment of their armament—which was their great motive for courting his alliance. We shall find the Lacedæmonian authorities themselves hereafter refusing to ratify the treaty, on the ground of its exorbitant concessions. But

Dishonourable and disadvantageous conditions of the treaty.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 18.

² Thucyd. viii. 84-109.

³ Thucyd. viii. 44.

it stands as a melancholy evidence of the new source of mischief now opening upon the Asiatic and insular Greeks, the moment that the empire of Athens was broken up—the revived pretensions of their ancient lord and master; whom nothing had hitherto kept in check, for the last fifty years, except Athens, first as representative and executive agent, next as successor and mistress of the confederacy of Delos. We thus see against what evils Athens had hitherto protected them: we shall presently see, what is partially disclosed in this very treaty, the manner in which Sparta realised her promise of conferring autonomy on each separate Grecian state.

The great stress of the war had now been transferred to Ionia and the Asiatic side of the *Ægean* sea. The enemies of Athens had anticipated that her entire empire in that quarter would fall an easy prey: yet in spite of two such serious defections as Chios and Milétus, she showed an unexpected energy in keeping hold of the remainder. Her great and capital station, from the present time to the end of the war, was Samos; and a revolution which now happened, ensuring the fidelity of that island to her alliance, was a condition indispensable to her power of maintaining the struggle in Ionia.

Energetic
efforts of
Athens—
democratical
revolution at
Samos.

We have heard nothing about Samos throughout the whole war, since its reconquest by the Athenians after the revolt of 440 B.C.: but we now find it under the government of an oligarchy called the *Geôtori* (the proprietors of land)—as at Syracuse before the rule of Gelon. It cannot be doubted that these *Geôtori* were disposed to follow the example of the Chian oligarchy, and revolt from Athens; while the people at Samos, as at Chios, were averse to such a change. Under this state of circumstances, the Chian oligarchy had themselves conspired with Sparta, to trick and constrain their *Demos* by surprise into revolt, through the aid of five Peloponnesian ships. The like would have happened at Samos, had the people remained quiet. But they profited by the recent warning, forestalled the designs of their oligarchy, and rose in insurrection, with the help of three Athenian triremes which then chanced to be in the port. The oligarchy were completely defeated, but not without a violent and bloody struggle; two hundred of them being slain, and

four hundred banished. This revolution secured (and probably nothing less than a democratical revolution could have secured, under the existing state of Hellenic affairs) the adherence of Samos to the Athenians; who immediately recognised the new democracy, and granted to it the privilege of an equal and autonomous ally. The Samian people confiscated and divided among themselves the property of such of the *Geômorî* as were slain or banished;¹ the survivors were deprived of all political privileges, and the other citizens (the *Demos*) were forbidden to intermarry with them.² We may fairly suspect that this latter

¹ Thucyd. viii. 21. Ἐγένετο δὲ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον καὶ ἡ ἐν Σάμῳ ἐκανάστασις ὑπὸ τοῦ δῆμου τοῖς δυνατοῖς, μετὰ Ἀθηναίων, οἱ ἔτυχον ἐν τρισὶ ναυσὶ παρόντες. Καὶ ὁ δῆμος ὁ Σαμίῳ ἐς διακοσίους μὲν τινὰς τοὺς πάντας τῶν δυνατῶν ἀπέκτεινε, τετρακοσίους δὲ φυγῇ ζῆμιώσαντες, καὶ αὐτοὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν καὶ οἰκίας ναυμάμενοι, Ἀθηναίων τε τρῖσιν αὐτονομίαν μετὰ ταῦτα ὡς βεβαίοις ἤδη φηρισαμένων, τὰ λοιπὰ διψύχουν τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τοῖς γεωμόροις μετεδίδωσαν οὕτε ἄλλου οὐδενός, οὕτε ἐχθρῶναι οὐδ' ἀγαθέσαι παρ' ἐκείνων οὐδ' ἐς ἐκείνους οὐδενὶ ἐτι τοῦ δήμου ἐξῆν.

² Thucyd. viii. 21. The dispositions and plans of the "higher people" at Samos, to call in the Peloponnesians and revolt from Athens, are fully admitted even by Mr. Mitford; and implied by Dr. Thirlwall, who argues that the government of Samos cannot have been oligarchical, because, if it had been so, the island would already have revolted from Athens to the Peloponnesians.

Mr. Mitford says (ch. xix. sect. iii. vol. iv. p. 191)—"Meanwhile the body of the higher people at Samos, more depressed than all others since their reduction on their former revolt, were proposing to seize the opportunity that seemed to offer through the prevalence of

the Peloponnesian arms, of mending their condition. The lower people, having intelligence of their design, rose upon them, and with the assistance of the crews of three Athenian ships then at Samos, overpowered them," &c. &c. &c.

"The massacre and robbery were rewarded by a decree of the Athenian people, granting to the perpetrators the independent administration of the affairs of their island; which since the last rebellion had been kept under the immediate control of the Athenian government."

To call this a massacre is perversion of language. It was an insurrection and intestine conflict, in which the "higher people" were vanquished, but of which they also were the beginners, by their conspiracy (which Mr. Mitford himself admits as a fact) to introduce a foreign enemy into the island. Does he imagine that the "lower people" were bound to sit still and see this done? And what means had they of preventing it, except by insurrection? which inevitably became bloody, because the "higher people" were a strong party, in possession of the powers of government, with great means of resistance. The loss on the part of the assailants is not made known to us, nor indeed the loss in so far as it fell on the followers of the

prohibition was only the retaliation of a similar exclusion, which the oligarchy, when in power, had enforced to

Geómori. Thucydides specifies only the number of the Geómori themselves, who were persons of individual importance.

I do not clearly understand what idea Mr. Mitford forms to himself of the government of Samos at this time. He seems to conceive it as democratical, yet under great immediate control from Athens—and that it kept the “higher people” in a state of severe depression, from which they sought to relieve themselves by the aid of the Peloponnesian arms.

But if he means by the expression *“under the immediate control of the Athenian government,”* that there was any Athenian governor or garrison at Samos, the account here given by Thucydides distinctly refutes him. The conflict was between two intestine parties, “the higher people and the lower people.” The only Athenians who took part in it were the crews of three triremes, and even they were there by accident (*οἱ ἔτυχον παρόντες*), not as a regular garrison. Samos was under an indigenous government; but it was a subject and tributary ally of Athens, like all the other allies, with the exception of Chios and Methymna (Thucyd. vi. 85). After this revolution, the Athenians raised it to the rank of an autonomous ally—which Mr. Mitford is pleased to call “rewarding massacre and robbery;” in the language of a party orator rather than of an historian.

But was the government of Samos, immediately before this intestine contest, oligarchical or democratical? The language of Thucydides carries to my mind a full conviction that it was oligarchical—under an exclusive aris-

tocracy called the Geómori. Dr. Thirlwall however (whose candid and equitable narrative of this event forms a striking contrast to that of Mr. Mitford) is of a different opinion. He thinks it certain that a democratical government had been established at Samos by the Athenians, when it was reconquered by them (B.C. 440) after its revolt. That the government continued democratical during the first years of the Peloponnesian war, he conceives to be proved by the hostility of the Samian exiles at Anæa, whom he looks upon as oligarchical refugees. And though not agreeing in Mr. Mitford’s view of the peculiarly depressed condition of the “higher people” at Samos at this later time, he nevertheless thinks that they were not actually in possession of the government. “Still (he says) as the island gradually recovered its prosperity, the privileged class seems also to have looked upward, perhaps contrived to regain a part of the substance of power under different forms, and probably betrayed a strong inclination to revive its ancient pretensions on the first opportunity. *That it had not yet advanced beyond this point, may be regarded as certain; because otherwise Samos would have been among the foremost to revolt from Athens:* and on the other hand, it is no less clear, that the state of parties there was such as to excite a high degree of mutual jealousy, and great alarm in the Athenians, to whom the loss of the island at this juncture would have been almost irreparable” (Hist. Gr. ch. xxvii. vol. iii. p. 477, 2nd edit.). Manso (Sparta, book iv. vol. ii. p. 266) is of the same opinion.

maintain the purity of their own blood. What they had enacted as a privilege was now thrown back upon them as an insult.

Surely the conclusion which Dr. Thirlwall here announces as certain, cannot be held to rest on adequate premises. Admitting that there was an oligarchy in power at Samos, it is perfectly possible to explain why this oligarchy had not yet carried into act its disposition to revolt from Athens. We see that none of the allies of Athens—not even Chios, the most powerful of all—revolted without the extraneous pressure and encouragement of a foreign fleet. Alkibiadēs, after securing Chios, considered Milētus to be next in order of importance, and had moreover peculiar connexions with the leading men there (viii. 17); so that he went next to detach that place from Athens. Milētus, being on the continent, placed him in immediate communication with Tissaphernēs, for which reason he might naturally deem it of importance superior even to Samos in his plans. Moreover, not only no foreign fleet had yet reached Samos, but several Athenian ships had arrived there: for Strombichidēs, having come across the Ægean too late to save Chios, made Samos a sort of central station (viii. 16). These circumstances, combined with the known reluctance of the Samian Demos or commonalty, are surely sufficient to explain why the Samian oligarchy had not yet consummated its designs to revolt. And hence the fact, that no revolt had yet taken place, cannot be held to warrant Dr. Thirlwall's inference, that the government was *not* oligarchical.

We have no information how or when the oligarchical government at Samos got up. That the Samian

refugees at Anæa, so actively hostile to Samos and Athens during the first ten years of the Peloponnesian war, were oligarchical exiles acting against a democratical government at Samos (iv. 75), is not in itself improbable; yet it is not positively stated. The government of Samos might have been, even at that time, oligarchical; yet, if it acted in the Athenian interest, there would doubtless be a body of exiles watching for opportunities of injuring it, by aid of the enemies of Athens.

Moreover, it seems to me, that if we read and put together the passages of Thucydides, viii. 21, 63, 73, it is impossible without the greatest violence to put any other sense upon them, except as meaning that the government of Samos was now in the hands of the oligarchy or Geōmori, and that the Demos rose in insurrection against them, with ultimate triumph. The natural sense of the words ἐπανάστασις, ἐπανίστασθαι, is that of *insurrection against an established government*: it does not mean "a violent attack by one party upon another"—still less does it mean, "an attack made by a party in possession of the government;" which nevertheless it ought to mean, if Dr. Thirlwall be correct in supposing that the Samian government was now democratical. Thus we have, in the description of the Samian revolt from Athens—Thucyd. i. 115 (after Thucydides has stated that the Athenians established a democratical government, he next says that the Samian exiles presently came over with a mercenary force)—καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τῷ δήμῳ ἐπανάστησαν, καὶ ἐξράττη-

On the other hand, the Athenian blockading fleet was surprised and defeated, with the loss of four triremes, by the Peloponnesian fleet at Peiræum, which was thus enabled to get to Kenchreæ, and to refit in order that it might be sent to Ionia. The sixteen Peloponnesian ships which had fought at Syracuse had already come back to Lechæum, in spite of the obstructions thrown in their

Peloponnesian fleet at Kenchreæ —Astychus is sent as Spartan admiral to Ionia.

σαν τῶν πλείστων, &c. Again, v. 23 —about the apprehended insurrection of the Helots against the Spartans—ἦν δὲ ἡ δοῦλεια ἐπανίσταται: compare Xenoph. Hellen. v. 4, 19; Plato, Republ. iv. 18, p. 444; Herodot. iii. 39-120. So also δυνατοί is among the words which Thucydides uses for an oligarchical party, either in government or in what may be called *opposition* (i. 24; v. 4). But it is not conceivable to me that Thucydides would have employed the words ἡ ἐπανάστασις ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου τοῖς δυνατοῖς—if the Demos had at that time been actually in the government.

Again, viii. 63, he says, that the Athenian oligarchical party under Peisander αὐτῶν τῶν Σαμίων προὔτρεψαντο τοὺς δυνατοὺς ὥστε πειράσθαι μετὰ σφῶν ὀλιγαρχηθῆναι, καίπερ ἐπαναστάντας αὐτοὺς ἀλλήλοισι ἵνα μὴ ὀλιγαρχῶνται. Here the motive of the previous ἐπανάστασις is clearly noted—it was in order that they might *not be under an oligarchical government*: for I agree with Krüger (in opposition to Dr. Thirlwall), that this is the clear meaning of the words, and that the use of the present tense prevents our construing it, “in order that their democratical government might not be subverted, and an oligarchy put upon them”—which ought to be the sense, if Dr. Thirlwall's view were just.

Lastly, viii. 73, we have οἱ γὰρ τότε τῶν Σαμίων ἐπαναστάντες τοῖς δυνατοῖς καὶ ὄντες

δῆμος, μεταβαλλόμενοι αὐθις—ἐγένοντό τε ἐς τριακοσίους ζυνωμόται, καὶ ἔμελλον τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς δῆμος ὄντι ἐπιθήσασθαι. Surely these words—οἱ ἐπαναστάντες τοῖς δυνατοῖς καὶ ὄντες δῆμος—“those who having risen in arms against the wealthy and powerful, were now a Demos or a democracy”—must imply *that the persons against whom a rising had taken place had been a governing oligarchy*. Surely also, the words μεταβαλλόμενοι αὐθις, can mean nothing else except to point out the strange antithesis between the conduct of these same men at two different epochs not far distant from each other. On the first occasion, they rose up against an established oligarchical government, and constituted a democratical government. On the second occasion, they rose up in conspiracy against this very democratical government, in order to subvert it, and constitute themselves an oligarchy in its place. If we suppose that on the first occasion, the established government was already democratical, and that the persons here mentioned were not conspirators against an established oligarchy, but merely persons making use of the powers of a democratical government to do violence to rich citizens—all this antithesis completely vanishes.

On the whole, I feel satisfied that the government of Samos, at the time when Chios revolted from Athens, was oligarchical like that

way by the Atheniansquadron under Hippoklês at Nau-paktus.¹ The Lacedæmonian admiral Astyochus was sent to Kenchreæ to take the command and proceed to Ionia as admiral in chief: but it was some time before he could depart for Chios, whither he arrived with only four triremes, followed by six more afterwards.²

Before he reached that island, however, the Chians, zealous in the new part which they had taken up, and interested for their own safety in multiplying defections from Athens, had themselves undertaken the prosecution of the plans concerted by Agis and the Lacedæmonians at Corinth. They originated an expedition of their own, with thirteen triremes under a Lacedæmonian Periœkus named Deiniadas, to procure the revolt of Lesbos; with the view, if successful, of proceeding afterwards to do the same among the Hellespontine dependencies of Athens. A land-force under the Spartan Eualas, partly Peloponnesian, partly Asiatic, marched along the coast of the mainland northward towards Kymê, to cooperate in both these objects. Lesbos was at this time divided into at least five separate city-governments—Methymna at the north of the island, Mitylênê towards the south-east, Antissa, Eresus and Pyrrha on the west. Whether these governments were oligarchical or democratical, we do not know; but the Athenian kleruchs who had been sent to Mitylênê after its revolt sixteen years before, must have long ago disappeared.³ The Chian fleet first went to Methymna and procured the revolt of that place, where four triremes were

of Chios itself. Nor do I see any difficulty in believing this to be the fact, though I cannot state when and how the oligarchy became established there. So long as the island performed its duty as a subject ally, Athens did not interfere with the form of its government. And she was least of all likely to interfere, during the seven years of peace intervening between the years 421-414 B.C. There was nothing then to excite her apprehensions. The degree to which Athens inter-meddled generally with the internal

affairs of her subject-allies, seems to me to have been much exaggerated.

The Samian oligarchy or Geômorî, dispossessed of the government on this occasion, were restored by Lysander, after his victorious close of the Peloponnesian war—Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 3, 6—where they are called *οἱ ἀρχαῖοι πολῖται*.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 13.

² Thucyd. viii. 20-23.

³ See the earlier part of this History, ch. 1.

left in guard, while the remaining nine sailed forward to Mitylênê, and succeeded in obtaining that important town also.¹

Their proceedings however were not unwatched by the Athenian fleet at Samos. Unable to recover possession of Teos, Diomedon had been obliged to content himself with procuring neutrality from that town, and admission for the vessels of Athens as well as of her enemies: he had moreover failed in an attack upon Eræ.² But

Ill-success
of the
Chians—
Lesbos is
maintained
by the
Athenians.

he had since been strengthened partly by the democratical revolution at Samos, partly by the arrival of Leon with ten additional triremes from Athens: so that these two commanders were now enabled to sail, with twenty-five triremes, to the relief of Lesbos. Reaching Mitylênê (the largest town in that island) very shortly after its revolt, they sailed straight into the harbour when no one expected them, seized the nine Chian ships with little resistance, and after a successful battle on shore, regained possession of the city. The Lacedæmonian admiral Astyochus—who had only been three days arrived at Chios from Kenchreæ with his four triremes—saw the Athenian fleet pass through the channel between Chios and the mainland, on its way to Lesbos; and immediately on the same evening followed it to that island, to lend what aid he could, with one Chian trireme added to his own four, and some hoplites on board. He sailed first to Pyrrha, and on the next day to Eresus, on the west side of the island, where he first learnt the recapture of Mitylênê by the Athenians. He was here also joined by three out of the four Chian triremes which had been left to defend that place, and which had been driven away, with the loss of one of their number, by a portion of the Athenian fleet pushing on thither from Mitylênê. Astyochus prevailed on Eresus to revolt from Athens, and having armed the population, sent them by land together with his own hoplites under Eteonikus to Methymna, in hopes of preserving that place—whither he also proceeded with his fleet along the coast. But in spite of all his endeavours, Methymna as well as Eresus and all Lesbos was recovered by the Athenians, while he himself was obliged to return with his force to Chios. The land troops which had marched along the mainland, with a view

¹ Thucyd. viii. 22.

² Thucyd. viii. 20.

to farther operations at the Hellespont, were carried back to Chios and their respective homes.¹

The recovery of Lesbos, which the Athenian now placed in a better posture of defence, was of great importance in itself, and arrested for the moment all operations against them at the Hellespont. Their fleet from Lesbos was first employed in the recovery of Klazomenæ, which they again carried back to its original islet near the shore—the new town on the mainland, called Polichna, though in course of being built, being not yet sufficiently fortified to defend itself. The leading anti-Athenians in the town made their escape, and went farther up the country to Daphnûs. Animated by such additional success—as well as by a victory which the Athenians, who were blockading Milêtus, gained over Chalkideus, wherein that officer was slain—Leon and Diomedon thought themselves in a condition to begin aggressive measures against Chios, now their most active enemy in Ionia. Their fleet of twenty-five sail was well-equipped with Epibatæ; who, though under ordinary circumstances they were Thêtes armed at the public cost, yet in the present stress of affairs were impressed from the superior hoplites in the city muster-roll.² They occupied the little islets called Cœnussæ, near Chios on the north-east—as well as the forts of Sidussa and Pteleus in the territory of Erythræ; from which positions they began a series of harassing operations against Chios itself. Disembarking on the island at Kardamylê and Bolissus, they not only ravaged the neighbourhood, but inflicted upon the Chian forces a bloody defeat. After two farther defeats, at Phanæ and at Leukonium, the Chians no longer dared to quit their fortifications; so that the invaders were left to ravage at pleasure the whole territory, being at the same time masters of the sea around, and blocking up the port.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 23. ἀπεχομίσθη δὲ πάλιν κατὰ πόλεις καὶ ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν πεζὸς, ὃς ἐπὶ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ἐμέλλησεν ἰέναι.

Dr. Arnold and Gœller suppose that these soldiers had been carried over to Lesbos to cooperate in detaching the island from the Athenians. But this is not implied in the narrative. The landforce *marched along by land towards Klazomenæ*

and Kymê (ὁ πεζὸς ἄμα Πελοποννησίων τε τῶν παρόντων καὶ τῶν αὐτόθεν συμμαχῶν παρῆει ἐπὶ Κλαζομένων τε καὶ Κύμης). Thucydides does not say that they ever crossed to Lesbos: they remained near Kymê prepared to march forward, after that island should have been conquered, to the Hellespont.

² Thucyd. viii. 24, with Dr. Arnold's note.

The Athenians now retaliated upon Chios the hardships under which Attica itself was suffering; hardships the more painfully felt, inasmuch as this was the first time that an enemy had ever been seen in the island, since the repulse of Xerxês from Greece, and the organization of the confederacy of Delos, more than sixty years before.

Hardships suffered by the Chians —prosperity of the island up to this time.

The territory of Chios was highly cultivated,¹ its commerce extensive, and its wealth among the greatest in all Greece. In fact, under the Athenian empire, its prosperity had been so marked and so uninterrupted, that Thucydidês expresses his astonishment at the undeviating prudence and circumspection of the government, in spite of circumstances well-calculated to tempt them into extravagance. "Except Sparta (he says),² Chios is the only state that I know, which maintained its sober judgement throughout a career of prosperity, and became even more watchful in regard to security, in proportion as it advanced in power." He adds, that the step of revolting from Athens, though the Chian government now discovered it to have been an error, was at any rate a pardonable error; for it was undertaken under the impression, universal throughout Greece and prevalent even in Athens herself after the disaster at Syracuse, that Athenian power, if not Athenian independence, was at an end—and undertaken in conjunction with allies seemingly more than sufficient to sustain it. This remarkable observation of Thucydidês doubtless includes an indirect censure upon his own city, as abusing her prosperity for purposes of unmeasured aggrandisement; a censure not undeserved in reference to the enterprise against Sicily. But it counts at the same time as a valuable testimony to the condition of the allies of Athens under the Athenian empire, and goes far in reply to the charge of practical oppression against the imperial city.

The operations now carrying on in Chios indicated such an unexpected renovation in Athenian affairs, that

¹ Aristotel. Politic. iv. 4, 1; Athenæus, vi. p. 265.

² Thucyd. viii. 24. Καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν Χίοι ἥδη οὐκέτι ἐπεξήρσαν, οἱ δὲ (Ἀθηναῖοι) τῇ χώρῃ, καλῶς κατεσκευασμένην καὶ ἀπαθῆ οὖσαν ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν μέχρι τότε, διεπόρθησαν.

Χίοι γὰρ μόνοι μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίους, ὧν ἐγὼ ἡσέομην, εὐδαιμονήσαντας ἄμα καὶ ἐσωφρόνησαν, καὶ ὅσῃ ἐπέδιδου ἡ πόλις αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῷ μείζον, τόσῃ καὶ ἐκοσμοῦντο ἐχυρώτερον, &c. viii. 45. Οἱ Χίοι . . . πλουσιώτατοι ὄντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, &c.

a party in the island began to declare in favour of re-union with Athens. The Chian government were forced to summon Astyochus, with his four Peloponnesian ships from Erythræ, to strengthen their hands, and keep down opposition; by seizing hostages from the suspected parties, as well as by other precautions. While the Chians were thus endangered at home, the Athenian interest in Ionia was still farther fortified by the arrival of a fresh armament from Athens at Samos. Phrynichus, Onomaklês, and Skironidês conducted a fleet of forty-eight triremes, some of them employed for the transportation of hoplites; of which latter there were aboard 1000 Athenians, and 1500 Argeians. Five hundred of these Argeians, having come to Athens without arms, were clothed with Athenian panoplies for service. The newly-arrived armament immediately sailed from Samos to Milêtus, where it effected a disembarkation, in conjunction with those Athenians who had been before watching the place from the island of Ladê. The Milesians marched forth to give them battle; mustering 800 of their own hoplites, together with the Peloponnesian seamen of the five triremes brought across by Chalkideus, and a body of troops, chiefly cavalry, yet with a few mercenary hoplites, under the satrap Tissaphernês. Alkibiadês also was present and engaged. The Argeians were so full of contempt for the Ionians of Milêtus who stood opposite to them, that they rushed forward to the charge with great neglect of rank or order; a presumption which they expiated by an entire defeat, with the loss of 300 men. But the Athenians on their wing were so completely victorious over the Peloponnesians and others opposed to them, that all the army of the latter, and even the Milesians themselves on returning from their pursuit of the Argeians, were forced to shelter themselves within the walls of the town. The issue of this combat excited much astonishment, inasmuch as on each side, Ionian hoplites were victorious over Dorian.¹

For a moment, the Athenian army, masters of the field under the walls of Milêtus, indulged the hope of putting that city under blockade, by a wall across the isthmus, which connected it with the continent. But these hopes soon vanished when they were apprised, on the very evening

¹ Thucyd. viii. 25, 26.

of the battle, that the main Peloponnesian and Sicilian fleet, 55 triremes in number, was actually in sight. Of these 55, 22 were Sicilian (20 from Syracuse and two from Selinus) sent at the pressing instance of Hermokratês and under his command, for the purpose of striking the final blow at Athens—so at least it was anticipated, in the beginning of 412 B.C. The remaining 33 triremes being Peloponnesian, the whole fleet was placed under the temporary command of Thera-menês until he could join the admiral Astyochus. Thera-menês, halting first at the island of Lerus (off the coast towards the southward of Milêtus), was there first informed of the recent victory of the Athenians, so that he thought it prudent to take station for the night in the neighbouring Gulf of Iasus. Here he was found by Alkibiadês, who came on horseback in all haste from Milêtus, to the Milesian town of Teichiussa on that Gulf. Alkibiadês strenuously urged him to lend immediate aid to the Milesians, so as to prevent the construction of the intended wall of blockade; representing that if that city were captured, all the hopes of the Peloponnesians in Ionia would be extinguished. Accordingly he prepared to sail thither the next morning; but during the night, the Athenians thought it wise to abandon their position near Milêtus and return to Samos with their wounded and their baggage. Having heard of the arrival of Theramenês with his fleet, they preferred leaving their victory unimproved, to the hazard of a general battle. Two out of the three commanders, indeed, were at first inclined to take the latter course, insisting that the maritime honour of Athens would be tarnished by retiring before the enemy. But the third, Phrynichus, opposed with so much emphasis the proposition of fighting, that he at length induced his colleagues to retire. The fleet (he said) had not come prepared for fighting a naval battle, but full of hoplites for land-operations against Milêtus: the numbers of the newly-arrived Peloponnesians were not accurately known; and a defeat at sea, under existing circumstances, would be utter ruin to Athens. Thucydidês bestows much praise on Phrynichus for the wisdom of this advice, which was forthwith acted upon. The Athenian fleet sailed back to Samos; from which place

Fresh Peloponnesian forces arrive—the Athenians retire, pursuant to the strong recommendation of Phrynichus.

the Argeian hoplites, sulky with their recent defeat, demanded to be conveyed home.¹

On the ensuing morning, the Peloponnesian fleet sailed from the Gulf of Iasus to Milêtus, expecting to find and fight the Athenians, and leaving their masts, sails, and rigging (as was usual when going into action) at Teichiussa. Finding Milêtus already relieved of the enemy, they stayed there only one day in order to reinforce themselves with the 25 triremes which Chalkideus had originally brought thither, and which had been since blocked up by the Athenian fleet at Ladê—and then sailed back to Teichiussa to pick up the tackle there deposited. Being now not far from Iasus, the residence of Amorgês, Tissaphernês persuaded them to attack it by sea, in cooperation with his forces by land. No one at Iasus was aware of the arrival of the Peloponnesian fleet: the triremes approaching were supposed to be Athenians and friends, so that the place was entered and taken by surprise;² though strong in situation and fortifications, and defended by a powerful band of Grecian mercenaries. The capture of Iasus, in which the Syracusans distinguished themselves, was of signal advantage from the abundant plunder which it distributed among the army; the place being rich from ancient date, and probably containing the accumulations of the satrap Pissuthnês, father of Amorgês. It was handed over to Tissaphernês, along with all the prisoners, for each head of whom he paid down a Daric stater, or twenty Attic drachmæ—and along with Amorgês himself, who had been taken alive and whom the satrap was thus enabled to send up to Susa. The Grecian mercenaries captured in the place were enrolled in the service of the captors, and sent by land under Pedaritus to Erythræ, in order that they might cross over from thence to Chios.³

¹ Thucyd. viii. 26, 27.

² Phrynichus the Athenian commander was afterwards displaced by the Athenians—by the recommendation of Peisander, at the time when this displacement suited the purpose of the oligarchical conspirators—on the charge of having abandoned and betrayed Amorgês on this occasion, and caused the capture of Iasus (Thucyd. viii. 54).

Phrynichus and his colleagues were certainly guilty of grave omission in not sending notice to Amorgês of the sudden retirement of the Athenian fleet from Milêtus; the ignorance of which circumstance was one reason why Amorgês mistook the Peloponnesian ships for Athenian.

³ Thucyd. viii. 28.

The arrival of the recent reinforcements to both the opposing fleets, and the capture of Iasus, took place about the autumnal equinox or the end of September; at which period, the Peloponnesian fleet being assembled at Milêtus, Tissaphernês paid to them the wages of the crews, at the rate of one Attic drachma per head per diem, as he had promised by his envoy at Sparta. But he at the same time gave notice for the future (partly at the instigation of Alkibiadês, of which more hereafter) that he could not continue so high a rate of pay, unless he should receive express instructions from Susa; and that until such instructions came, he should give only half a drachma per day. Theramenês, being only commander for the interim, until the junction with Astyochus, was indifferent to the rate at which the men were paid (a miserable jealousy which marks the low character of many of these Spartan officers): but the Syracusan Hermodratês remonstrated so loudly against the reduction, that he obtained from Tissaphernês the promise of a slight increase above the half drachma, though he could not succeed in getting the entire drachma continued.¹ For the present, however, the seamen were in good spirits; not merely from having received the high rate of pay, but from the plentiful booty recently acquired at Iasus;² while Astyochus and the Chians were also greatly encouraged by the arrival of so large a fleet. Nevertheless the Athenians on their side were also reinforced by 35 fresh triremes, which reached Samos under Strombichidês, Charminus, and Euktêmon. The Athenian fleet from Chios was now recalled to Samos, where the commanders mustered their whole naval force, with a view of redividing it for ulterior operations.

Tissaphernês begins to furnish pay to the Peloponnesian fleet. He reduces the rate of pay for the future.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 29. What this new rate of pay was, or by what exact fraction it exceeded the half drachma, is a matter which the words of Thucydides do not enable us to make out. None of the commentators can explain the text without admitting some alteration or omission of words: nor does

any of the explanations given appear to me convincing. On the whole, I incline to consider the conjecture and explanation given by Paulmier and Dobree as more plausible than that of Dr. Arnold and Gôller, or of Poppe and Hermann.

² Thucyd. viii. 36.

Considering that in the autumn of the preceding year, immediately after the Syracusan disaster, the navy of Athens had been no less scanty in number of ships than defective in equipment—we read with amazement, that she had now at Samos no less than 104 triremes in full condition and disposable for service, besides some others specially destined for the transport of troops. Indeed the total number which she had sent out, putting together the separate squadrons, had been 128.¹ So energetic an effort, and so unexpected a renovation of affairs from the hopeless prostration of last year, was such as no Grecian state except Athens could have accomplished; nor even Athens herself, had she not been aided by that reserve fund, consecrated twenty years before through the long-sighted calculation of Periklês.

The Athenians resolved to employ 30 triremes in making a landing, and establishing a fortified post, in Chios; and lots being drawn among the generals, Strombichidês with two others were assigned to the command. The other 74 triremes, remaining masters of the sea, made descents near Milêtus, trying in vain to provoke the Peloponnesian fleet out of that harbour. It was some time before Astyochus actually went thither to assume his new command—being engaged in operations near to Chios, which island had been left comparatively free by the recall of the Athenian fleet to the general muster at Samos. Going forth with twenty triremes—ten Peloponnesian and ten Chian—he made a fruitless attack upon Pteleus, the Athenian fortified post in the Erythræan territory; after which he sailed to Klazomenæ, recently re-transferred from the continent to the neighbouring islet. He here (in conjunction with Tamôs, the Persian general of the district) enjoined the Klazomenians again to break with Athens, to leave their islet, and to take up their residence inland at Daphnûs, where the philo-Peloponnesian party among them still remained established since the former revolt. This demand being rejected, he attacked Klazomenæ, but was repulsed, although the town was unfortified; and was presently driven off by a severe storm, from which he found shelter at Kymê and Phokæa. Some of his ships sheltered themselves

¹ Thucyd. viii. 30: compare Dr. Arnold's note.

during the same storm on certain islets near to and belonging to Klazomenæ; on which they remained eight days, destroying and plundering the property of the inhabitants and then rejoined Astyochus. That admiral was now anxious to make an attempt on Lesbos, from which he received envoys promising revolt from Athens. But the Corinthians and others in his fleet were so averse to the enterprise, that he was forced to relinquish it and sail back to Chios; his fleet, before it arrived there, being again dispersed by the storms, frequent in the month of November.¹

Meanwhile Pedaritus, despatched by land from Milêtus (at the head of the mercenary forcemade prisoners at Iasus, as well as of 500 of the Peloponnesian seamen who had originally crossed the sea with Chalkideus and since served as hoplites), had reached Erythræ, and from thence crossed the channel to Chios. To him and to the Chians, Astyochus now proposed to undertake the expedition to Lesbos; but he experienced from them the same reluctance as from the Corinthians—a strong proof that the tone of feeling in Lesbos had been found to be decidedly philo-Athenian on the former expedition. Pedaritus even peremptorily refused to let him have the Chian triremes for any such purpose—an act of direct insubordination in a Lacedæmonian officer towards the admiral-in-chief, which Astyochus resented so strongly, that he immediately left Chios for Milêtus, carrying away with him all the Peloponnesian triremes, and telling the Chians, in terms of strong displeasure, that they might look in vain to him for aid, if they should come to need it. He halted with his fleet for the night under the headland of Korykus (in the Erythræan territory), on the north side; but while there, he received an intimation of a supposed plot to betray Erythræa by means of prisoners sent back from the Athenian station at Samos. Instead of pursuing his voyage to Milêtus, he therefore returned on the next day to Erythræa to investigate this plot, which turned out to be a stratagem of the prisoners themselves in order to obtain their liberation.²

Pedaritus,
Lacedæmo-
nian govern-
or at Chios
—disagree-
ment be-
tween him
and Asty-
ochus.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 31, 32.

² Thucyd. viii. 32, 33.

The fact of his thus going back to Erythræa, instead of pursuing his voyage, proved, by accident, the salvation of his fleet. For it so happened that on that same night the Athenian fleet under Strombichidês—30 triremes accompanied by some triremes carrying hoplites—had its station on the southern side of the same headland. Neither knew of the position of the other, and Astyochns, had he gone forward the next day towards Milêtus, would have fallen in with the superior numbers of his enemy. He farther escaped a terrible storm, which the Athenians encountered when they doubled the headland going northward. Descrying three Chian triremes, they gave chase, but the storm became so violent that even these Chians had great difficulty in making their own harbour, while the three foremost Athenian ships were wrecked on the neighbouring shore, all the crews either perishing or becoming prisoners.¹ The rest of the Athenian fleet found shelter in the harbour of Phœnikus on the opposite mainland—under the lofty mountain called Mimas, north of Erythræa.

As soon as weather permitted, they pursued their voyage to Lesbos, from which island they commenced their operations of invading Chios and establishing in it a permanent fortified post. Having transported their land-force across from Lesbos, they occupied a strong maritime site called Delphinium, seemingly a projecting cape having a sheltered harbour on each side, not far from the city of Chios.² They bestowed great labour and time in fortifying this post, both on the land and the sea side, during which process they were scarcely interrupted at all either by the Chians, or by Pedaritus and his garrison; whose inaction arose not merely from the discouragement of the previous defeats, but from the political dissension.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 33. 34.

² Thucyd. viii. 34-38 Δελφίνιον . . . —λιμένας ἔχον, &c.

That the Athenians should select Lesbos on this occasion as the base of their operations, and as the immediate scene of last preparations, against Chios—was only

repeating what they had once done before (c. 24), and what they again did afterwards (c. 100). I do not feel the difficulty which strikes Dobree and Dr. Thirlwall. Doubtless Delphinium was to the north of the city of Chios.

which now reigned in the city. A strong philo-Athenian party had pronounced itself; and though Tydeus its leader was seized by Pedaritus and put to death, still his remaining partisans were so numerous, that the government was brought to an oligarchy narrower than ever—and to the extreme of jealous precaution, not knowing whom to trust. In spite of numerous messages sent to Milêtus, entreating succour and representing the urgent peril to which this greatest among all the Ionian allies of Sparta was exposed—Astyochus adhered to his parting menaces, and refused compliance. The indignant Pedaritus sent to prefer complaint against him at Sparta as a traitor. Meanwhile the fortress at Delphinium advanced so near towards completion, that Chios began to suffer from it as much as Athens suffered from Dekeleia, with the farther misfortune of being blocked up by sea. The slaves in this wealthy island—chiefly foreigners acquired by purchase, but more numerous than in any other Grecian state except Laconia—were emboldened by the manifest superiority and assured position of the invaders to desert in crowds; and the loss arising, not merely from their flight, but from the valuable information and aid which they gave to the enemy, was immense.¹ The distress of the island increased every day, and could only be relieved by succour from without, which Astyochus still withheld.

That officer, on reaching Milêtus, found the Peloponnesian force on the Asiatic side of the Ægean just reinforced by a squadron of twelve triremes under Dorieus; chiefly from Thurii, which had undergone a political revolution since the Athenian disaster at Syracuse, and was now decidedly in the hands of the active philo-Laconian party; the chief persons friendly to Athens having been exiled.² Dorieus and his squadron, crossing the Ægean in its southern latitude, had arrived

Dorieus arrives on the Asiatic coast with a squadron from Thurii, to join Astyochus—maritime contests near Knidus.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 38-40. About the slaves in Chios, see the extracts from Theopompus and Nymphodôrus in Athenæus, vi. p. 265.

That from Nymphodôrus appears to be nothing but a romantic local legend, connected with the Chapel of the *Kindhearted Hero* (Ἡρώς εὐμέρους) at Chios.

Even in antiquity, though the institution of slavery was universal and noway disapproved, yet the slave-trade, or the buying and selling of slaves, was accounted more or less odious.

² See the Life of Lysias the Rhetor, in Dionysius of Halikar-

safely at Knidus, which had already been conquered by Tissaphernês from Athens, and had received a Persian garrison.¹ Orders were sent from Milêtus that half of this newly-arrived squadron should remain on guard at Knidus, while the other half should cruise near the Triopian Cape to intercept the trading-vessels from Egypt. But the Athenians, who had also learned the arrival of Dorieus, sent a powerful squadron from Samos, which captured all these six triremes off Cape Triopium, though the crews escaped ashore. They farther made an attempt to recover Knidus, which was very nearly successful, as the town was unfortified on the sea-side. On the morrow the attack was renewed; but additional defences had been provided during the night, while the crews of the ships captured near Triopium had come in to help; so that the Athenians were forced to return to Samos without any farther advantage than that of ravaging the Knidian territory. Astyochus took no step to intercept them, nor did he think himself strong enough to keep the sea against the 74 Athenian triremes at Samos, though his fleet at Milêtus was at this moment in high condition. The rich booty acquired at Iasus was unconsumed; the Milesians were zealous in the confederate cause; while the pay from Tissaphernês continued to be supplied with tolerable regularity, yet at the reduced rate mentioned a little above.²

Though the Peloponnesians had hitherto no ground of complaint (such as they soon came to have) against the satrap for irregularity of payment, still the powerful fleet now at Milêtus inspired the commanders with a new tone of confidence, so that they became ashamed of the stipulations of that treaty to which Chalkideus and Alkiabiadês, when first landing at Milêtus with their scanty armament, had submitted. Accordingly Astyochus, shortly after his arrival at Milêtus, and even before the departure of Theramenês (whose functions had expired when he had handed over the fleet), insisted on a fresh treaty with Tissaphernês, which was agreed on, to the following effect:—

“Convention and alliance is concluded, on the following

nassus, c. i. p. 453 Reisk., and in Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 835.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 35-109.

² Thucyd. viii. 35, 36. καὶ γὰρ μισθὸς ἐδίδοτο ἀρχοῦντως, &c.

conditions, between the Lacedæmonians with their allies—and King Darius, his sons, and Tissaphernês. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall not attack or injure any territory or any city which belongs to Darius or has belonged to his father or ancestors; nor shall they raise any tribute from any of the said cities. Neither Darius nor any of his subjects shall attack or injure the Lacedæmonians or their allies. Should the Lacedæmonians or their allies have any occasion for the king—or should the king have any occasion for the Lacedæmonians or their allies—let each meet as much as may be the wishes expressed by the other. Both will carry on jointly the war against Athens and her allies: neither party shall bring the war to a close, without mutual consent. The king shall pay and keep any army which he may have sent for and which may be employed in his territory. If any of the cities parties to this convention shall attack the king's territory, the rest engage to hinder them, and to defend the king with their best power. And if any one within the king's territory, or within the territory subject to him,¹ shall attack the Lacedæmonians or their allies, the king shall hinder them and lend his best defensive aid."

Looked at with the eyes of Pan-hellenic patriotism, this second treaty of Astyochus and Theramenês was less disgraceful than the first treaty of Chalkideus. It did not formally proclaim that all those Grecian cities which had ever belonged to the king or to his ancestors, should still be considered as his subjects; nor did it pledge the Lacedæmonians to aid the king in hindering any of them from achieving their liberty. It still admitted, however, by implication, undiminished extent of the king's dominion, the same as at the maximum under his predecessors—the like undefined rights

Comparison of the second treaty with the first.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 37. Καὶ ἤν τις τῶν ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ χώρῃ, ἢ ὅλης βασιλείας ἄρχῃ, ἐπὶ τῇ Λακεδαιμονίων ἢ τῶν συμμαχῶν, βασιλεὺς κωλύετω καὶ ἀμυνέτω κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν.

The distinction here drawn between *the king's territory*, and the *territory over which the king holds empire*—deserves notice. By the former phrase is understood (I

presume) the continent of Asia, which the court of Susa looked upon, together with all its inhabitants, as a freehold exceedingly sacred and peculiar (Herodot. i. 4): by the latter, as much as the satrap should find it convenient to lay hands upon, of that which had once belonged to Darius son of Hystaspes or to Xerxes, in the plenitude of their power.

of the king to meddle with Grecian affairs—the like unqualified abandonment of all the Greeks on the continent of Asia. The conclusion of this treaty was the last act performed by Theramenês, who was lost at sea shortly afterwards, on his voyage home, in a small boat—no one knew how.¹

Astyochus, now alone in command, was still importuned by the urgent solicitations of the distressed Chians for relief, and in spite of his reluctance, was compelled by the murmurs of his own army to lend an ear to them—when a new incident happened which gave him at least a good pretext for directing his attention southward. A Peloponnesian squadron of 27 triremes under the command of Antisthenês, having started from Cape Malea about the winter tropic or close of 412 B.C., had first crossed the sea to Melos, where it dispersed ten Athenian triremes and captured three of them—then afterwards, from apprehension that these fugitive Athenians would make known its approach at Samos, had made a long circuit round by Krete, and thus ultimately reached Kaunus at the south-eastern extremity of Asia Minor. This was the squadron which Kalligeitus and Timagoras had caused to be equipped, having come over for that purpose a year before as envoys from the satrap Pharnabazus. Antisthenês was instructed first to get to Milêtus and put himself in concert with the main Lacedæmonian fleet; next, to forward these triremes, or another squadron of equal force, under Klearchus, to the Hellespont, for the purpose of cooperating with Pharnabazus against the Athenian dependencies in that region. Eleven Spartans, the chief of whom was Lichas, accompanied Antisthenês, to be attached to Astyochus as advisers, according to a practice not unusual with the Lacedæmonians. These men were not only directed to review the state of affairs at Milêtus, and exercise control coordinate with Astyochus—but even empowered, if they saw reason, to dismiss that admiral himself, upon whom the complaints of Pedaritus from Chios had cast suspicion; and to appoint Antisthenês in his place.²

¹ Thucyd. viii. 38. ἀποπλέων ἐν τοῖς, ἐς Μίλητον ἀφικομένους τῶν
 ἐλγῶν ἀφάνιζεται. τε ἄλλων συνεπιμελεῖσθαι,

² Thucyd. vii. 39. Καὶ εἵρητο αὐ- ἧ μέλλει ἄριστα εἶναι, &c.

No sooner had Astyochus learnt at Milêtus the arrival of Antisthenês at Kaunos, than he postponed all idea of lending aid to Chios, and sailed immediately to secure his junction with the 27 new triremes as well as with the new Spartan counsellors. In his voyage southward he captured the city of Kôs, unfortified and half ruined by a recent earthquake, and then passed on to Knidus; where the inhabitants strenuously urged him to go forward at once, even without disembarking his men, in order that he might surprise an Athenian squadron of 20 triremes under Charminus; which had been despatched from Samos, after the news received from Melos, in order to attack and repel the squadron under Antisthenês. Charminus, having his station at Symê, was cruising near Rhodes and the Lykian coast, to watch, though he had not been able to keep back, the Peloponnesian fleet just arrived at Kaunos. In this position he was found by the far more numerous fleet of Astyochus, the approach of which he did not at all expect. But the rainy and hazy weather had so dispersed it, that Charminus, seeing at first only a few ships apart from the rest, mistook them for the smaller squadron of new-comers. Attacking the triremes thus seen, he at first gained considerable advantage—disabling three and damaging several others. But presently the dispersed vessels of the main fleet came in sight and closed round him, so that he was forced to make the best speed in escaping, first to the island called Tentulussa, next to Halikarnassus. He did not effect his escape without the loss of six ships; while the victorious Peloponnesians, after erecting their trophy on the island of Symê, returned to Knidus, where the entire fleet, including the 27 triremes newly arrived, was now united.¹ The Athenians in Samos (whose affairs were now in confusion, from causes which will be explained in the ensuing chapter) had kept no watch on the movements of the main Peloponnesian fleet at Milêtus, and seem to have been ignorant of its departure until they were apprised of the defeat of Charminus. They then sailed down to Symê, took up the sails and rigging belonging to that squadron, which had been there deposited, and then, after an attack upon Loryma,

Astyochus goes with the fleet from Milêtus to join the newly-arrived squadron—he defeats the Athenian squadron under Charminus.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 42.

carried back their whole fleet (probably including the remnant of the squadron of Charmînus) to Samos.¹

Though the Peloponnesian fleet now assembled at Knidus consisted of 94 triremes, much superior in number to the Athenian, it did not try to provoke any general action. The time of Lichas and his brother commissioners was at first spent in negotiations with Tissaphernês, who had joined them at Knidus, and against whom they found a strong feeling of discontent prevalent in the fleet. That satrap (now acting greatly under the advice of Alkibiadês, of which also more in the coming chapter) had of late become slack in the Peloponnesian cause, and irregular in furnishing pay to their seamen, during the last weeks of their stay at Milêtus. He was at the same time full of promises, paralysing all their operations by assurances that he was bringing up the vast fleet of Phenicia to their aid: but in reality his object was, under fair appearances, merely to prolong the contest and waste the strength of both parties. Arriving in the midst of this state of feeling, and discussing with Tissaphernês the future conduct of the war, Lichas not only expressed displeasure at his past conduct, but even protested against the two conventions concluded by Chalkideus and by Theramenês, as being, both the one and the other, a disgrace to the Hellenic name. By the express terms of the former, and by the implications of the latter, not merely all the islands of the Ægean, but even Thessaly and Bœotia, were acknowledged as subject to Persia; so that Sparta, if she sanctioned such conditions, would be merely imposing upon the Greeks a Persian sceptre, instead of general freedom, for which she professed to be struggling. Lichas, declaring that he would rather renounce all prospect of Persian pay, than submit to such conditions, proposed to negotiate for a fresh treaty upon other and better terms—a proposition, which Tissaphernês rejected with so much indignation, as to depart without settling anything.²

His desertion did not discourage the Peloponnesian counsellors. Possessing a fleet larger than they had ever

¹ Thucyd. viii. 43. This defeat of Charmînus is made the subject of a jest by Aristophanês—Thes-

mophor. 810, with the note of Paulmier.

² Thucyd. viii. 43.

before had united in Asia, together with a numerous body of allies, they calculated on being able to get money to pay their men without Persian aid; and an invitation, which they just now received from various powerful men at Rhodes, tended to strengthen such confidence. The island of Rhodes, inhabited by a Dorian population considerable in number as well as distinguished for nautical skill, was at this time divided between three separate city-governments, as it had been at the epoch of the Homeric Catalogue—Lindus, Ialysus, and Kameirus; for the city called Rhodes, formed by a coalescence of all these three, dates only from two or three years after the period which we have now reached. Invited by several of the wealthy men of the island, the Peloponnesian fleet first attacked Kameirus, the population of which, intimidated by a force of 94 triremes, and altogether uninformed of their approach, abandoned their city, which had no defences, and fled to the mountains.¹ All the three Rhodian towns, destitute of fortifications, were partly persuaded, partly frightened, into the step of revolting from Athens and allying themselves with the Peloponnesians. The Athenian fleet, whose commanders were just now too busy with political intrigue to keep due military watch, arrived from Samos too late to save Rhodes, and presently returned to the former island, leaving detachments at Chalkê and Kôs to harass the Peloponnesians with desultory attacks.

Peloponnesian fleet masters Rhodes, and establishes itself in that island.

¹ Thueyd. viii. 44. Οἱ δ' ἐς τὴν Ῥόδον, ἐπιχρηρευμένοι ἀπὸ τῶν δυνατωτάτων ἀνδρῶν, τὴν γνώμην εἶχον πλεῖν, &c.

. . . Καὶ προσβαλόντες Καμείρου τῆς Ῥοδίας πρώτη, ναυοὶ τέσσαροι καὶ ἑννεήκοντα, ἐξεφόβησαν μὲν τοὺς πολλοὺς, οὐκ εἰδότας τὰ πρᾶσσόμενα, καὶ ἔφυγον, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀτειχίστου οὐσῆς τῆς πόλεως, &c.

We have to remark here, as on former occasions of revolts among the dependent allies of Athens—that the general population of the allied city manifests no previous discontent, nor any spontaneous

disposition to revolt. The powerful men of the island (those who, if the government was democratical, formed the oligarchical minority, but who formed the government itself, if oligarchical) conspire and bring in the Peloponnesian force, unknown to the body of the citizens and thus leave to the latter no free choice. The real feeling towards Athens on the part of the body of the citizens is one of simple acquiescence, with little attachment on the one hand—yet no hatred, or sense of practical suffering, on the other.

The Peloponnesians now levied from the Rhodians a contribution of 32 talents, and adopted the island as the main station for their fleet, instead of Milêtus. We can explain this change of place by their recent unfriendly discussion with Tissaphernês, and their desire to be more out of his reach.¹ But what we cannot so easily explain, is—that they remained on the island without any movement or military action, and actually hauled their triremes ashore, for the space of no less than eighty days; that is, from about the middle of January to the end of March, 441 B.C. While their powerful fleet of 94 triremes, superior to that of Athens at Samos, was thus lying idle—their allies in Chios were known to be suffering severe and increasing distress, and repeatedly pressing for aid:² moreover the promise of sending to cooperate with Pharnabazus against the Athenian dependencies on the Hellespont, remained unperformed.³ We may impute such extreme military slackness mainly to the insidious policy of Tissaphernês, now playing a double game between Sparta and Athens. He still kept up intelligence with the Peloponnesians at Rhodes—paralysed their energies by assurances that the Phœnician fleet was actually on its way to aid them—and ensured the success of these intrigues by bribes distributed personally among the generals and the trierarchs. Even Astyochus the general-in-chief took his share in this corrupt bargain, against which not one stood out except the Syracusan Hermokratês.⁴ Such prolonged inaction of the armament, at the moment of its greatest force, was thus not simply the fruit of honest mistake, like the tardiness of Nikias in Sicily—but proceeded from the dishonesty and personal avidity of the Peloponnesian officers.

I have noticed, on more than one previous occasion, the many evidences which exist of the prevalence of personal corruption—even in its coarsest form, that of direct

¹ Thucyd. viii. 44: compare c. 57.

² Thucyd. viii. 40-55.

³ Thucyd. viii. 39.

⁴ Thucyd. viii. 45. Suggestions of Alkibiadês to Tissaphernês—
Καὶ τοὺς τριηράρχους καὶ τοὺς στρα-
τηγούς τῶν πόλεων ἐδίδασκεν ὥστε

δόντα χρήματα αὐτὸν πείσαι,
ὥστε συγχωρῆσαι ταῦτα ἑαυ-
τῷ, πλὴν τῶν Συρακοσίων· τοῦτων
δὲ, Ἐρμοκράτης ἠναντιοῦτο μόνος
ὑπὲρ τοῦ ξυμπαντος συμμαχικοῦ.

About the bribes to Astyochus himself, see also c. 50.

bribery—among the leading Greeks of all the cities, when acting individually. Of such evidences the incident here recorded is not the least remarkable. Nor ought this general fact ever to be forgotten by those who discuss the question between oligarchy and democracy, as it stood in the Grecian world. The confident pretensions put forth by the wealthy and oligarchical Greeks to superior virtue, public as well as private—and the quiet repetition, by various writers modern and ancient, of the laudatory epithets implying such assumed virtue—are so far from being borne out by history, that these individuals were perpetually ready as statesmen to betray their countrymen, or as generals even to betray the interests of their soldiers, for the purpose of acquiring money themselves. Of course it is not meant that this was true of all of them; but it was true sufficiently often, to be reckoned upon as a contingency more than probable. If, speaking on the average, the leading men of a Grecian community were not above the commission of political misdeeds thus palpable, and of a nature not to be disguised even from themselves—far less would they be above the vices, always more or less mingled with self-delusion, of pride, power-seeking, party-antipathy or sympathy, love of ease, &c. And if the community were to have any chance of guarantee against such abuses, it could only be by full license of accusation against delinquents, and certainty of trial before judges identified in interest with the people themselves. Such were the securities which the Grecian democracies, especially that of Athens, tried to provide; in a manner not always wise, still less always effectual—but assuredly justified, in the simplest manner, by the urgency and prevalence of the evil. Yet in the common representations given of Athenian affairs, this evil is overlooked or evaded; the precautions taken against it are denounced as so many evidences of democratical ill-temper and injustice; and the class of men, through whose initiatory action alone such precautions were enforced, are held up to scorn as demagogues and *sycophants*. Had these Peloponnesian generals and trierarchs, who under the influence of bribes wasted two important months in inaction, been Athenians, there might have been some chance of their being tried and punished; though even at Athens the chance of impunity to offenders, through powerful political clubs and other sinister artifices,

was much greater than it ought to have been. So little is it consistent with the truth, however often affirmed, that judicial accusation was too easy, and judicial condemnation too frequent. When the judicial precautions provided at Athens are looked at, as they ought to be, side by side with the evil—they will be found imperfect indeed both in the scheme and in the working, but certainly neither un-called-for nor over-severe.

CHAPTER LXII.

TWENTY-FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.—OLIGARCHY OF
FOUR HUNDRED AT ATHENS.

ABOUT a year elapsed between the catastrophe of the Athenians near Syracuse and the victory which they gained over the Milesians, on landing near Milêtus (from September 413 B.C., to September 412 B.C.). After the first of those two events, the complete ruin of Athens had appeared both to her enemies and to herself, impending and irreparable. But so astonishing, so rapid, and so energetic, had been her rally, that at the time of the second, she was found again carrying on a tolerable struggle, though with impaired resources and on a purely defensive system, against enemies both bolder and more numerous than ever. There is no reason to doubt that her foreign affairs might have gone on thus improving, had they not been endangered at this critical moment by the treason of a fraction of her own citizens—bringing her again to the brink of ruin, from which she was only rescued by the incompetence of her enemies.

Rally of
Athens,
during the
year after
the defeat
at Syracuse.
B.C. 412.

That treason took its first rise from the exile Alki-
biadês. I have already recounted how this man,
alike unprincipled and energetic, had thrown
himself with his characteristic ardour into the
service of Sparta, and had indicated to her the
best means of aiding Syracuse, of inflicting
positive injury upon Athens, and lastly, of
provoking revolt among the Ionic allies of the latter. It
was by his boldness and personal connexions in Ionia that
the revolt of Chios and Milêtus had been determined.

Commence-
ment of the
conspiracy
of the Four
Hundred at
Athens—
Alki-
biadês.

In the course of a few months, however, he had greatly
lost the confidence of the Spartans. The revolt of the
Asiatic dependencies of Athens had not been accomplished
so easily and rapidly as he had predicted: Chalkideus, the
Spartan commander with whom he had acted, was defeated

and slain near Milêtus: the Ephor Endius, by whom he was chiefly protected, retained his office only for one year, and was succeeded by other Ephors¹ just about the end of September, or beginning of October, when the Athenians gained their second victory near Milêtus, and were on the point of blocking up the town; lastly, King Agis, the personal enemy of Alkibiadês, still remained to persecute him. Moreover, there was in the character of this remarkable man something so essentially selfish, vain, and treacherous, that no one could ever rely upon his faithful cooperation. Accordingly, as soon as any reverse occurred, that very energy and ability, which seldom failed him, made those with whom he acted the more ready to explain the mischance by supposing that he had betrayed them.

It was thus that, after the defeat of Milêtus, King Agis was enabled to discredit Alkibiadês as a traitor to Sparta; upon which the new Ephors sent out at once an order to the general Astyochus, to put him to death.² Alkibiadês had now an opportunity of tasting the difference between Spartan and Athenian procedure. Though his enemies at Athens were numerous and virulent,—with all the advantage, so unspeakable in political warfare, of being able to raise the cry of irreligion against him; yet the utmost which they could obtain was, that he should be summoned home to take his trial before the Dikastery. At Sparta, without any positive ground of crimination and without any idea of judicial trial, his enemies procure an order that he shall be put to death.

Alkibiadês however got intimation of the order in time to retire to Tissaphernês. Probably he was forewarned by Astyochus himself, not ignorant that so monstrous a deed would greatly alienate the Chians and Milêsiens, nor foreseeing the full mischief which his desertion would bring upon Sparta. With that flexibility of character which enabled him at once to master and take up a new position, Alkibiadês soon found means to insinuate himself into the confidence of the satrap. He began now to play a game neither Spartan, nor Athenian, but Persian and anti-Hellenic: a game of duplicity to which Tissaphernês

Order from
Sparta to
kill Alkibi-
adês.

He escapes,
retires to
Tissapher-
nês and be-
comes ad-
viser of the
Persians.

¹ See Thucyd. v. 36.

² Thucyd. viii. 45. Καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀφικομένης ἐπιστολῆς πρὸς Ἀστυόχον

ἐκ Λακεδαιμόνος ὥστ' ἀποκτείνειν (ἦν γὰρ καὶ τῷ Ἀγίδι ἐχθρὸς καὶ ἄλλως ἄπιστος ἐφαίνετο), &c.

himself was spontaneously disposed, but to which the intervention of a dexterous Grecian negotiator was indispensable. It was by no means the interest of the Great King (Alkibiadês urged) to lend such effective aid to either of the contending parties as would enable it to crush the other: he ought neither to bring up the Phenician fleet to the aid of the Lacedæmonians, nor to furnish that abundant pay which would procure for them indefinite levies of new Grecian force. He ought so to feed and prolong the war, as to make each party an instrument of exhaustion and impoverishment against the other, and thus himself to rise on the ruins of both: first to break down the Athenian empire by means of the Peloponnesians, and afterwards to expel the Peloponnesians themselves—which might be effected with little trouble if they were weakened by a protracted previous struggle.¹

Thus far Alkibiadês gave advice, as a Persian counsellor, not unsuitable to the policy of the court of Susa. But he seldom gave advice without some view to his own profit, ambition, or antipathies. Cast off unceremoniously by the Lacedæmonians, he was now driven to seek restoration in his own country. To accomplish this object, it was necessary not only that he should preserve her from being altogether ruined, but that he should present himself to the Athenians as one who could, if restored, divert the aid of Tissaphernês from Lacedæmon to Athens. Accordingly, he farther suggested to the satrap, that while it was essential to his interest not to permit land power and maritime power to be united in the same hands, whether Lacedæmonian or Athenian—it would nevertheless be found easier to arrange matters with the empire and pretensions of Athens, than with those of Lacedæmon. Athens (he argued) neither sought nor professed any other object than the subjection of her own maritime dependencies, in return for which she would willingly leave all the Asiatic Greeks in the hands of the Great King; while Sparta, forswearing all idea of empire, and professing ostentatiously to aim at the universal enfranchisement of every Grecian city, could not with the smallest consistency conspire to deprive the Asiatic Greeks of the same

He advises the satrap to assist neither of the Grecian parties heartily—but his advice leans towards Athens, with a view to his own restoration.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 45, 46.

privilege. This view appeared to be countenanced by the objection which Theramenês and many of the Peloponnesian officers had taken to the first convention concluded by Chalkideus and Alkibiadês with Tissaphernês; objections afterwards renewed by Lichas even against the second modified convention of Theramenês, and accompanied with an indignant protest against the idea of surrendering to the Great King all the territory which had been ever possessed by his predecessors.¹

All these latter arguments, whereby Alkibiadês professed to create in the mind of the satrap a preference for Athens, were either futile or founded on false assumptions.

For on the one hand, even Lichas never refused to concur in surrendering the Asiatic Greeks to Persia—while on the other hand, the empire of Athens, so long as she retained any empire, was pretty sure to be more formidable to Persia than any efforts undertaken by Sparta under the disinterested pretence of liberating generally the Grecian cities. Nor did Tissaphernês at all lend himself to any such positive impression: though he felt strongly the force of the negative recommendations of Alkibiadês—that he should do no more for the Peloponnesians than was sufficient to feed the war, without ensuring to them either a speedy or a decisive success: or rather, this duplicity was so congenial to his Oriental mind, that there was no need of Alkibiadês to recommend it. The real use of the Athenian exile, was to assist the satrap in carrying it into execution; and to provide for him those plausible pretences and justifications, which he was to issue as a substitute for effective supplies of men and money. Established along with Tissaphernês at Magnesia—the same place which had been occupied about fifty years before by another Athenian exile, equally unprincipled and yet abler, Themistoklês—Alkibiadês served as interpreter of his views in all his conversations with the Greeks, and appeared to be thoroughly in his confidence: an appearance of which he took advantage to pass himself off falsely upon the Athenians at Samos as having the power of turning Persian wealth to the aid of Athens.

The first payment made by Tissaphernês, immediately after the capture of Iasus and of the revolted Amorgês,

¹ Thucyd. viii. 46-52.

to the Peloponnesians at Milêtus, was at the rate of one drachma per head. But notice was given that for the future it would be reduced one half; a reduction for which Alkibiadês undertook to furnish a reason. The Athenians (he urged) gave no more than half a drachma; not because they could not afford more, but because, from their long experience of nautical affairs, they had found that higher pay spoiled the discipline of the seamen by leading them into excesses and over-indulgence, as well as by inducing too ready leave of absence to be granted, in confidence that the high pay would bring back the men when called for.¹ As he probably never expected that such subterfuges (employed at a moment when Athens was so poor that she could not even pay the half drachma per head) would carry conviction to any one—so he induced Tissaphernês to strengthen their effect by individual bribes to the generals and trierarchs; a mode of argument which was found effectual in silencing the complaints of all, with the single exception of the Syracusan Hermokratês. In regard to other Grecian cities who sent to ask pecuniary aid, and especially Chios, Alkibiadês spoke out with less reserve. They had been hitherto compelled to contribute to Athens (he said), and now that they had shaken off this payment, they must not shrink from imposing upon themselves equal or even greater burthens in their own defence. Nor was it anything less (he added) than sheer impudence in the Chians, the richest people in Greece—if they required a foreign military force for their protection, to require at the same time that others should furnish the means of paying it.² At the same time, however, he intimated—by way of keeping up hopes for the future—that Tissaphernês was at present carrying on the war at his own cost; but if hereafter remittances should

Diminution of the rate of pay furnished by Tissaphernês to the Peloponnesians.

Cran
this is
pay
in
decent
pay sh

¹ Thucyd. viii. 45. Οἱ δὲ τὰς ναῦς ἀπολείπωσιν, ὑπολιπόντες ἐς ὁμήρειαν τὸν προσοφειλόμενον μισθόν.

This passage is both doubtful in the text and difficult in the translation. Among the many different explanations given by the commentators, I adopt that of Dr. Arnold as the least unsatisfactory, though without any confidence that

it is right.

² Thucyd. viii. 45. Τὰς δὲ πόλεις δεομένας χρημάτων ἀπήλασεν, αὐτὸς ἀντιλέγων ὑπὲρ τοῦ Τισσαφέρνηους, ὡς οἱ μὲν Χῖοι ἀναίσχυντοι εἶεν, πλουσιώτατοι ὄντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἐπικουρίᾳ δὲ ἕμῳ σωζόμενοι ἀξιοῦσι καὶ τοῖς σωμασι καὶ τοῖς χρημασιν ἄλλους ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐκείνων ἐλευθερίας κινδυνεύειν.

arrive from Susa, the full rate of pay would be resumed, with the addition of aid to the Grecian cities in any other way which could be reasonably asked. To this promise was added an assurance that the Phenician fleet was now under equipment, and would shortly be brought up to their aid, so as to give them a superiority which would render resistance hopeless: an assurance not merely deceitful, but mischievous, since it was employed to dissuade them from all immediate action, and to paralyse their navy during its moments of fullest vigour and efficiency. Even the reduced rate of pay was furnished so irregularly, and the Peloponnesian force kept so starved, that the duplicity of the satrap became obvious to every one, and was only carried through by his bribery to the officers.¹

While Alkibiadês, as the confidential agent and interpreter of Tissaphernês, was carrying on this anti-Peloponnesian policy through the autumn and winter of 412—411 B.C.—partly during the stay of the Peloponnesian fleet at Milêtus, partly after it had moved to Knidus and Rhodes—he was at the same time opening correspondence with the Athenian officers at Samos. His breach with the Pe-

Alkibiadês opens correspondence with the Athenian officers at Samos. He originates the scheme of an oligarchical revolution at Athens.

loponnesians, as well as his ostensible position in the service of Tissaphernês, were facts well-known among the Athenian armament; and his scheme was, to procure both restoration and renewed power in his native city, by representing himself as competent to bring over to her the aid and alliance of Persia, through his ascendancy over the mind of the satrap. His hostility to the democracy, however, was so generally known, that he despaired of accomplish-

ing his return unless he could connect it with an oligarchical revolution; which, moreover, was not less gratifying to his sentiment of vengeance for the past, than to his ambition for the future. Accordingly he sent over a private message to the officers and trierarchs at Samos, several of them doubtless his personal friends, desiring to

¹ Thucyd. viii. 46. Τὴν τε τροφὴν κακῶς ἐπόριζε τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις καὶ ναυμαχεῖν οὐκ εἶπ' ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς Φοινίσσας ναῦς φάσκειν ἤξειν καὶ ἐκ περιόντος ἀγωνισέσθαι ἐφ' ἧειρε τὰ

πράγματα καὶ τὴν ἀκμὴν τοῦ ναυτικοῦ αὐτῶν ἀφείλετο, γενομένην καὶ πανυ ἰσχυράν, τὰ τε ἄλλα, καταφανέστερον ἢ ὥστε λαυθάνειν, οὐ προθύμως ζυνοπολέμει.

be remembered to the "best men" in the armament¹—such was one of the standing phrases by which oligarchical men knew and described each other—and intimating his anxious wish to come again as a citizen among them, bringing with him Tissaphernês as their ally. But he would come only on condition of the formation of an oligarchical government; nor would he ever again set foot amidst the odious democracy to whom he owed his banishment.²

Such was the first originating germ of that temporary calamity, which so near brought Athens to absolute ruin, called the Oligarchy of Four Hundred: a suggestion from the same exile who had already so deeply wounded his country by sending Gylippus to Syracuse, and the Lacedæmonian garrison to Dekeleia. As yet, no man in Samos had thought of a revolution; but the moment that the idea was thus started, the trierarchs and wealthy men in the armament caught at it with avidity. To subvert the democracy for their own profit, and to be rewarded for doing so with the treasures of Persia as a means of carrying on the war against the Peloponnesians—was an extent of good fortune greater than they could possibly have hoped. Amidst the exhaustion of the public treasure at Athens, and the loss of tribute from her dependencies, it was now the private proprietors, and most of all, the wealthy proprietors—upon whom the cost of military operations fell; from which burthen they here saw the prospect of relief, coupled with increased chance of victory. Elate with so tempting a promise, a deputation of them crossed over from Samos to the mainland to converse personally with Alkibiadês, who again renewed his assurances in person, that he would bring not only Tissaphernês, but the Great King himself, into active alliance and cooperation with Athens provided they would put down the Athenian democracy, which he affirmed that the king could not possibly trust.³ He doubtless did not omit to set forth the other side of the alternative; that if the proposition were refused, Persian aid would be thrown heartily into the scale

Conspiracy
arranged
between the
Athenian
officers and
Alkibiadês.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 47. Τὰ μὲν καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδου προσέπεμψαντος λόγους ἐς τοὺς δυνάτωτάτους αὐτῶν (Ἀθηναίων) ἄνδρας, ὥστε μνησθῆναι περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐς τοὺς βελτίστους τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅτι ἐπ' ὀλιγαρχίᾳ βούλεται, καὶ οὐ πονηρίᾳ οὐδὲ δημοκρατίᾳ τῇ αὐτοῦ ἐχβαλοῦσθαι, κατελθόν, &c.

² Thucyd. viii. 47.

³ Thucyd. viii. 48.

of the Peloponnesians; in which case, there was no longer any hope of safety for Athens.

On the return of the deputation with these fresh assurances, the oligarchical men in Samos came together, both in greater number and with redoubled ardour, to take their measures for subverting the democracy. They even ventured to speak of the project openly among the mass of the armament, who listened to it with nothing but aversion; but who were silenced at least, though not satisfied, by being told that the Persian treasury would be thrown open to them on condition, and only on condition, that they would relinquish their democracy. Such was at this time the indispensable need of foreign money for the purposes of the war—such was the certainty of ruin, if the Persian treasure went to the aid of the enemy—that the most democratical Athenian might well hesitate when the alternative was thus laid before him. The oligarchical conspirators, however, knew well that they had the feeling of the armament altogether against them—that the best which they could expect from it was a reluctant acquiescence—and that they must accomplish the revolution by their own hands and management. They formed themselves into a political confederacy (or *Hetæria*) for the purpose of discussing the best measures towards their end. It was resolved to send a deputation to Athens, with Peisander¹ at the head, to make known the new prospect and to put the standing oligarchical clubs (*Hetæries*)

¹ It is asserted in an Oration of Lysias (*Orat.* xxv. *Δύμου Καταλό-σσω; Ἀπολογία*, c. 3. p. 766 Reisk.) that Phrynichus and Peisander embarked in this oligarchical conspiracy for the purpose of getting clear of previous crimes committed under the democracy. But there is nothing to countenance such an assertion, and the narrative of Thucydides gives quite a different colour to their behaviour.

Peisander was now serving with the armament at Samos; moreover his forwardness and energy (presently to be described) in taking the formidable initiative of putting

down the Athenian democracy, is to me quite sufficient evidence that the taunts of the comic writers against his cowardice are unfounded. Xenophon in the *Symposion* repeats this taunt (*ii.* 14), which also appears in *Aristophanês*, *Eupolis*, *Plato Comicus*, and others: see the passages collected in *Meineke, Histor. Critic. Comicor. Græcorum*, vol. i. p. 178, &c.

Modern writers on Grecian history often repeat such bitter jests as if they were so much genuine and trustworthy evidence against the person libelled.

into active cooperation for the purpose of violently breaking up the democracy; and farther, to establish oligarchical governments in all the remaining dependencies of Athens. They imagined that these dependencies would be thus induced to remain faithful to her, perhaps even that some of those which had already revolted might come back to their allegiance—when once she should be relieved from her democracy and placed under the rule of her “best and most virtuous citizens.”

Hitherto, the bargain tendered for acceptance had been—subversion of the Athenian democracy and restoration of Alkibiadês, on one hand—against hearty cooperation, and a free supply of gold, from Persia, on the other. But what security was there that such bargain would be realised—or that when the first part should have been brought to pass, the second would follow? There was absolutely no security except the word of Alkibiadês: very little to be trusted, even when promising what was in his own power to perform, as we may recollect from his memorable dealing with the Lacedæmonian envoys at Athens—and on the present occasion, vouching for something in itself extravagant and preposterous. For what reasonable motive could be imagined to make the Great King shape his foreign policy according to the interests of Alkibiadês—or to inspire him with such lively interest in the substitution of oligarchy for democracy at Athens? This was a question which the oligarchical conspirators at Samos not only never troubled themselves to raise, but which they had every motive to suppress. The suggestion of Alkibiadês coincided fully with their political interest and ambition. Their object was to put down the democracy, and get possession of the government for themselves—a purpose, towards which the promise of Persian gold, if they could get it accredited, was inestimable as a stepping-stone, whether it afterwards turned out to be a delusion or not. The probability is, that having a strong interest in believing it themselves, and a still stronger interest in making others believe it, they talked each other into a sincere persuasion. Without adverting to this fact, we should be at a loss to understand how the word of such a man as Alkibiadês, on such a matter, could be so implicitly accepted as to set in motion a whole train of novel and momentous events.

Credulity of
the oligar-
chical con-
spirators.

There was one man, and one man alone so far as we know, who ventured openly to call it in question. This was Phrynichus, one of the generals of the fleet, who had recently given valuable counsel after the victory of Milêtus; a clear-sighted and sagacious man, but personally hostile to Alkibiadês, and thoroughly seeing through his character and projects. Though Phrynichus was afterwards one of the chief organizers of the oligarchical movement, when it became detached from and hostile to Alkibiadês—yet under the actual circumstances he discountenanced it altogether.¹ Alkibiadês (he said) had no attachment to oligarchical government rather than to democratical; nor could he be relied on for standing by it after it should have been set up. His only purpose was, to make use of the oligarchical conspiracy now forming, for his own restoration; which, if brought to pass, could not fail to introduce political discord into the camp—the greatest misfortune that could at present happen. As to the Persian king, it was unreasonable to expect that he would put himself out of his way to aid the Athenians, his old enemies, in whom he had no confidence—while he had the Peloponnesians present as allies, with a good naval force and powerful cities in his own territory, from whom he had never experienced either insult or annoyance. Moreover the dependencies of Athens—upon whom it was now proposed to confer, simultaneously with Athens herself, the blessing of oligarchical government—would receive that boon with indifference. Those who had already revolted, would not come back; those who yet remained faithful, would not be the more inclined to remain so longer. Their object would be to obtain autonomy, either under oligarchy or democracy, as the case might be. Assuredly they would not expect better treatment from an oligarchical government at Athens, than from a democratical; for they knew that those self-styled “good and virtuous” men, who would form the oligarchy, were, as ministers of democracy, the chief advisers

¹ Phrynichus is affirmed in an Oration of Lysias to have been originally poor, keeping sheep in the country part of Attica; then to have resided in the city, and practised what was called *syco-*

phancy, or false and vexatious accusation before the Dikastery and the public assembly (Lysias, Orat. xx. pro Polystrato, c. 3, p. 674 Reisk.).

and instigators of the people to iniquitous deeds; most commonly for nothing but their own individual profit. From an Athenian oligarchy, the citizens of these dependencies had nothing to expect but violent executions without any judicial trial; but under the democracy, they could obtain shelter and the means of appeal, while their persecutors were liable to restraint and chastisement, from the people and the popular *Dikasteries*. Such (Phrynichus affirmed on his own personal knowledge) was the genuine feeling among the dependencies of Athens.¹ Having thus shown the calculations of the conspirators—as to Alkibiadês, as to Persia, and as to the allied dependencies—to be all illusory, Phrynichus concluded by entering his decided protest against adopting the propositions of Alkibiadês.

But in this protest (borne out afterwards by the result) he stood nearly alone. The tide of opinion, among the oligarchical conspirators, ran so furiously the other way, that it was resolved to despatch Peisander and others immediately to Athens to consummate the oligarchical revolution as well as the recall of Alkibiadês; and at the same time to propose to the people their new intended ally Tissaphernês.

Manœuvres
and
counter-
manœuvres
of Phryni-
chus and
Alkibiadês.

Phrynichus knew well what would be the consequence to himself—if this consummation were brought about, as he foresaw that it probably would be—from the vengeance of his enemy Alkibiadês against his recent opposition. Satisfied that the latter would destroy him, he took

¹ Thucyd. viii. 48. Τὰς τε ξυμμαχίδας πόλεις, αἷς ὑπεσχησθαι δὴ σφᾶς ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὅτι δὴ καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐ δημοκρατήσονται, εὖ εἰδέναι ἔφη ὅτι οὐδὲν μᾶλλον σφίσιν οὐθ' αἱ ἀφισταμένηαι προσχωρήσονται, οὐθ' αἱ ὑπάρχουσαι βεβαιότεραι ἔσονται· οὐ γὰρ βουλήσονται αὐτοὺς μετ' ὀλιγαρχίας ἢ δημοκρατίας δουλεύειν μᾶλλον, ἢ μεθ' ὁποτέρου ἀντύχουσι τοῦτων ἐλευθέρους εἶναι. Τοὺς τε καλοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ὀνομαζομένους οὐκ ἐλάσσω αὐτοὺς νομίζειν σφίσι πράγματα παρέξειν τοῦ δήμου, ποριστάς ὄντας καὶ ἐσηγητάς τῶν κακῶν τῷ δήμῳ, ἐξ ὧν τὰ πλείω αὐτοὺς ὠφελείσθαι· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐπ' ἐκεί-

νοὺς εἶναι, καὶ ἄκριτοι ἂν καὶ βιαιότερον ἀποθνήσκουσιν, τὸν τε δὴ μὲν σφῶν τε καταφυγὴν εἶναι καὶ ἐκείνων σωφρονιστὴν. Καὶ ταῦτα παρ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων ἐπισταμένας τὰς πόλεις σαφῶς αὐτοὺς εἰδέναι, ὅτι οὕτω νομίζουσι.

In taking the comparison between oligarchy and democracy in Greece, there is hardly any evidence more important than this passage: a testimony to the comparative merit of democracy, pronounced by an oligarchical conspirator, and sanctioned by an historian himself unfriendly to the democracy.

measures for destroying Alkibiadês beforehand, even by a treasonable communication to the Lacedæmonian admiral Astyochus at Milêtus; to whom he sent a secret account of the intrigues which the Athenian exile was carrying on at Samos to the prejudice of the Peloponnesians, prefaced with an awkward apology for this sacrifice of the interests of his country to the necessity of protecting himself against a personal enemy. But Phrynichus was imperfectly informed of the real character of the Spartan commander, or of his relations with Tissaphernês and Alkibiadês. Not merely was the latter now at Magnesia, under the protection of the satrap, and out of the power of the Lacedæmonians—but Astyochus, a traitor to his duty through the gold of Tissaphernês, went up thither to show the letter of Phrynichus to the very person whom it was intended to expose. Alkibiadês forthwith sent intelligence to the generals and officers at Samos of the step taken by Phrynichus, and pressed them to put him to death.

The life of Phrynichus now hung by a thread, and was probably preserved only by that respect for judicial formalities so deeply rooted in the Athenian character. In the extremity of danger, he resorted to a still more subtle artifice to save himself. He despatched a second letter to Astyochus, complaining of the violation of confidence in regard to the former, but at the same time intimating that he was now willing to betray to the Lacedæmonians the camp and armament at Samos. He invited Astyochus to come and attack the place, which was as yet unfortified—explaining minutely in what manner the attack could be best conducted; and he concluded by saying that this, as well as every other means of defence, must be pardoned to one whose life was in danger from a personal enemy. Foreseeing that Astyochus would betray this letter as he had betrayed the former, Phrynichus waited a proper time, and then revealed to the camp the intention of the enemy to make an attack, as if it had reached him by private information. He insisted on the necessity of immediate precautions, and himself as general superintended the work of fortification, which was soon completed. Presently arrived a letter from Alkibiadês, communicating to the army that Phrynichus had betrayed them, and that the Peloponnesians were on the point of making an attack. But this letter, arriving after the precautions taken by

order of Phrynichus himself had been already completed, was construed into a mere trick on the part of Alkibiadês himself, through his acquaintance with the intentions of the Peloponnesians, to raise a charge of treasonable correspondence against his personal enemy. The impression thus made by his second letter effaced the taint which had been left upon Phrynichus by the first, insomuch that the latter stood exculpated on both charges.¹

But Phrynichus, though thus successful in extricating himself, failed thoroughly in his manœuvre against the influence and life of Alkibiadês; in whose favour the oligarchical movement not only went on, but was transferred from Samos to Athens. On arriving at the latter place, Peisander and his companions laid before the public assembly the projects which had been conceived by the oligarchs at Samos. The people were invited to restore Alkibiadês and renounce their democratical constitution; in return for which, they were assured of obtaining the Persian king as an ally, and of overcoming the Peloponnesians.² Violent was the storm which these propositions raised in the public assembly. Many speakers rose in animated defence of the democracy; few, if any, distinctly against it. The opponents of Alkibiadês indignantly denounced the mischief of restoring him, in violation of the laws, and in reversal of a judicial sentence; while the Eumolpidæ and Kerykes, the sacred families connected with the Eleusinian mysteries which Alkibiadês had profaned, entered their solemn protest on religious grounds to the same effect. Against all these vehement opponents, whose impassioned invectives obtained the full sympathy of the assembly, Peisander had but one simple reply. He called them forward successively

Proceedings of Peisander at Athens—strong opposition among the people both to the conspiracy and to the restoration of Alkibiadês.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 50, 51.

² In the speech made by Theramênês (the Athenian) during the oligarchy of Thirty, seven years afterwards, it is affirmed that the Athenian people voted the adoption of the oligarchy of Four Hundred, from being told that the *Lacedæmonians* would never trust a democracy (Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 8, 45).

This is thoroughly incorrect—a specimen of the loose assertion of speakers in regard to facts even not very long past. At the moment when Theramênês said this, the question, what political constitution at Athens the Lacedæmonians would please to tolerate, was all-important to the Athenians. Theramênês transfers the feelings of the present to the incidents of the past.

by name, and put to each the question—"What hope have you of salvation for the city, when the Peloponnesians have a naval force against us fully equal to ours, together with a greater number of allied cities—and when the king as well as Tissaphernês are supplying them with money, while we have no money left? What hope have you of salvation, unless we can persuade the king to come over to our side?" The answer was a melancholy negative—or perhaps not less melancholy silence. "Well then (rejoined Peisander)—that object cannot possibly be attained, unless we conduct our political affairs for the future in a more moderate way, and put the powers of government more into the hands of a few—and unless we recall Alkiabiadês, the only man now living who is competent to do the business. Under present circumstances, we surely shall not lay greater stress upon our political constitution than upon the salvation of the city; the rather as what we now enact may be hereafter modified, if it be found not to answer."

Against the proposed oligarchical change the repugnance of the assembly was alike angry and un-
 Unwilling vote of the assembly to relinquish their democracy, under the promise of Persian aid for the war. Peisander is sent back to negotiate with Alkiabiadês.
 nance of the assembly was alike angry and un-animous. But they were silenced by the imperious necessity of the case, as the armament at Samos had been before; and admitting the alternative laid down by Peisander (as I have observed already), the most democratical citizen might be embarrassed as to his vote. Whether any speaker, like Phrynichus at Samos, arraigned the fallacy of the alternative, and called upon Peisander for some guarantee, better than mere asseveration, of the benefits to come—we are not informed. But the general vote of the assembly, reluctant and only passed in the hope of future change, sanctioned his recommendation.¹ He and ten other envoys,

¹ Thucyd. viii. 54. 'Ο δὲ δῆμος τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀκούων χαλεπῶς ἔφρε τὸ περὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας· σαφῶς δὲ διδασκόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ Πεισάνδρου μὴ εἶναι ἄλλην σωτηρίαν, δειττας, καὶ ἄμα ἐλπίζων ὡς καὶ μεταβαλεῖται, ἐνέδωκε.

"Atheniensibus, imminente periculo belli, major salutis quam dignitatis cura fuit. Itaque, per-

mittente populo, imperium ad Senatum transfertur" (Justin, v. 3).

Justin is correct, so far as this vote goes: but he takes no notice of the change of matters afterwards, when the establishment of the Four Hundred was consummated *without* the promised benefit of Persian alliance, and by simple terrorism.

invested with full powers of negotiating with Alkibiadês and Tissaphernês, were despatched to Ionia immediately. Peisander at the same time obtained from the assembly a vote deposing Phrynichus from his command; under the accusation of having traitorously caused the loss of Iasus and the capture of Amorgês, after the battle of Milêtus—but from the real certainty that he would prove an insuperable bar to all negotiations with Alkibiadês. Phrynichus, with his colleague Skironidês, being thus displaced, Leon and Diomedon were sent to Samos as commanders in their stead; an appointment, of which, as will be presently seen, Peisander was far from anticipating the consequences.

Before his departure for Asia, he took a step yet more important. He was well aware that the recent vote—a result of fear inspired by the war, representing a sentiment utterly at variance with that of the assembly, and only procured as the price of Persian aid against a foreign enemy—would never pass into a reality by the spontaneous act of the people themselves. It was indeed indispensable as a first step; partly as an authority to himself, partly also as a confession of the temporary weakness of the democracy, and as a sanction and encouragement for the oligarchical forces to show themselves. But the second step yet remained to be performed; that of calling these forces into energetic action—organising an amount of violence sufficient to extort from the people actual submission in addition to verbal acquiescence—and thus as it were tying down the patient while the process of emasculation was being consummated. Peisander visited all the various political clubs, conspiracies, or Hetæries, which were habitual and notorious at Athens; associations, bound together by oath, among the wealthy citizens, partly for purposes of amusement, but chiefly pledging the members to stand by each other in objects of political ambition, in judicial trials, in accusation or defence of official men after the period of office had expired, in carrying points through the public assembly, &c. Among these clubs were distributed most of “the best citizens, the good and honourable men, the elegant men, the men of note, the temperate, the honest and moderate men,”¹ &c., to

Peisander brings the oligarchical clubs at Athens into organised action against the democracy.

¹ Οἱ βέλτιστοι, οἱ καλοκἀγαθοί, οἱ χρηέντες, οἱ γνώριμοι, οἱ σώφρονες,

employ that complimentary phraseology by which wealthy and anti-popular politicians have chosen to designate each other, in ancient as well as in modern times. And though there were doubtless individuals among them who deserved these appellations in their best sense, yet the general character of the clubs was not the less exclusive and oligarchical. In the details of political life, they had different partialities as well as different antipathies, and were oftener in opposition than in cooperation with each other. But they furnished, when taken together, a formidable anti-popular force; generally either in abeyance, or disseminated in the accomplishment of smaller political measures and separate personal successes—but capable, at a special crisis, of being evoked, organised, and put in conjoint attack, for the subversion of the democracy. Such was the important movement now initiated by Peisander. He visited separately each of these clubs, put them into communication with each other, and exhorted them all to joint aggressive action against their common enemy the democracy, at a moment when it was already intimidated and might be finally overthrown.¹

&c.: le parti honnête et modéré, &c.

¹ About these *ἐννομολογίαὶ ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς*—political and judicial associations—see above in this History, ch. xxxvii., ch. li.; see also Hermann Büttner, *Geschichte der politischen Heterieen zu Athen*, pp. 75, 79, Leipsic, 1840.

There seem to have been similar political clubs or associations at Carthage, exercising much influence, and holding perpetual banquets as a means of largess to the poor—Aristotel. *Polit.* ii. 8, 2; Livy, xxxiii. 46; xxxiv. 61: compare Kluge, *ad Aristotel. de Polit. Carthag.* p. 46-127, Wratisl. 1824.

The like political associations were both of long duration among the nobility of Rome, and of much influence for political objects as well as judicial success—"coitiones (compare Cicero *pro Cluentio*, c. 54, s. 148) *honorum adipiscendorum causa factæ*—factiones—sodalita-

tes." The incident described in Livy (ix. 26) is remarkable. The Senate, suspecting the character and proceedings of these clubs, appointed the Dictator Mænius (in 312 B.C.) as commissioner with full power to investigate and deal with them. But such was the power of the clubs, in a case where they had a common interest and acted in cooperation (as was equally the fact under Peisander at Athens), that they completely frustrated the inquiry, and went on as before. "*Nec diutius, ut fit, quam dum recens erat, quæstio per clara nomina reorum viguit: inde labi cœpit ad viliora capita, donec coitionibus factionibusque, adversus quas comparata erat, oppressa est*" (Livy, ix. 26.). Compare Dio Cass. xxxvii. 57, about the *ἐταρπυκὰ* of the Triumvirs at Rome. Quintus Cicero (*de Petition. Consulatus*, c. 5) says to his brother the orator—"Quod si satis grati homines essent,

Having taken other necessary measures towards the same purpose, Peisander left Athens with his colleagues to enter upon his negotiation with Tissaphernês. But the cooperation and aggressive movement of the clubs which he had originated, was prosecuted with increased ardour during his absence, and even fell into hands more organising and effective than his own. The rhetorical teacher Antiphon, of the deme Rhamnus, took it in hand especially, acquired the confidence of the clubs, and drew the plan of

Peisander leaves Athens for Samos—Antiphon takes the management of the oligarchical conspiracy—Theramênês and Phrynichus.

hæc omnia (i. e. all the subsidia necessary for success in his coming election) tibi parata esse debebant, sicut parata esse confido. Nam hoc biennio quatuor sodalitates civium ad ambitionem gratiosissimorum tibi obligasti Horum in causis ad te deferendis quidnam eorum sodales tibi receperint et confirmarint, scio; nam interfui."

See Th. Mommsen, *De Collegiis et Sodaliciis Romanorum*, Kiel 1843, ch. iii. sect. 5, 6, 7; also the Dissertation of Wunder, inserted in the *Onomasticon Tullianum* of Orelli and Baier, in the last volume of their edition of Cicero, p. 200-210, ad Ind. *Legum; Lex Licinia de Sodalitiis*.

As an example of these clubs or conspiracies for mutual support in *ἐνωμοσίαι ἐπὶ δίκαις* (not including *ἀρχαίς*, so far as we can make out), we may cite the association called *οἱ Εἰκαδῆς* made known to us by an Inscription recently discovered in Attica, and published first in Dr. Wordsworth's *Athens and Attica*, p. 223; next in Ross, *Die Deme von Attica*, Preface, p. v. These *Εἰκαδῆς* are an association, the members of which are bound to each other by a common oath, as well as by a curse which the mythical hero of the association, Eikadeus, is supposed to have imprecated (*ἐνωμοτίον τῇ ἄρᾳ τῶν Εἰκα-*

δῆς ἐπὶ πράξεσσι)—they possess common property, and it was held contrary to the oath for any of the members to enter into a pecuniary process against the *χοινόν*: compare analogous obligations among the Roman *Sodales*, Mommsen, p. 4. Some members had violated their obligation upon this point: Polyxenus had attacked them at law for false witness: and the general body of the *Eikadeis* pass a vote of thanks to him for so doing, choosing three of their members to assist him in the cause before the *Dikastery* (*οἰκτινῆς συναγωγῶσιν* τῷ ἐπεσχημένῳ τοῖς μάρτυσι): compare the *ἐταίρια* alluded to in Demosthenês (cont. Theokrin. c. 11. p. 1335) as assisting Theokrinês before the *Dikastery* and intimidating the witnesses.

The Guilds in the European cities during the middle ages, usually sworn to by every member and called *Conjuraciones Amicitie*, bear in many respects a resemblance to these *ἐνωμοσίαι*; though the judicial proceedings in the mediæval cities, being so much less popular than at Athens, narrowed their range of interference in this direction: their political importance however was quite equal. (See Wilda, *Das Gilden-Wesen des Mittelalters*, Absehn. ii. p. 167, &c.)

"Omnes autem ad Amicitiam per-

campaign against the democracy. He was a man estimable in private life and not open to pecuniary corruption: in other respects, of pre-eminent ability, in contrivance, judgment, speech, and action. The profession to which he belonged, generally unpopular among the democracy, excluded him from taking rank as a speaker either in the public assembly or the dikastery: for a rhetorical teacher, contending in either of them against a private speaker (to repeat a remark already once made), was considered to stand at the same unfair advantage, as a fencing-master fighting a duel with a gentleman would be held to stand in modern times. Himself thus debarred from the showy celebrity of Athenian political life, Antiphon became only the more consummate, as a master of advice, calculation, scheming, and rhetorical composition,¹ to assist the celebrity of others; insomuch that his silent assistance in political and judicial debates, as a sort of chamber-counsel, was highly appreciated and largely paid. Now such were precisely the talents required for the present occasion; while Antiphon, who hated the democracy for having hitherto kept him in the shade, gladly bent his full talents towards its subversion.

Thus efficient was the man to whom Peisander in departing chiefly confided the task of organising the anti-popular clubs, for the consummation of the revolution already in immediate prospect. His chief auxiliary was Theramenês, another Athenian, now first named, of eminent ability and cunning. His father (either natural or by

tinentes villæ per fidem et sacramentum firmaverunt, quod unus subveniat alteri tanquam fratri suo in utili et honesto" (ib. p. 148).

¹ The person described by Krito in the Euthydêmus of Plato (c. 31 p. 305 C.) as having censured Sokratês for conversing with Euthydêmus and Dionysodôrus, is presented exactly like Antiphon in Thucydides — ἤχιστα νῆ τὸν Δία ῥήτωρ· οὐδὲ οἶμαι πώποτε αὐτὸν ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβεβηκέναι· ἀλλ' ἐπαΐειν αὐτὸν φασὶ περὶ τοῦ πράγματος, νῆ τὸν Δία, καὶ δεινὸν εἶναι καὶ δεινὸς λόγους ξυμπιθέσθαι.

Heindorf thinks that Isokratês

is here meant: Groen van Prinsterer talks of Lysias; Winkelmann, of Thrasymachus. The description would fit Antiphon as well as either of these three: though Stallbaum may perhaps be right in supposing no particular individual to have been in the mind of Plato.

Οἱ συνδικεῖν ἐπιστάμενοι, whom Xenophon specifies as being so eminently useful to a person engaged in a law-suit, are probably the persons who knew how to address the Dikastery effectively in support of his case (Xenoph. Memorab. i. 2, 51).

adoption), Agnon, was one of the Probûli, and had formerly been founder of Amphipolis. Even Phrynichus—whose sagacity we have already had occasion to appreciate, and who from hatred towards Alkibiadês had pronounced himself decidedly against the oligarchical movement at Samos—became zealous in forwarding the movement at Athens, after his dismissal from the command. He brought to the side of Antiphon and Theramenês a contriving head not inferior to theirs, coupled with daring and audacity even superior. Under such skilful leaders, the anti-popular force of Athens was organised with a deep skill, and directed with a dexterous wickedness, never before witnessed in Greece.

At the time when Peisander and the other envoys reached Ionia (seemingly about the end of January or beginning of February 411 B.C.), the Peloponnesian fleet had already quitted Milêtus and gone to Knidus and Rhodes, on which latter island Leon and Diomedon made some hasty descents, from the neighbouring island of Chalkê. At the same time, the Athenian armament at Chios was making progress in the siege of that place and the construction of the neighbouring fort at Delphinium. Pedaritus, the Lacedæmonian governor of the island, had sent pressing messages to solicit aid from the Peloponnesians at Rhodes, but no aid arrived; and he therefore resolved to attempt a general sally and attack upon the Athenians, with his whole force foreign as well as Chian. Though at first he obtained some success, the battle ended in his complete defeat and death, with great slaughter of the Chian troops, and with the loss of many whose shields were captured in the pursuit.¹ The Chians, now reduced to greater straits than before, and beginning to suffer severely from famine, were only enabled to hold out by a partial reinforcement soon afterwards obtained from the Peloponnesian guard-ships at Milêtus. A Spartan named Leon, who had come out in the vessel of Antisthenês as one of the Epibatæ or Marines, conducted this reinforcing squadron of 12 triremes (chiefly Thurian and Syracusan) succeeding Pedaritus in the general command of the island.²

¹ Thucyd. viii. 55, 56.

² Thucyd. viii. 61. ἔτυχον δὲ ἔτι ἐν Ῥόδῳ ὄντος Ἀστυόχου ἐκ τῆς Μιλήτου Λέοντά τε ἄνδρα Σπαρτιάτην,

ὃς Ἀντισθένην ἐπιβάτης συνέπλει, τοῦτον χειρομεινόμενι μετὰ τὸν Πεδάρиту θάνατον ἄρχοντα, &c.

I do not see why the word ἐπι-

It was while Chios seemed thus likely to be recovered by Athens—and while the superior Peloponnesian fleet was paralysed at Rhodes by Persian intrigues and bribes—that Peisander arrived in Ionia to open his negotiations with Alkibiadês and Tissaphernês. He was enabled to announce that the subversion of the democracy at Athens was already begun and would soon be consummated: and he now required the price which had been promised in exchange—Persian alliance and aid to Athens against the Peloponnesians. But Alkibiadês knew well that he had promised what he had not the least chance of being able to perform. The satrap had appeared to follow his advice—or had rather followed his own inclination, employing Alkibiadês as an instrument and auxiliary—in the endeavour to wear out both parties, and to keep them nearly on an equality until each should ruin the other. But he was no way disposed to identify himself with the cause of Athens, nor to break decidedly with the Peloponnesians—especially at a moment when their fleet was both the greater of the two, and in occupation of an island close to his own satrapy. Accordingly Alkibiadês, when summoned by the Athenian envoys to perform his engagement, found himself in a dilemma from which he could only escape by one of his characteristic manœuvres.

Receiving the envoys himself in conjunction with Tissaphernês, and speaking on behalf of the latter, he pushed his demands to an extent which he knew that the Athenians

βάρης should not be construed here, as elsewhere, in its ordinary sense of *miles classarius*. The commentators (see the notes of Dr. Arnold, Poppo, and Götter) start difficulties which seem to me of little importance; and they imagine divers new meanings, for none of which any authority is produced. We ought not to wonder that a common *miles classarius* or marine (being a Spartan citizen) should be appointed commander at Chios, when (a few chapters afterwards) we find Thrasylulus at Samos promoted, from being a common hoplite in the ranks, to be one of the Athenian

generals (viii. 73).

The like remark may be made on the passage cited from Xenophon (*Hellenic*. i. 3. 17), about Hegesandridas—ἐπιβάρης ὢν Μινδαρου, where also the commentators reject the common meaning (see Schneider's note in the *Addenda* to his edition of 1791, p. 97). The participle ὢν in that passage must be considered as an inaccurate substitute for γεγεννημένος, since Mindarus was dead at the time. Hegesandridas *had been* among the epibatæ of Mindarus, and was *now* in command of a squadron on the coast of Thrace.

would never concede; in order that the rupture might seem to be on their side, and not on his. First, he required the whole of Ionia to be conceded to the Great King; next, all the neighbouring islands, with some other items besides.¹ Large as these requisitions were, comprehending the cession of Lesbos and Samos as well as Chios, and replacing the Persian monarchy in the condition in which it had stood in 496 B.C. before the Ionic revolt—Peisander and his colleagues granted them all: so that Alkibiadês was on the point of seeing his deception exposed and frustrated. At last he bethought himself of a fresh demand, which touched Athenian pride as well as Athenian safety, in the tenderest place. He required that the Persian king should be held free to build ships of war in unlimited number, and to keep them sailing along the coast as he might think fit, through all these new portions of territory. After the immense concessions already made, the envoys not only rejected this fresh demand at once, but resented it as an insult which exposed the real drift and purpose of Alkibiadês. Not merely did it cancel the boasted treaty (called the peace of Kallias) concluded about forty years before between Athens and Persia, and limiting the Persian ships of war to the sea eastward of Phasêlis—but it extinguished the maritime empire of Athens, and compromised the security of all the coasts and islands of the Ægean. To see Lesbos, Chios, and Samos, &c. in possession of Persia, was sufficiently painful; but if there came to be powerful Persian fleets on these islands, it would be the certain precursor and means of farther conquests to the westward, and would revive the aggressive dispositions of the Great King as they had stood at the beginning of the reign of Xerxes. Peisander and his comrades, abruptly breaking off the debate, returned to Samos;—indignant at the discovery, which they now made for the first time, that Alkibiadês had juggled them from the outset, and was imposing conditions which he knew to be inadmissible.²

Tricks of Alkibiadês—he exaggerates his demands with a view of breaking off the negotiation—indignation of the oligarchs against him.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 56. Ἰωνίαν τε γὰρ πᾶσαν ἡξίουν διδοσθαι, καὶ αὐθις νήσους τε ἐπικειμένους καὶ ἄλλα, οἷς οὐκ ἐνατιούμενων τῶν Ἀθηναίων, &c.

What these *et cetera* comprehended, we cannot divine. The demand was certainly ample enough without them.

² Thucyd. viii. 56. γὰρ οὐκ ἡξίουν ἑᾶν

They still appear however to have thought that Alkibiadês acted thus, no because he *could* not, but because he *would* not, bring about the alliance under discussion.¹ They suspected him of playing false with the oligarchical movement which he had himself instigated, and of projecting the accomplishment of his own restoration, coupled with the alliance of Tissaphernês, into the bosom of the democracy which he had begun by denouncing. Such was the light in which they presented his conduct; venting their disappointment in invectives against his duplicity, and in asseverations that he was, after all, unsuitable for a place in oligarchical society. Such declarations, when circulated at Samos, to account for their unexpected failure in realising the hopes which they had raised, created among the armament an impression that Alkibiadês was really favourable to the democracy; at the same time leaving unabated the prestige of his unbounded ascendancy over Tissaphernês and the Great King. We shall presently see the effects resulting from this belief.

Immediately after the rupture of the negotiations, however, the satrap took a step well-calculated to destroy the hopes of the Athenians altogether, so far as Persian aid was concerned. Though persisting in his policy of lending no decisive assistance to either party, and of merely prolonging the war so as to enfeeble both—he yet began to fear that he was pushing matters too far against the Peloponnesians, who had now been two months inactive at Rhodes, with their large fleet hauled ashore. He had no treaty with them actually in force,

Reconciliation between Tissaphernês and the Peloponnesians.

βασιλέα ποιῆσθαι, καὶ παραπλεῖν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ γῆν, ὅπη ἂν καὶ ἕσταις ἂν βούληται.

In my judgement ἐκ τοῦ is decidedly the proper reading here, not ἐκ τῶν. I agree in this respect with Dr. Arnold, Bekker, and Göller.

In a former volume of this History, I have shown reasons for believing (in opposition to Mitford, Dahlmann, and others) that the treaty called by the name of Kallias, and sometimes miscalled by the name of Kimon—was a real

fact and not a boastful fiction: see ch. xlv.

The note of Dr. Arnold, though generally just, gives an inadequate representation of the strong reasons of Athens for rejecting and resenting this third demand.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 63. Καὶ ἐν στίσι αὐτοῖς ἅμα οἱ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων κρινολογούμενοι ἐσκέψαντο, Ἀλκιβιάδην μὲν, ἐπεὶ δὴ περ οὐ βούλεται, εἶν (καὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιτήδειον αὐτὸν εἶναι ἐς ὀλιγαρχίαν ἐλθεῖν), &c.

since Lichas had disallowed the two previous conventions; nor had he furnished them with pay or maintenance. His bribes to the officers had hitherto kept the armament quiet; yet we do not distinctly see how so large a body of men found subsistence.¹ He was now however apprised that they could find subsistence no longer, and that they would probably desert, or commit depredations on the coast of his satrapy, or perhaps be driven to hasten on a general action with the Athenians, under desperate circumstances. Under such apprehensions he felt compelled to put himself again in communication with them, to furnish them with pay, and to conclude with them a third convention—the proposition of which he had refused to entertain at Knidus. He therefore went to Kaunus, invited the Peloponnesian leaders to Milêtus, and concluded with them near that town a treaty to the following effect:—

“In this 13th year of the reign of Darius, and in the ephorship of Alexippidas at Lacedæmon, a convention is hereby concluded by the Lacedæmonians and their allies, with Tissaphernês and Hieramenês and the sons of Pharnakês, respecting the affairs of the king and of the Lacedæmonians and their allies. The territory of the king, as much of it as is in Asia, shall belong to the king. Let the king determine as he chooses respecting his own territory. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall not approach the king’s territory with any mischievous purpose—nor shall the king approach that of the Lacedæmonians and their allies with any like purpose. If any one among the Lacedæmonians or their allies shall approach the king’s territory with mischievous purpose, the Lacedæmonians and their allies shall hinder him: if any one from the king’s territory shall approach the Lacedæmonians or their allies with mischievous purpose, the king shall hinder him. Tissaphernês shall provide pay and maintenance, for the fleet now present, at the rate already stipulated, until the king’s fleet shall arrive; after that it shall be at the option of the

Third convention concluded between them.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 44-57. In two parallel cases, one in Chios, the other in Korkyra, the seamen of an unpaid armament found subsistence by hiring themselves out for agricultural labour. But this

was only during the summer (see Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 1; vi. 2, 37), while the stay of the Peloponnesians at Rhodes was from January to March.

Lacedæmonians to maintain their own fleet if they think fit—or if they prefer, Tissaphernês shall furnish maintenance, and at the close of the war the Lacedæmonians shall repay to him what they have received. After the king's fleet shall have arrived, the two fleets shall carry on war conjointly, in such manner as shall seem good to Tissaphernês and the Lacedæmonians and their allies. If they choose to close the war with the Athenians, they shall close it only by joint consent.”¹

In comparing this third convention with the two preceding, we find that nothing is now stipulated as to any territory except the continent of Asia; which is ensured unreservedly to the king, of course with all the Greek residents planted upon it. But by a diplomatic finesse, the terms of the treaty imply that this is not *all* the territory which the king is entitled to claim—though nothing is covenanted as to any remainder.² Next, this third treaty includes Pharnabazus (the son of Pharnakês) with his satrapy of Daskylium; and Hieramenês, with his district, the extent and position of which we do not know; while in the former treaties no other satrap except Tissaphernês had been concerned. We must recollect that the Peloponnesian fleet included those 27 triremes, which had been brought across by Kalligeitus expressly for the aid of Pharnabazus; and therefore that the latter now naturally became a party to the general operations. Thirdly, we here find, for the first time, formal announcement of a Persian fleet about to be brought up as auxiliary to the Peloponnesians. This was a promise which the satrap now set forth more plainly than before, to amuse them, and to abate the mistrust which they had begun to conceive of his sincerity. It served the temporary purpose of restraining them from any immediate act of despair hostile to his interests, which was all that he looked for. While he renewed his payments, therefore, for the moment, he affected to busy himself in orders and preparations for the fleet from Phenicia.³

¹ Thucyd. viii. 58.

² Thucyd. viii. 58. χώραν τὴν βασι-
λέως, ὅση τῆς Ἀσίας ἐστὶ, βα-
σιλέως εἶναι καὶ περὶ τῆς χώρας τῆς

ἐαυτοῦ βουλευάτω βασιλεὺς ὥπως
βούλεται.

³ Thucyd. viii. 59.

The Peloponnesian fleet was now ordered to move from Rhodes. Before it quitted that island, however, envoys came thither from Eretria and from Orôpus; which latter place (a dependency on the north-eastern frontier of Attica), though protected by an Athenian garrison, had recently been surprised and captured by the Bœotians. The loss of Orôpus much increased the facilities for the revolt of Eubœa; and these envoys came to entreat aid from the Peloponnesian fleet, to second the island in that design. The Peloponnesian commanders, however, felt themselves under prior obligation to relieve the sufferers at Chios, towards which island they first bent their course. But they had scarcely passed the Triopian cape, when they saw the Athenian squadron from Chalkê dogging their motions. Though there was no wish on either side for a general battle, yet they saw evidently that the Athenians would not permit them to pass by Samos, and get to the relief of Chios, without a battle. Renouncing therefore the project of relieving Chios, they again concentrated their force at Milêtus; while the Athenian fleet was also again united at Samos.¹ It was about the end of March 411 B.C., that the two fleets were thus replaced in the stations which they had occupied four months previously.

After the breach with Alkibiadês, and still more after this manifest reconciliation of Tissaphernês with the Peloponnesians, Peisander and the oligarchical conspirators at Samos had to reconsider their plan of action. They would not have begun the movement at first, had they not been instigated by Alkibiadês, and furnished by him with the treacherous delusion of Persian alliance to cheat and paralyse the people. They had indeed motives enough, from their own personal ambition, to originate it of themselves, apart from Alkibiadês; but without the hopes—equally useful for their purpose whether false or true—connected with his name, they would have had no chance of achieving the first step. Now, however, that first step had been achieved, before the delusive expectation of Persian gold was dissipated. The Athenian people had been familiarised with the idea of a subversion of their constitution, in consideration of a certain price: it remained

Peisander
and his col-
leagues
persist in
the oligarch-
ical con-
spiracy,
without
Alkibiadês.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 60.

to extort from them at the point of the sword, without paying the price, what they had thus consented to sell.¹ Moreover the leaders of the scheme felt themselves already compromised, so that they could not recede with safety. They had set in motion their partisans at Athens, where the system of murderous intimidation (though the news had not as yet reached Samos) was already in full swing: so that they felt constrained to persevere as the only chance of preservation to themselves. At the same time, all that faint pretence of public benefit, in the shape of Persian alliance, which had been originally attached to it and which might have been conceived to enlist in the scheme some timid patriots—was now entirely withdrawn. Nothing remained except a naked, selfish, and unscrupulous scheme of ambition, not only ruining the freedom of Athens at home, but crippling and imperilling her before the foreign enemy at a moment when her entire strength was scarcely adequate to the contest. The conspirators resolved to persevere, at all hazards, both in breaking down the constitution and in carrying on the foreign war. Most of them being rich men, they were content (Thucydidês observes) to defray the cost out of their own purses, now that they were contending, not for their country, but for their own power and profit.²

They lost no time in proceeding to execution, immediately after returning to Samos from the abortive conference with Alkibiadês. While they despatched Peisander with five of the envoys back to Athens, to consummate what was already in progress there—and the remaining five to oligarchise the dependent allies—they organised all their partisan force in the armament, and began to take measures for putting down the democracy in Samos itself. That democracy had been the product of a forcible revolution, effected about ten months before by the aid of three Athenian triremes. It had since preserved

¹ See Aristotel. Politic. v. 3, 8. He cites this revolution as an instance of one begun by deceit, and afterwards consummated by force—οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν τετραχολοσίων τὸν δῆμον ἐξηπάτησαν, φάσκοντες τὸν βασιλέα χρήματα παρέξειν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους· ψευσάμενοι δὲ, κατέχριν ἐπειρώντο

τὴν πολιτείαν.

² Thucyd. viii. 63. Αὐτοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν, ὡς ἤδη καὶ κινδυνεύοντας, ὅρᾳν ὅπως τρόπῳ μὴ ἀνεθῆσεται τὰ πράγματα, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πολέμου ἅμα ἀντέχειν, καὶ ἐσφέρειν αὐτοὺς προθύμως χρήματα καὶ ἦν τι ἄλλο δέη, ὡς οὐκέτι ἄλλοις ἢ σφίσι αὐτοῖς ταλαιπωρούοντας.

Samos from revolting, like Chios: it was now the means of preserving the democracy at Athens itself. The partisans of Peisander, finding it an invincible obstacle to their views, contrived to gain over a party of the leading Samians now in authority under it. Three hundred of these latter, a portion of those who ten months before had risen in arms to put down the pre-existing oligarchy, now enlisted as conspirators along with the Athenian oligarchs, to put down the Samian democracy, and get possession of the government for themselves. The new alliance was attested and cemented, according to genuine oligarchical practice, by a murder without judicial trial, or an assassination—for which a suitable victim was at hand. The Athenian Hyperbolus, who had been ostracised some years before by the coalition of Nikias and Alkibiadês, together with their respective partisans—ostracised (as Thucydidês tells us) not from any fear of his power and over-transcendent influence, but from his bad character and from his being a disgrace to the city—and thus ostracised by an abuse of the institution—was now resident at Samos. He represented the demagogic and accusatory eloquence of the democracy, the check upon official delinquency; so that he served as a common object of antipathy to Athenian and Samian oligarchs. Some of the Athenian partisans, headed by Charminus, one of the generals, in concert with the Samian conspirators, seized Hyperbolus and put him to death; seemingly with some other victims at the same time.¹

But though these joint assassinations served as a pledge to each section of the conspirators for the fidelity of the other in respect to farther operations, they at the same time gave warning to opponents. Those leading men at Samos who remained attached to the democracy, looking abroad for defence against the coming attack, made earnest appeal to Leon and Diomedon, the two

The democracy at Samos is sustained by the Athenian armament.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 73. Καὶ Ὑπέρβολον τὲ τινα τῶν Ἀθηναίων, μοχθηρὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὡστραχισμένον οὐ διὰ δυνάμεως καὶ ἀξιώματος φόβον, ἀλλ' ἀδιὰ πονηρίαν καὶ αἰσχύνην τῆς πόλεως, ἀποκτείνουσι μετὰ Χαρμίνου τε ἐνὸς τῶν στρατηγῶν καὶ τινων τῶν παρὰ σφίσιν Ἀθηναίων, πίστιν δίδοντες αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἄλλα μετ' αὐτῶν τοι-

αῦτα ξυνέπραξαν, τοῖς τε πλείοσιν ὥρμητο ἐπιτίθεσθαι.

I presume that the words ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ξυνέπραξαν, must mean that other persons were assassinated along with Hyperbolus.

The incorrect manner in which Mr. Mitford recounts these proceedings at Samos has been properly

generals most recently arrived from Athens in substitution for Phrynichus and Skironidês—men sincerely devoted to the democracy, and adverse to all oligarchical change—as well as to the trierarch Thrasyllus, to Thrasybulus (son of Lykus) then serving as a hoplite, and to many others of the pronounced democrats and patriots in the Athenian armament. They made appeal, not simply in behalf of their own personal safety and of their own democracy, now threatened by conspirators of whom a portion were Athenians—but also on grounds of public interest to Athens; since, if Samos became oligarchised, its sympathy with the Athenian democracy and its fidelity to the alliance would be at an end. At this moment the most recent events which had occurred at Athens (presently to be told) were not known, and the democracy was considered as still subsisting there.¹

To stand by the assailed democracy of Samos, and to preserve the island itself, now the mainstay of the shattered Athenian empire, were motives more than sufficient to awaken the Athenian leaders thus solicited. Commencing a personal canvass among the soldiers and seamen, and invoking their interference to avert the overthrow of the Samian democracy, they found the general sentiment decidedly in their favour, but most of all, among the Parali, or crew of the consecrated public trireme called the Paralus. These men were the picked seamen of the state; each of them not merely a freeman, but a full Athenian citizen; receiving higher pay than the ordinary seamen, and known as devoted to the democratical constitution, with an active repugnance to oligarchy itself as well as to every-thing which scented of it.² The vigilance of Leon and Diomedon

commented on by Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. ch. xxviii. vol. iv. p. 30). It is the more surprising, since the phrase *μετὰ Χαρμίνου*, which Mr. Mitford has misunderstood, is explained in a special note of Duker.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 73, 74. οὐκ ἤξιουν περιῦδσιν αὐτοὺς σφῶς τε διαφύλαξεν-
τας, καὶ Σάμον Ἀθηναίοις ἀλλοτριω-
θεῖσαν, &c.

.... οὐ γὰρ ἤδεσάν πω τοὺς τετρα-
κοσίους ἄρχοντας, &c.

² Thucyd. viii. 73. καὶ οὐχ ἥμισυ
τοὺς Πράξιλους, ἄνδρας Ἀθηναίους τε
καὶ ἐλευθέρους πάντας... ἐν τῇ νηϊ
πλέοντας, καὶ ἀεὶ δῆποτε ὁ λι-
γάρχιζα καὶ μὴ παρούσης ἐπι-
χειμενους.

Peitholaus called the Paralus
ῥόπαλον τοῦ δήμου—"the club, staff,
or mace of the people." (Aristotel.
Rhetoric. iii. 3).

on the defensive side counteracted the machinations of their colleague Charmînus, along with the conspirators; and provided, for the Samian democracy, faithful auxiliaries constantly ready for action. Presently the conspirators made a violent attack to overthrow the government; but though they chose their own moment and opportunity, they still found themselves thoroughly worsted in the struggle, especially through the energetic aid of the Parali. Thirty of their number were slain in the contest, and three of the most guilty afterwards condemned to banishment. The victorious party took no farther revenge, even upon the remainder of the three hundred conspirators—granted a general amnesty—and did their best to re-establish constitutional and harmonious working of the democracy.¹

Chæreas, an Athenian trierarch, who had been forward in the contest, was sent in the Paralus itself to Athens, to make communication of what had occurred. But this democratical crew, on reaching their native city, instead of being received with that welcome which they doubtless expected, found a state of things not less odious than surprising. The democracy of Athens had been subverted: instead of the Senate of Five Hundred, and the assembled people, an oligarchy of Four Hundred self-installed persons were enthroned with sovereign authority in the Senate House. The first order of the Four Hundred, on hearing that the Paralus had entered Peiræus, was to imprison two or three of the crew, and to remove all the rest from their own privileged trireme aboard a common trireme, with orders to depart forthwith and to cruise near Eubœa. The commander Chæreas found means to escape, and returned back to Samos to tell the unwelcome news.²

The Paralus is sent to Athens with the news.

The steps, whereby this oligarchy of Four Hundred had been gradually raised up to their new power, must be taken up from the time when Peisander quitted Athens,—after having obtained the vote of the public assembly authorising him to treat with Alkibiadês and Tissaphernês,—and after having set on foot a joint organisation and conspiracy of all the anti-popular clubs, which fell

Progress of the oligarchical conspiracy at Athens—dexterous management of Antiphon.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 73. Καὶ τριάκοντα μὲν τινας ἀπέκτειναν τῶν τριακσίων, τοῖς δὲ τοῖς αἰσιωτάτοις φυγῇ ἐξήμωσαν τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις οὐ μνησικα-

κούντες δημοκρατούμενοι τὸ λοιπὸν ἐναυτολίτευσαν.

² Thucyd. viii. 74.

under the management especially of Antiphon and Theramenês, afterwards aided by Phrynichus. All the members of that board of Elders called Probûli, who had been named after the defeat in Sicily—with Agnon, father of Theramenês, at their head¹—together with many other leading citizens, some of whom had been counted among the firmest friends of the democracy, joined the conspiracy; while the oligarchical and the neutral rich came into it with ardour; so that a body of partisans was formed both numerous and well provided with money. Antiphon did not attempt to bring them together, or to make any public demonstration, armed or unarmed, for the purpose of overawing actual authorities. He permitted the senate and the public assembly to go on meeting and debating as usual; but his partisans, neither the names nor the numbers of whom were publicly known, received from him instructions both when to speak and what language to hold. The great topic upon which they descanted, was the costliness of democratical institutions in the present distressed state of the finances, when tribute from the allies could no longer be reckoned upon—the heavy tax imposed upon the state by paying the Senators, the Dikasts, the Ekklesiasts or citizens who attended the public assembly, &c. The state could now afford to pay none but those soldiers who fought in its defence, nor ought any one else to touch the public money. It was essential (they insisted) to exclude from the political franchise all except a select body of Five Thousand, composed of those who were best able to do service to the city by person and by purse.

The extensive disfranchisement involved in this last proposition was quite sufficiently shocking to the ears of an Athenian assembly. But in reality the proposition was itself a juggle, never intended to become reality, and representing something far short of what Antiphon and his partisans intended. Their design was to appropriate the powers of government to themselves simply, without control or partnership; leaving this body of Five Thousand not merely unconvened, but non-existent, as a mere empty

Language
of the con-
spirators—
juggle
about
naming
Five
Thousand
citizens to
exercise the
political
franchise
exclusive-
ly.

¹ Thucyd., viii. 1. About the countenance which *all* these Probûli lent to the conspiracy, see

Aristotle, Rhetoric. iii. 18, 2.

Respecting the activity of Agnon, as one of the Probûli, in the same

name to impose upon the citizens generally. Of such real intention, however, not a word was as yet spoken. The projected body of Five Thousand was the theme preached upon by all the party orators; yet without submitting any substantive motion for the change, which could not be yet done without illegality.

Even thus indirectly advocated, the project of cutting down the franchise to Five Thousand, and of suppressing all the paid civil functions, was a change sufficiently violent to call forth abundant opponents. For such opponents Antiphon was fully prepared. Of the men who thus stood forward in opposition, either all, or at least all the most prominent, were successively taken off by private assassination. The first of them who thus perished was Androklês, distinguished as a demagogue or popular speaker, and marked out to vengeance not only by that circumstance, but by the farther fact that he had been among the most vehement accusers of Alkibiadês before his exile. For at this time, the breach of Peisander with Tissaphernês and Alkibiadês had not yet become known at Athens, so that the latter was still supposed to be on the point of returning home as a member of the contemplated oligarchical government. After Androklês, many other speakers of similar sentiments perished in the same way, by unknown hands. A band of Grecian youths, strangers got together from different cities,¹ was organised for the business: the victims were all chosen on the same special ground, and the deed was so skilfully perpetrated that neither director nor instrument ever became known. After these assassinations—sure, special, secret, and systematic, emanating from an unknown Directory like a Vehmlic tribunal—had continued for some time, the terror which they inspired became intense and universal. No justice could be had, no inquiry could be instituted, even for the

Assassination of the popular speakers by Antiphon and the oligarchical party.

cause, see Lysias, Orat. xii. cont. Eratosthen. c. 11. p. 426 Reisk. sect. 66.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 69. Οἱ εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν μετ' αὐτῶν (that is, along with the Four Hundred) Ἑλληνες νεανίσκοι, οἷς ἔχρωντο εἰ τι ποῦ δεοῖτο χειρουργεῖν.

Dr. Arnold explains the words

Ἑλληνες νεανίσκοι to mean some of the members of the aristocratical clubs or unions, formerly spoken of. But I cannot think that Thucydides would use such an expression to designate Athenian citizens: neither is it probable that Athenian citizens would be employed in repeated acts of such a character.

death of the nearest and dearest relative. At last, no man dared to demand or even to mention inquiry, looking upon himself as fortunate that he had escaped the same fate in his own person. So finished an organisation, and such well-aimed blows, raised a general belief that the conspirators were much more numerous than they were in reality. And as it turned out that there were persons among them who had before been accounted hearty democrats,¹ so at last dismay and mistrust became universally prevalent. No one dared even to express indignation at the murders going on, much less to talk about redress or revenge, for fear that he might be communicating with one of the unknown conspirators. In the midst of this terrorism, all opposition ceased in the senate and public assembly, so that the speakers of the conspiring oligarchy appeared to carry an unanimous assent.²

Such was the condition to which things had been brought in Athens, by Antiphon and the oligarchical conspirators acting under his direction, at the time when Peisander and the five envoys arrived thither returning from Samos. It is probable that they had previously transmitted home from Samos news of the rupture with Alkibiadês, and of the necessity of prose-

Return of
Peisander
to Athens—
oligarchi-
cal govern-
ment estab-
lished in
several of
the allied
cities.

¹ Even Peisander himself had professed the strongest attachment to the democracy, coupled with exaggerated violence against parties suspected of oligarchical plots—four years before, in the investigations which followed on the mutilation of the Hermæ at Athens (Andokidês de *Myster.* c. 9, 10. sect. 36-43).

It is a fact that Peisander was one of the prominent movers on both these two occasions, four years apart. And if we could believe Isokratês (de *Bigis*, sect. 4-7. p. 347), the second of the two occasions was merely the continuance and consummation of a plot, which had been projected and begun on the first, and in which the conspirators had endeavoured to enlist Alkibiadês. The latter refused (so his son, the speaker in the above-mentioned oration, contends) in

consequence of his attachment to the democracy; upon which the oligarchical conspirators, incensed at his refusal, got up the charge of irreligion against him and procured his banishment.

Though Droysen and Wattenbach (*De Quadringentorum Athenis Factione*, p. 7, 8, Berlin 1842) place confidence to a considerable extent, in this manner of putting the facts—I consider it to be nothing better than complete perversion; irreconcilable with Thucydidês, confounding together facts unconnected in themselves as well as separated by a long interval of time and introducing unreal causes—for the purpose of making out (what was certainly not true) that Alkibiadês was a faithful friend of the democracy, and even a sufferer in its behalf.

² Thucyd. viii. 66.

cuting the conspiracy without farther view either to him or to the Persian alliance. Such news would probably be acceptable both to Antiphon and Phrynichus, both of them personal enemies of Alkibiadês; especially Phrynichus, who had pronounced him to be incapable of fraternising with an oligarchical revolution.¹ At any rate, the plans of Antiphon had been independent of all view to Persian aid, and had been directed to carry the revolution by means of naked, exorbitant, and well-directed fear, without any intermixture of hope or any prospect of public benefit. Peisander found the reign of terror fully matured. He had not come direct from Samos to Athens, but had halted in his voyage at various allied dependencies—while the other five envoys, as well as a partisan named Diotrophês, had been sent to Thasos and elsewhere;² all for the same purpose, of putting down democracies in those allied cities where they existed, and establishing oligarchies in their room. Peisander made this change at Tênos, Andros, Karystus, Ægina, and elsewhere; collecting from these several places a regiment of 300 hoplites, which he brought with him to Athens as a sort of body-guard to his new oligarchy.³ He could not know, until he reached Peiræus, the full success of the terrorism organised by Antiphon and the rest; so that he probably came prepared to surmount a greater resistance than he actually found. As the facts stood, so completely had the public opinion and spirit been subdued, that he was enabled to put the finishing stroke at once. His arrival was the signal for consummating the revolution; first by an extorted suspension of the tutelary constitutional sanction—next, by the more direct employment of armed force.

First, he convoked a public assembly, in which he proposed a decree, naming ten commissioners with full

¹ Thucyd. viii. 68. νομίζων οὐκ ἂν ποτε αὐτὸν (Alkibiadês) κατὰ τὸ εἶκος ὅτι ὀλιγαρχίαν καταλθεῖν, &c.

² Thucyd. viii. 64.

³ Thucyd. viii. 65. Οἱ δὲ ἄμφω τὸν Πεισανδρὸν παραπλέοντες τε, ὡς περ ἐδεδοκτο, τοὺς δῆμονους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν κατέλυον, καὶ ἅμα ἔστιν ἀπ' ὧν χωρίων καὶ ὁπίστας ἔχοντας πρὶν αὐτοῖς ἐμμελῆσαι

ἦλθον ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας. Καὶ καταλαμβάνουσι τὰ πλείστα τοῖς ἐταίροις προερχομένοις.

We may gather from c. 69 that the places which I have named in the text were among those visited by Peisander: all of them lay very much in his way from Samos to Athens.

powers, to prepare propositions for such political reform as they should think advisable—and to be ready by a given day.¹ According to the usual practice, this decree must previously have been approved in the Senate of Five Hundred, before it was submitted to the people. Such was doubtless the case in the present instance, so that the decree passed without any opposition. On the day fixed, a fresh assembly met, which Peisander and his partisans caused to be held, not in the usual place (called the Pnyx) within the city walls, but at a place called Kolônus, ten stadia (rather more than a mile) without the walls,² north of the city. Kolônus was a temple of Poseidon, within the precinct of which the assembly was enclosed for the occasion. Such an assembly was not likely to be numerous, wherever held,³ since there could be little motive

¹ Thucyd. viii. 67. Καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὸν δῆμον συλλέξαντες εἶπον γνῶμην, δέκα ἄνδρας ἐλέσθαι συγγραφάς αὐτοκράτορας, τούτους δὲ συγγράψαντας γνῶμην ἐσενεγκεῖν ἐς τὸν δῆμον ἐς ἡμέραν ῥητὴν, καθ' ὅτι ἀρίστα ἢ πόλις οἰκίσεται.

In spite of certain passages found in Suidas and Harpokration (see K. F. Hermann, *Lehrbuch der Griechischen Staats-Alterthümer*, sect. 167, note 12: compare also Wattenbach, *De Quadringentor. Factione*, p. 38), I cannot think that there was any connexion between these ten συγγραφεῖς, and the Board of πρόβουλοι mentioned as having been before named (Thucyd. viii. 1). Nor has the passage in Lysias, to which Hermann makes allusion, anything to do with these συγγραφεῖς. The mention of Thirty persons, by Androtion and Philochorus, seems to imply that either they, or Harpokration, confounded the proceedings ushering in this oligarchy of Four Hundred, with those before the subsequent oligarchy of Thirty. The σύνεδροι or συγγραφεῖς mentioned by Isokratēs (*Areopagit. Or.* vii. sect. 67) might refer either to the case of the Four Hundred or

to that of the Thirty.

² Thucyd. viii. 67. Ἐπειτα, ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἡμέρα ἐφῆκε, συνέκλησαν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἐς τὸν Κόλωνον (ἐστὶ δ' ἱερὸν Ποσειδῶνος ἔξω πόλεως, ἀπέχον σταδίους μάλιστα δέκα), &c.

The very remarkable word συνέκλησαν, here used respecting the assembly, appears to me to refer (not, as Dr. Arnold supposes in his note, to any existing practice observed even in the usual assemblies which met in the Pnyx, but rather) to a departure from the usual practice, and the employment of a stratagem in reference to this particular meeting.

Kolônus was one of the Attic Demes: indeed there seems reason to imagine that two distinct Demes bore this same name (see Boeckh, in the *Commentary* appended to his translation of the *Antigonê* of Sophoklēs, p. 190, 191; and Ross, *Die Demen von Attika*, pp. 10, 11). It is in the grove of the Eumenides, hard by this temple of Poseidon, that Sophoklēs has laid the scene of his immortal drama, the *Cedipus Koloneus*.

³ Compare the statement in Lysias (*Orat. xii. cont. Eratosth.* s. 76, p.

to attend when freedom of debate was extinguished; but the oligarchical conspirators now transferred it without the walls; selecting a narrow area for the meeting—in order that they might lessen still farther the chance of numerous attendance—of an assembly which they fully designed should be the last in the history of Athens. They were thus also more out of the reach of an armed movement in the city, as well as enabled to post their own armed partisans around, under colour of protecting the meeting against disturbance by the Lacedæmonians from Dekeleia.

The proposition of the newly-appointed Decemvirs (probably Peisander, Antiphon, and other partisans themselves) was exceedingly short and simple. They merely moved the abolition of the celebrated Graphê Paranomôn; that is, they proposed that every Athenian citizen should have full liberty of making any anti-constitutional proposition that he chose—and that every other citizen should be interdicted, under heavy penalties, from prosecuting him by Graphê Paranomôn (indictment on the score of informality, illegality, or unconstitutionality), or from doing him any other mischief. This proposition was adopted without a single dissentient. It was thought more formal by the directing chiefs to sever this proposition pointedly from the rest, and to put it, singly and apart, into the mouth of the special commissioners; since it was the legalizing condition of every other positive change which they were about to move afterwards. Full liberty being thus granted to make any motion, however anti-constitutional, and to dispense with all the established formalities, such as preliminary authorisation by the senate—Peisander now came forward with his substantive propositions to the following effect:—

Abolition
of the
Graphê
Paranomôn.

1. All the existing democratical magistracies were suppressed at once, and made to cease for the future. 2. No civil functions whatever were hereafter to be salaried. 3. To constitute a new government, a committee of five persons were named forthwith, who were to choose a larger body of one hundred (that is, one hundred in-

New go-
vernment
proposed by
Peisander—
oligarchy
of Four
Hundred.

127) respecting the small numbers assembly by which the subsequent who attended and voted at the oligarchy of Thirty was named.

cluding the five choosers themselves). Each individual, out of this body of one hundred, was to choose three persons. 4. A body of Four Hundred was thus constituted, who were to take their seat in the Senate-house, and to carry on the government with unlimited powers, according to their own discretion. 5. They were to convene the Five Thousand, whenever they might think fit.¹ All was passed without a dissentient voice.

The invention and employment of this imaginary aggregate of Five Thousand was not the least dexterous among the combinations of Antiphon. No one knew who these Five Thousand were: yet the resolution, just adopted, purported—not that such a number of citizens should be singled out and constituted, either by choice, or by lot, or in some determinate manner which should exhibit them to the view and knowledge of others—but that the Four Hundred should convene *The Five Thousand*, whenever they thought proper: thus assuming the latter to be a list already made up and notorious, at least to the Four Hundred themselves. The real fact was that the Five Thousand existed nowhere except in the talk and proclamations of the conspirators, as a supplement of fictitious auxiliaries. They did not even exist as individual names on paper, but simply as an imposturous nominal aggregate. The Four Hundred now installed formed the entire and exclusive rulers of the state.² But the mere name of the Five Thousand, though it was nothing more than a name, served two important purposes for Antiphon and his conspiracy. First, it admitted of being falsely produced (especially to the armament at Samos) as proof of a tolerably numerous and popular body of equal, qualified, concurrent citizens—all intended to take their turn by rotation in exercising the powers of government; thus lightening the odium of extreme usurpation to the Four Hundred, and passing them off merely as the earliest section of the Five Thousand, put into office for a few months, and destined at the end of that period to give place to another equal

¹ Thucyd. viii. 68. Ἐλθόντας δὲ αὐτοὺς τετρακοσίους ὄντας ἐς τὸ βουλευτήριον, ἄρχειν ἑπὶ αὐτοὺς ἄριστα γινώσκουσιν, αὐτοκράτορας, καὶ τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους δὲ ζυγλᾶν, ὅποτε αὐτοῖς δοχῇ.

² Thucyd. viii. 66. ἦν δὲ τοῦτο εὐπρεπὲς πρὸς τοὺς πλείους, ἐπεὶ ἔδειν γε τὴν πόλιν οἷον καὶ μεθιστάναι ἑμελλον.

Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 26.

section.¹ Next, it immensely augmented the means of intimidation possessed by the Four Hundred at home, by exaggerating the impression of their supposed strength. For the citizens generally were made to believe that there were five thousand real and living partners in the conspiracy; while the fact that these partners were not known and could not be individually identified, rather aggravated the reigning terror and mistrust—since every man, suspecting that his neighbour might possibly be among them, was afraid to communicate his discontent or propose means for joint resistance.² In both these two ways, the name and assumed existence of the Five Thousand lent strength to the real Four Hundred conspirators. It masked their usurpation while it increased their hold on the respect and fears of the citizens.

As soon as the public assembly at Kolônus had with such seeming unanimity accepted all the propositions of Peisander, they were dismissed; and the new regiment of Four Hundred were chosen and constituted in the form prescribed. It now only remained to install them in the Senate-house. But this could not be done without force, since the senators were already within it; having doubtless gone thither immediately from the assembly, where their presence (at least the presence of

The Four Hundred install themselves in the senate-house, expelling the senators by armed force.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 72. Πέμπουσι δὲ ἐς τὴν Σάμον δέκα ἄνδρας. . . . διδάζοντες—πεντακισχιλίοι δὲ ὅτι εἶεν, καὶ οὐ τετρακόσιοι μόνον, οἱ πρᾶσσοντες.

viii. 86. Οἱ δ' ἀπήγγελλον ὡς οὕτως ἐπὶ διαφθορᾷ τῆς πόλεως ἢ μετὰ στάσις γένοιτο, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ. . . . τῶν δὲ πεντακισχιλίων ὅτι πάντες ἐν τῷ μέρει μεθέξουσιν, &c.

viii. 89. ἀλλὰ τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους ἔργῳ καὶ τῇ ὀνόματι χρῆναι ἀποδεικνύουσι, καὶ τὴν πολιτείαν ἰσχυτέρην καθιστάναι.

viii. 92. (After the Four Hundred had already been much opposed and humbled, and were on the point of being put down)—τὴν δὲ πρὸς τὸν ὄχλον ἢ παράκλησις ὡς χρῆν, ὅστις τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους βούλεται ἄρχειν ἀντὶ τῶν τετρακο-

σίων, εἶναι ἐπὶ τὸ ἔργον. Ἐπεκρύνοντο γὰρ ὁμῶς ἐπὶ τῶν πεντακισχιλίων τῷ ὀνόματι, μὴ ἀντικρυς δῆμον ὅστις βούλεται ἄρχειν ὀνομάζειν—φοβούμενοι μὴ τῷ ὄντι ὦσι, καὶ πρὸς τινὰ εἰπὼν τίς τι δι' ἄγνοίαν σφαλῇ. Καὶ οἱ τετρακόσιοι διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ᾔθελον τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους οὕτως εἶναι, οὕτως μὴ ὄντας δῆλους εἶναι—τὸ μὲν καταστῆσαι μετόχους, τοσοῦτους, ἀντικρυς ὅν δῆμον ἡγοῦμενοι, τὸ δ' αὖ ἀφανὲς φόβον ἐς ἀλλήλους παρῆξιν.

viii. 93. λέγοντες τοὺς τε πεντακισχιλίους ἀποφανεῖν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐν μέρει, ἢ ἂν τοὺς τετρακισχιλίους δοκῇ, τοὺς τετρακοσίους ἔσεσθαι, τῶς δὲ τὴν πόλιν μηδενὶ τρόπῳ δυσφείρειν, &c.

Compare also c. 97.

² Compare the striking passage

the Prytanes, or Senators of the presiding tribe) was essential as legal presidents. They had to deliberate what they would do under the decree just passed, which divested them of all authority. It was even possible that they might organise armed resistance; for which there seemed more than usual facility at the present moment, since the occupation of Dekeleia by the Lacedæmonians kept Athens in a condition like that of a permanent camp, with a large proportion of the citizens day and night under arms.¹ Against this chance the Four Hundred made provision. They selected that hour of the day when the greater number of citizens habitually went home (probably to their morning meal), leaving the military station, with the arms piled and ready, under comparatively thin watch. While the general body of hoplites left the station at this hour according to the usual practice, the hoplites (Andrian, Tenian and others) in the immediate confidence of the Four Hundred were directed by private order to hold themselves prepared and in arms at a little distance off; so that if any symptoms should appear of resistance being contemplated, they might at once interfere and forestall it. Having taken this precaution, the Four Hundred marched in a body to the Senate-house, each man with a dagger concealed under his garment, and followed by their special body-guard of 120 young men from various Grecian cities—the instruments of the assassinations ordered by Antiphon and his colleagues. In this array they marched into the Senate-house, where the senators were assembled—and commanded them to depart; at the same time tendering to them their pay for all the remainder of the year (seemingly about three months or more down to the beginning of Hekatombæon, the month of new nominations) during which their functions ought to have continued. The senators were noway prepared to resist the decree just passed under the forms of legality, with an armed body now arrived to enforce its execution. They obeyed and departed, each man as he passed the door receiving the salary tendered to him. That

(Thucyd. viii. 92) cited in my previous note.

¹ See the jests of Aristophanês, about the citizens all in armour buying their provision in the market-place and carrying them

home—in the *Lysistrata* 560; a comedy represented about December 412 or January 411 B.C., three months earlier than the events here narrated.

they should yield obedience to superior force under the circumstances, can excite neither censure nor surprise; but that they should accept from the hands of the conspirators this anticipation of an unearned salary, was a meanness which almost branded them as accomplices, and dishonoured the expiring hour of the last democratical authority. The Four Hundred now found themselves triumphantly installed in the Senate-house. There was not the least resistance, either within its walls, or even without, by any portion of the citizens.¹

Thus perished, or seemed to perish, the democracy of Athens, after an uninterrupted existence of nearly one hundred years since the revolution of Kleisthenês. So incredible did it appear Remarks on this revolution. that the numerous, intelligent, and constitutional citizens of Athens should suffer their liberties to be overthrown by a band of four hundred conspirators, while the great mass of them not only loved their democracy, but had arms in their hands to defend it—that even their enemy and neighbour Agis at Dekeleia could hardly imagine the revolution to be a fact accomplished. We shall see presently that it did not stand—nor would it probably have stood, had circumstances even been more favourable—but the accomplishment of it at all, is an incident too extraordinary to be passed over without some words in explanation.

We must remark that the tremendous catastrophe and loss of blood in Sicily had abated the energy of the Athenian character generally—but especially, had made them despair of their foreign relations; of the possibility that they could make head against enemies, increased in number by revolts among their own allies, and farther sustained by Persian gold. Upon this sentiment of despair is brought to bear the treacherous delusion of Alkibiadês, offering them the Persian aid; that is, means of defence and success against foreign enemies, at the price of their democracy. Reluctantly the people are brought, but they *are* brought, to entertain the proposition: and thus the conspirators gain their first capital point—of familiarising the people with the idea of such a change of constitution. The ulterior success of the conspiracy—when all prospect of Persian gold, or improved foreign position, was at an end—is due to the combinations, alike nefarious and skilful, of Antiphon,

¹ Thucyd. viii. 69, 70.

wielding and organising the united strength of the aristocratical classes at Athens; strength always exceedingly great, but under ordinary circumstances working in fractions disunited and even reciprocally hostile to each other—restrained by the ascendent democratical institutions—and reduced to corrupt what it could not overthrow. Antiphon, about to employ this anti-popular force in one systematic scheme and for the accomplishment of a predetermined purpose, keeps still within the same ostensible constitutional limits. He raises no open mutiny: he maintains inviolate the cardinal point of Athenian political morality—respect to the decision of the senate and political assembly, as well as to constitutional maxims. But he knows well that the value of these meetings, as political securities, depends upon entire freedom of speech; and that if that freedom be suppressed, the assembly itself becomes a nullity—or rather an instrument of positive imposture and mischief. Accordingly he causes all the popular orators to be successively assassinated, so that no man dares to open his mouth on that side; while on the other hand, the anti-popular speakers are all loud and confident, cheering one another on, and seeming to represent all the feeling of the persons present. By thus silencing each individual leader, and intimidating every opponent from standing forward as spokesman, he extorts the formal sanction of the assembly and the senate to measures which the large majority of the citizens detest. That majority however are bound by their own constitutional forms: and when the decision of these, by whatever means obtained, is against them, they have neither the inclination nor the courage to resist. In no part of the world has this sentiment of constitutional duty, and submission to the vote of a legal majority, been more keenly and universally felt, than it was among the citizens of democratical Athens.¹ Antiphon thus finds means to employ the constitutional sentiment of Athens as a means of killing the constitution: the mere empty form, after its vital and protective efficacy has been abstracted, remains simply as a cheat to paralyse individual patriotism.

¹ This striking and deep-seated regard of the Athenians for all the forms of an established constitu-

tion, makes itself felt even by Mr. Mitford (*Hist. Gr. ch. xix. sect. v. vol. iv. p. 235*).

It was this cheat which rendered the Athenians indisposed to stand forward with arms in defence of that democracy to which they were attached. Accustomed as they were to unlimited pacific contention within the bounds of their constitution, they were in the highest degree averse to anything like armed intestine contention. This is the natural effect of an established free and equal polity—to substitute the contests of the tongue for those of the sword, and sometimes, even to create so extreme a disinclination to the latter, that if liberty be energetically assailed, the counter-energy necessary for its defence may probably be found wanting. So difficult is it for the same people to have both the qualities requisite for making a free constitution work well in ordinary times, together with those very different qualities requisite for upholding it against exceptional dangers and under trying emergencies. None but an Athenian of extraordinary ability like Antiphon would have understood the art of thus making the constitutional feeling of his countrymen subservient to the success of his conspiracy—and of maintaining the forms of legal dealing towards assembled and constitutional bodies, while he violated them in secret and successive stabs directed against individuals. Political assassination had been unknown at Athens (as far as our information reaches), since the time when it was employed about fifty years before by the oligarchical party against Ephialtês, the coadjutor of Periklês.¹ But this had been an individual case, and it was reserved for Antiphon and Phrynichus to organise a band of assassins working systematically, and taking off a series of leading victims one after the other. As the Macedonian kings in after-times required the surrender of the popular orators in a body, so the authors of this conspiracy found the same enemies to deal with, and adopted another way of getting rid of them; thus reducing the assembly into a tame and lifeless mass, capable of being intimidated into giving its collective sanction to measures which its large majority detested.

Attachment to constitutional forms at Athens—use made of this sentiment by Antiphon, to destroy the constitution.

¹ See Plutarch, Periklês, c. 10; Diodor. vi. 77; and chap. xlvii. of this History.

As Grecian history has been usually written, we are instructed to believe that the misfortunes, and the corruption, and the degradation, of the democratical states, were brought upon them by the class of demagogues, of whom Kleon, Hyperbolus, Androklês, &c. stand forth as specimens. These men are represented as mischief-makers and revilers, accusing without just cause, and converting innocence into treason.

Now the history of this conspiracy of the Four Hundred presents to us the other side of the picture. It shows that the political enemies—against whom the Athenian people were protected by their democratical institutions, and by the demagogues as living organs of those institutions—were not fictitious but dangerously real. It reveals the continued existence of powerful anti-popular combinations, ready to come together for treasonable purposes when the moment appeared safe and tempting. It manifests the character and morality of the leaders, to whom the direction of the anti-popular force naturally fell. It proves that these leaders, men of uncommon ability, required nothing more than the extinction or silence of the demagogues, to be enabled to subvert the popular securities, and get possession of the government. We need no better proof to teach us what was the real function and intrinsic necessity of these demagogues in the Athenian system; taking them as a class, and apart from the manner in which individuals among them may have performed their duty. They formed the vital movement of all that was tutelary and public-spirited in democracy. Aggressive in respect to official delinquents, they were defensive in respect to the public and the constitution. If that anti-popular force, which Antiphon found ready-made, had not been efficient, at a much earlier moment, in stifling the democracy—it was because there were demagogues to cry aloud, as well as assemblies to hear and sustain them. If Antiphon's conspiracy was successful, it was because he knew where to aim his blows, so as to strike down the real enemies of the oligarchy and the real defenders of the people. I here employ the term demagogues because it is that commonly used by those who denounce the class of men here under review: the proper neutral phrase, laying aside odious associations would be to call them, popular

speakers or opposition speakers. But by whatever name they may be called, it is impossible rightly to conceive their position in Athens, without looking at them in contrast and antithesis with those anti-popular forces against which they formed the indispensable barrier, and which come forth into such manifest and melancholy working under the organising hands of Antiphon and Phrynichus.

As soon as the Four Hundred found themselves formally installed in the Senate-house, they divided themselves by lot into separate Prytanies (probably ten in number, consisting of forty members each, like the former Senate of Five Hundred, in order that the distribution of the year to which the people were accustomed might not be disturbed), and then solemnized their installation by prayer and sacrifice. They put to death some political enemies, though not many: they farther imprisoned and banished others, and made large changes in the administration of affairs; carrying everything with a strictness and rigour unknown under the old constitution.¹ It seems to have been proposed among them to pass a vote of restoration to all persons under sentence of exile. But this was rejected by the majority, in order that Alkibiadēs might not be among the number; nor did they think it expedient, notwithstanding, to pass the law, reserving him as a special exception.

Proceed-
ings of the
Four
Hundred in
the govern-
ment.

They farther despatched a messenger to Agis at Dekeleia, intimating their wish to treat for peace; which (they affirmed) he ought to be ready to grant to them, now that "the faithless Demos" was put down. Agis however, not believing that the Athenian people would thus submit to be deprived of their liberty, anticipated that intestine dissension would certainly break out, or at least that some portion of the Long Walls would be found unguarded, should a foreign army appear. While therefore he declined the overtures for peace, he at the same time sent for reinforcements out of Peloponnesus, and marched with a considerable army, in addition to his own garrison, up to the very walls of Athens. But he found the ramparts carefully manned: no commotion took place within: even

They make
overtures
for peace to
Agis, and
to the
Spartans.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 70. I imagine that this must be the meaning of the words—τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἐνεμεν κατὰ κράτος τῇ πόλει.

a sally was made in which some advantage was gained over him. He therefore speedily retired, sending back his newly-arrived reinforcements to Peloponnesus; while the Four Hundred, on renewing their advances to him for peace, now found themselves much better received, and were even encouraged to despatch envoys to Sparta itself.¹

As soon as they had thus got over the first difficulties, and placed matters on a footing which seemed to promise stability, they despatched ten envoys to Samos. Aware beforehand of the danger impending over them in that quarter from the known aversion of the soldiers and seamen to anything in the nature of oligarchy, they had moreover just heard, by the arrival of Chæreas and the Paralus, of the joint attack made by the Athenian and Samian oligarchs, and of its complete failure. Had this event occurred a little earlier, it might perhaps have deterred even some of their own number from proceeding with the revolution at Athens—which was rendered thereby almost sure of failure, from the first. Their ten envoys were instructed to represent at Samos that the recent oligarchy had been established with no views injurious to the city, but on the contrary for the general benefit; that though the Council now installed consisted of Four Hundred only, yet the total number of partisans who had made the revolution and were qualified citizens under it, was Five Thousand; a number greater (they added) than had ever been actually assembled in the Pnyx under the democracy, even for the most important debates,² in consequence of the unavoidable absences of numerous individuals on military service and foreign travel.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 71.

² Thucyd. viii. 72. This allegation, respecting the number of citizens who attended in the Athenian democratical assemblies, has been sometimes cited as if it carried with it the authority of Thucydides; which is a great mistake, duly pointed out by all the best recent critics. It is simply the allegation of the Four Hundred, whose testimony, as a guarantee for truth, is worth little enough.

That no assembly had ever been

attended by so many as 5000 (οὐδέπω ποτε) I certainly am far from believing. It is not improbable, however, that 5000 was an unusually large number of citizens to attend. Dr. Arnold, in his note, opposes the allegation, in part, by remarking that "the law required not only the presence but the sanction of at least 6000 citizens to some particular decrees of the assembly." It seems to me however quite possible, that in cases where this large number of votes was required, as

What satisfaction might have been given, by this allusion to the fictitious Five Thousand, or by the fallacious reference to the numbers, real or pretended, of the past democratical assemblies—had these envoys carried to Samos the first tidings of the Athenian revolution—we cannot say. They were forestalled by Chæreas the officer of the *Paralus*; who, though the Four Hundred tried to detain him, made his escape and hastened to Samos to communicate the fearful and unexpected change which had occurred at Athens. Instead of hearing that change described under the treacherous extenuations prescribed by Antiphon and Phrynichus, the armament first learnt it from the lips of Chæreas, who told them at once the extreme truth—and even more than the truth. He recounted with indignation that every Athenian, who ventured to say a word against the Four Hundred rulers of the city, was punished with the scourge—that even the wives and children of persons hostile to them were outraged—that there was a design of seizing and imprisoning the relatives of the democrats at Samos, and putting them to death if the latter refused to obey orders from Athens. The simple narrative, of what had really occurred, would have been quite sufficient to provoke in the armament a sentiment of detestation against the Four Hundred. But these additional details of Chæreas, partly untrue, filled them with uncontrollable wrath, which they manifested by open menace against the known partisans of the Four Hundred at Samos, as well as against those who had taken part in the recent oligarchical conspiracy in the island. It was not without difficulty that their hands were arrested by the more reflecting citizens present, who remonstrated against the madness of such disorderly proceedings when the enemy was close upon them.

First news of the revolution is conveyed to the camp by Chæreas—strong sentiment in the camp against the Four Hundred.

But though violence and aggressive insult were thus seasonably checked, the sentiment of the armament was too ardent and unanimous to be satisfied without some

in the ostracism, and where there was no discussion carried on immediately before the voting the process of voting may have lasted some hours, like our keeping open

of a poll. So that though more than 6000 citizens must have *voted* altogether—it was not necessary that all should have been present in the same assembly.

solemn, emphatic, and decisive declaration against the oligarchs at Athens. A great democratical manifestation, of the most earnest and imposing character, was proclaimed, chiefly at the instance of Thrasybulus and Thrasylus. The Athenian armament, brought together in one grand assembly, took an oath by the most stringent sanctions—To maintain their democracy—To keep up friendship and harmony with each other—To carry on the war against the Peloponnesians with energy—To be at enmity with the Four Hundred at Athens, and to enter into no amicable communication with them whatever. The whole armament swore to this compact with enthusiasm, and even those who had before taken part in the oligarchical movements were forced to be forward in the ceremony.¹ What lent double force to this touching scene, was, that the entire Samian population, every male of the military age, took the oath along with the friendly armament. Both pledged themselves to mutual fidelity and common suffering or triumph, whatever might be the issue of the contest. Both felt that the Peloponnesians at Milêtus, and the Four Hundred at Athens, were alike their enemies, and that the success of either would be their common ruin.

Pursuant to this resolution—of upholding their democracy and at the same time sustaining the war against the Peloponnesians, at all cost or peril to themselves—the soldiers of the armament now took a step unparalleled in Athenian history. Feeling that they could no longer receive orders from Athens under her present oligarchical rulers, with whom Charmînus and others among their own leaders were implicated, they constituted themselves into a sort of com-

¹ Thueyd. viii. 75. Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο, λαμπρῶς ἤδη ἐς δημοκρατίαν βουλόμενοι μεταστῆται τὰ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ ὅτε Θρασύβουλος καὶ Θράσυλλος ὤρκωσαν πάντας τοὺς στρατιώτας τοὺς μεγιστοὺς ὄρκους, καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας μάλιστα, ἥ μὴν δημοκρατήσεσθαι καὶ ὁμονήσειν, καὶ τὸν πρὸς Πελοποννησίου πόλεμον προθύμως διοίσειν, καὶ τοῖς τετρακοσίοις πολέμιοι τε ἔσεσθαι καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπικη-

ρυκεῖσθαι. Συνώμωσαν δὲ καὶ Σαμίων πάντες τὸν αὐτὸν ὄρκον οἱ ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ, καὶ τὰ πράγματα πάντα καὶ τὰ ἀποβηρόμενα ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων συνεκοινώσαντο οἱ στρατιῶται τοῖς Σαμίοις, νομίζοντες οὔτε ἐκείνοις ἀποστροφὴν σωτηρίας οὔτε σφίσι εἶναι, ἀλλ' εἴαν τε οἱ τετρακοσίοι κρατήρῳσιν εἴαν τε οἱ ἐκ Μιλήτου πολέμιοι, διαφθάρῃεσθαι.

munity apart, and held an assembly as citizens to choose anew their generals and trierarchs. Of those already in command, several were deposed as unworthy of trust; others being elected in their places, especially Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus. The assembly was not held for election alone. It was a scene of effusive sympathy, animating eloquence, and patriotism generous as well as resolute. The united armament felt that *they* were the real Athens; the guardians of her constitution—the upholders of her remaining empire and glory—the protectors of her citizens at home against those conspirators who had intruded themselves wrongfully into the Senate-house—the sole barrier, even for those conspirators themselves, against the hostile Peloponnesian fleet. “*The city has revolted from us*” (exclaimed Thrasybulus and others in pregnant words which embodied a whole train of feeling¹). “But let not this abate our courage: for they are only the lesser force—we are the greater and the self-sufficing. We have here the whole navy of the state, whereby we can ensure to ourselves the contributions from our dependencies just as well as if we started from Athens. We have the hearty attachment of Samos, second in power only to Athens herself, and serving us as a military station against the enemy, now as in the past. We are better able to obtain supplies for ourselves, than those in the city for themselves; for it is only through our presence at Samos that they have hitherto kept the mouth of Peiræus open. If they refuse to restore to us our democratical constitution, we shall be better able to exclude them from the sea than they to exclude us. What indeed does the city do now for us to second our efforts against the enemy? Little or nothing. We have lost nothing by their separation. They send us no pay—they leave us to provide maintenance for ourselves—they are now out of condition for sending us even good counsel, which is the great superiority of a city over a camp.² As counsellors, we here are better than

¹ Thucyd. viii. 76. Καὶ παραinéσεις ἄλλας τε ἐποιοῦντο ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἀνιστάμενοι, καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ ἀθυμεῖν ὅτι ἡ πόλις αὐτῶν ἀφέστηκε· τοὺς γὰρ ἐλάσσους ἀπὸ σφῶν τῶν πλεόνων καὶ ἐς πάντα ποριμωτέρων μεθεστάναι.

² Thucyd. viii. 76. Βραχὺ δέ τι εἶναι καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξιον, ὃ πρὸς τὸ

περιγίγνεσθαι τῶν πολέμιων ἡ πόλις χρήσιμος ἦν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἀπολωλεῖναι, οἳ γε μήτε ἀργύριον ἔτι εἶχον πέμπειν, ἀλλ’ αὐτοὶ ἐπορίζοντο οἱ στρατιῶται, μήτε βούλευμα χρηστὸν, οὐπὲρ ἔνεκα πόλις στρατοπέδων κρατεῖ· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τούτοις τοὺς μὲν ἡμαρτηκέναι, τοὺς πατέρους νόμους καταλύσαντας, αὐτοὶ δὲ σώζειν καὶ ἐκείνους πευρά-

they; for they have just committed the wrong of subverting the constitution of our common country—while we are striving to maintain it, and will do our best to force them into the same track. Alkibiadês, if we ensure to him a safe restoration, will cheerfully bring the alliance of Persia to sustain us; and even if the worst comes to the worst—if all other hopes fail us—our powerful naval force will always enable us to find places of refuge in abundance, with city and territory adequate to our wants.”

Such was the encouraging language of Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus, which found full sympathy in the armament, and raised among them a spirit of energetic patriotism and resolution, not unworthy of their forefathers when refugees at Salamis under the invasion of Xerxes. To regain their democracy and to sustain the war against the Peloponnesians, were impulses alike ardent and blended in the same tide of generous enthusiasm; a tide so vehement as to sweep before it the reluctance of that minority who had before been inclined to the oligarchical movement. But besides these two impulses, there was also a third, tending towards the recall of Alkibiadês; a coadjutor, if in many ways useful, yet bringing with him a spirit of selfishness and duplicity uncongenial to the exalted sentiment now all-powerful at Samos.¹

This exile had been the first to originate the oligarchical conspiracy, whereby Athens, already scarcely adequate to the exigences of her foreign war, was now paralysed in courage and torn by civil discord—preserved from absolute ruin only by that counter-enthusiasm which a fortunate turn of circumstances had raised up at Samos. Having

Alkibiadês
opens correspond-
ence with
the demo-
cratical
armament
at Samos.

σεσθαι προσαναγκάζειν. Ὅστε οὐδὲ τούτους, οἵπερ ἂν βουλευοίεν τι χρηστόν, παρὰ σφίσι χείρους εἶναι.

¹ The application of the Athenians at Samos to Alkibiadês, reminds us of the emphatic language in which Tacitus characterises an incident in some respects similar. The Roman army, fighting in the cause of Vitellius against Vespasian, had been betrayed by their general Cæcina, who endeavoured to carry them over to the latter: his army however refused to follow

him, adhered to their own cause, and put him under arrest. Being afterwards defeated by the troops of Vespasian, and obliged to capitulate in Cremona, they released Cæcina, and solicited his intercession to obtain favourable terms. “Primores castrorum nomen atque imagines Vitellii amoliuntur; catenas Cæcinæ (nam etiam tum vinctus erat) exsolvunt, orantque, ut causæ suæ deprecator adsistat: aspernantem tumentemque lacrymis fatigant. *Extremum malorum,*

at first duped the conspirators themselves and enabled them to dupe the sincere democrats, by promising Persian aid, and thus floating the plot over its first and greatest difficulties—Alkibiadês had found himself constrained to break with them as soon as the time came for realising his promises. But he had broken off with so much address as still to keep up the illusion that he *could* realise them if he chose. His return by means of the oligarchy being now impossible, he naturally became its enemy, and this new antipathy superseded his feeling of revenge against the democracy for having banished him. In fact he was disposed (as Phrynichus had truly said about him)¹ to avail himself indifferently of either, according as the one or the other presented itself as a serviceable agency for his ambitious views. Accordingly, as soon as the turn of affairs at Samos had made itself manifest, he opened communication with Thrasybulus and the democratical leaders,² renewing to them the same promises of Persian alliance, on condition of his own restoration, as he had before made to Peisander and the oligarchical party. Thrasybulus and his colleagues either sincerely believed him, or at least thought that his restoration afforded a possibility, not to be neglected, of obtaining Persian aid, without which they despaired of the war. Such possibility would at least infuse spirit into the soldiers; while the restoration was now proposed without the terrible condition which had before accompanied it, of renouncing the democratical constitution.

It was not without difficulty, however, nor until after more than one assembly and discussion,³ that Thrasybulus prevailed on the armament to pass a vote of security and restoration to Alkibiadês. As Athenian citizens, the soldiers probably were unwilling to take upon them the reversal of a sentence solemnly passed by the democratical tribunal, on the ground of irreligion with suspicion of treason. They were however induced to pass the vote, after which Thrasybulus sailed over to the Asiatic coast, brought across Alkibiadês to the island, and introduced him to the assembled

Alkibiadês comes to Samos, on the invitation of the armament.

tot fortissimi viri, proditoris opem invocantes? (Tacitus, *Histor.* iii. 31).

¹ Thucyd. viii. 48.

² Thucydides does not expressly mention this communication—but it is implied in the words Ἀλκιβιά-

δην—ἄσμενον παρέξεν, &c. (viii. 76).

³ Thucyd. viii. 51. Θροσόβουλος, ἀεὶ τε τῆς ἀδότης γυναικὸς ἐχόμενος, ἐπειδὴ μετέσχευε τὰ πράγματα, ὥστε κατὰγειν Ἀλκιβιάδην, καὶ

armament. The supple exile, who had denounced the democracy so bitterly both at Sparta, and in his correspondence with the oligarchical conspirators, knew well how to adapt himself to the sympathies of the democratical assembly now before him. He began by deploring the sentence of banishment passed against him, and throwing the blame of it, not upon the injustice of his countrymen, but upon his own unhappy destiny.¹ He then entered upon the public prospects of the moment, pledging himself with entire confidence to realise the hopes of Persian alliance, and boasting in terms not merely ostentatious but even extravagant, of the ascendant influence which he possessed over Tissaphernês. The satrap had promised him (so the speech went on) never to let the Athenians want for pay, as soon as he once came to trust them; not even if it were necessary to issue out his last daric or to coin his own silver couch into money. Nor would he require any farther condition to induce him to trust them, except that Alkibiadês should be restored and should become their guarantee. Not only would he furnish the Athenians with pay, but he would, besides, bring up to their aid the Phenician fleet, which was already at Aspendus—instead of placing it at the disposal of the Peloponnesians.

In the communications of Alkibiadês with Peisander and his coadjutors, Alkibiadês had pretended that the Great King could have no confidence in the Athenians unless they not only restored him, but abnegated their democracy. On this occasion, the latter condition was withdrawn, and the confidence of the Great King was said to be more easily accorded. But though Alkibiadês thus presented himself with a new falsehood, as well as with a new vein of political sentiment, his discourse was eminently successful. It answered all the various purposes which he contemplated—partly of intimidating and disuniting the oligarchical conspirators at home—partly of exalting his own grandeur in the eyes of

τέλος ἐπ' ἐκκλησίας ἔπεισε τὸ πλῆθος τῶν στρατιωτῶν, &c.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 81. γενομένης δὲ ἐκκλησίας τὴν τε ἰδίαν ξυμφορὰν τῆς φυγῆς ἐπητιάσατο καὶ ἀνωλοφύρατο ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, &c.

Contrast the different language of Alkibiadês, vi. 92; viii. 47.

For the word ξυμφορὰν, compare i. 127.

Nothing can be more false and perverted than the manner in which the proceedings of Alkibiadês, during this period, are presented in the Oration of Isokratês de Bigis, sect. 18-23.

the armament—partly of sowing mistrust between the Spartans and Tissaphernês. It was in such full harmony with both thereigning feelings of the armament—eagerness to put down the Four Hundred, as well as to get the better of their Peloponnesian enemies in Ionia—that the hearers were not disposed to scrutinise narrowly the grounds upon which his assurances rested. In the fulness of confidence and enthusiasm, they elected him general along with Thrasybulus and the rest; conceiving redoubled hopes of victory over their enemies both at Athens and at Milêtus. So completely indeed were their imaginations filled with the prospect of Persian aid, against their enemies in Ionia, that alarm for the danger of Athens under the government of the Four Hundred became the predominant feeling; and many voices were even raised in favour of sailing to Peiræus for the rescue of the city. But Alkibiadês, knowing well (what the armament did not know) that his own promises of Persian pay and fleet were a mere delusion, strenuously dissuaded such a movement, which would have left the dependencies in Ionia defenceless against the Peloponnesians. As soon as the assembly broke up, he crossed over again to the mainland, under pretence of concerting measures with Tissaphernês to realise his recent engagements.

Relieved, substantially though not in strict form, from the penalties of exile, Alkibiadês was thus launched in a new career. After having first played the game of Athens against Sparta, next that of Sparta against Athens, thirdly that of Tissaphernês against both—he now professed to take up again the promotion of Athenian interests. In reality, however, he was, and had always been, playing his own game, or obeying his own self-interest, ambition, or antipathy. He was at this time eager to make a show of intimate and confidential communication with Tissaphernês, in order that he might thereby impose upon the Athenians at Samos; to communicate to the satrap his recent election as general of the Athenian force, that his importance with the Persians might be enhanced; and lastly, by passing backwards and forwards from Tissaphernês to the Athenian camp, to exhibit an appearance of friendly concert between the two, which might sow mistrust and alarm in the minds of the Peloponnesians. In this tripartite manœuvring, so suitable to his habitual character, he was more or less successful; especially in regard to the latter purpose. For

New position of Alkibiadês—present turn of his ambition.

though he never had any serious chance of inducing Tissaphernês to assist the Athenians, he did nevertheless contribute to alienate him from the enemy, as well as the enemy from him.¹

Without any longer delay in the camp of Tissaphernês than was necessary to keep up the faith of the Athenians in his promise of Persian aid, Alkibiadês returned to Samos, where he was found by the ten envoys sent by the Four Hundred from Athens, on their first arrival. These envoys had been long in their voyage; having made a considerable stay at Delos, under alarm from intelligence of the previous visit of Chæreas, and the furious indignation which his narrative had provoked.² At length they reached Samos, and were invited by the generals to make their communication to the assembled armament. They had the utmost difficulty in procuring a hearing—so strong was the antipathy against them—so loud were the cries that the subverters of the democracy ought to be put to death. Silence being at length obtained, they proceeded to state that the late revolution had been brought to pass for the salvation of the city, and especially for the economy of the public treasure, by suppressing the salaried civil functions of the democracy, and thus leaving more pay for the soldiers:³ that there was no purpose of mischief in the change, still less of betrayal to the enemy, which might already have been effected, had such been the intention of the Four Hundred, when Agis advanced from Dekeleia up to the walls: that the citizens, now possessing the political franchise, were, not Four Hundred only, but Five Thousand in number, all of whom would take their turn in rotation for the places now occupied by the Four Hundred:⁴ that

¹ Thucyd. viii. 82, 83, 87.

² Thucyd. viii. 77-86.

³ Thucyd. viii. 86. Εἰ δὲ ἐς εὐτέλειαν τι ζυυτέμεται, ὥστε τοὺς στρατιώτας ἔχειν τροφήν, πάντοτε ἐπαινεῖν.

This is a part of the answer of Alkibiadês to the envoys, and therefore indicates what they had urged.

⁴ Thucyd. viii. 86. τῶν τε πεντακισχιλίων ὅτι πάντες ἐν τῷ μέρει μετέξουσιν, &c. I dissent from Dr. Arnold's construction of this passage, which is followed both by

Poppo and by Gôller. He says in his note—"The sense must clearly be, 'that all the citizens should be of the five thousand in their turn,' however strange the expression may seem. μετέξουσιν τῶν πεντακισχιλίων. But without referring to the absurdity of the meaning, that all the Five Thousand should partake of the government *in their turn*—for they *all* partook of it as being the sovereign assembly—yet μετεχειν in this sense would require τῶν πραγμάτων after it, and would

the recitals of Chæreas, affirming ill-usage to have been offered to the relatives of the soldiers at Athens, were utterly false and calumnious.

Such were the topics on which the envoys insisted, in an apologetic strain, at considerable length, but without any effect in conciliating the soldiers who heard them. The general resentment against the Four Hundred was expressed by several persons present in public speech, by others in private manifestation of feeling against the envoys: and so passionately was this sentiment aggravated—consisting not only of wrath for what the oligarchy had done, but of fear for what they might do—that the proposition of sailing immediately to the Peiræus was revived with greater ardour than before. Alkibiadês, who had already once discountenanced this design, now stood forward to repel it again. Nevertheless

Eagerness of the armament to sail to Peiræus.—is discountenanced by Alkibiadês—his answer to the envoys.

be at least as harsh, standing alone, as in the construction of μεθέξουσιν τῶν πεντακισχιλίων.”

Upon this I remark—1. Μετέχειν may be construed with a genitive case not actually expressed,² but understood out of the words preceding; as we may see by Thueyd. ii. 16, where I agree with the interpretation suggested by Matthiæ (Gr. Gr. § 325), rather than with Dr. Arnold's note.

2. In the present instance, we are not reduced to the necessity of gathering a genitive case for μετέχειν by implication out of previous phraseology: for the express genitive case stands there a line or two before—τῆς πόλεως, the idea of which is carried down without being ever dropped—οἱ δ' ἀπήγγελλον, ὡς οὕτε ἐπὶ διαφθορῇ τῆς πόλεως ἡ μετάστασις γένοιτο, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ, οὐδ' ἵνα τοῖς πολεμίοις παραδοθῇ (i. e. ἡ πόλις) . . . τῶν τε πεντακισχιλίων ὅτι πάντες ἐν τῷ μέρει μεθέξουσιν (i. e. τῆς πόλεως).

There is therefore no harshness of expression; nor is there any

absurdity of meaning, as we may see by the repetition of the very same in viii. 93.—λέγοντες τοὺς τε πεντακισχιλίους ἀποφανεῖν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐν μέρει, ἧ ἂν τοῖς πεντακισχιλίοις δοκῇ, τοὺς τετρακοσίους ἐξεσθαι, &c.

Dr. Arnold's designation of these Five Thousand as “the sovereign assembly” is not very accurate. They were not an assembly at all: they had never been called together, nor had anything been said about an intention of calling them together: in reality, they were but a fiction and a name—but even the Four Hundred themselves pretended only to talk of them as partners in the conspiracy and revolution, not as an assembly to be convoked—πεντακισχιλιοι—οἱ πράσσοντες (viii. 72).

As to the idea of bringing all the remaining citizens to equal privileges (in rotation) with the Five Thousand, we shall see that it was never broached until considerably after the Four Hundred had been put down.

all the plenitude of his influence, then greater than that of any other officer in the armament, and seconded by the esteemed character as well as the loud voice of Thrasybulus,¹ was required to avert it. But for him it would have been executed. While he reproved and silenced those who were most clamorous against the envoys, he took upon himself to give to the latter a public answer in the name of the collective armament. "We make no objection (he said) to the power of the Five Thousand: but the Four Hundred must go about their business, and reinstate the Senate of Five Hundred as it was before. We are much obliged for what you have done in the way of economy, so as to increase the pay available for the soldiers. Above all, maintain the war strenuously, without any flinching before the enemy. For if the city be now safely held, there is good hope that we may make up the mutual differences between us by amicable settlement; but if once either of us perish, either we here or you at home, there will be nothing left for the other to make up with."²

With this reply he dismissed the envoys; the armament reluctantly abandoning their wish of sailing to Athens.

Thucydidês insists much on the capital service which Alkibiadês then rendered to his country, by arresting a project which would have had the effect of leaving all Ionia and the Hellespont defenceless against the Peloponnesians. His advice doubtless turned out well in the result; yet if we contemplate the state of affairs at the moment when he gave it, we shall be inclined to doubt whether prudential calculation was not rather against him, and in favour of the impulse of the armament. For what was to hinder the Four Hundred from patching up a peace with Sparta, and getting a Lacedæmonian garrison into Athens to help them in maintaining their dominion? Even apart from ambition, this was their best chance, if not their only chance, of safety for themselves: and we shall presently see that they tried to do it—being prevented from succeeding, partly indeed by the mutiny which arose against

Dissuasive
advice of
Alkibiadês
—how far it
is to be
commended
as saga-
cious.

¹ Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 26.

² Thucyd. viii. 86. Καὶ τὰλλα ἐκέλευεν ἀντέχειν, καὶ μὴδὲν ἐνδιδοῖναι τοῖς πολεμίοις· πρὸς μὲν γὰρ σοῶς αὐτοὺς σωζομένης τῆς πόλεως πολλὰν

ἐλπὶδα εἶναι καὶ ζυμβῆναι, εἰ δὲ ἅπαρ τὸ ἕτερον σφαλῆσεται ἢ τὸ ἐν Σάμῳ ἢ ἐκείναι, οὐδὲ ὅτῳ διαλλαχῆσεται τις ἐπι ἑτασθαι.

them at Athens, but still more by the stupidity of the Lacedæmonians themselves. Alkibiadês could not really imagine that the Four Hundred would obey his mandate delivered to the envoys, and resign their power voluntarily. But if they remained masters of Athens, who could calculate what they would do—after having received this declaration of hostility from Samos—not merely in regard to the foreign enemy, but even in regard to the relatives of the absent soldiers? Whether we look to the legitimate apprehensions of the soldiers, inevitable while their relatives were thus exposed, and almost unnerving them as to the hearty prosecution of the war abroad in their utter uncertainty with regard to matters at home—or to the chance of irreparable public calamity, greater even than the loss of Ionia, by the betrayal of Athens to the enemy—we shall be disposed to conclude that the impulse of the armament was not merely natural, but even founded on a more prudent estimate of the actual chances, and that Alkibiadês was nothing more than fortunate in a sanguine venture. And if, instead of the actual chances, we look to the chances as Alkibiadês represented, and as the armament conceived them upon his authority—viz. that the Phœnician fleet was close at hand to act against the Lacedæmonians in Ionia—we shall sympathise yet more with the defensive movement homeward. Alkibiadês had an advantage over every one else, simply by knowing his own falsehoods.

At the same assembly were introduced envoys from Argos, bearing a mission of recognition and an offer of aid to the Athenian Demos in Samos. They came in an Athenian trireme, navigated by the Parali who had brought home Chæreas in the Paralus from Samos to Athens, and had been then transferred into a common ship of war, and sent to cruise about Eubœa. Since that time, however, they had been directed to convey Læspodias, Aristophon, and Melêsias,¹ as ambassadors from the Four Hundred to Sparta. But when crossing the Argolic Gulf, probably under orders to land at Prasiæ, they declared against the oligarchy, sailed to Argos, and there deposited as prisoners the three

Envoys
sent from
Argos to
the "Athe-
nian Demos
at Samos."

¹ Thucyd. viii. 86. It is very probable that the Melêsias here mentioned was the son of that Thucydidês who was the leading political

opponent of Periklês. Melêsias appears as one of the *dramatis personæ* in Plato's dialogue called Lachês.

ambassadors, who had all been active in the conspiracy of the Four Hundred. Being then about to depart for Samos, they were requested by the Argeians to carry thither their envoys, who were dismissed by Alkibiadês with an expression of gratitude, and with a hope that their aid would be ready when called for.

Meanwhile the envoys returned from Samos to Athens, carrying back to the Four Hundred the unwelcome news of their total failure with the armament. A little before, it appears, some of the trierarchs on service at the Hellespont had returned to Athens also—Eratosthenês, Iatroklês and others, who had tried to turn their squadron to the purposes of the oligarchical conspirators, but had been baffled and driven off by the inflexible democracy of their own seamen.¹ If at Athens, the calculations of these conspirators had succeeded more triumphantly than could have been expected beforehand—everywhere else they had completely miscarried; not merely at Samos and in the fleet, but also with the allied dependencies. At the time when Peisander quitted Samos for Athens to consummate the oligarchical conspiracy even without Alkibiadês, he and others had gone round many of the dependencies and had effected a similar revolution in their internal government, in hopes that they would thus become attached to the new oligarchy at Athens. But this anticipation (as Phrynichus had predicted) was nowhere realised. The newly-created oligarchies only became more anxious for complete autonomy than the democracies had been before. At Thasos especially, a body of exiles who had for some time dwelt in Peloponnesus were recalled, and active preparations were made for revolt, by new fortifications as well as by new triremes.² Instead of strengthening their hold on the maritime empire, the Four Hundred thus found that they had actually weakened it; while the pronounced hostility of the armament at Samos not only put an end to all their hopes

¹ Lysias cont. Eratosthen. sect. 43. c. 9. p. 411 Reisk. οὗ γὰρ νῦν πρῶτον (Eratosthenês) τῷ ὑμετέρῳ πλῆθει τὰ ἐναντία ἐπραξεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν Τετρακοσίων, ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ὀλιγαρχίαν καθίστας ἐρευνῶν, ἐξ

Ἑλλησπόντου τριηράρχος καταλιπὼν τῇ ναυῶν, μετὰ Ἰατροκλέους καὶ ἐτέρων. . . . ἀφικόμενος δὲ δεῦρο τὰναντία τοῖς βουλευμένοις δημοκρατίαν εἶναι ἐπραττε.

² Thucyd. viii. 64.

abroad, but rendered their situation at home altogether precarious.

From the moment when the coadjutors of Antiphon first learnt, through the arrival of Chæreas at Athens, the proclamation of the democracy at Samos—discord, mistrust, and alarm began to spread even among their own members; together with a conviction that the oligarchy could never stand except through the presence of a Peloponnesian garrison in Athens. Antiphon and Phrynichus, the leading minds who directed the majority of the Four Hundred, despatched envoys to Sparta for concluding peace (these envoys never reached Sparta, being seized by the Parali and sent prisoners to Argos, as above stated). They farther commenced the erection of a special fort at Eetioneia, the projecting mole which contracted and commanded, on the northern side, the narrow entrance of Peiræus. Against their proceedings, however, there began to arise, even in the bosom of the Four Hundred, an opposition minority affecting popular sentiment, among whom the most conspicuous persons were Theramenês and Aristokratês.¹

Mistrust and discord among the Four Hundred themselves. An opposition party formed under Theramenês.

Though these two men had stood forward prominently as contrivers and actors throughout the whole progress of the conspiracy, they had found themselves bitterly disappointed by the result. Individually, their ascendancy with their colleagues was inferior to that of Peisander, Kallæschrus, Phrynichus, and others; while, collectively, the ill-gotten power of the Four Hundred was diminished in value, as much as it was aggravated in peril, by the loss of the foreign empire and the alienation of their Samian armament. Now began the workings of jealousy and strife among the successful conspirators, each of whom had entered into the scheme with unbounded expectations of personal ambition for himself—each had counted on stepping at once into the first place among the new oligarchical body. In a democracy (observes Thucydidês) contentions for power and pre-eminence provoke in the unsuccessful competitors

¹ Thucyd. viii. 89, 90. The representation of the character and motives of Theramenês, as given by Lysias in the Oration contra Erasthenem (Orat. xii. sect. 66, 67,

79; Orat. xiii. cont. Agorat. sect. 12-17), is quite in harmony with that of Thucydidês (viii. 89): compare Aristophan. Ran. 541-966; Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 27-30.

less of fierce antipathy and sense of injustice, than in an oligarchy; for the losing candidates acquiesce with comparatively little repugnance in the unfavourable vote of a large miscellaneous body of unknown citizens; but they are angry at being put aside by a few known comrades, their rivals as well as their equals: moreover at the moment when an oligarchy of ambitious men has just raised itself on the ruins of a democracy, every man of the conspirators is in exaggerated expectation—every one thinks himself entitled to become at once the first man of the body, and is dissatisfied if he be merely put upon a level with the rest.¹

¹ Thueyd. viii. 89. ἦν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν σχῆμα πολιτικὸν τοῦ λόγου αὐτοῖς, κατ' ἐξίας δὲ φιλοτιμίας οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ προσέχαιντο, ἐν ᾧ περ καὶ μάλιστα ὀλιγαρχία ἐκ δημοκρατίας γενομένη ἀπόλλυται. Πάντες γάρ αὐθιμέρου αἰσίουσιν οὐχ ὅπως ἔσσι. ἀλλὰ καὶ πολὺ πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἕκαστος εἶναι· ἐκ δὲ δημοκρατίας αἰρέσεως γιγνομένης, ἔχον τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα, ὥς ὅχι ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἐλασσομένους τις φέρει.

I give in the text what appears to me the proper sense of this passage, the last words of which are obscure: see the long notes of the commentators, especially Dr. Arnold and Poppo. Dr. Arnold considers τῶν ὁμοίων as a neuter, and gives the paraphrase of the last clause as follows:—"Whereas under an old established government, they (ambitious men of talent) are prepared to fail: they know that the weight of the government is against them, and are thus spared the peculiar pain of being beaten in a fair race, when they and their competitors start with equal advantages, and there is nothing to lessen the mortification of defeat. Ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐλασσοόμενος, is, *being beaten when the game is equal, when the terms of the match are fair.*"

I cannot concur in Dr. Arnold's explanation of these words, or of the general sense of the passage.

He thinks that Thueydides means to affirm what applies generally "to an opposition minority when it succeeds in revolutionizing the established government, whether the government be a democracy or a monarchy—whether the minority be an aristocratical party or a popular one." It seems to me, on the contrary, that the affirmation bears only on the special case of an oligarchical conspiracy subverting a democracy, and that the comparison taken is only applicable to the state of things as it stood under the preceding democracy.

Next, the explanation given of the words by Dr. Arnold assumes that "to be beaten in a fair race, or when the terms of the match are fair," causes to the loser *the maximum* of pain and offence. This is surely not the fact; or rather, the reverse is the fact. The man who loses his cause or his election through unjust favour, jealousy, or antipathy, is *more* hurt than if he had lost it under circumstances where he could find no injustice to complain of. In both cases, he is doubtless mortified: but if there be injustice, he is offended and angry as well as mortified; he is disposed to take vengeance on men whom he looks upon as his personal enemies. It is important to distinguish the

Such were the feelings of disappointed ambition, mingled with despondency, which sprung up among a

mortification of simple failure, from the discontent and anger arising out of belief that the failure has been unjustly brought about: it is this discontent, tending to break out in active opposition, which Thucydides has present to his mind in the comparison which he takes between the state of feeling which precedes and follows the subversion of the democracy.

It appears to me that the words τῶν ὁμοίων are masculine, and that they have reference (like πάντας and ἑαυτὸν in the preceding line) to the privileged minority of equal confederates who are supposed to have just got possession of the government. At Sparta, the word οἱ ὅμοιοι acquired a sort of technical sense to designate the small ascendent minority of wealthy Spartan citizens, who monopolised in their own hands political power, to the practical exclusion of the remainder (see Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 3, 5; Xenoph. Resp. Lac. x. 7; xiii. 1; Demosth. cont. Lept. s. 8). Now their ὅμοιοι or peers, here indicated by Thucydides as the peers of a recently-formed oligarchy, are not merely equal among themselves, but rivals one with another, and personally known to each other. It is important to bear in mind all these attributes as tacitly implied (though not literally designated or connoted) by the word ὅμοιοι or peers; because the comparison instituted by Thucydides is founded on all the attributes taken together; just as Aristotle (Rhetoric. ii. 8; ii. 13, 4), in speaking of the envy and jealousy apt to arise towards τοῖς ὁμοίοις, considers them as ἀντεπείστας and ἀντιγωνίστας.

The Four Hundred at Athens were all peers—equals, rivals, and

personally known among one another—who had just raised themselves by joint conspiracy to supreme power. Theramenes, one of the number, conceives himself entitled to pre-eminence, but finds that he is shut out from it; the men who shut him out being this small body of known equals and rivals. He is inclined to impute the exclusion to personal motives on the part of this small knot—to selfish ambition on the part of each—to ill-will—to jealousy—to wrongful partiality: so that he thinks himself injured, and the sentiment of injury is embittered by the circumstance that those from whom it proceeds are a narrow, known, and definite body of colleagues. Whereas, if his exclusion had taken place under the democracy, by the suffrage of a large, miscellaneous, and personally unknown collection of citizens—he would have been far less likely to carry off with him a sense of injury. Doubtless he would have been mortified: but he would not have looked upon the electors in the light of jealous or selfish rivals, nor would they form a definite body before him for his indignation to concentrate itself upon. Thus Nikomaehides—whom Sokrates (see Xenophon, Memor. iii. 4) meets returning mortified because the people had chosen another person and not him as general—would have been not only mortified, but angry and vindictive besides, if he had been excluded by a few peers and rivals.

Such, in my judgement, is the comparison which Thucydides wishes to draw between the effect of disappointment inflicted by the suffrage of a numerous and mis-

minority of the Four Hundred, immediately after the news of the proclamation of the democracy at Samos among the armament. Theramenês, the leader of this minority—a man of keen ambition, clever but unsteady and treacherous, not less ready to desert his party than to betray his country, though less prepared for extreme atrocities than many of his oligarchical comrades—began to look out for a good pretence to disconnect himself from a precarious enterprise. Taking advantage of the delusion which the Four Hundred had themselves held out about the fictitious Five Thousand, he insisted that since the dangers that beset the newly-formed authority were so much more formidable than had been anticipated, it was necessary to

cellaneous body of citizens—compared with disappointment inflicted by a small knot of oligarchical peers upon a competitor among their own number, especially at a moment when the expectations of all these peers are exaggerated, in consequence of the recent acquisition of their power. I believe the remark of the historian to be quite just; and that the disappointment in the first case is less intense—less connected with the sentiment of injury—and less likely to lead to active manifestation of enmity. This is one among the advantages of a numerous suffrage.

I cannot better illustrate the jealousies pretty sure to break out among a small number of ἑμοιοὶ or rival peers, than by the description which Justin gives of the leading officers of Alexander the Great immediately after that monarch's death (Justin, xii. 2):—

“Cæterum, occiso Alexandro, non, ut læti, ita et securi fuere, omnibus unum locum competentibus: nec minus milites invicem se timebant, quorum et libertas solutior et favor incertus erat. *Inter ipsos vero aequalitas discordiam augebat, nemine tantum cæteros excedente,*

ut ei aliquis se submitteret.”

Compare Plutarch, Lysander, c. 23.

Haack and Poppo think that ὁμοίων cannot be masculine, because ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐλαττούμενος would not then be correct, but ought to be, ὑπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐλαττούμενος. I should dispute, under all circumstances, the correctness of this criticism; for there are quite enough parallel cases to defend the use of ἀπὸ here (see Thucyd. i. 17; iii. 82; iv. 115; vi. 28, &c.). But we need not enter into the debate; for the genitive τῶν ὁμοίων depends rather upon τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα which precedes, than upon ἐλαττούμενος which follows; and the preposition ἀπὸ is what we should naturally expect. To mark this I have put a comma after ἀποβαίνοντα as well as after ὁμοίων.

To show that an opinion is not correct, indeed, does not afford certain evidence that Thucydides may not have advanced it: for he might be mistaken. But it ought to count as good presumptive evidence, unless the words peremptorily bind us to the contrary; which in this case they do not.

popularise the party by enrolling and producing these Five Thousand as a real instead of a fictitious body.¹

Such an opposition, formidable from the very outset, became still bolder and more developed when the envoys returned from Samos, with an account of their reception by the armament, as well as of the answer, delivered in the name of the armament, whereby Alkibiadês directed the Four Hundred to dissolve themselves forthwith, but at the sametime approved of the constitution of the Five Thousand, coupled with the restoration of the old senate. To enroll the Five Thousand at once, would be meeting the army half-way; and there were hopes that at that price a compromise and reconciliation might be effected, of which Alkibiadês had himself spoken as practicable.² In addition to the formal answer, the envoys doubtless brought back intimation of the enraged feelings manifested by the armament, and of their eagerness, uncontrollable by every one except Alkibiadês, to sail home forthwith and rescue Athens from the Four Hundred. Hence arose an increased conviction that the dominion of the latter could not last; and an ambition, on the part of others as well as Theramenês, to stand forward as leaders of a popular opposition against it, in the name of the Five Thousand.³

¹ Thucyd. viii. 86, 2. Of this sentence from φοβούμενοι down to καθίσταται, I only profess to understand the last clause. It is useless to discuss the many conjectural amendments of a corrupt text, none of them satisfactory.

² Thucyd. viii. 86-89. It is alleged by Andokidês (in an Oration delivered many years afterwards before the people of Athens—De Reditu suo, seet. 10-15), that during this spring he furnished the armament at Samos with wood proper for the construction of oars—only obtained by the special favour of Archelaus king of Macedonia, and of which the armament then stood in great need. He farther alleges, that he afterwards visited Athens, while the Four Hundred were in full dominion; and that Peisander, at the head of this oligarchical

body, threatened his life for having furnished such valuable aid to the armament, then at enmity with Athens. Though he saved his life by clinging to the altar, yet he had to endure bonds and manifold hard treatment.

Of these claims which Andokidês prefers to the favour of the subsequent democracy, I do not know how much is true.

³ Thucyd. viii. 89. συμφέστατα δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐπῆρε τὰ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἰσχυρὰ ὄντα, καὶ ὅτι αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἐδόκει νόμιμον τὸ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας εἶσθαι. ἡγωνίζετο οὖν εἰς ἕκαστος προστάτης τοῦ δήμου εἶσθαι.

This is a remarkable passage as indicating what is really meant by προστάτης τοῦ δήμου—"the leader of a popular opposition." Theramenês and the other persons here spoken

Measures of Antiphon and the Four Hundred—their solicitations to Sparta—construction of the fort of Eetioneia, for the admission of a Spartan garrison.

Against this popular opposition, Antiphon and Phrynichus exerted themselves with demagogic assiduity to caress and keep together the majority of the Four Hundred, as well as to uphold their power without abridgement. They were noway disposed to comply with this requisition that the fiction of the Five Thousand should be converted into a reality. They knew well that the enrolment of so many partners¹ would be tantamount to a democracy, and would be in substance at least, if not in form, an annihilation of their own power. They had now gone too far to recede with safety; while the menacing attitude of Samos, as well as the opposition growing up against them at home both within and without their own body, served only as instigation to them to accelerate their measures for peace with Sparta and to secure the introduction of a Spartan garrison.

With this view, immediately after the return of their envoys from Samos, the two most eminent leaders, Antiphon and Phrynichus, went themselves with ten other colleagues in all haste to Sparta, prepared to purchase peace and the

of did not even mention the name of the democracy—they took up simply the name of the Five Thousand—yet they are still called πρόσταται τοῦ δήμου, inasmuch as the Five Thousand were a sort of qualified democracy, compared to the Four Hundred.

The words denote the leader of a popular party, as opposed to an oligarchical party (see Thucyd. iii. 70; iv. 66; vi. 35), in a form of government either entirely democratical, or at least, in which the public assembly is frequently convoked and decides on many matters of importance. Thucydides does not apply the words to any Athenian except in the case now before us respecting Theramenes: he does not use the words even with respect to Kleon, though he employs expressions which seem equivalent to it (iii. 36; iv. 21)—

ἀνὴρ δημαγωγός κατ' ἐξέεινον τὸν χρόνον ὧν καὶ τῷ πλήθει πιθανώτατος, &c. This is very different from the words which he applies to Periklēs —ὧν γὰρ δυνατώτατος τῶν κατ' ἐαυτὸν καὶ ἄγων τὴν πολιτείαν (i. 127). Even in respect to Nikias, he puts him in conjunction with Pleistoanax at Sparta, and talks of both of them as σπεύδοντες τὰ μέγιστα τὴν ἡγεμονίαν (v. 16).

Compare the note of Dr. Arnold on vi. 35; and Wachsmuth. Hellen. Alterth. i. 2. Beilage 1. p. 435-438.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 92. τὸ μὲν καταστῆσαι μετοχὺς τοσούτους, ἀντικρὺς ἂν δήμον ἡγούμενοι, &c.

Aristotle (Polit. v. 5, 4) calls Phrynichus the *demagogue* of the Four Hundred; that is, the person who most strenuously served their interests and struggled for their favour.

promise of Spartan aid almost at any price. At the same time the construction of the fortress as Etioneia was prosecuted with redoubled zeal; under pretence of defending the entrance of Peiræus against the armament from Samos, if the threat of their coming should be executed—but with the real purpose of bringing into it a Lacedæmonian fleet and army. For this latter object every facility was provided. The north-western corner of the fortification of Peiræus, to the north of the harbour and its mouth, was cut off by a cross wall reaching southward so as to join the harbour: from the southern end of this cross wall, and forming an angle with it, a new wall was built, fronting the harbour and running to the extremity of the mole which narrowed the mouth of the harbour on the northern side, at which mole it met the termination of the northern wall of Peiræus. A separate citadel was thus enclosed, defensible against any attack from Peiræus—furnished besides with distinct broad gates and posterns of its own, as well as with facilities for admitting an enemy within it.¹ The new cross wall was carried so as to traverse a vast portico or open market-house, the largest in Peiræus: the larger half of this portico thus became enclosed within the new citadel, and orders were issued that all the corn, both actually warehoused and hereafter to be imported into Peiræus, should be deposited therein and sold out from thence for consumption. As Athens was sustained almost exclusively on corn brought from Eubœa and elsewhere, since the permanent occupation of Dekeleia,—the Four Hundred rendered themselves masters by this arrangement of all the subsistence of the citizens, as well as of the entrance into the harbour; either to admit the Spartans or exclude the armament from Samos.²

¹ Thueyd. viii. 90-92. τὸ τεῖχος τοῦτο, καὶ πολὺς ἔχον, καὶ ἐσόδους, καὶ ἐπείσσωγας τῶν πολέμων, &c.

I presume that the last expression refers to facilities for admitting the enemy either from the sea-side, or from the land-side—that is to say, from the north-western corner of the old wall of Peiræus, which formed one side of the new citadel.

See Leake's Topographie Athens,

p. 269, 270, Germ. transl

² Thueyd. viii. 90. διψχοδόμησαν δὲ καὶ στραὶν, &c.

I agree with the note in M. Didot's translation, that this portico, or *halle* open on three sides, must be considered as pre-existing; not as having been first built now, which seems to be the supposition of Colonel Leake, and the commentators generally.

Though Theramenês, himself one of the generals named under the Four Hundred, denounced, in conjunction with his supporters, the treasonable purpose of this new citadel—yet the majority of the Four Hundred stood to their resolution, so that the building made rapid progress under the superintendence of the general Alexiklês, one of the most strenuous of the oligarchical faction.¹ Such was the habit of obedience at Athens to an established authority, when once constituted—and so great the fear and mistrust arising out of the general belief in the reality of the Five Thousand, unknown auxiliaries supposed to be prepared to enforce the orders of the Four Hundred—that the people, and even armed citizen hoplites, went on working at the building, in spite of their suspicions as to its design. Though not completed, it was so far advanced as to be defensible, when Antiphon and Phrynichus returned from Sparta. They had gone thither prepared to surrender everything,—not merely their naval force, but their city itself—and to purchase their own personal safety by making the Lacedæmonians masters of Peiræus.² Yet we read with astonishment that the latter could not be prevailed on to contract any treaty, and that they manifested nothing but backwardness in seizing this golden opportunity. Had Alkibiadês been now playing their game, as he had been doing a year earlier, immediately before the revolt of Chios—had they been under any energetic leaders to impel them into hearty cooperation with the treason of the Four Hundred, who combined at this moment both the will and the power to place Athens in their hands, if seconded by an adequate force—they might now have overpowered their great enemy at home, before the armament at Samos could have been brought to the rescue.

Considering that Athens was saved from capture only by the slackness and stupidity of the Spartans, we may see that the armament at Samos had reasonable excuse for their eagerness previously manifested to come home; and

¹ Thucyd. viii. 91, 92. Ἀλεξικλέα, στρατηγὸν ὄντα ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ μάλιστα πρὸς τοὺς ἐταίρους τετραμμένον, &c.

² Thucyd. viii. 91. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς πολέμιους ἐσαγαγόμενοι ἀνευ τειχῶν

καὶ νεῶν ξυμβῆναι, καὶ ὁπωσοῦν τὰ τῆς πόλεως ἔχειν, εἰ τοῖς γε σωμασι σφῶν ἄδεια ἔσται.

Ibid. ἐπειδὴ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαιμονίας πρέσβεις οὐδὲν πράξαντες ἀνεχωρήσαντο τοῖς πᾶσι ξυμβατικόν, &c.

that Alkibiadês, in combating that intention, braved an extreme danger which nothing but incredible good fortune averted. Why the Lacedæmonians remained idle, both in Peloponnesus and at Dekeleia, while Athens was thus betrayed and in the very throes of dissolution, we can render no account: possibly the caution of the Ephors may have distrusted Antiphon and Phrynichus, from the mere immensity of their concessions. All that they would promise was, that a Lacedæmonian fleet of 42 triremes (partly from Tarentum and Lokri)—now about to start from Las in the Laconian Gulf, and to sail to Eubœa on the invitation of a disaffected party in that island—should so far depart from its straight course as to hover near Ægina and Peiræus, ready to take advantage of any opportunity for attack laid open by the Four Hundred.¹

Of this squadron, however, even before it rounded Cape Malea, Theramenês obtained intelligence, and denounced it as intended to operate in concert with the Four Hundred for the occupation of Eetioneia. Meanwhile Athens became daily a scene of greater discontent and disorder, after the abortive embassy and return from Sparta of Antiphon and Phrynichus. The coercive ascendancy of the Four Hundred was silently disappearing, while the hatred which their usurpation had inspired, together with the fear of their traitorous concert with the public enemy, became more and more loudly manifested in men's private conversations, as well as in gatherings secretly got together within numerous houses; especially the house of the peripolarch (the captain of the peripoli, or youthful hoplites who formed the chief police of the country). Such hatred was not long in passing from vehement passion into act. Phrynichus, as he left the Senate-house, was assassinated by two confederates, one of them a peripolus, or youthful hoplite, in the midst of the crowded market-place and in full daylight. The man who struck the blow made his escape, but his comrade was seized and put to the torture by order of the Four Hundred;² he was however a stranger, from Argos, and

Assassination of Phrynichus—Lacedæmonian fleet hovering near Peiræus.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 91. ἦν δὲ τι καὶ τοιοῦτον ἀπὸ τῶν τῆς κατηγόριαν ἔχόντων, καὶ οὐ πᾶν διαβολὴ μόνον τοῦ λόγου.

The reluctant language, in which Thucydides admits the treasonable

concert of Antiphon and his colleagues with the Lacedæmonians, deserves notice—also c. 94, τὰχα μὲν τι καὶ ἀπὸ συγκαίμενου λόγου, &c.

² Thucyd. viii. 91. The statement

either could not or would not reveal the name of any directing accomplice. Nothing was obtained from him except general indications of meetings and wide-spread disaffection. Nor did the Four Hundred, being thus left without special evidence, dare to lay hands upon Theramenês, the pronounced leader of the opposition—as we shall find Kritias doing six years afterwards, under the rule of the Thirty. The assassins of Phrynichus remaining undiscovered and unpunished, Theramenês and his associates became bolder in their opposition than before. And the approach of the Lacedæmonian fleet under Agesandridas—which, having now taken station at Epidaurus, had made a descent on Ægina, and was hovering not far off Peiræus, altogether out of the straight course for Eubœa—lent double force to all their previous assertions about the imminent dangers connected with the citadel at Etioneia.

Amidst this exaggerated alarm and discord, the general body of hoplites became penetrated with aversion,¹ every day increasing, against the new citadel. At length the hoplites of the tribe in which Aristokratês (the warmest partisan of Theramenês) was taxiarch, being on duty and engaged in the prosecution of the building, broke out into absolute mutiny against it, seized the person of Alexiklês, the general in command, and put him under arrest in a neighbouring house; while the peripoli, or youthful military police, stationed at Munychia, under Hermon, abetted them in the proceeding.² News of this violence was speedily conveyed to the Four Hundred, who were at that moment holding session in the Senate-house, Theramenês himself being present. Their wrath and menace were at first vented against him as the instigator of the revolt; a charge against which he could only vindicate himself by volunteering to go among the foremost for the liberation of the prisoner. He forthwith started in haste for the Peiræus, accompanied by one of the generals his colleague, who was of the same political sentiment as himself. A third among the generals, Aristarchus, one of the fiercest of the oligarchs, followed him, probably from mis-

of Plutarch is in many respect different (Alkibiadês, c. 25).

¹ Thucyd. viii. 92. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, τῶν ὀπλιτῶν τὸ στίχος ταῦτα ἐβού-

λετο.

² Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 26, represents Hermon as one of the assassins of Phrynichus.

trust, together with some of the younger Knights (Horsemen or richest class in the state) identified with the cause of the Four Hundred. The oligarchical partisans ran to marshal themselves in arms—alarming exaggerations being rumoured, that Alexiklês had been put to death, and that Peiræus was under armed occupation; while at Peiræus the insurgents imagined that the hoplites from the city were in full march to attack them. For a time all was confusion and angry sentiment, which the slightest untoward accident might have inflamed into sanguinary civil carnage. Nor was it appeased except by earnest entreaty and remonstrance from the elder citizens (aided by Thucydidês of Pharsalus, proxenus or public guest of Athens in his native town) on the ruinous madness of such discord when a foreign enemy was almost at their gates.

The perilous excitement of this temporary crisis, which brought into full daylight every man's real political sentiments, proved the oligarchical faction, hitherto exaggerated in number, to be far less powerful than had been imagined by their opponents. And the Four Hundred had found themselves too much embarrassed how to keep up the semblance of their authority even in Athens itself, to be able to send down any considerable force for the protection of their citadel at Eetioneia; though they were reinforced, only eight days before their fall, by at least one supplementary member, probably in substitution for some predecessor who had accidentally died.¹ Theramenês, on reaching Peiræus, began to address the mutinous hoplites in a tone of simulated displeasure, while Aristarchus and his oligarchical companions spoke in the harshest language, and threatened them with the force which they imagined to be presently coming down from the city. But these menaces were met by equal firmness on the part of the hoplites, who even appealed to Theramenês himself, and called upon him to say whether he thought the construction of this citadel was for the good of Athens, or whether it would not be better demolished. His opinion had been fully pronounced beforehand; and he replied, that if they thought proper to demolish it, he cordially concurred. Without farther delay, hoplites and unarmed people mounted

¹ See Lysias, Orat. xx. pro Polystrato. The fact that Polystratus was only eight days a member of the Four Hundred, before their

fall, is repeated three distinct times in this Oration (c. 2, 4, 5. p. 672, 674, 679 Reisk.), and has all the air of truth.

pellmell upon the walls, and commenced the demolition with alacrity; under the general shout—"Whoever is for the Five Thousand in place of the Four Hundred, let him lend a hand in this work." The idea of the old democracy was in every one's mind, but no man uttered the word; the fear of the imaginary Five Thousand still continuing. The work of demolition seems to have been prosecuted all that day, and not to have been completed until the next day; after which the hoplites released Alexiklês from arrest, without doing him any injury.¹

Two things deserve notice, among these details, as illustrating the Athenian character. Though Alexiklês was vehemently oligarchical as well as unpopular, these mutineers do no harm to his person, but content themselves with putting him under arrest. Next, they do not venture to commence the actual demolition of the citadel, until they have the formal sanction of Theramenês, one of the constituted generals. The strong habit of legality, implanted in all Athenian citizens by their democracy—and the care, even in departing from it, to depart as little as possible—stand plainly evidenced in these proceedings.

The events of this day gave a fatal shock to the ascendancy of the Four Hundred. Yet they assembled on the morrow as usual in the Senate-house; and they appear, now when it was too late, to have directed one of their members to draw up a real list, giving body to the fiction of the Five Thousand.² Meanwhile the hoplites in Peiræus, having finished the levelling of the new fortifications, took the still more important step of

Decline of
the Four
Hundred—
concessions
made by
them—re-
newal of
the public
Assembly.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 92, 93. In the Oration of Demosthenês (or Deinarchus) against Theokrinês (c. 17. p. 1343) the speaker Epicharês makes allusion to this destruction of the fort at Eetioneia by Aristokratês, uncle of his grandfather. The allusion chiefly deserves notice from the erroneous mention of Kritias and the return of the Demos from exile—betraying a complete confusion between the events in the time of the Four Hundred and those in the time of the Thirty.

² Lysias, Orat. xx. pro Polystrato,

c. 4. p. 675 Reisk.

This task was confided to Polystratus, a very recent member of the Four Hundred, and therefore probably less unpopular than the rest. In his defence after the restoration of the democracy, he pretended to have undertaken the task much against his will, and to have drawn up a list containing 9000 names instead of 5000.

It may probably have been in this meeting of the Four Hundred, that Antiphon delivered his oration strongly recommending concord—

entering, armed as they were, into the theatre of Dionysus hard by (in Peiræus, but on the verge of Munychia) and there holding a formal assembly; probably under the convocation of the general Theramenês, pursuant to the forms of the antecedent democracy. They here took the resolution of adjourning their assembly to the Anakeion, (or temple of Castor and Pollux, the Dioskuri,) in the city itself and close under the acropolis; whither they immediately marched and established themselves, still retaining their arms. So much was the position of the Four Hundred changed, that they, who had on the preceding day been on the aggressive against a spontaneous outburst of mutineers in Peiræus, were now thrown upon the defensive against a formal assembly, all armed, in the city and close by their own Senate-house. Feeling themselves too weak to attempt any force, they sent deputies to the Anakeion to negotiate and offer concessions. They engaged to publish the list of *The Five Thousand*, and to convene them for the purpose of providing for the periodical cessation and renewal of the Four Hundred, by rotation from the Five Thousand, in such order as the latter themselves should determine. But they entreated that time might be allowed for effecting this, and that internal peace might be maintained, without which there was no hope of defence against the enemy without. Many of the hoplites in the city itself joined the assembly in the Anakeion, and took part in the debates. The position of the Four Hundred being no longer such as to inspire fear, the tongues of speakers were now again loosed, and the ears of the multitude again opened—for the first time since the arrival of Peisander from Samos, with the plan of the oligarchical conspiracy. Such renewal of free and fearless public speech, the peculiar life-principle of the democracy, was not less wholesome in tranquillizing intestine discord, than in heightening the sentiment of common patriotism against the foreign enemy.¹ The assembly at

Περὶ ὁμονοίας. All his eloquence was required just now, to bring back the oligarchical party, if possible, into united action. Philostratus (Vit. Sophistar. c. xv. p. 500. ed. Olear.) expresses great admiration for this oration, which is several times alluded to both by Harpokration and Suidas. See

Westermann, Gesch. der Griech. Beredsamkeit, Beilage ii. p. 276.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 93. Τὸ δὲ πᾶν πλῆθος τῶν ὁπλιτῶν, ἀπὸ πολλῶν καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς λόγων γιγνομένων, ἡπιώτερον ἤνῃ πρότερον, καὶ ἐφοβεῖτο μάλιστα περὶ τοῦ παντός πολιτικοῦ.

length dispersed, after naming an early future time for a second assembly, to bring about the re-establishment of harmony, in the theatre of Dionysus.¹

On the day, and at the hour, when this assembly in the theatre of Dionysus was on the point of coming together, the news ran through Peiræus and Athens, that the forty-two triremes under the Lacedæmonian Agesandridas, having recently quitted the harbour of Megara, were sailing along the coast of Salamis in the direction towards Peiræus. Such an event, while causing universal consternation throughout the city, confirmed all the previous warnings of Theramenês as to the treasonable destination of the citadel recently demolished, and every one rejoiced that the demolition had been accomplished just in time. Foregoing their intended assembly, the citizens rushed with one accord down to Peiræus, where some of them took post to garrison the walls and the mouth of the harbour—others got aboard the triremes lying in the harbour—others, again, launched some fresh triremes from the boat-houses into the water. Agesandridas rowed along the shore, near the mouth of Peiræus; but found nothing to promise concert within, or tempt him to the intended attack. Accordingly, he passed by and moved onward to Sunium in a southerly direction. Having doubled the cape of Sunium, he then turned his course along the coast of Attica northward, halted for a little while between Thorikus and Prasiæ, and presently took station at Orôpus.²

Though relieved when they found that he passed by Peiræus without making any attack, the Athenians knew that his destination must now be against Eubœa; which to them was hardly less important than Peiræus, since their main supplies were derived from that island. Accordingly they put to sea at once with all the triremes which could be manned and got ready in the harbour. But from the hurry of the occasion, coupled

Lacedæmonian fleet threatens Peiræus—passes by to Eubœa.

Naval battle near Eretria—Athenians defeated—Eubœa revolts.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 93. ξυνεχώρησαν δὲ ὧστε' εἰς ἡμέραν ὅτι τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ποιήσιν ἐν τῷ Διονυσίῳ περὶ ὁμοθυμίᾳς.

The definition of time must here allude to the morrow, or to the

day following the morrow: at least it seems impossible that the city could be left longer than this interval without a government.

² Thucyd. viii. 94.

with the mistrust and dissension now reigning, and the absence of their great naval force at Samos—the crews mustered were raw and ill-selected, and the armament inefficient. Polystratus, one of the members of the Four Hundred, perhaps others of them also, were aboard; men who had an interest in defeat rather than victory.¹ Thymocharês the admiral conducted them round Cape Sunium to Eretria in Eubœa, where he found a few other triremes, which made up his whole fleet to 36 sail.

He had scarcely reached the harbour and disembarked, when, without allowing time for his men to procure refreshment—he found himself compelled to fight a battle with the forty-two ships of Agesandridas, who had just sailed across from Orôpus, and was already approaching the harbour. This surprise had been brought about by the anti-Athenian party in Eretria, who took care, on the arrival of Thymocharês, that no provisions should be found in the market-place, so that his men were compelled to disperse and obtain them from houses at the extremity of the town; while at the same time a signal was hoisted, visible at Orôpus on the opposite side of the strait (less than seven miles broad), indicating to Agesandridas the precise moment for bringing his fleet across to the attack, with their crews fresh after the morning meal. Thymocharês, on seeing the approach of the enemy, ordered his men aboard; but to his disappointment, many of them were found to be so far off that they could not be brought back in time—so that he was compelled to sail out and meet the Peloponnesians with ships very inadequately manned. In a battle immediately outside of the Eretrian harbour, he was, after a short contest, completely defeated, and his fleet driven back upon the shore. Some of his ships escaped to Chalkis, others to a fortified post garrisoned by the Athenians themselves not far from Eretria: yet not less than 22 triremes, out of the whole 36, fell into the

¹ Lysias, Orat. xx. pro Polystrato, c. 4. p. 676 Reisk.

From another passage, in this oration, it would seem that Polystratus was in command of the fleet—possibly enough, in conjunction with Thymocharês, according to a common Athenian practice (c. 5. p. 679). His son who defends

him affirms that he was wounded in the battle.

Diodorus (xiii. 34) mentions the discord among the crews on board these ships under Thymocharês; almost the only point which we learn from his meagre notice of this interesting period.

hands of Agesandridas, and a large proportion of the crews were slain or made prisoners. Of those seamen who escaped, too, many found their death from the hands of the Eretrians, into whose city they fled for shelter. On the news of this battle, not merely Eretria, but also all Eubœa (except Oreus in the north of the island, which was settled by Athenian Kleruchs) declared its revolt from Athens, which had been intended more than a year before—and took measures for defending itself in concert with Agesandridas and the Bœotians.¹

Ill could Athens endure a disaster, in itself so immense and aggravated, under the present distressed condition of the city. Her last fleet was destroyed; her nearest and most precious island torn from her side; an island which of late had yielded more to her wants than Attica itself, but which was now about to become a hostile and aggressive neighbour.² The previous revolt of Eubœa, occurring thirty-four years before during the maximum of Athenian power, had been even then a terrible blow to Athens, and formed one of the main circumstances which forced upon her the humiliation of the Thirty years' truce. But this second revolt took place when she had not only no means of reconquering the island, but no means even of defending Peiræus against the blockade by the enemy's fleet.

The dismay and terror excited by the news at Athens was unbounded; even exceeding what had been felt after the Sicilian catastrophe, or the revolt of Chios. There was no second reserve now in the treasury, such as the thousand talents which had rendered such essential service on the last-mentioned occasion. In addition to their foreign dangers, the Athenians were farther weighed down by two intestine calamities in themselves hardly supportable—alienation of their own fleet at Samos, and the discord, yet unappeased, within their own walls; wherein the Four Hundred still held provisionally the reins of government, with the ablest and most unscrupulous leaders at their

¹ Thucyd. viii. 5; viii. 95.

² Thucyd. viii. 95. To show what Eubœa became at a later period, see Demosthenès, *De Fals. Legat.* c. 64. p. 409—τὰ ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ κατα-

σχευασθῆσόμενα ὀρμητήρια ἐφ' ὧμας; &c.; and Demosthenès, *De Corona*, c. 71—ἄπλους δ' ἡ θάλασσα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς Εὐβοίας ὀρμυμένων ληστῶν γέγνε, &c.

head. In the depth of their despair, the Athenians expected nothing less than to see the victorious fleet of Agesandridas (more than sixty triremes strong, including the recent captures) off the Peiræus, forbidding all importation, and threatening them with approaching famine, in combination with Agis at Dekeleia. The enterprise would have been easy, for there were neither ships nor seamen to repel him; and his arrival at this critical moment would most probably have enabled the Four Hundred to resume their ascendancy, with the means as well as the disposition to introduce a Lacedæmonian garrison into the city.¹ And though the arrival of the Athenian fleet from Samos would have prevented this extremity, yet it could not have arrived in time, except on the supposition of a prolonged blockade. Moreover the mere transfer of the fleet from Samos to Athens would have left Ionia and the Hellespont defenceless against the Lacedæmonians and Persians, and would have caused the loss of all the Athenian empire. Nothing could have saved Athens, if the Lacedæmonians at this juncture had acted with reasonable vigour, instead of confining their efforts to Eubœa, now an easy and certain conquest. As on the former occasion, when Antiphon and Phrynichus went to Sparta prepared to make any sacrifice for the purpose of obtaining Lacedæmonian aid and accommodation—so now, in a still greater degree, Athens owed her salvation only to the fact that the enemies actually before her were indolent and dull Spartans—not enterprising Syracusans under the conduct of Gylippus.² And this is the second occasion (we may add) on which Athens was on the brink of ruin in consequence of the policy of Alkibiadês in retaining the armament at Samos.

Fortunately for the Athenians, no Agesandridas appeared off Peiræus; so that the twenty triremes, which they contrived to man as a remnant for defence, had no enemy to repel.³ Accordingly the Athenians were allowed to enjoy an interval of repose which enabled them to recover partially both from consternation and from

The Four Hundred are put down—the democracy in substance restored.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 69. Μάλιστα δ' αὐτοὺς καὶ δι' ἐγγυτάτου ἐθροῦβει, εἰ οἱ πολέμιοι τοιμήσουσι νενικηχότες εὐθὺς σφῶν ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ ἔρημον ὄντα νεῶν πλεῖν καὶ ὅσον οὐκ ἤδη ἐνόμιζον αὐτοὺς παρβαίνειν. Ὅ περ ἂν, εἰ τοιμηρότεροι ἦσαν, ῥαδίως

ἂν ἐποίησαν· καὶ ἡ διέστησαν ἂν ἔτι μᾶλλον τὴν πόλιν ἐφορμούντες, ἢ εἰ ἐπολιόρχουν μένοντες, καὶ τὰς ἀπ' Ἰωνίας ναῦς ἡνάγκασαν ἂν βοηθῆσαι, &c.

² Thucyd. viii. 96; vii. 21-55.

³ Thucyd. viii. 97.

intestine discord. It was their first proceeding, when the hostile fleet did not appear, to convene a public assembly, and that too in the Pnyx itself; the habitual scene of the democratical assemblies, well-calculated to re-inspire that patriotism which had now been dumb and smouldering for the four last months. In this assembly the tide of opinion ran vehemently against the Four Hundred.¹ Even those, who (like the Board of Elders entitled Probûli) had originally counselled their appointment, now denounced them along with the rest, though severely taunted by the oligarchical leader Peisander for their inconsistency. Votes were finally passed—1. To depose the Four Hundred—2. To place the whole government in the hands of *The Five Thousand*—3. Every citizen, who furnished a panoply either for himself, or for any one else, was to be of right a member of this body of *The Five Thousand*—4. No citizen was to receive pay for any political function, on pain of becoming solemnly accursed, or excommunicated.² Such

¹ It is to this assembly that I refer, with confidence, the remarkable dialogue of contention between Peisander and Sophoklês, one of the Athenian Probûli, mentioned in Aristotcl. Rhetoric. iii. 18, 2. There was no other occasion on which the Four Hundred were ever publicly thrown upon their defence at Athens.

This was not Sophoklês the tragic poet, but another person of the same name, who appears afterwards as one of the oligarchy of Thirty.

² Thucyd. viii. 97. Καὶ ἐκκλησίαν ἐυνέλεγον, μίαν μὲν εὐθὺς τότε πρῶτον ἐς τὴν Πύνα καλουμένην, οὐπὲρ καὶ ἄλλοτε εἰώθεσαν, ἐν ᾗ περ καὶ τοὺς τετρακοσίους καταπαύσαντες τοῖς πεντακισχιλίους ἐψήφισαντο τὰ πράγματα παραδοῦναι εἶναι δὲ αὐτῶν, ὁπόσοι καὶ ὅπλα παρέχονταν καὶ μισθὸν μηδὲνα φέρειν, μηδεμίαν ἀρχὴν, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐπ' ἀρσενον ἐποιήσαντο. Ἐγίγνοντο δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι ὕστερον πυκναὶ ἐκκλησίαι, ἀπ' ὧν καὶ νομοθέτας καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐψήφισαντο ἐς τὴν πολιτείαν.

In this passage I dissent from the commentators on two points. First, they understand this number Five Thousand as a real definite list of citizens, containing 5000 names, neither more nor less. Secondly, they construe νομοθέτας, not in the ordinary meaning which it bears in Athenian constitutional language, but in the sense of ζυγγραφεῖς (c. 67), "persons to model the constitution, corresponding to the ζυγγραφεῖς appointed by the aristocratical party a little before"—to use the words of Dr. Arnold.

As to the first point, which is sustained also by Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. ch. xxviii. vol. iv. p. 61. 2nd ed.), Dr. Arnold really admits what is the ground of my opinion, when he says—"Of course the number of citizens capable of providing themselves with heavy arms must have much exceeded 5000: and it is said in the defence of Polystratus, one of the Four Hundred (Lysias, p. 675 Reisk.), that he drew up a list of 9000. But we must suppose that all who could

were the points determined by the first assembly held in the Pnyx. The Archons, the Senate of Five Hundred, &c.,

furnish heavy arms *were eligible into the number of the 5000*, whether the members were fixed on by lot, by election, or by rotation; as it had been proposed to appoint the Four Hundred by rotation out of the Five Thousand (viii. 93)."

Dr. Arnold here throws out a supposition which by no means conforms to the exact sense of the words of Thucydides—*εἶναι δὲ αὐτῶν, ὅποιοι καὶ ὅπλα παρέχονται*. These words distinctly signify, that all who furnished heavy arms *should be of the Five Thousand; should belong of right to that body*: which is something different from *being eligible* into the number of Five Thousand, either by lot, rotation, or otherwise. The language of Thucydides, when he describes (in the passage referred to by Dr. Arnold, c. 93) the projected formation of the Four Hundred by rotation out of the Five Thousand, is very different—*καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐν μέρει τοὺς τετρακσίους ἕσσεσθαι*, &c. M. Boeckh (Public Economy of Athens, b. ii. ch. 21. p. 268, Eng. Tr.) is not satisfactory in his description of this event.

The idea which I conceive of the Five Thousand, as a number existing from the commencement only in talk and imagination, neither realized nor intended to be realized—coincides with the full meaning of this passage of Thucydides, as well as with everything which he had before said about them.

I will here add that *ὅποιοι ὅπλα παρέχονται* means persons furnishing arms either for themselves alone, or for others also (Xénoph. Hellen. iii. 4, 15).

As to the second point, the signification of *νομοθέτας*, I stand upon the general use of that word

in Athenian political language: see the explanation earlier in this History, ch. xlv. It is for the commentators to produce some justification of the unusual meaning which they assign to it—"persons to model the constitution—commissioners who drew up the new constitution," as Dr. Arnold, in concurrence with the rest, translates it. Until some justification is produced, I venture to believe that *νομοθέται* is a word which would not be used in that sense with reference to nominees chosen by the democracy, and intended to act with the democracy: for it implies a final, decisive, authoritative determination—whereas the *ἐυγγραφεῖς* or "commissioners to draw up a constitution," were only invested with the function of submitting something for approbation to the public assembly or competent authority; that is, assuming that the public assembly remained an efficient reality.

Moreover the words *καὶ ἄλλα* would hardly be used in immediate sequence to *νομοθέτας* if the latter word meant that which the commentators suppose:—"Commissioners for framing a constitution *and the other things towards the constitution*." Such commissioners are surely far too prominent and initiative in their function to be named in this way. Let us add, that the most material items in the new constitution (if we are so to call it) have already been distinctly specified as settled by public vote, before these *νομοθέται* are even named.

It is important to notice, that even the Thirty, who were named six years afterwards to draw up a

were renewed: after which many other assemblies were also held, in which *Nomothetæ*, *Dikasts*, and other institutions essential to the working of the democracy, were constituted. Various other votes were also passed; especially one, on the proposition of *Kritias*, seconded by *Theramênês*,¹ to restore *Alkibiadês* and some of his friends from exile; while messages were farther despatched, both to him and to the armament at *Samos*, doubtless confirming the recent nomination of generals, apprising them of what had recently occurred at Athens, as well as bespeaking their full concurrence and unabated efforts against the common enemy.

Thucydides bestows marked eulogy upon the general spirit of moderation and patriotic harmony which now reigned at Athens, and which directed the political proceedings of the people.² But he does not countenance the belief (as he has been sometimes understood), nor is it true in point of fact—that they now introduced a

Moderation of political antipathies, and patriotic spirit, now prevalent.

constitution, at the moment when Sparta was mistress of Athens and when the people were thoroughly put down, are not called *νομοθέται*, but are named by a circumlocution equivalent to *ξυγγραφείς*—*Ἐδοξε τῷ δήμῳ, τριάκοντα ἀνδρας ἐλέσθαι, οἱ τοὺς πατρίους νόμους ξυγγράψουσι, καθ' οὓς πολιτεύσουσι.*—*Αἰρεθέντες δὲ, ἐφ' ᾧ τε ξυγγράψαι νόμους καθ' οὔσιν ας πολιτεύσονται, τούτους μὲν αἰεὶ ἐμελλον ξυγγράψαι τε καὶ ἀποδεικνύναι, &c.* (*Xenophon*, *Hellen.* ii. 3, 2—11.) *Xenophon* calls *Kritias* and *Chariklês* the *Nomothetæ* of the Thirty (*Memor.* i. 2, 30), but this is not democracy.

For the signification of *νομοθέτης* (applied most generally to *Solon*, sometimes to others either by rhetorical looseness or by ironical taunt) or *νομοθέται*, a numerous body of persons chosen and sworn—see *Lysias* cont. *Nikomach.* sect. 3, 33, 37; *Andokidês* de *Mysteriis*, sect. 81—85, c. 14. p. 38—where the *Nomothetæ* are a sworn body of

Five Hundred, exercising conjointly with the senate the function of accepting or rejecting the laws proposed to them.

¹ *Plutarch*, *Alkibiadês*, c. 33. *Cornelius Nepos* (*Alkibiad.* c. 5, and *Diodorus*, xiii. 38—42) mentions *Theramênês* as the principal author of the decree for restoring *Alkibiadês* from exile. But the precise words of the elegy composed by *Kritias*, wherein the latter vindicates this proceeding to himself, are cited by *Plutarch*, and are very good evidence. Doubtless many of the leading men supported, and none opposed, the proposition.

² *Thucyd.* viii. 97. *Καὶ οὐχ ἥμισυ δὴ τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον ἐπὶ γὰρ ἐμοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι φαίνονται εὖ πολιτεύσαντες. μετρία γὰρ ἦ τε ἐς τοὺς ὀλίγους καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐξόχρασις ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐκ πονηρῶν τῶν πραγμάτων γενομένων τοῦτο πρῶτον ἀνέγενχε τὴν πόλιν.*

I refer the reader to a note on this passage in one of my former

new constitution. Putting an end to the oligarchy, and to the rule of the Four Hundred, they restored the old democracy, seemingly with only two modifications—first, the partial limitation of the right of suffrage—next, the discontinuance of all payment for political functions. The impeachment against Antiphon, tried immediately afterwards, went before the Senate and the Dikastery, exactly according to the old democratical forms of procedure. But we must presume that the Senate, the Dikasts, the Nomothetæ, the Ekklesiasts (or citizens who attended the assembly), the public orators who prosecuted state-criminals or defended any law when it was impugned—must have worked for the time without pay.

Moreover the two modifications above-mentioned were of little practical effect. The exclusive body of Five Thousand citizens, professedly constituted at this juncture, was neither exactly realised, nor long retained. It was constituted, even now, more as a nominal than as a real limit; a nominal total, yet no longer a mere blank as the Four Hundred had originally produced it, but containing indeed a number of individual names greater than the total, and without any assignable line of demarcation. The mere fact, that every one who furnished a panoply was entitled to be of the Five Thousand—and not they alone, but others besides¹—shows that no care was taken to adhere either to that or to any other precise number. If we may credit a speech composed by Lysias,² the Four Hundred had themselves (after the demolition of their intended fortress at Eetioneia, and when power was passing out of their hands) appointed a committee of their number to draw up for the first time a real list of *The Five Thousand*: and Polystratus, a member of that committee, takes credit with the succeeding democracy for having made the list comprise nine thousand names instead of five thousand. As this list of Polystratus (if indeed it ever existed) was never either published or adopted, I merely notice the description

The Five
Thousand—
a number
never
exactly
realised.

volumes, and on the explanation given of it by Dr. Arnold (see ch. xlv.).

¹ The words of Thucydides (viii. 97)—εἶναι δὲ αὐτῶν, ὅπως αἱ καὶ ἐπὶ παραγρονται—show that this body was not composed *exclusively*

of those who furnished panoplies. It could never have been intended, for example, to exclude the Hippeis or Knights.

² Lysias, Orat. xx. pro Polystrato, c. 4. p. 675 Reisk.

given of it to illustrate my position, that the number Five Thousand was now understood on all sides as an indefinite expression for a suffrage extensive, but not universal. The number had been first invented by Antiphon and the leaders of the Four Hundred, to cloak their own usurpation and intimidate the democracy: next, it served the purpose of Theramenês and the minority of the Four Hundred, as a basis on which to raise a sort of dynastic opposition (to use modern phraseology) within the limits of the oligarchy—that is, without appearing to overstep principles acknowledged by the oligarchy themselves: lastly, it was employed by the democratical party generally as a convenient middle term to slide back into the old system, with as little dispute as possible; for Alkibiadês and the armament had sent word home that they adhered to the Five Thousand, and to the abolition of salaried civil functions.¹

But exclusive suffrage of the so-called Five Thousand, especially with the expansive numerical construction now adopted, was of little value either to themselves or to the state;² while it was an insulting shock to the feelings of the excluded multitude, especially to brave and active seamen like the Parali. Though prudent as a step of momentary transition, it could not stand, nor was any attempt made to preserve it in permanence—amidst a community so long accustomed to universal citizenship, and where the necessities of defence against the enemy called for energetic efforts from all the citizens.

Even as to the gratuitous functions, the members of the Five Thousand themselves would soon become tired, not less than the poorer freemen, of serving without pay, as senators or in other ways: so that nothing but absolute financial deficit would prevent the re-establishment, entire or partial, of the pay. And that deficit was never so complete as to stop the disbursement of the Diobely, or distribution of two oboli to each citizen on occasion of various religious festivals. Such distribution continued without interruption; though perhaps the number of occasions on which it was made may have been lessened.³

¹ Thucyd. viii. 86.

² Thucyd. viii. 92. τὸ μὲν καταστῆσαι μετόχους τοσούτους, ἀντικρὺς ἂν ὁῦμον ἡγούμενοι, &c.

³ See the valuable financial inscriptions in M. Boeckh's *Corpus Inscriptionum*, part i. nos. 147, 148, which attest considerable disburse-

How far, or under what restriction, any re-establishment of civil pay obtained footing during the seven years between the Four Hundred and the Thirty, we cannot say. But leaving this point undecided, we can show, that within a year after the deposition of the Four Hundred, the suffrage of the so-called Five Thousand expanded into the suffrage of all Athenians without exception, or into the full antecedent democracy. A memorable decree, passed about eleven months after that event—at the commencement of the archonship of Glaukippus (June or July 410 B.C.) when the Senate of Five Hundred, the Dikasts and other civil functionaries were renewed for the coming year, pursuant to the ancient democratical practice—exhibits to us the full democracy not merely in action, but in all the glow of feeling called forth by a recent restoration. It seems to have been thought that this first renewal of archons and other functionaries, under the revived democracy, ought to be stamped by some emphatic proclamation of sentiment, analogous to the solemn and heart-stirring oath taken in the preceding year at Samos. Accordingly Demophantus proposed and carried a (psephism or) decree,¹ prescribing the form of an oath to be taken by all Athenians to stand by the democratical constitution.

Restoration of the complete democracy, all except pay.

The terms of his psephism and oath are striking. "If any man subvert the democracy at Athens, or hold any magistracy after the democracy has been subverted, he shall be an enemy of the Athenians. Let him be put to death with impunity, and let his property be confiscated to the public, with the reservation of a tithe to Athênê. Let the man who has killed him, and the accomplice privy to the act, be accounted holy and of good religious odour.

Psephism of Demophantus—democratical oath prescribed.

ments for the Diobely in 410 409 B.C.

Nor does it seem that there was much diminution during these same years in the private expenditure and ostentation of the Chorêgi at the festivals and other exhibitions: see the Oration xxi. of Lysias—*Ἀπολογία Δωροδοξίας*—c. 1, 2, p. 698-700 Reiske.

¹ About the date of this psephism or decree, see Boeckh, *Staatshaus-*

haltung der Athener, vol. ii. p. 168 (in the comment upon sundry inscriptions appended to his work, not included in the English translation by Sir G. Lewis); also Mejer, *De Bonis Damnatorum*, sect. ii. p. 6-10. Wachsmuth erroneously places the date of it after the Thirty—see *Hellen. Alterth.* ii. ix. p. 2 7.

Let all Athenians swear an oath under the sacrifice of full-grown victims, in their respective tribes and demes, to kill him.¹ Let the oath be as follows:—‘I will kill with my own hand, if I am able, any man who shall subvert the democracy at Athens, or who shall hold any office in future after the democracy has been subverted, or shall rise in arms for the purpose of making himself a despot, or shall help the despot to establish himself. And if any one else shall kill him, I will account the slayer to be holy as respects both gods and demons, as having slain an enemy of the Athenians. And I engage, by word, by deed and by vote, to sell his property and make over one-half of the proceeds to the slayer, without withholding anything. If any man shall perish in slaying or in trying to slay the despot, I will be kind both to him and to his children, as to Harmodius and Aristogeiton and their descendants. And I hereby dissolve and release all oaths which have been sworn hostile to the Athenian people, either at Athens, or at the camp (at Samos) or elsewhere.’² Let all Athenians swear this as the regular oath immediately before the festival of the Dionysia, with sacrifice and full-grown victims;³ invoking upon him who keeps it, good things in abundance,—but upon him who breaks it, destruction for himself as well as for his family.”

Such was the remarkable decree which the Athenians

¹ Andokidēs de Mysteriis, sect. 95-99. (c. 16, p. 48 R.)—‘Ο δ’ ἀποκτείνας τὸν ταῦτα ποιήσαντα, καὶ ὁ συμβουλευσας, ὅσιος ἔστω, καὶ εὐαγγής. ‘Ομόσαι δ’ Ἀθηναίους ἅπαντας καθ’ ἱερῶν τελείων, κατὰ φυλὰς καὶ κατὰ ὄγμους, ἀποκτείνειν τὸν ταῦτα ποιήσαντα.

The comment of Sievers (*Commentationes De Xenophontis Hellenicis*, Berlin, 1833, p. 18, 19) on the events of this time, is not clear.

² Andokidēs de Mysteriis, sect. 95-99. (c. 16, p. 48 R.) ‘Οπόσαι δ’ ἔρχοι ὁμωμονταὶ Ἀθήνησιν ἢ ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἢ ἄλλοθι πού ἐναντίῳ τῷ ὄγμῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, λύω καὶ ἀφίημι.

To what particular anti-constitutional oaths allusion is here made, we cannot tell. All those of the

oligarchical conspirators, both at Samos and at Athens, are doubtless intended to be abrogated: and this oath, like that of the armament at Samos (*Thucyd.* viii. 75), is intended to be sworn by every one, including those who had before been members of the oligarchical conspiracy. Perhaps it may also be intended to abrogate the covenant sworn by the members of the political clubs or *ξυωμοσσίαι* among themselves, insofar as it pledged them to anti-constitutional acts (*Thucyd.* viii. 54-81).

³ Andokidēs de Mysteriis, sect. 95-99. (c. 16, p. 48 R.) Ταῦτα δὲ ὁμοσάντων Ἀθηναῖοι πάντες καθ’ ἱερῶν τελείων, τὸν νόμιμον ἔρχον, πρὸ Διονυσίων, &c.

not only passed in senate and public assembly, less than a year after the deposition of the Four Hundred, but also caused to be engraved on a column close to the door of the Senate-house. It plainly indicates, not merely that the democracy had returned, but an unusual intensity of democratical feeling along with it. The constitution which *all* the Athenians thus swore to maintain by the most strenuous measures of defence, must have been a constitution in which *all* Athenians had political rights—not one of Five Thousand privileged persons excluding the rest.¹ This decree became invalid after the expulsion of the Thirty, by the general resolution then passed not to act upon any laws passed before the archonship of Eukleidês, unless specially re-enacted. But the column, on which it stood engraved, still remained, and the words were read upon it at least down to the time of the orator Lykurgus, eighty years afterwards.²

The mere deposition of the Four Hundred, however, and the transfer of political power to the Five Thousand, which took place in the first public assembly held after the defeat off Eretria—was sufficient to induce most of the violent leaders of the Four Hundred forthwith to leave Athens. Peisander, Alexiklês, and others, went off secretly to Dekeleia;³ Aristarchus alone made his flight the means of inflicting a new wound upon his country. Being among the

Flight of most of the leaders of the Four Hundred to Dekeleia.

¹ Those who think that a new constitution was established (after the deposition of the Four Hundred) are perplexed to fix the period at which the old democracy was restored. K. F. Hermann and others suppose, without any special proof, that it was restored at the time when Alkibiadês returned to Athens in 407 B.C. See K. F. Hermann, Griech. Staats-Alterthümer, s. 167. uot. 13.

² Lykurgus, adv. Leokrat. sect. 131. e. p. 225: compare Demosthen. adv. Leptin. sect. 133. e. 34. p. 506.

If we wanted any proof, how perfectly reckless and unmeaning is the mention of the name of *Solon* by the orators, we should find it in this passage of Andokidês.

He calls this psephism of Demophantus *a law of Solon* (sect. 96): see above in this History, ch. xi.

³ Thueyd. viii. 98. Most of these fugitives returned six years afterwards, after the battle of Ægospotami, when the Athenian people again became subject to an oligarchy in the persons of the Thirty. Several of them became members of the senate which worked under the Thirty (Lysias cont. Agorat. stet. 80. e. 18. p. 495).

Whether Aristotelês and Chariklês were among the number of the Four Hundred who now went into exile, as Wattenbach affirms (De Quadringent. Ath. Factione, p. 66), seems not clearly made out.

number of the generals, he availed himself of this authority to march—with some of the rudest among those Scythian archers, who did the police duty of the city—to Œnoë on the Bœotian frontier, which was at that moment under siege by a body of Corinthians and Bœotians united. Aristarchus, in concert with the besiegers, presented himself to the garrison, and acquainted them that Athens and Sparta had just concluded peace, one of the conditions of which was that Œnoë should be surrendered to the Bœotians. He therefore, as general, ordered them to evacuate the place, under the benefit of a truce to return home. The garrison, having been closely blocked up, and kept wholly ignorant of the actual condition of politics, obeyed the order without reserve; so that the Bœotians acquired possession of this very important frontier position—a new thorn in the side of Athens, besides Dekeleia.¹

Thus was the Athenian democracy again restored, and the divorce between the city and the armament at Samos terminated, after an interruption of about four months by the successful conspiracy of the Four Hundred. It was only by a sort of miracle—or rather by the incredible backwardness and stupidity of her foreign enemies—that Athens escaped alive from this nefarious aggression of her own ablest and wealthiest citizens. That the victorious democracy should animadvert upon and punish the principal actors concerned in it—who had satiated their own selfish ambition at the cost of so much suffering, anxiety, and peril, to their country—was nothing more than rigorous justice.

But the circumstances of the case were peculiar: for the counter-revolution had been accomplished partly by the aid of a minority among the Four Hundred themselves—Theramenês, Aristokratês, and others, together with the Board of Elders called Probûli—all of whom had been, at the outset, either principals or accomplices in that system of terrorism and assassination, whereby the democracy had been overthrown and the oligarchical rulers established in the Senate-house. The earlier operations of the conspiracy, therefore, though among its worst features, could not be exposed to inquiry and trial, without compromising

¹ Thucyd. viii. 89-90. Ἀριστάρχος, ἀνὴρ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα καὶ ἐκ πλείστον ἐναντίος τῷ δήμῳ, &c.

these parties as fellow-criminals. Theramenês evaded the difficulty, by selecting for animadversion a recent act of the majority of the Four Hundred, which he and his partisans had opposed, and on which therefore he had no interests adverse either to justice or to the popular feeling. He stood forward to impeach the last embassy sent by the Four Hundred to Sparta—sent with instructions to purchase peace and alliance at almost any price—and connected with the construction of the fort at Eetioneia for the reception of an enemy's garrison. This act of manifest treason, in which Antiphon, Phrynichus, and ten other known envoys were concerned, was chosen as the special matter for public trial and punishment, not less on public grounds than with a view to his own favour in the renewed democracy. But the fact that it was Theramenês who thus denounced his old friends and fellow-conspirators, after having lent hand and heart to their earlier and not less guilty deeds—was long remembered as a treacherous betrayal, and employed in after-days as an excuse for atrocious injustice against himself.¹

Of the twelve envoys who went on this mission, all except Phrynichus, Antiphon, Archeptolemus, and Onomaklês, seem to have already escaped to Dekeleia or elsewhere. Phrynichus (as I have mentioned a few pages above) had been assassinated several days before. Respecting his memory, a condemnatory vote had already been just passed by the restored Senate of Five Hundred, decreeing that his property should be confiscated and his house razed to the ground; and conferring the gift of citizenship, together with a pecuniary recompense, on two foreigners who claimed to have assassinated him.² The

¹ Lysias cont. Eratosthen. c. 11. p. 427. sect. 66-68. Βουλευόμενος δὲ (Theramenês) τῷ ὑμετέρῳ πλήθει πιστός δοκεῖν εἶναι, Ἀντιφῶντα καὶ Ἀρχεπτόλεμον, φιλιτάτους ὄντας αὐτῷ, κατηγορῶν ἀπέχτεινεν εἰς τοσοῦτον δὲ κακίας ἤλθεν, ὥστε ἅμα μὲν διὰ τὴν πρὸς ἐκείνους πίστιν ὑμᾶς κατεδούλωσато, διὰ δὲ τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοῦς φίλους ἀπώλεσεν.

Compare Xenophon, Hellen. ii. 3, 30-33.

² That these votes, respecting the memory and the death of Phryni-

chus, preceded the trial of Antiphon—we may gather from the concluding words of the sentence passed upon Antiphon: see Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 384 B.: compare Schol. Aristoph. Lysistr. 313.

Both Lysias and Lykurgus, the orators, contain statements about the death of Phrynichus which are not in harmony with Thucydides. Both these orators agree in reporting the names of the two foreigners who claimed to have slain Phryni-

other three, Antiphon, Archeptolemus, and Onomaklês,¹ were presented in name to the Senate by the generals (of whom probably Theramenês was one) as having gone on a mission to Sparta for purposes of mischief to Athens, partly on board an enemy's ship, partly through the Spartan garrison at Dekeleia. Upon this presentation, doubtless a document of some length and going into particulars, a senator named Andron moved,—That the generals, aided by any ten senators whom they may choose, do seize the three persons accused, and hold them in custody for trial: —That the Thesmothetæ do send to each of the three a formal summons, to prepare themselves for trial on a future day before the Dikastery, on the charge of high treason—and do bring them to trial on the day named; assisted by the generals, the ten senators chosen as auxiliaries, and any other citizen who may please to take part, as their accusers. Each of the three was to be tried separately, and if condemned, was to be dealt with according to the penal law of the city against traitors, or persons guilty of treason.²

Though all the three persons thus indicated were in Athens, or at least were supposed to be there, on the day when this resolution was passed by the Senate,—yet before it was executed, Onomaklês had fled; so that Antiphon and Arche-

Antiphon
tried, con-
demned,
and
executed.

chus, and whose claim was allowed by the people afterwards, in a formal reward and vote of citizenship—Thrasybulus of Kalydon—Apollodorus of Megara (Lysias cont. Agorat. c. 18. p. 492; Lykurg. cont. Leokrat. c. 29. p. 217).

Lykurgus says that Phrynichus was assassinated by night "near the fountain hard by the willow-trees:" which is quite contradictory to Thucydides, who states that the deed was done in daylight, and in the market-place. Agoratus, against whom the speech of Lysias is directed, pretended to have been one of the assassins, and claimed reward on that score.

The story of Lykurgus, that the Athenian people, on the proposition of Kritias, exhumed and brought to

trial the dead body of Phrynichus, and that Aristarchus and Alexiklês were put to death for undertaking its defence—is certainly in part false, and probably wholly false. Aristarchus was then at Genoë, Alexiklês at Dekeleia.

¹ Onomaklês had been one of the colleagues of Phrynichus, as general of the armament in Ionia, in the preceding autumn (Thucyd. viii. 25).

In one of the Biographies of Thucydides (p. xxii. in Dr. Arnold's edition) it is stated that Onomaklês was executed along with the other two; but the document cited in the Pseudo-Plutarch contradicts this.

² Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 834: compare Xenophon, Hellenic. i. 7, 22.

ptolemus only were imprisoned for trial. They too must have had ample opportunity for leaving the city, and we might have presumed that Antiphon would have thought it quite as necessary to retire as Peisander and Alexiklês. So acute a man as he, at no time very popular, must have known that now at least he had drawn the sword against his fellow-citizens in a manner which could never be forgiven. However, he chose voluntarily to stay: and this man, who had given orders for taking off so many of the democratical speakers by private assassination, received from the democracy, when triumphant, full notice and fair trial, on a distinct and specific charge. The speech which he made in his defence though it did not procure acquittal, was listened to, not merely with patience, but with admiration; as we may judge from the powerful and lasting effect which it produced. Thucydidês describes it as the most magnificent defence against a capital charge, which had ever come before him;¹ and the poet Agathon, doubtless a hearer, warmly complimented Antiphon on his eloquence; to which the latter replied, that the approval of one such discerning judge was in his eyes an ample compensation for the unfriendly verdict of the multitude. Both he and Archeptolemus were found guilty by the Dikastery and condemned to the penalties of treason. They were handed over to the magistrates called the Eleven (the chiefs of executive justice at Athens) to be put to death by the customary draught of hemlock. Their properties were confiscated: their houses were directed to be razed, and the vacant site to be marked by columns, with the inscription—"The residence of Antiphon the traitor—of Archeptolemus the traitor." They were not

Apolêxis was one of the accusers of Antiphon: see Harpokration, v. Στασιώτης.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 68; Aristotel. Ethic. Eudem. iii. 5. Καὶ αὐτός τε (Ἀντιφῶν)—ἄριστα φάνηται τῶν μέχρι ἐμοῦ, ὅπερ αὐτῶν τοῦτων αἰτιαθεὶς—θανάτου δίκην ἀπολογησάμενος—"And he too for himself," &c. Thucydidês had just before stated that Antiphon rendered the most valuable service as an adviser to other litigants, but that he seldom spoke before the people or the

Dikastery himself. The words καὶ αὐτός τε, following immediately, set forth his great efficiency when he did for once plead his own cause.

Ruhnken seems quite right (Dissertat. De Antiphont. p. 818 Reisk.) in considering the oration περὶ μεταστάσεως to be Antiphon's defence of himself—though Westermann (Geschichte der Griechisch. Beredsamkeit, p. 277) controverts this opinion. This oration is alluded to in several of the articles in Harpokration.

permitted to be buried either in Attica or in any territory subject to Athenian dominion.¹ Their children, both legitimate and illegitimate, were deprived of the citizenship; and the citizen, who should adopt any descendant of either of them, was to be himself in like manner disfranchised.

Such was the sentence passed by the Dikastery, pursuant to the Athenian law of treason. It was directed to be engraved on the same brazen column as the decree of honour to the slayers of Phrynichus. From that column it was transcribed, and has thus passed into history.²

How many of the Four Hundred oligarchs actually came to trial or were punished, we have no means of knowing; but there is ground for believing that none were put to death except Antiphon and Archeptolemus—perhaps also Aristarchus, the betrayer of Cenoë to the Bœotians. The

¹ So, Themistoklēs, as a traitor, was not allowed to be buried in Attica (Thucyd. i. 138; Cornel. Nepos. Vit. Themistocl. ii. 10). His friends are said to have brought his bones thither secretly.

² It is given at length in Pseudo-Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 833, 834. It was preserved by Cæcilius, a Sicilian and rhetorical teacher, of the Augustan age; who possessed sixty orations ascribed to Antiphon, twenty-five of which he considered to be spurious.

Antiphon left a daughter, whom Kallæschrus sued for in marriage pursuant to the forms of law, being entitled to do so on the score of near relationship (ἐπειδάσατο). Kallæschrus was himself one of the Four Hundred—perhaps a brother of Kritias. It seems singular that the legal power of suing at law for a female in marriage, by right of near kin (τοῦ ἐπειδάσασθαι), could extend to a female disfranchised and debarred from all rights of citizenship.

If we may believe Harpokration, Andron (who made the motion in

the Senate for sending Antiphon and Archeptolemus to trial) had been himself a member of the Four Hundred oligarchs, as well as Thermenēs (Harp. v. Ἀνδρων).

The note of Dr. Arnold, upon that passage (viii. 68) wherein Thucydides calls Antiphon ἀρετῇ οὐδενὸς ὕστερος—"inferior to no man in virtue"—well deserves to be consulted. This passage shows in a remarkable manner, what were the political and private qualities which determined the esteem of Thucydides. It shows that his sympathies went along with the oligarchical party; and that while the exaggerations of opposition speakers or demagogues, such as those which he imputes to Kleon and Hyperboulos, provoked his bitter hatred—exaggerations of the oligarchical warfare, or multiplied assassinations, did not make him like a man the worse. But it shows at the same time his high candour in the narration of facts; for he gives an undisguised revelation both of the assassinations, and of the treason, of Antiphon.

latter is said to have been formally tried and condemned:¹ though by what accident he afterwards came into the power of the Athenians, after having once effected his escape, we are not informed. The property of Peisander (he himself having escaped) was confiscated, and granted either wholly or in part as a recompense to Apollodorus, one of the assassins of Phrynichus:² probably the property of the other conspicuous fugitive oligarchs was confiscated also. Polystratus, another of the Four Hundred, who had only become a member of that body a few days before its fall, was tried during absence (which absence his defenders afterwards accounted for by saying that he had been wounded in the naval battle off Eretria) and heavily fined. It seems that each of the Four Hundred was called on to go through an audit and a trial of accountability (according to the practice general at Athens with magistrates going out of office). Such of them as did not appear to this trial were condemned to fine, to exile, or to have their names recorded as traitors. But most of those who did appear seem to have been acquitted, partly, we are told, by bribes to the Logistæ or auditing officers—though some were condemned either to fine or to partial political disability, along with those hoplites who had been the most marked partisans of the Four Hundred.³

¹ Xenoph. Hellenic. i. 7, 28. This is the natural meaning of the passage; though it *may* also mean that a day for trial was named, but that Aristarchus did not appear. Aristarchus may possibly have been made prisoner in one of the engagements which took place between the garrison of Dekeleia and the Athenians. The Athenian exiles in a body established themselves at Dekeleia and carried on constant war with the citizens at Athens: see Lysias, De Bonis Nicia Fratri, Or. xviii. ch. 4. p. 604; Pro Polystrato, Orat. xx. c. 7. p. 688; Andokidès de Mysteriis, c. 17. p. 50.

² Lysias, De Oleâ Sacrà, Or. vii. ch. 2. p. 263 Reisk.

³ "Quadringtonis ipsa dominatio fraudi non fuit; imo qui eum Thera-

mene et Aristocrate steterant, in magno honore habiti sunt: omnibus autem rationes reddendæ fuerunt; qui solum vertissent, proditores judicati sunt, nomina in publico proposita" (Wattenbaeh, De Quadringtonum Athenis Factione, p. 65).

From the psephism of Patrokleidès (passed six years subsequently, after the battle of Ægospotamos) we learn that the names of such among the Four Hundred as did not stay to take their trial were engraved on pillars distinct from those who were tried and condemned either to fine or to various disabilities—Andokidès de Mysteriis, sect. 75-78—Καὶ ὅσα ὀνόματα τῶν τετρακοσίων τινὲς ἐγγέγραπται, ἣ ἄλλο τι περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πραχθέντων ἔστι που γε-

Indistinctly as we make out the particular proceedings of the Athenian people at this restoration of the democracy, we know from Thucydides that their prudence and moderation were exemplary. The eulogy, which he bestows in such emphatic terms upon their behaviour at this juncture, is

Favourable
judgement
of Thucy-
dides on the
conduct of
the Athe-
nians.

γραμμένον, πλὴν ὅποσα ἐν στή-
λαις γέγραπται τῶν μὴ ἐνθάδε
μεινάντων, &c. (these last names,
as the most criminal, were excepted
from the amnesty of Patrokleidēs).

We here see that there were two categories among the condemned Four Hundred:—1. Those who remained to stand the trial of accountability, and were condemned either to a fine which they could not pay, or to some positive disability. 2. Those who did not remain to stand their trial, and were condemned *par contumace*.

Along with the first category we find other names besides those of the Four Hundred, found guilty as their partisans—ἄλλο τι (ὄνομα) περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πραχθέντων. Among these partisans we may rank the soldiers mentioned a little before, sect. 75—οἱ στρατιῶται, οἷς ὅτι ἐπέμειναν ἐπὶ τῶν τυράννων ἐν τῇ πόλει, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἦν ἄπερ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις, εἰπεῖν δ' ἐν τῷ δῆμῳ οὐκ ἐξῆν αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ βουλεῖσθαι—where the preposition ἐπὶ seems to signify not simply contemporaneousness, but a sort of intimate connexion, like the phrase ἐπὶ προστάτου οἰκεῖν (see Matthiæ, Gr. Gr. sect. 584; Kühner, Gr. Gr. sect. 611).

The oration of Lysias pro Polystrato is on several points obscure: but we make out that Polystratus was one of the Four Hundred who did not come to stand his trial of accountability, and was therefore condemned in his absence. Severe accusations were made against him, and he was falsely asserted

to be the cousin, whereas he was in reality only fellow demot, of Phrynichus (sect. 20, 24, 11). The defence explains his non-appearance by saying that he had been wounded at the battle of Eretria, and that the trial took place immediately after the deposition of the Four Hundred (sect. 14, 24). He was heavily fined, and deprived of his citizenship (sect. 15, 33, 38). It would appear that the fine was greater than his property could discharge: accordingly this fine, remaining unpaid, would become chargeable upon his sons after his death, and unless they could pay it, they would come into the situation of insolvent public debtors to the state, which would debar them from the exercise of the rights of citizenship, so long as the debt remained unpaid. But while Polystratus was alive, his sons were not liable to the state for the payment of his fine; and *they* therefore still remained citizens and in the full exercise of their rights, though *he* was disfranchised. They were three sons, all of whom had served with credit as hoplites, and even as horsemen, in Sicily and elsewhere. In the speech before us, one of them prefers a petition to the Dikastery that the sentence passed against his father may be mitigated—partly on the ground that it was unmerited, being passed while his father was afraid to stand forward in his own defence—partly as recompense for distinguished military services of all the three sons. The speech was delivered at

indeed doubly remarkable:¹ first, because it comes from an exile, not friendly to the democracy, and a strong admirer of Antiphon; next, because the juncture itself was one eminently trying to the popular morality and likely to degenerate, by almost natural tendency, into excess of reactionary vengeance and persecution. The democracy was now one hundred years old, dating from Kleisthenês—and fifty years old, even dating from the final reforms of Ephialtês and Periklês; so that self-government and political equality were a part of the habitual sentiment of every man's bosom—heightened in this case by the fact that Athens was not merely a democracy, but an imperial democracy, having dependencies abroad.² At a moment when, from unparalleled previous disasters, she is barely able to keep up the struggle against her foreign enemies, a small knot of her own wealthiest citizens, taking advantage of her weakness, contrive by a tissue of fraud and force not less flagitious than skilfully combined, to concentrate in their own hands the powers of the state, and to tear from their countrymen the security against bad government, the sentiment of equal citizenship, and the long-established freedom of speech. Nor is this all: these conspirators not only plant an oligarchical sovereignty in the Senate-house, but also sustain that sovereignty by inviting a foreign garrison from without, and by betraying Athens to her Peloponnesian enemies. Two more deadly injuries it is impossible to imagine; and from neither of them would Athens have escaped, if her foreign enemy had manifested reasonable alacrity. Considering the immense peril, the narrow escape, and the impaired condition in which Athens was left notwithstanding her escape—we might well have expected in the people a violence of

a time later than the battle of Kynossema, in the autumn of this year (sect. 31), but not very long after the overthrow of the Four Hundred, and certainly (I think) long before the Thirty; so that the assertion of Taylor (*Vit. Lysiaë*, p. 55) that all the extant orations of Lysias bear date after the Thirty, must be received with this exception.

¹ This testimony of Thucydides

is amply sufficient to refute the vague assertions in the Oration xxv. of Lysias (*Δήμου Κατάλογ.* Ἀπολ. sec. 34, 35) about great enormities now committed by the Athenians; though Mr. Mitford copies these assertions as if they were real history, referring them to a time four years afterwards (*History of Greece*, ch. xx. s. 1. vol. iv. p. 327).

² Thucyd. viii. 68.

reactionary hostility such as every calm observer, while making allowance for the provocation, must nevertheless have condemned; and perhaps somewhat analogous to that exasperation which, under very similar circumstances, had caused the bloody massacres at Korkyra.¹ And when we find that this is exactly the occasion which Thucydides (an observer rather less than impartial) selects to eulogise their good conduct and moderation, we are made deeply sensible of the good habits which their previous democracy must have implanted in them, and which now served as a corrective to the impulse of the actual moment. They had become familiar with the cementing force of a common sentiment; they had learnt to hold sacred the inviolability of law and justice, even in respect to their worst enemy; and what was of not less moment, the frequency and freedom of political discussion had taught them not only to substitute the contentions of the tongue for those of the sword, but also to conceive their situation with its present and prospective liabilities, instead of being hurried away by blind retrospective vengeance against the past.

There are few contrasts in Grecian history more memorable or more instructive, than that between this oligarchical conspiracy,—conducted by some of the ablest hands at Athens—and the democratical movement going on at the same time in Samos, among the Athenian armament and the Samian citizens. In the former we have nothing but selfishness and personal ambition from the beginning: first, a partnership to seize for their own advantage the powers of government—next, after this object has been accomplished, a breach among the partners, arising out of disappointment alike selfish. We find appeal made to nothing but the worst tendencies; either tricks to practise upon the credulity of the people, or extra-judicial murders to work upon their fear. In the latter, on the contrary, the sentiment invoked is that of common patriotism, and equal, public-minded sympathy. That which we read in Thucydides—when the soldiers of the armament and the Samian citizens pledged themselves to each other by solemn oaths to uphold their democracy, to maintain harmony and good feeling with each other, to prosecute energetically the war against the Peloponnesians, and to remain at enmity with the oli-

Oligarchy
at Athens,
democracy
at Samos—
contrast.

¹ See, about the events in Korkyra, ch. I.

garchical conspirators at Athens—is a scene among the most dramatic and inspiring which occurs in his history.¹ Moreover we recognise at Samos the same absence of reactionary vengeance as at Athens, after the attack of the oligarchs, Athenian as well as Samian, has been repelled; although those oligarchs had begun by assassinating Hyperbolus and others. There is throughout this whole democratical movement at Samos a generous exaltation of common sentiment over personal, and at the same time an absence of ferocity against opponents, such as nothing except democracy ever inspired in the Grecian bosom.

It is indeed true that this was a special movement of generous enthusiasm, and that the details of a democratical government correspond to it but imperfectly. Neither in the life of an individual, nor in that of a people, does the ordinary and every-day movement appear at all worthy of those particular seasons in which a man is lifted above his own level, and becomes capable of extreme devotion and heroism. Yet such emotions, though their complete predominance is never otherwise than transitory, have their foundation in veins of sentiment which are not even at other times wholly extinct, but count among the manifold forces tending to modify and improve, if they cannot govern, human action. Even their moments of transitory predominance leave a luminous tract behind, and render the men who have passed through them more apt to conceive again the same generous impulse, though in fainter degree. It is one of the merits of Grecian democracy that it *did* raise this feeling of equal and patriotic communion; sometimes, and on rare occasions, like the scene at Samos, with overwhelming intensity, so as to impassion an unanimous multitude; more frequently, in feebler tide, yet such as gave some chance to an honest and eloquent orator of making successful appeal to public feeling against corruption or selfishness. If we follow the movements of Antiphon and his fellow-conspirators at Athens, contemporaneous with the democratical manifestations at Samos, we shall see that not only was no such generous impulse included in it, but the success of their scheme depended upon their being able to strike all common and active patriotism out of the Athenian bosom. Under the “cold shade” of their oligarchy—even if we suppose the absence of cruelty and rapa-

¹ Thucyd. viii. 75.

city, which would probably soon have become rife had their dominion lasted, as we shall presently learn from the history of the second oligarchy of Thirty—no sentiment would have been left to the Athenian multitude except fear, servility, or at best a tame and dumb sequacity to leaders whom they neither chose nor controlled. To those who regard different forms of government as distinguished from each other mainly by the feelings which each tends to inspire, in magistrates as well as citizens, the contemporaneous scenes of Athens and Samos will suggest instructive comparisons between Grecian oligarchy and Grecian democracy.

CHAPTER LXIII.

THE RESTORED ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY, AFTER THE DEPOSITION OF THE FOUR HUNDRED, DOWN TO THE ARRIVAL OF CYRUS THE YOUNGER IN ASIA MINOR.

THE oligarchy of Four Hundred at Athens (installed in the Senate-house about February or March 411 B.C., and deposed about July of the same year), after four or five months of danger and distraction such as to bring her almost within the grasp of her enemies, has now been terminated by the restoration of her democracy; with what attendant circumstances has been amply detailed. I now revert to the military and naval operations on the Asiatic coast, partly contemporaneous with the political dissensions at Athens, above described.

B.C. 411.
Embar-
rassed state
of Athens
after the
Four
Hundred.

It has already been stated that the Peloponnesian fleet of 94 triremes,¹ having remained not less than 80 days idle at Rhodes, had come back to Milêtus towards the end of March; with the intention of proceeding to the rescue of Chios, which a portion of the Athenian armament under Strombichidês had been for some time besieging, and which was now in the greatest distress. The main Athenian fleet at Samos, however, prevented Astyochus from effecting this object, since he did not think it advisable to hazard a general battle. He was influenced partly by the bribes, partly by the delusions of Tissaphernês, who sought only to wear out both parties by protracted war, and who now professed to be on the point of bringing up the Phœnician fleet to his aid. Astyochus had in his fleet the ships which had been brought over for cooperation with Pharnabazus at the Hellespont, and which were thus equally unable to reach their destination. To meet this difficulty, the Spartan

Peloponne-
sian fleet—
revolt of
Abydos
from
Athens.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 44, 45.

Derkyllidas was sent with a body of troops by land to the Hellespont, there to join Pharnabazus, in acting against Abydos and the neighbouring dependencies of Athens. Abydos, connected with Milêtus by colonial ties, set the example of revolting from Athens to Derkyllidas and Pharnabazus; an example followed, two days afterwards, by the neighbouring town of Lampsakus.

It does not appear that there was at this time any Athenian force in the Hellespont; and the news of this danger to the empire in a fresh quarter, when conveyed to Chios, alarmed Strombichidês, the commander of the Athenian besieging armament. The Chians, driven to despair by increasing famine as well as by want of relief from Astyochus, and having recently increased their fleet to 36 triremes against the Athenian 32, by the arrival of 12 ships under Leon (obtained from Milêtus during the absence of Astyochus at Rhodes), had sallied out and fought an obstinate naval battle against the Athenians, with some advantage.¹ Nevertheless Strombichidês felt compelled immediately to carry away 24 triremes and a body of hoplites for the relief of the Hellespont. Hence the Chians became sufficiently masters of the sea, to provision themselves afresh, though the Athenian armament and fortified post still remained on the island. Astyochus also was enabled to recall Leon with the twelve triremes to Milêtus, and thus to strengthen his main fleet.²

The present appears to have been the time, when the oligarchical party both in the town and in the camp at Samos, were laying their plan of conspiracy as already recounted, and when the Athenian generals were divided in opinion—Charminus siding with this party, Leon and Diomedon against it. Apprised of the reigning dissension, Astyochus thought it a favourable opportunity for sailing with his whole fleet up to the harbour of Samos, and offering battle; but the Athenians were in no condition to leave the harbour. He accordingly returned to Milêtus, where he again remained inactive, in expectation (real or pretended) of the arrival of the Phenician ships. But the discontent of his own troops, especially the Syracusan contingent,

¹ Thucyd. viii. 61, 62. οὐκ ἔλαττον not very decisive.
 σὺν ἔτυχον means a certain success,

² Thucyd. viii. 63.

presently became uncontrollable. They not only murmured at the inaction of the armament during this precious moment of disunion in the Athenian camp, but also detected the insidious policy of Tissaphernês in thus frittering away their strength without result; a policy still more keenly brought home to their feelings by his irregularity in supplying them with pay and provision, which caused serious distress. To appease their clamours, Astyochus was compelled to call together a general assembly, the resolution of which was pronounced in favour of immediate battle. He accordingly sailed from Milêtus with his whole fleet of 112 triremes round to the promontory of Mykalê immediately opposite Samos—ordering the Milesian hoplites to cross the promontory by land to the same point. The Athenian fleet, now consisting of only 82 sail, in the absence of Strombichidês, was then moored near Glaukê on the mainland of Mykalê: but the public decision just taken by the Peloponnesians to fight becoming known to them, they retired to Samos, not being willing to engage with such inferior numbers.¹

It seems to have been during this last interval of inaction on the part of Astyochus, that the oligarchical party in Samos made their attempt and miscarried; the reaction from which attempt brought about, with little delay, the great democratical manifestation, and solemn collective oath, of the Athenian armament—coupled with the nomination of new, cordial, and unanimous generals. They were now in high enthusiasm, anxious for battle with the enemy; and Strombichidês had been sent for immediately, that the fleet might be united against the main enemy at Milêtus. That officer had recovered Lampsakus, but had failed in his attempt on Abydos.² Having established a central fortified station at Sestos, he now rejoined the fleet at Samos, which by his arrival was increased to 108 sail. He arrived in the night, when the Peloponnesian fleet was preparing to renew its attack from Mykalê the next morning. It consisted of 112 ships, and was therefore still superior in number to the Athenians. But having now learnt both the arrival of Strombichidês, and the renewed spirit as well as unanimity of the Athenians, the Peloponnesian commanders did not venture to persist in their resolution of fighting. They

Strombichidês returns from Chios to Samos.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 78, 79.

² Thucyd. viii. 62.

returned back to Milêtus, to the mouth of which harbour the Athenians sailed, and had the satisfaction of offering battle to an unwilling enemy.¹

Such confession of inferiority was well-calculated to embitter still farther the discontents of the Peloponnesian fleet at Milêtus. Tissaphernês had become more and more parsimonious in furnishing pay and supplies; while the recall of Alkibiadês to Samos, which happened just now, combined with the uninterrupted apparent intimacy between him and the satrap, confirmed their belief that the latter was intentionally cheating and starving them, in the interest of Athens. At the same time, earnest invitations arrived from Pharnabazus, soliciting the cooperation of the fleet at the Hellespont, with liberal promises of pay and maintenance. Klearchus, who had been sent out with the last squadron from Sparta for the express purpose of going to aid Pharnabazus, claimed to be allowed to execute his orders; while Astyochus also, having renounced the idea of any united action, thought it now expedient to divide the fleet, which he was at a loss how to support. Accordingly Klearchus was sent with forty triremes from Milêtus to the Hellespont, yet with instructions to evade the Athenians at Samos by first stretching out westward into the Ægean. Encountering severe storms, he was forced with the greater part of his squadron to seek shelter at Delos, and even suffered so much damage as to return to Milêtus, from whence he himself marched to the Hellespont by land. Ten of his triremes, however, under the Megarian Helixus, weathered the storm and pursued their voyage to the Hellespont, which was at this moment unguarded, since Strombichidês seems to have brought back all his squadron. Helixus passed on unopposed to Byzantium, a Doric city and Megarian colony, from whence secret invitations had already reached him, and which he now induced to revolt from Athens. This untoward news admonished the Athenian generals at Samos, whose vigilance the circuitous route of Klearchus had eluded, of the necessity of guarding the Hellespont, whither they sent a detachment, and even attempted in vain to recapture Byzantium. Sixteen fresh triremes afterwards proceeded from Milêtus to the Helles-

¹ Thucyd. viii. 79.

pont and Abydos, thus enabling the Peloponnesians to watch that strait as well as the Bosphorus and Byzantium,¹ and even to ravage the Thracian Chersonese.

Meanwhile the discontents of the fleet at Milêtus broke out into open mutiny against Astyochus and Tissaphernês. Unpaid and only half-fed, the seamen came together in crowds to talk over their grievances; denouncing Astyochus as having betrayed them for his own profit to the satrap, who was treacherously ruining the armament under the inspirations of Alkibiadês. Even some of the officers, whose silence had been hitherto purchased, began to hold the same language; perceiving that the mischief was becoming irreparable, and that the men were actually on the point of desertion. Above all, the incorruptible Hermokratês of Syracuse, and Dorieus the Thurian commander, zealously espoused the claims of their seamen, who being mostly freemen (in greater proportion than the crews of the Peloponnesian ships), went in a body to Astyochus, with loud complaints and demand of their arrears of pay. But the Peloponnesian general received them with haughtiness and even with menace, lifting up his stick to strike the commander Dorieus while advocating their cause. Such was the resentment of the seamen that they rushed forward to pelt Astyochus with missiles: he took refuge, however, on a neighbouring altar, so that no actual mischief was done.²

Nor was the discontent confined to the seamen of the fleet. The Milesians also, displeased and alarmed at the fort which Tissaphernês had built in their town, watched an opportunity of attacking it by surprise, and expelled his garrison. Though the armament in general, now full of antipathy against the satrap, sympathised in this proceeding, yet the Spartan commissioner Lichas censured it severely; intimating to the Milesians that they, as well as the other Greeks in the king's territory, were bound to be subservient to Tissaphernês within all reasonable limits—and even to court him by extreme subservience, until the war should be prosperously terminated. It appears that in other matters also, Lichas had enforced instead of mitigating the authority of the satrap over them; so that the Milesians now came to hate him

Discontent
and meet-
ing against
Astyochus
at Milêtus.

The Spartan
com-
missioner
Lichas en-
joins the
Milesians
to obey
Tissapher-
nês—dis-
content of
the Mile-
sians.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 80—99.

² Thucyd. viii. 83, 84.

vehemently,¹ and when he shortly afterwards died of sickness, they refused permission to bury him in the spot (probably some place of honour) which his surviving countrymen had fixed upon. Though Lichas in these enforcements only carried out the stipulations of his treaty with Persia, yet it is certain that the Milesians, instead of acquiring autonomy according to the general promises of Sparta, were now farther from it than ever, and that imperial Athens had protected them against Persia much better than Sparta.

The subordination of the armament, however, was now almost at an end, when Mindarus arrived from Sparta as admiral to supersede Astyochus, who was summoned home and took his departure. Both Hermokratês and some Milesian deputies availed themselves of this opportunity to go to Sparta for the purpose of preferring complaints against Tissaphernês; while the latter on his part sent thither an envoy named Gaulites (a Karian brought up in equal familiarity with the Greek and Karian languages) both to defend himself against the often-repeated charges of Hermokratês, that he had been treacherously withholding the pay under concert with Alkibiadês and the Athenians—and to denounce the Milesians on his own side, as having wrongfully demolished his fort.² At the same time, he thought it necessary to put forward a new pretence, for the purpose of strengthening the negotiations of his envoy at Sparta, soothing the impatience of the armament, and conciliating the new admiral Mindarus. He announced that the Phenician fleet was on the point of arriving at Aspendus in Pamphylia, and that he was going thither to meet it, for the purpose of bringing it up to the seat of war to cooperate with the Peloponnesians. He invited Lichas to accompany him, and engaged to leave Tamos at Milêtus, as deputy during his absence, with orders to furnish pay and maintenance to the fleet.³

¹ Thucyd. viii. 84. 'Ο μέντοι Λίχας οὔτε ἡρέσκετο αὐτοῖς, ἔφη τε χρῆναι Τισσαφέρνει καὶ δουλεύειν Μιλησίους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τὰ μέτρα, καὶ ἐπιθεραπεύειν ἕως ἂν τὸν πόλεμον εὖ θῶνται.

Οἱ δὲ Μιλήσιοι ὀργίζοντό τε αὐτῷ καὶ διὰ ταῦτα καὶ δι' ἄλλα τοιούτων ἔργων, &c.

² Thucyd. viii. 85.

³ Thucyd. viii. 87.

Mindarus, a new commander without any experience of the mendacity of Tissaphernês, was imposed upon by his plausible assurance, and even captivated by the near prospect of so powerful a reinforcement. He despatched an officer named Philippos with two triremes round the Triopian Cape to Aspendus, while the satrap went thither by land.

Phenician
fleet at
Aspendus—
duplicity
of Tissa-
phernês.

Here again was a fresh delay of no inconsiderable length, while Tissaphernês was absent at Aspendus, on this ostensible purpose. Some time elapsed before Mindarus was undeceived, for Philippos found the Phenician fleet at Aspendus, and was therefore at first full of hope that it was really coming onward. But the satrap soon showed that his purpose now, as heretofore, was nothing better than delay and delusion. The Phenician ships were 147 in number; a fleet more than sufficient for concluding the maritime war, if brought up to act zealously. But Tissaphernês affected to think that this was a small force, unworthy of the majesty of the Great King; who had commanded a fleet of 300 sail to be fitted out for the service.¹ He waited for some time in pretended expectation that more ships were on their way, disregarding all the remonstrance of the Lacedæmonian officers.

Presently arrived the Athenian Alkibiadês, with thirteen Athenian triremes, exhibiting himself as on the best terms with the satrap. He too had made use of the approaching Phenician fleet to delude his countrymen at Samos, by promising to go and meet Tissaphernês at Aspendus; so as to determine him, if possible, to employ the fleet in aid of Athens—but at the very least, *not* to employ it in aid of Sparta. The latter alternative of the promise was sufficiently safe, for he knew well that Tissaphernês had no intention of applying the fleet to any really efficient purpose. But he was thereby enabled to take credit with his countrymen for having been the means

Alkibiadês
at Aspen-
dus—his
double
game be-
tween Tis-
saphernês
and the
Athenians.

¹ Thueyd. viii. 87. This greater total, which Tissaphernês pretended that the Great King purposed to send, is specified by Diodorus at 300 sail. Thucydidês does not assign any precise number (Diodor. xiii. 38, 42, 46).

On a subsequent occasion, too, we hear of the Phenician fleet as intended to be augmented to a total of 300 sail (Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 4, 1). It seems to have been the sort of standing number for a fleet worthy of the Persian king.

of diverting such a formidable reinforcement from the enemy.

Partly the apparent confidence between Tissaphernês and Alkibiadês—partly the impudent shifts of the former, grounded on the incredible pretence that the fleet was insufficient in number—at length satisfied Philippus that the present was only a new manifestation of deceit. After a long and vexatious interval, he apprised Mindarus—not without indignant abuse of the satrap—that nothing was to be hoped from the fleet at Aspendus. Yet the proceeding of Tissaphernês, indeed, in bringing up the Phenicians to that place, and still withholding the order for farther advance and action, was in every one's eyes mysterious and unaccountable. Some fancied that he did it with a view of levying larger bribes from the Phenicians themselves, as a premium for being sent home without fighting, as it appears that they actually were. But Thucydidês supposes that he had no other motive than that which had determined his behaviour during the last year—to protract the war and impoverish both Athens and Sparta, by setting up a fresh deception, which would last for some weeks, and thus procure so much delay.¹ The historian is doubtless right: but without his assurance, it would have been difficult to believe, that the maintenance of a fraudulent pretence, for so inconsiderable a time, should have been held as an adequate motive for bringing this large fleet from Phenicia to Aspendus, and then sending it away unemployed.

Having at length lost his hope of the Phenician ships, Mindarus resolved to break off all dealing with the perfidious Tissaphernês—the more so as Tamos, the deputy of the latter, though left ostensibly to pay and keep the fleet, performed that duty with greater irregularity than ever—and to conduct his fleet to the Hellespont into cooperation with Pharnabazus, who still continued his promises and invitations. The Peloponnesian fleet² (73 triremes strong, after deducting 13 which had been sent under Dorieus to suppress some disturbances in Rhodes) having been carefully prepared beforehand, was put in motion by sudden order, so that no

Phenicians
sent back
from Aspen-
dus without
action—
motives of
Tissapher-
nês.

Mindarus
leaves Mi-
lêtus with
his fleet—
goes to
Chios—
Thrasyllus
and the
Athenian
fleet at
Lesbos.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 87, 88, 99.

² Diodor. xiii. 33.

previous intimation might reach the Athenians at Samos. After having been delayed some days at Ikarus by bad weather, Mindarus reached Chios in safety. But here he was pursued by Thrasyllus, who passed, with 55 triremes, to the northward of Chios, and was thus between the Lacedæmonian admiral and the Hellespont. Believing that Mindarus would remain some time at Chios, Thrasyllus placed scouts both on the high lands of Lesbos and on the continent opposite Chios, in order that he might receive instant notice of any movement on the part of the enemy's fleet.¹ Meanwhile he employed his Athenian force in reducing the Lesbian town of Eresus, which had been lately prevailed on to revolt by a body of 300 assailants from Kymê under the Theban Anaxander—partly Methymnæan exiles with some political sympathisers, partly mercenary foreigners—who succeeded in carrying Eresus after failing in an attack on Methymna. Thrasyllus found before Eresus a small Athenian squadron of five triremes under Thrasybulus, who had been despatched from Samos to try and forestall the revolt, but had arrived too late. He was farther joined by two triremes from the Hellespont, and by others from Methymna, so that his entire fleet reached the number of 67 triremes, with which he proceeded to lay siege to Eresus; trusting to his scouts for timely warning in case the enemy's fleet should move northward.

The course which Thrasyllus expected the Peloponnesian fleet to take, was to sail from Chios northward through the strait which separates the north-eastern portion of that island from Mount Mimas on the Asiatic mainland: after which it would probably sail past Eresus on the western side of Lesbos, as being the shortest track to the Hellespont—though it might also go round on the eastern side between Lesbos and the continent, by a somewhat longer route. The Athenian scouts were planted so as to descry the Peloponnesian fleet if it either passed through

Mindarus
eludes
Thrasyllus,
and reaches
the Helles-
pont.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 100. Λισσόμενος δὲ ἔτι ἐν τῇ Χίῳ εἶναι, καὶ νομίσας αὐτὸν καλεῖσθαι αὐτοῦ, σκοποῦς μὲν γοτεστήσατο καὶ ἐν τῇ Δέσφῳ, καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀντιπέρῳ ἤπειρῳ, εἰ ἄρα ποὶ κινεῖντο αἱ νῆες, ὥπως μὴ λάθοιεν, &c.

I construe τῇ ἀντιπέρῳ ἤπειρῳ

as meaning the mainland opposite Chios, not opposite Lesbos. The words may admit either sense, since Χίῳ and αὐτοῦ appear so immediately before: and the situation for the scouts was much more suitable, opposite the northern portion of Chios.

this strait or neared the island of Lesbos. But Mindarus did neither; thus eluding their watch and reaching the Hellespont without the knowledge of the Athenians. Having passed two days in provisioning his ships, receiving besides from the Chians three tessarakosts (a Chian coin of unknown value) for each man among his seamen, he departed on the third day from Chios, but took a southerly route and rounded the island in all haste on its western or sea side. Having reached and passed the northern latitude of Chios, he took an eastward course, with Lesbos at some distance to his left-hand, direct to the mainland; which he touched at a harbour called Karterii in the Phokæan territory. Here he stopped to give the crew their morning meal: he then crossed the arc of the Gulf of Kymê to the little islets called Arginusæ (close on the Asiatic continent opposite Mitylênê), where he again halted for supper. Continuing his voyage onward during most part of the night, he was at Hermatûs (on the continent, directly northward and opposite to Methymna) by the next day's morning meal: then still hastening forward after a short halt, he doubled Cape Lektum, sailed along the Troad and past Tenedos, and reached the entrance of the Hellespont before midnight; where his ships were distributed at Sigeium, Rhœteium, and other neighbouring places.¹

¹ Thucyd. viii. 101. The latter portion of this voyage is sufficiently distinct; the earlier portion less so. I describe it in the text differently from all the best and most recent editors of Thucydidês; from whom I dissent with the less reluctance, as they all here take the gravest liberty with his text, inserting the negative *οὐ* on pure conjecture, without the authority of a single MS. Niebuhr has laid it down as almost a canon of criticism that this is never to be done: yet here we have Krüger recommending it, and Haack, Gölner, Dr. Arnold, Poppo, and M. Didot, all adopting it as a part of the text of Thucydidês; without even following the caution of Bekker in his small edition, who admonishes the reader by enclosing the

word in brackets. Nay, Dr. Arnold goes so far as to say in note, "*This correction is so certain and so necessary, that it only shows the inattention of the earlier editors that it was not made long since.*"

The words of Thucydidês, without this correction and as they stood universally before Haack's edition (even in Bekker's edition of 1821), are—

Ὁ δὲ Μίνδαρος ἐν τούτῳ καὶ αἱ ἐκ τῆς Χίου τῶν Πελοποννησίων νῆες ἐπισιτισάμεναι ὅσιν ἡμέραις, καὶ λαβόντες παρὰ τῶν Χίων τρεῖς τεσσαρακοστὰς ἑκαστος Χίος τῇ τρίτῃ διὰ ταχέων ἀπαίρουσιν ἐκ τῆς Χίου πελάγισαι, ἵνα μὴ περιτόχῳι ταῖς ἐν τῇ Ἐρέσῳ ναυσίν, ἀλλὰ ἐν ἀριστέραν τὴν Λέσβον ἔχοντες ἐπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν ἤπειρον. Καὶ προσβαλόντες τῆς Φωκαί-

By this well-laid course, and accelerated voyage, the Peloponnesian fleet completely eluded the lookers-out of

δος ἐς τὸν ἐν Καρτερίοις λιμένα, καὶ ἀριστοποιησάμενοι, παραπλεύσαντες τὴν Κυμναίαν δειπνοποιοῦνται ἐν Ἀργενούσαις τῆς ἡπείρου, ἐν τῷ ἀντιπέρασ τῆς Μιτυλήνης, &c.

Haack and the other eminent critics just mentioned, all insist that these words as they stand are absurd and contradictory, and that it is indispensable to insert οὐ before πελάγισι; so that the sentence stands in their editions ἀπαίρουσιν ἐκ τῆς Χίου οὐ πελάγισι. They all picture to themselves the fleet of Mindarus as sailing from the town of Chios *northward*, and going out at the northern strait. Admitting this, they say, plausibly enough, that the words of the old text involve a contradiction, because Mindarus would be going in the direction towards Eresus, and not away from it; though even then, the propriety of their correction would be disputable. But the word πελάγισι, when applied to ships departing from Chios—though it may perhaps mean that they round the north-eastern corner of the island and then strike west round Lesbos—yet means also as naturally, and more naturally, to announce them as *departing by the outer sea*, or sailing *on the seashore* (round the southern and western coast) of the island. Accept *this meaning*, and the old words construe perfectly well. Ἀπαίρουσιν ἐκ τῆς Χίου πελάγισι is the natural and proper phrase for describing the circuit of Mindarus round the south and west coast of Chios. This, too, was the only way by which he could have escaped the scouts and the ships of Thrasyllus: for which same purpose of avoiding Athenian ships, we find (viii. 80) the

squadron of Klearchus, on another occasion, making a long circuit out to sea. If it be supposed (which those who read οὐ πελάγισι must suppose) that Mindarus sailed first up the northern strait between Chios and the mainland, and then turned his course east towards Phokæa, this would have been the course which Thrasyllus expected that he would take; and it is hardly possible to explain why he was not seen both by the Athenian scouts as well as by the Athenian garrison at their station of Delphinium on Chios itself. Whereas by taking the circuitous route round the southern and western coast, he never came in sight either of one or the other; and he was enabled, when he got round to the latitude north of the island, to turn to the right and take a straight easterly course *with Lesbos on his left hand*, but at a sufficient distance from land to be out of sight of all scouts. Ἀνάγεισθαι ἐκ τῆς Χίου πελάγισι (Xen. Hellen. ii. 1. 17) means to strike into the open sea, quite clear of the coast of Asia: that passage does not decisively indicate whether the ships rounded the south-east or the north-east corner of the island.

We are here told that the seamen of Mindarus received from the Chians per head *three Chian tessarakosta*. Now this is a small Chian coin, nowhere else mentioned; and it is surprising to find so petty and local a denomination of money here specified by Thucydides, contrasted with the different manner in which Xenophon describes Chian payments to the Peloponnesian seamen (Hellen. i. 6, 12; ii. 1, 5). But the voyage of Mindarus round

Thrasyllus, and reached the opening of the Hellespont when that admiral was barely apprised of its departure from Chios. When it arrived at Harmatûs, however, opposite to and almost within sight of the Athenian station at Methymna, its progress could no longer remain a secret. As it advanced still farther along the Troad, the momentous news circulated everywhere, and was promulgated through numerous fire-signals and beacons on the hill, by friend as well as by foe.

These signals were perfectly visible, and perfectly intelligible, to the two hostile squadrons now on guard on each side of the Hellespont: 18 Athenian triremes at Sestos

the south and west of the island explains the circumstance. He must have landed twice on the island during this circumnavigation (perhaps starting in the evening), for dinner and supper: and this Chian coin (which probably had no circulation out of the island) served each man to buy provisions at the Chian landing-places. It was not convenient to Mindarus to take aboard *more* provisions in kind at the town of Chios; because he had already aboard a stock of provisions for two days—the subsequent portion of his voyage, along the coast of Asia to Sigeium, during which he could not afford time to halt and buy them, and where indeed the territory was not friendly.

It is enough if I can show that the old text of Thucydides will construe very well, without the violent intrusion of this conjectural *οὐ*. But I can show more; for this negative actually renders even the construction of the sentence awkward at least, if not inadmissible. Surely, ἀπαίρουσιν *οὐ* πελάγαι, ἀλλὰ—ought to be followed by a correlative adjective or participle belonging to the same verb ἀπαίρουσιν: yet if we take ἔχοντες as such correlative participle, how are we to construe

ἐπλεον? In order to express the sense which Haack brings out, we ought surely to have different words, such as—οὐκ ἀπῆραν ἐκ τῆς Χίου πελάγαι, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀριστερᾷ τῇ Λέσβῳ ἔχοντες ἐπλεον ἐπὶ τῇ ἡπείρῳ. Even the change of tense from present to past, when we follow the construction of Haack, is awkward; while if we understand the words in the sense which I propose, the change of tense is perfectly admissible, since the two verbs do not both refer to the same movement or to the same portion of the voyage. *"The fleet starts from Chios out by the sea-side of the island; but when it came to have Lesbos on the left-hand, it sailed straight to the continent."*

I hope that I am not too late to make good my γράφῃ ξενίας, or protest against the unwarranted right of Thucydidean citizenship which the recent editors have conferred upon this word *οὐ* in c. 101. The old text ought certainly to be restored, or if the editors maintain their views, they ought at least to enclose the word in brackets. In the edition of Thucydides, published at Leipsic, 1845, by C. A. Koch, I observe that the text is still correctly printed, without the negative.

in Europe—16 Peloponnesian triremes at Abydos in Asia. To the former, it was destruction to be caught by this powerful enemy in the narrow channel of the Hellespont. They quitted Sestos in the middle of the night, passing opposite to Abydos, and keeping a southerly course close along the shore of the Chersonese, in the direction towards Elæûs at the southern extremity of that peninsula, so as to have the chance of escape in the open sea and of joining Thrasyllus. But they would not have been allowed to pass even the hostile station at Abydos, had not the Peloponnesian guardships received the strictest orders from Mindarus, transmitted before he left Chios, or perhaps even before he left Milêtus, that if he should attempt the start, they were to keep a vigilant and special look-out for his coming, and reserve themselves to lend him such assistance as might be needed, in case he were attacked by Thrasyllus. When the signals first announced the arrival of Mindarus, the Peloponnesian guard-ships at Abydos could not know in what position he was, nor whether the main Athenian fleet might not be near upon him. Accordingly they acted on these previous orders, holding themselves in reserve in their station at Abydos, until daylight should arrive, and they should be better informed. They thus neglected the Athenian Hellespontine squadron in its escape from Sestos to Elæûs.¹

¹ Thucyd. viii. 102. Οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν τῇ Σητεῖ, . . . ὡς αὐτοῖς οἱ τε φρουραῖοι ἐσήμαινον, καὶ ἡσθάνοντο τὰ πυρὰ ἐξαίφνης πολλὰ ἐν τῇ πολεμίᾳ φανέντα, ἔγνωσαν ὅτι ἐσπλέονσιν οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι. Καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ταύτης νυκτός, ὡς εἶχον τάρχους, ὑπομίζαντες τῇ Χερσονήσῳ, παρέπλεον ἐπ' Ἐλαιούντος, βουλόμενοι ἐκπλεῦσαι ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν τὰς τῶν πολεμίων ναῦς. Καὶ τὰς μὲν ἐν Ἀβύδῳ ἐκκαίδεξαν αὐτὰς ἐλαθόν, προειρημένης φυλακῆς τῷ φιλιῷ ἐπίπλῳ, ὅπως αὐτῶν ἀναχωρῶς ἔξουσιν, ἣν ἐκπλέωσι τὰς δὲ μετὰ τοῦ Μινδάρου ἅμα ἔφρατιζόντες, &c.

Here, again, we have a difficult text, which has much perplexed the commentators, and which I

venture to translate (as it stands in my text) differently from all of them. The words—προειρημένης φυλακῆς τῷ φιλιῷ ἐπίπλῳ, ὅπως αὐτῶν ἀναχωρῶς ἔξουσιν, ἣν ἐκπλέωσι—are explained by the Scholiast to mean—"Although watch had been enjoined to them (i. e. to the Peloponnesian guard-squadron at Abydos) by the friendly approaching fleet (of Mindarus), that they should keep strict guard on the Athenians at Sestos, in case the latter should sail out."

Dr. Arnold, Göller, Poppo, and M. Didot, all accept this construction, though all agree that it is most harsh and confused. The former says, "This again is most strangely intended to mean, προ-

On arriving about daylight near the southern point of the Chersonese, these Athenians were descried by the

εἰρημένους αὐτοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιπλεόντων φίλων φυλάσσειν τοὺς πολέμιους."

To construe τῷ φίλῳ ἐπίπλῳ as equivalent to ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιπλεόντων φίλων, is certainly such a harshness as we ought to be very glad to escape. And the construction of the Scholiast involves another liberty which I cannot but consider as objectionable. He supplies, in his paraphrase, the word καίτοι—*although*—from his own imagination. There is no indication of *although*, either express or implied, in the text of Thucydides; and it appears to me hazardous to assume into the meaning so decisive a particle without any authority. The genitive absolute, when annexed to the main predication affirmed in the verb, usually denotes something naturally connected with it in the way of cause, concomitancy, explanation, or modification—not something opposed to it, requiring to be prefaced by an *although*; if this latter be intended, then the word *although* is expressed, not left to be understood. After Thucydides has told us that the Athenians at Sestos escaped their opposite enemies at Abydos—when he next goes on to add something under the genitive absolute, we expect that it should be a new fact which explains why or how they escaped: but if the new fact which he tells us, far from explaining the escape, renders it more extraordinary (such as, that the Peloponnesians had received strict orders to watch them), he would surely prepare the reader for this new fact by an express particle such as *although* or *notwithstanding*, "The Athenians escaped, *although* the Peloponnesians

had received the strictest orders to watch them and block them up." As nothing equivalent to, or implying, the adversative particle *although* is to be found in the Greek words, so I infer, as a high probability, that it is not to be sought in the meaning.

Differing from the commentators, I think that these words—προειρημένης φυλακῆς τῷ φίλῳ ἐπίπλῳ, ὅπως αὐτῶν ἀνακῶς ἔξουσιν, ἣν ἐκπλέωσι—do assign the reason for the fact which had been immediately before announced, and which was really extraordinary; viz. that the Athenian squadron was allowed to pass by Abydos, and escape from Sestos to Elæus. That reason was, that the Peloponnesian guard-squadron had before received special orders from Mindarus, *to concentrate its attention and watchfulness upon his approaching squadron*; hence it arose that they left the Athenians at Sestos unnoticed.

The words τῷ φίλῳ ἐπίπλῳ are equivalent to τῷ τῶν φίλων ἐπίπλῳ, and the pronoun αὐτῶν, which immediately follows, refers to φίλων (*the approaching fleet of Mindarus*), not to the Athenians at Sestos, as the Scholiast and the commentators construe it. This mistake about the reference of αὐτῶν seems to me to have put them all wrong.

That τῷ φίλῳ ἐπίπλῳ must be construed as equivalent to τῷ τῶν φίλων ἐπίπλῳ is certain: but it is not equivalent to ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιπλεόντων φίλων—nor is it possible to construe the words as the Scholiast would understand them—"orders had been previously given by the approach (or arrival) of their friends;" whereby we should turn

fleet of Mindarus which had come the night before to the opposite stations of Sigeium and Rhœteium. The latter immediately gave chase: but the Athenians, now in the wide sea, contrived to escape most of them to Imbros—not without

Thrasyllus and the Athenian fleet at the Hellespont.

ὁ ἐπίπλους into an acting and commanding personality. The "approach of their friends" is an event—which may properly be said "to have produced an effect"—but which cannot be said "to have given previous orders." It appears to me that τῷ φίλῳ ἐπίπλω is the dative case governed by φυλακῆς—"a look-out for the arrival of the Peloponnesians" having been enjoined (upon these guard-ships at Abydos)—"They had been ordered to watch for the approaching voyage of their friends." The English preposition *for* expresses here exactly the sense of the Greek dative—that is, the object, purpose, or persons whose benefit is referred to.

The words immediately succeeding—ἐπὶ τῶν φίλων (τῶν φίλων) ἀνακῶς ἔξουσιν, ἣν ἐκπλέωσι—are an expansion of consequences intended to follow from—φυλακῆς τῷ φίλῳ ἐπίπλω. "They shall watch for the approach of the main fleet, in order that they may devote special and paramount regard to its safety, in case it makes a start." For the phrase ἀνακῶς ἔχειν, compare Herodot. i. 24; viii. 109. Plutarch, Theseus, c. 33: ἀνακῶς, φυλακῶς, προνοητικῶς, ἐπιμελῶς—the notes of Arnold and Götter here; and Kühner, Gr. Gr. sect. 533. ἀνακῶς ἔχειν τινός for ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. The words ἀνακῶς ἔχειν express the anxious and special vigilance which the Peloponnesian squadron at Abydos was directed to keep for the arrival of Mindarus and his fleet, which was a matter of doubt and danger: but they would not be properly applicable to the duty of that squadron as respects the

opposite Athenian squadron at Sestos, which was hardly of superior force to themselves, and was besides an avowed enemy, in sight of their own port.

Lastly, the words ἣν ἐκπλέωσι refer to Mindarus and his fleet about to start from Chios, as their subject—not to the Athenians at Sestos.

The whole sentence would stand thus, if we dismiss the peculiarities of Thucydides and express the meaning in common Greek—Καὶ τὰς μὲν ἐν Ἀβύδῳ ἐκκαίδεα ναῦς (Ἀθηναῖοι) ἔλαθον· προεῖρητο γὰρ (ἐκρίναις ταῖς ναύσιν) φυλάσσειν τὸν ἐπίπλουν τῶν φίλων, ἐπὶ τῶν (τῶν φίλων) ἀνακῶς ἔξουσιν, ἣν ἐκπλέωσι. The verb φυλάσσειν here (and of course the abstract substantive φυλακῆ which represents it) signifies to *watch* for or *wait* for: like Thucyd. ii. 3. φυλάσσοντες ἐτι νόητα, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ περιεσθρον; also viii. 41. ἐφύλασσα.

If we construe the words in this way, they will appear in perfect harmony with the general scheme and purpose of Mindarus. That admiral is bent upon carrying his fleet to the Hellespont, but to avoid an action with Thrasyllus in doing so. This is difficult to accomplish, and can only be done by great secrecy of proceeding, as well as by an unusual route. He sends orders beforehand from Chios (perhaps even from Milæus, before he quitted that place) to the Peloponnesian squadron guarding the Hellespont at Abydos. He contemplates the possible case that Thrasyllus may detect his plan, intercept him on the passage, and

the loss however of four triremes, one even captured with all the crew on board, near the temple of Protesilaus at Elæûs: the crews of the other three escaped ashore. Mindarus was now joined by the squadron from Abydos, and their united force (86 triremes strong) was employed for one day in trying to storm Elæûs. Failing in this enterprise, the fleet retired to Abydos. Before all could arrive there, Thrasyllus with his fleet arrived in haste from Eresus, much disappointed that his scouts had been eluded and all his calculations baffled. Two Peloponnesian triremes, which had been more adventurous than the rest in pursuing the Athenians, fell into his hands. He awaited at Elæûs the return of the fugitive Athenian squadron from Imbros, and then began to prepare his triremes, 76 in number, for a general action.

perhaps block him up or compel him to fight in some roadstead or bay on the coast opposite Leshos, or on the Troad (which would indeed have come to pass, had he been seen by a single hostile fishingboat in rounding the island of Chios). Now the orders sent forward, direct the Peloponnesian squadron at Abydos what they are to do in this contingency; since without such orders, the captain of the squadron would not have known what to do, assuming Mindarus to be intercepted by Thrasyllus—whether to remain on guard at the Hellespont, which was his special duty; or to leave the Hellespont unguarded, keep his attention concentrated on Mindarus, and come forth to help him. "Let your first thought be to ensure the safe arrival of the main fleet at the Hellespont, and to come out and render help to it, if it be attacked in its route; even though it be necessary for that purpose to leave the Hellespont for a time unguarded." Mindarus could not tell beforehand the exact moment when he would start from Chios—nor was it indeed absolutely certain

that he would start at all, if the enemy were watching him: his orders were therefore sent, *conditional* upon his being able to get off ($\eta\nu\ \epsilon\kappa\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\omega\sigma\iota$). But he was lucky enough, by the well-laid plan of his voyage, to get to the Hellespont without encountering an enemy. The Peloponnesian squadron at Abydos, however, having received his special orders—when the fire-signals acquainted them that he was approaching, thought only of keeping themselves in reserve to lend him assistance if he needed it, and neglected the Athenians opposite. As it was night, probably the best thing which they could do, was to wait in Abydos for daylight, until they could learn particulars of his position, and how or where they could render aid.

We thus see both the general purpose of Mindarus, and in what manner the orders which he had transmitted to the Peloponnesian squadron at Abydos, brought about indirectly the escape of the Athenian squadron without interruption from Sestos.

After five days of such preparation, his fleet was brought to battle, sailing northward towards Sestus up the Hellespont, by single ships ahead, along the coast of the Chersonese, or on the European side. The left or most advanced squadron under Thrasyllus, stretched even beyond the headland called Kynossema, or the Dog's Tomb, ennobled by the legend and the chapel of the Trojan queen Hecuba: it was thus nearly opposite Abydos, while the right squadron under Thrasybulus was not very far from the southern mouth of the strait, nearly opposite Dardanus. Mindarus on his side brought into action eighty-six triremes (ten more than Thrasyllus in total number), extending from Abydos to Dardanus on the Asiatic shore; the Syracusans under Hermokratês being on the right, opposed to Thrasyllus, while Mindarus with the Peloponnesian ships was on the left opposed to Thrasybulus. The epibatæ or maritime hoplites on board the ships of Mindarus are said to have been superior to the Athenians; but the latter had the advantage in skilful pilots and nautical manœuvring: nevertheless the description of the battle tells us how much Athenian manœuvring had fallen off since the glories of Phormion at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war; nor would that eminent seaman have selected for the scene of a naval battle the narrow waters of the Hellespont. Mindarus took the aggressive, advancing to attack near the European shore, and trying to outflank his opponents on both sides, as well as to drive them up against the land. Thrasyllus on one wing, and Thrasybulus on the other, by rapid movements, extended themselves so as to frustrate this attempt to outflank them; but in so doing, they stripped and weakened the centre, which was even deprived of the sight of the left wing by means of the projecting headland of Kynossema. Thus unsupported, the centre was vigorously attacked and roughly handled by the middle division of Mindarus. Its ships were driven up against the land, and the assailants even disembarked to push their victory against the men ashore. But this partial success threw the central Peloponnesian division itself into disorder, while Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus carried on a conflict at first equal, and presently victorious, against the ships on the right and left of the enemy. Having driven back both these two divisions, they easily

Battle of
Kynossema
—victory of
the Athenian fleet.

chased away the disordered ships of the centre, so that the whole Peloponnesian fleet was put to flight, and found shelter first in the river Meidius, next in Abydos. The narrow breadth of the Hellespont forbade either long pursuit or numerous captures. Nevertheless eight Chian ships, five Corinthian, two Ambrakian and as many Bœotian, and from Sparta, Syracuse, Pellène and Leukas, one each—fell into the hands of the Athenian admirals; who however on their own side lost fifteen ships. They erected a trophy on the headland of Kynossêma, near the tomb or chapel of Hecuba; not omitting the usual duties of burying their own dead, and giving up those of the enemy under the customary request for truce.¹

A victory so incomplete and indecisive would have been little valued by the Athenians, in the times preceding the Sicilian expedition. But since that overwhelming disaster, followed by so many other misfortunes, and last of all, by the defeat of Thymocharis with the revolt of Eubœa—their spirit had been so sadly lowered, that the trireme which brought the news of the battle of Kynossêma, seemingly towards the end of August 411 B.C., was welcomed with the utmost delight and triumph. They began to feel as if the ebb-tide had reached its lowest point, and had begun to turn in their favour, holding out some hopes of ultimate success in the war. Another piece of good fortune soon happened to strengthen this belief. Mindarus was compelled to reinforce himself at the Hellespont by sending Hippokratês and Epiklês to bring the fleet of fifty triremes now acting at Eubœa.² This was in itself an important relief to Athens, by withdrawing an annoying enemy near home.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 105, 106; Diodor. xiii. 39, 40.

The general account which Diodorus gives of this battle, is, even in its most essential features, not reconcilable with Thucydides. It is vain to try to blend them. I have been able to borrow from Diodorus hardly anything except his statement of the superiority of the Athenian pilots, and the Peloponnesian epibata. He states that twenty-five fresh ships arrived

to join the Athenians in the middle of the battle, and determined the victory in their favour: this circumstance is evidently borrowed from the subsequent conflict a few months afterwards.

We owe to him, however, the mention of the chapel or tomb of Hecuba on the headland of Kynossêma.

² Thucyd. viii. 107; Diodor. xiii. 41.

But it was still farther enhanced by the subsequent misfortunes of the fleet, which in passing round the headland of Mount Athos to get to Asia, was overtaken by a terrific storm and nearly destroyed, with great loss of life among the crews; so that a remnant only under Hippokratês survived to join Mindarus.¹

But though Athens was thus exempted from all fear of aggression on the side of Eubœa, the consequences of this departure of the fleet were such as to demonstrate how irreparably the island itself had passed out of her supremacy. The inhabitants of Chalkis and the other cities, now left without foreign defence against her, employed themselves jointly with the Bœotians, whose interest in the case was even stronger than their own, in divesting Eubœa of its insular character, by constructing a mole or bridge across the Euripus, the narrowest portion of the Eubœan strait, where Chalkis was divided from Bœotia. From each coast a mole was thrown out, each mole guarded at the extremity by a tower, and leaving only an intermediate opening, broad enough for a single vessel to pass through, covered by a wooden bridge. It was in vain that the Athenian Theramenês, with thirty triremes, presented himself to obstruct the progress of the undertaking. The Eubœans and Bœotians both prosecuted it in such numbers, and with so much zeal, that it was speedily brought to completion. Eubœa, so lately the most important island attached to Athens, is from henceforward a portion of the mainland, altogether independent of her, even though it should please fortune to re-establish her maritime power.²

Bridge
across the
Euripus,
joining
Eubœa with
Bœotia.

¹ Diodor. xiii. 41. It is probable that this fleet was in great part Bœotian; and twelve seamen who escaped from the wreck commemorated their rescue by an inscription in the temple of Athênê at Korôneia; which inscription was read and copied by Ephorus. By an exaggerated and over-literal confidence in the words of it, Diodorus is led to affirm that these twelve men were the only persons saved, and that every other person perished. But we know perfectly that Hippokratês himself survived,

and that he was alive at the subsequent battle of Kyzikus (Xenoph. Hellen. i. 1, 23).

Respecting the danger of sailing round the promontory of Athos, the reader is referred to a former chapter of this work, wherein the ship-canal, cut across the Isthmus by order of Xerxes, is described; together with an instructive citation from Colonel Leake's Travels. See ch. xxxviii. of this History.

² Diodor. xiii. 47. He places this event a year later, but I agree with Sievers in conceiving it as

The battle of Kynossêma produced no very important consequences, except that of encouragement to the Athenians. Even just after the action, Kyzikus revolted from them, and on the fourth day after it, the Athenian fleet, hastily refitted at Sestos, sailed to that place to retake it. It was unfortified, so that they succeeded with little difficulty, and imposed upon it a contribution: moreover in the voyage thither, they gained an additional advantage by capturing, off the southern coast of the Propontis, those eight Peloponnesian triremes which had accomplished, a little while before, the revolt of Byzantium. But on the other hand, as soon as the Athenian fleet had left Sestos, Mindarus sailed from his station at Abydos to Elæûs, and recovered all the triremes captured from him at Kynossêma, which the Athenians had there deposited; except some of them which were so much damaged, that the inhabitants of Elæûs set them on fire.¹

But that which now began to constitute a far more important element of the war, was, the difference of character between Tissaphernês and Pharnabazus, and the transfer of the Peloponnesian fleet from the satrapy of the former to that of the latter. Tissaphernês, while furnishing neither aid nor pay to the Peloponnesians, had by his treacherous promises and bribes enervated all their proceedings for the last year, with the deliberate view of wasting both the belligerent parties. Pharnabazus was a brave and earnest man, who set himself to assist them strenuously, by men as well as by money, and who laboured hard to put down the Athenian power; as we shall find

Zeal of
Pharnaba-
zus against
Athens—
importance
of Persian
money.

following with little delay on the withdrawal of the protecting fleet (Sievers, *Comment. in Xenoph. Hellen.* p. 9; not. p. 66).

See Colonel Leake's *Travels in Northern Greece*, for a description of the Euripus, and the adjoining ground, with a plan, vol. ii. ch. xiv. p. 259–265.

I cannot make out from Colonel Leake what is the exact breadth of the channel. Strabo talks in his time of a bridge reaching 200 feet (x. p. 400). But there must have been material alterations

made by the inhabitants of Chalkis during the time of Alexander the Great (Strabo, x. p. 447). The bridge here described by Diodorus, covering an open space broad enough for one ship, could scarcely have been more than 20 feet broad; for it was not at all designed to render the passage easy. The ancient ships could all lower their masts. I cannot but think that Colonel Leake (p. 259) must have read in Diodorus xiii. 47—60 in place of 6.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 107.

him labouring equally hard, eighteen years afterwards, to bring about its partial renovation. From this time forward, Persian aid becomes a reality in the Grecian war; and in the main—first through the hands of Pharnabazus, next through those of the younger Cyrus—the determining reality. For we shall find that while the Peloponnesians are for the most part well-paid, out of the Persian treasury—the Athenians, destitute of any such resource, are compelled to rely on the contributions which they can levy here and there, without established or accepted right; and to interrupt for this purpose even the most promising career of success. Twenty-six years after this, at a time when Sparta had lost her Persian allies, the Lacedæmonian Teutias tried to appease the mutiny of his unpaid seamen, by telling them how much nobler it was to extort pay from the enemy by means of their own swords, than to obtain it by truckling to the foreigner;¹ and probably the Athenian generals, during these previous years of struggle, tried similar appeals to the generosity of their soldiers. But it is not the less certain, that the new constant paymaster now introduced gave fearful odds to the Spartan cause.

The good pay and hearty cooperation which the Peloponnesians now enjoyed from Pharnabazus, only made them the more indignant at the previous deceit of Tissaphernês. Under the influence of this sentiment, they readily lent aid to the inhabitants of Antandrus in expelling his general Arsakes with the Persian garrison. Arsakes had recently committed an act of murderous perfidy, under the influence of some unexplained pique, against the Delians established at Adramyttium: he had summoned their principal citizens to take part as allies in an expedition, and had caused them all to be surrounded, shot down, and massacred during the morning meal. Such an act was more than sufficient to excite hatred and alarm among the neighbouring Antandrians, who invited from Abydos, across the mountain range of Ida, a body of Peloponnesian hoplites; by whose aid Antandrus was liberated from the Persians.²

Tissa-
phernês
again
courts the
Pelopon-
nesians.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. v. 1, 17. Compare a like explanation, under nobler circumstances, from the Spartan Kallikratidas, Xenoph.

Hellen. i. 6, 7; Plutarch, Lysander, c. 6.

² Thucyd. viii. 108; Diodor. xiii. 42.

In Milêtus as well as in Knidus, Tissaphernês had already experienced the like humiliation:¹ Lichas was no longer alive to back his pretensions: nor do we hear that he obtained any result from the complaints of his envoy Gaulites at Sparta. Under these circumstances he began to fear that he had incurred a weight of enmity which might prove seriously mischievous, and he was not without jealousy of the popularity and possible success of Pharnabazus. The delusion respecting the Phenician fleet, now that Mindarus had openly broken with him and quitted Milêtus, was no longer available to any useful purpose. Accordingly he dismissed the Phenician fleet to their own homes, pretending to have received tidings that the Phenician towns were endangered by sudden attacks from Arabia and Egypt;² while he himself quitted Aspendus to revisit Ionia, as well as to go forward to the Hellespont for the purpose of renewing personal intercourse with the dissatisfied Peloponnesians. He wished, while trying again to excuse his own treachery about the Phenician fleet, at the same time to protest against their recent proceedings at Antandrus; or, at the least, to obtain some guarantee against repetition of such hostility. His visit to Ionia, however, seems to have occupied some time, and he tried to conciliate the Ionic Greeks by a splendid sacrifice to Artemis at Ephesus.³

¹ Thucyd. viii. 109.

² Diodor. xiii. 46. This is the statement of Diodorus, and seems probable enough; though he makes a strange confusion in the Persian affairs of this year, leaving out the name of Tissaphernês, and jumbling the acts of Tissaphernês with the name of Pharnabazus.

³ Thucyd. viii. 109. It is at this point that we have to part company with the historian Thucydîdês, whose work not only closes without reaching any definite epoch or limit, but even breaks off (as we possess it) in the middle of a sentence.

The full extent of this irreparable loss can hardly be conceived, except by those who have been called upon to study his work with the profound and minute

attention required from an historian of Greece. To pass from Thucydîdês to the Hellenica of Xenophou, is a descent truly mournful: and yet, when we look at Grecian history as a whole, we have great reason to rejoice that even so inferior a work as the latter has reached us. The historical purposes and conceptions of Thucydîdês, as set forth by himself in his preface, are exalted and philosophical to a degree altogether wonderful, when we consider that he had no pre-existing models before him from which to derive them. And the eight books of his work (in spite of the unfinished condition of the last) are not unworthy of these large promises, either in spirit or in execution. Even the peculiarity, the

Having quitted Aspendus (as far as we can make out) about the beginning of August (411 B.C.), he did not reach the Hellespont until the month of November.¹

As soon as the Phenician fleet had disappeared, Alki-
biadês returned with his thirteen triremes from
Phasêlis to Samos. He too, like Tissaphernês, Alki-
biadês
returns from
Aspendus
to Samos.
made the proceeding subservient to deceit of his
own. He took credit with his countrymen for

having enlisted the goodwill of the satrap more strongly than ever in the cause of Athens, and for having induced him to abandon his intention of bringing up the Phenician fleet.² At this time Dorieus was at Rhodes with thirteen triremes, having been despatched by Mindarus (before his departure from Milêtus) in order to stifle the growth of a philo-Athenian party in the island. Perhaps the presence of this force may have threatened the Athenian interest in Kos and Halikarnassus; for we now find Alki-
biadês going to these places from Samos, with nine fresh triremes in addition to his own thirteen. Having erected fortifications at the town of Kos, he planted in it an Athenian officer and garrison. From Halikarnassus he levied large contributions; upon what pretence, or whether from simple want of money,

condensation, and the harshness, of his style, though it sometimes hides from us his full meaning, has the general effect of lending great additional force and of impressing his thoughts much more deeply upon every attentive reader.

During the course of my two last volumes, I have had frequent occasion to notice the criticisms of Dr. Arnold in his edition of Thueydidês; most generally on points where I dissented from him. I have done this, partly because I believe that Dr. Arnold's edition is in most frequent use among English readers of Thueydidês—partly because of the high esteem which I entertain for the liberal spirit, the erudition, and the judgement, which pervade his criticisms generally throughout the book. Dr. Arnold deserves, especially, the high commendation, not often to be bestowed even upon

learned and exact commentators, of conceiving and appreciating antiquity as a living whole, and not merely as an aggregate of words and abstractions. His criticisms are continually adopted by Göl-
ler in the second edition of his Thueydidês, and to a great degree also by Poppo. Desiring, as I do sincerely, that his edition may long maintain its pre-eminence among English students of Thueydidês, I have thought it my duty at the same time to indicate many of the points on which his remarks either advance or imply views of Grecian history different from my own.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 1, 9.

² Thueyd. viii. 108. Diodorus (xiii. 38) talks of this influence of Alki-
biadês over the satrap as if it were real. Plutarch (Alki-
biad. c. 26) speaks in more qualified lan-
guage.

we do not know. It was towards the middle of September that he returned to Samos.¹

At the Hellespont, Mindarus had been reinforced after the battle of Kynossema by the squadron from Eubœa; at least by that portion of it which had escaped the storm off Mount Athos. The departure of the Peloponnesian fleet from Eubœa enabled the Athenians also to send a few more ships to their fleet at Sestos. Thus ranged on the opposite sides of the strait, the two fleets came to a second action, wherein the Peloponnesians, under Agesandridas, had the advantage; yet with little fruit. It was about the month of October, seemingly, that Dorieus with his fourteen triremes came from Rhodes to rejoin Mindarus at the Hellespont. He had hoped probably to get up the strait to Abydos during the night, but he was caught by daylight a little way from the entrance, near Rhœteium; and the Athenian scouts instantly gave signal of his approach. Twenty Athenian triremes were despatched to attack him: upon which Dorieus fled, and sought safety by hauling his vessels ashore in the receding bay near Dardanus. The Athenian squadron here attacked him, but were repulsed and forced to sail back to Madytus. Mindarus was himself a spectator of this scene, from a distance; being engaged in sacrificing to Athênê on the venerated hill of Ilium. He immediately hastened to Abydos, where he fitted out his whole fleet of 84 triremes; Pharnabazus cooperating on the shore with his land-force. Having rescued the ships of Dorieus, his next care was, to resist the entire Athenian fleet, which presently came to attack him under Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus. An obstinate naval combat took place between the two fleets, which lasted nearly the whole day with doubtful issue: at length, towards the evening, 20 fresh triremes were seen approaching. They proved to be the squadron of Alkibiadês sailing from Samos: having probably heard of the re-junction of the squadron of Dorieus with the main Peloponnesian fleet, he had come with his own counterbalancing reinforcement.²

¹ Thucyd. viii. 108. πρὸς τὸ μέσ-
τωρον. Haack and Sievers (see
Sievers, Comment. ad Xenoph.
Hellen. p. 103) construe this as
indicating the middle of August,
which I think too early in the

year.

² Diodorus (xiii. 46) and Plutarch
(Alkib. c. 27) speak of his coming
to the Hellespont by accident—
κατὰ τὸ ἄγαν—which is certainly very
improbable.

As soon as his purple flag or signal was ascertained, the Athenian fleet became animated with redoubled spirit. The new-comers aided them in pressing the action so vigorously, that the Peloponnesian fleet was driven back to Abydos, and there run ashore. Here the Athenians still followed up their success, and endeavoured to tow them all off. But the Persian land-force protected them, and Pharnabazus himself was seen foremost in the combat; even pushing into the water in person, as far as his horse could stand. The main Peloponnesian fleet was thus preserved: yet the Athenians retired with an important victory, carrying off thirty triremes as prizes, and retaking those which they had themselves lost in the two preceding actions.¹

Mindarus kept his defeated fleet unemployed at Abydos during the winter, sending to Peloponnesus as well as among his allies to solicit reinforcements: in the meantime, he engaged jointly with Pharnabazus in operations by land against various Athenian allies on the continent. The Athenian admirals, on their side, instead of keeping their fleet united to prosecute the victory, were compelled to disperse a large portion of it in flying squadrons for collecting money, retaining only forty sail at Sestos; while Thrasyllus in person went to Athens to proclaim the victory and ask for reinforcements. Pursuant to this request, thirty triremes were sent out under Theramenês; who first endeavoured without success to impede the construction of the bridge between Eubœa and Bœotia, and next sailed on a voyage among the islands for the purpose of collecting money. He acquired considerable plunder by descents upon hostile territory, and also extorted money from various parties, either contemplating or supposed to contemplate revolt, among the dependencies of Athens. At Paros, where the oligarchy established by Peisander in the conspiracy of the Four Hundred still subsisted, Theramenês deposed and fined the men who had exercised it—establishing a democracy in their room. From hence he passed to Macedonia, to the assistance and probably into the temporary pay, of Archelaus king of Macedonia, whom he aided for some time in the siege of Pydna; blocking up the town by sea while the Macedonians besieged it by land. The blockade having lasted the whole winter, Theramenês was summoned away,

B.C. 411-410.

Theramenês
sent out
with rein-
forcements
from
Athens.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 1, 6, 7.

before its capture, to join the main Athenian fleet in Thrace: Archelaus however took Pydna not long afterwards, and transported the town with its residents from the sea-board to a distance more than two miles inland.¹ We trace in all these proceedings the evidence of that terrible want of money which now drove the Athenians to injustice, extortion, and interference with their allies, such as they had never committed during the earlier years of the war.

It is at this period that we find mention made of a fresh intestine commotion in Korkyra, less stained however with savage enormities than that renewed troubles at Korkyra. counted in the seventh year of the war. It appears that the oligarchical party in the island, which had been for the moment nearly destroyed at the period, had since gained strength, and was encouraged by the misfortunes of Athens to lay plans for putting the island into the hands of the Lacedæmonians. The democratical leaders, apprised of this conspiracy, sent to Naupaktus for the Athenian admiral Konon. He came with a detachment of 600 Messenians, by the aid of whom they seized the oligarchical conspirators in the market-place, putting a few to death, and banishing more than a thousand. The extent of their alarm is attested by the fact, that they liberated the slaves and conferred the right of citizenship upon the foreigners. The exiles, having retired to the opposite continent, came back shortly afterwards, and were admitted, by the connivance of a party within, into the market-place. A serious combat took place within the walls, which was at last made up by a compromise and by the restoration of the exiles.² We know nothing about the particulars of this compromise, but it seems to have been wisely drawn up and

¹ Diodor. xiii. 47, 49.

² Diodor. xiii. 48. Sievers (Commentat. ad Xenoph. Hellen. p. 12; and p. 65. not. 58) controverts the reality of these tumults in Korkyra, here mentioned by Diodorus, but not mentioned in the Hellenika of Xenophon, and contradicted, as he thinks, by the negative inference derivable from Thucyd. iv. 48—ὅσα γε κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε. But it appears to

me that F. W. Ullrich (Beiträge zur Erklärung des Thukydides, p. 95—99) has properly explained this phrase of Thucydides, as meaning, in the place here cited, the first ten years of the Peloponnesian war, between the surprise of Plataea and the peace of Nikias.

I see no reason to call in question the truth of these disturbances in Korkyra here alluded to by Diodorus.

faithfully observed; for we hear nothing about Korkyra until about thirty-five years after this period, and the island is then presented to us as in the highest perfection of cultivation and prosperity.¹ Doubtless the emancipation of slaves, and the admission of so many new foreigners to the citizenship, contributed to this result.

Meanwhile Tissaphernês, having completed his measures in Ionia, arrived at the Hellespont not long after the battle of Abydos—seemingly about November 411 B.C. He was anxious to retain some credit with the Peloponnesians, for which an opportunity soon presented itself. Alkibiadês, then in command of the Athenian fleet at Sestos, came to visit him in all the pride of victory, bringing the customary presents; but the satrap seized his person and sent him away to Sardis as a prisoner in custody, affirming that he had the Great King's express orders for carrying on war with the Athenians.² Here was an end of all the delusions of Alkibiadês, respecting pretended power of influencing the Persian counsels. Yet these delusions had already served his purpose by procuring for him a renewed position in the Athenian camp, which his own military energy enabled him to sustain and justify.

Towards the middle of this winter the superiority of the fleet of Mindarus at Abydos, over the Athenian fleet at Sestos, had become so great (partly, as it would appear, through reinforcements obtained by the former—partly through the dispersion of the latter into flying squadrons from want of pay) that the Athenians no longer dared to maintain their position in the Hellespont. They sailed round the southern point of the Chersonese, and took station at Kardia on the western side of the isthmus of that Peninsula. Here, about the commencement of spring, they were rejoined by Alkibiadês; who had found means to escape from Sardis, (along with Mantitheus, another Athenian prisoner,) first to Klazomenæ, and next to Lesbos, where he collected a small squadron of five triremes. The dispersed squadrons of the Athenian fleet being now all summoned to concentrate, Theramenês came to Kardia from Macedonia, and Thrasybulus from

Alkibiadês
is seized
by Tissa-
phernês and
confined at
Sardis.

B.C. 410.

Escape of
Alkibiadês
—concentration of
the Athenian fleet—
Mindarus
besieges
Kyzikus.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 2, 25.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 9; Plutarch Alkibiadês, c. 27.

Thasos; whereby the Athenian fleet was rendered superior in number to that of Mindarus. News was brought that the latter had moved with his fleet from the Hellespont to Kyzikus, and was now engaged in the siege of that place, jointly with Pharnabazus and the Persian land-force.

His vigorous attacks had in fact already carried the place, when the Athenian admirals resolved to attack him there, and contrived to do it by surprise. Having passed first from Kardia to Elæûs at the south of the Chersonese, they sailed up the Hellespont to Prokonnesus by night, so that their passage escaped the notice of the Peloponnesian guard-ships at Abydos.¹

Resting at Prokonnesus one night, and seizing every boat on the island, in order that their movements might be kept secret, Alkibiadês warned the assembled seamen that they must prepare for a sea-fight, a land-fight, and a wall-fight, all at once. "We have no money (said he), while our enemies have plenty from the Great King." Neither zeal in the men, nor contrivance in the commanders, was wanting. A body of hoplites were landed on the mainland in the territory of Kyzikus, for the purpose of operating a diversion; after which the fleet was distributed into three divisions under Alkibiadês, Theramenês, and Thrasybulus. The former, advancing near to Kyzikus with his single division, challenged the fleet of Mindarus, and contrived to inveigle him by pretended fight to a distance from the harbour; while the other Athenian divisions, assisted by hazy and rainy weather, came up unexpectedly, cut off his retreat, and forced him to run his ships ashore on the neighbouring mainland. After a gallant and hard-fought battle, partly on ship-board, partly ashore—at one time unpromising to the Athenians, in spite of their superiority of number, but not very intelligible in its details, and differently conceived by our two authorities—both the Peloponnesian fleet by sea and the forces of Pharnabazus on land were completely defeated. Mindarus himself was slain; and the entire fleet, every single trireme, was captured, except the triremes of Syracuse, which were burnt by their own crews; while Kyzikus itself surrendered

¹ Diod. xiii. 49. Diodorus specially notices this fact, which must obviously be correct. Without it, the surprise of Mindarus could not have been accomplished.

to the Athenians, and submitted to a large contribution, being spared from all other harm. The booty taken by the victors was abundant and valuable. The number of the triremes thus captured or destroyed is differently given; the lowest estimate states it at 60, the highest at 80.¹

This capital action, ably planned and bravely executed by Alkibiadês and his two colleagues (about April 410, B.C.), changed sensibly the relative position of the belligerents.

The Peloponnesians had now no fleet of importance in Asia, though they probably still retained a small squadron at the station of Milêtus; while the Athenian fleet was more powerful and menacing than ever. The dismay of the defeated army is forcibly portrayed in the laconic despatch sent by Hippokratês (secretary of the late admiral Mindarus) to the Ephors at Sparta:—"All honour and advantage are gone from us: Mindarus is slain: the men are starving: we are in straits what to do."² The Ephors doubtless heard the same deplorable tale from more than one witness; for this particular despatch never reached them, having been intercepted and carried to Athens. So discouraging was the view which they entertained of the future, that a Lacedæmonian embassy with Endius at their head, came to Athens to propose peace; or rather perhaps Endius (ancient friend and guest of Alkibiadês, who had already been at Athens as envoy before) was allowed to come thither now again to sound the temper of the city, in a sort of informal manner which admitted of being easily disavowed if nothing came of it. For it is remarkable that Xenophon makes no mention of this embassy: and his silence, though not sufficient to warrant us in questioning the reality of the event—which is stated by Diodorus, perhaps on the authority of Theopompus, and is noway improbable in itself—nevertheless leads me to doubt whether the Ephors themselves admitted that they had made or sanctioned the proposition. It is to be remembered, that Sparta, not to mention her obligation to her confederates

B.C. 410.

Discouragement of the Spartans—proposition to Athens for peace.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 1, 14—20; Diodor. xiii. 50, 51.

The numerous discrepancies between Diodorus and Xenophon, in the events of these few years, are collected by Sievers, Commentat.

in Xenoph. Hellen. not. 62, pp. 65, 66 seq.

² Xen. Hellen. i. 1, 23. Ἐρῶναι τὰ κατὰ Μινδάρου ἀπεσπῶντι πενιθῶντι τῶνδε ἀπορέμεναι τί γὰρ ὅραν.

Plutarch, Alkib. c. 28.

generally, was at this moment bound by special convention to Persia to conclude no separate peace with Athens.

According to Diodorus, Endius, having been admitted to speak in the Athenian assembly, invited the Athenians to make peace with Sparta on the following terms:—That each party should stand just as they were: That the garrisons on both sides should be withdrawn: That prisoners should be exchanged, one Lacedæmonian against one Athenian. Endius insisted in his speech on the mutual mischief which each was doing to the other by prolonging the war: but he contended that Athens was by far the greater sufferer of the two, and had the deepest interest in accelerating peace. She had no money, while Sparta had the Great King as a paymaster: she was robbed of the produce of Attica by the garrison of Dekeleia, while Peloponnesus was undisturbed: all her power and influence depended upon superiority at sea, which Sparta could dispense with, and yet retain her pre-eminence.¹

If we may believe Diodorus, all the most intelligent citizens in Athens recommended that this proposition should be accepted. Only the demagogues, the disturbers, those who were accustomed to blow up the flames of war in order to obtain profit for themselves, opposed it. Especially the demagogue Kleophon, now enjoying great influence, enlarged upon the splendour of the recent victory, and upon the new chances of success now opening to them; insomuch that the assembly ultimately rejected the proposition of Endius.²

It was easy for those who wrote after the battle of Ægospotamos and the capture of Athens, to be wise after the fact, and to repeat the stock denunciations against an insane people misled by a corrupt demagogue. But if, abstracting from our knowledge of the final close of the war, we look to the tenor of this proposition (even assuming it to have been formal and authorised) as well as the time at which it was made—we shall hesitate before we pronounce Kleophon to have been foolish, much less corrupt, for recommending its rejection. In reference to the charge of corrupt interest in the continuance of war, I have already made some remarks about Kleophon, tending to show that no such interest

The Lacedæmonian Endius at Athens—his propositions for peace.

Refused by Athens—opposition of Kleophon.

Grounds of the opposition of Kleophon.

¹ Diodor. xiii. 52.

² Diodor. xiii. 53.

can fairly be ascribed to demagogues of that character.¹ They were essentially unwarlike men, and had quite as much chance personally of losing, as of gaining, by a state of war. Especially this is true respecting Kleophon during the last years of the war—since the financial posture of Athens was then so unprosperous, that all her available means were exhausted to provide for ships and men, leaving little or no surplus for political speculators. The admirals, who paid the seamen by raising contributions abroad, might possibly enrich themselves, if so inclined; but the politicians at home had much less chance of such gains than they would have had in time of peace. Besides, even if Kleophon were ever so much a gainer by the continuance of war, yet assuming Athens to be ultimately crushed in the war, he was certain beforehand to be deprived, not only of all his gains and his position, but of his life also.

So much for the charge against him of corrupt interest. The question whether his advice was judicious, is not so

easy to dispose of. Looking to the time when the proposition was made, we must recollect that the Peloponnesian fleet in Asia had been just annihilated, and that the brief epistle itself, from Hippokratês to the Ephors, divulging in so emphatic a manner the distress of his troops, was at this moment before the Athenian assembly. On the other hand, the despatches of the Athenian generals, announcing their victory, had excited a sentiment of universal triumph, manifested by public thanksgiving, at Athens.² We cannot doubt that Alkibiadês and his colleagues promised a large career of coming success, perhaps the recovery of most part of the lost maritime empire. In this temper of the Athenian people and of their generals, justified as it was to a great degree by the reality, what is the proposition which comes from Endius? What he proposes is, in reality, no concession at all. Both parties to stand in their actual position—to withdraw garrisons—to restore prisoners. There was only one way in which Athens would have been a gainer by accepting these propositions. She would have withdrawn her garrison from Pylus—she would have been relieved from the garrison of Dekeleia: such an exchange would have been a considerable advantage to her. To this we must add the relief arising from simple cessation of war—doubtless real and important.

Question of policy, as it then stood, between war and peace.

¹ See a former volume, chap. liv.

² Diodor. xiii. 52.

Now the question is, whether a statesman like Periklês would have advised his countrymen to be satisfied with such a measure of concession, immediately after the great victory at Kyzikus, and the two smaller victories preceding it? I incline to believe that he would not. It would rather have appeared to him in the light of a diplomatic artifice calculated to paralyse Athens during the interval while her enemies were defenceless, and to gain time for them to build a new fleet.¹ Sparta could not pledge herself either for Persia, or for her Peloponnesian confederates: indeed past experience had shown that she could not do so with effect. By accepting the propositions, therefore, Athens would not really have obtained relief from the entire burthen of war; but would merely have blunted the ardour and tied up the hands of her own troops, at a moment when they felt themselves in the full current of success. By the armament, most certainly—and by the generals, Alkibiadês, Theramenês, and Thrasybulus—the acceptance of such terms at such a moment would have been regarded as a disgrace. It would have balked them of conquests ardently, and at that time not unreasonably, anticipated; conquests tending to restore Athens to that eminence from which she had been so recently deposed. And it would have inflicted this mortification, not merely without compensating gain to her in any other shape, but with a fair probability of imposing upon all her citizens the necessity of redoubled efforts at no very distant future, when the moment favourable to her enemies should have arrived.

If therefore, passing from the vague accusation, that it was the demagogue Kleophon who stood between Athens and the conclusion of peace, we examine what were the specific terms of peace which he induced his countrymen to reject—we shall find that he had very strong reasons, not to say preponderant reasons, for his advice. Whether he made any use of this proposition, in itself inadmissible, to try and invite the conclusion of peace on more suitable and lasting terms, may well be doubted. Probably no such

¹ Philochorus (ap. Schol. ad Eurip. Orest. 371) appears to have said that the Athenians rejected the proposition as insincerely meant—*Δακρυλαμνίων πρεσβευσσ-*

μένων περί ειρήνης ἀπιστήσαντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐ προσήχοντο: compare also Schol. ad Eurip. Orest. 722—Philochori Fragment. 117—118. ed. Didot.

efforts would have succeeded, even if they had been made: yet a statesman like Periklês would have made the trial, in a conviction that Athens was carrying on the war at a disadvantage which must in the long run sink her. A mere opposition speaker like Kleophon, even when taking what was probably a right measure of the actual proposition before him, did not look so far forward into the future.

Meanwhile the Athenian fleet reigned alone in the Propontis and its two adjacent straits, the Bosphorus and the Hellespont; although the ardour and generosity of Pharnabazus not only supplied maintenance and clothing to the distressed seamen of the vanquished fleet, but also encouraged the construction of fresh ships in the room of those captured. While he armed the seamen, gave them pay for two months, and distributed them as guards along the coast of the satrapy, he at the same time granted an unlimited supply of ship-timber from the abundant forests of Mount Ida, and assisted the officers in putting new triremes on the stocks at Antandrus; near to which (at a place called Aspaneus) the Idæan wood was chiefly exported.¹

B.C. 410.
May, June,
&c.

Strenuous
aid of Pharnabazus to
the Peloponnesians
—Alkibiadês and
the Athenian fleet
at the
Bosphorus.

Having made these arrangements, he proceeded to lend aid at Chalkêdon, which the Athenians had already begun to attack. Their first operation after the victory had been to sail to Perinthus and Selymbria, both of which had before revolted from Athens: the former, intimidated by the recent events, admitted them and rejoined itself to Athens; the latter resisted such a requisition, but ransomed itself from attack for the present by the payment of a pecuniary fine. Alkibiadês then conducted them to Chalkêdon, opposite to Byzantium on the southernmost Asiatic border of the Bosphorus. To be masters of these two straits, the Bosphorus and the Hellespont, was a point of first-rate moment to Athens: first, because it enabled her to secure the arrival of the corn-ships from the Euxine for her own consumption; next, because she had it in her power to impose a tithe or due upon all the trading ships passing through—not unlike the dues imposed by the Danes at the Sound even down to the present time. For the opposite reasons, of course the importance of the position was equally great to the enemies of Athens. Until the spring of the

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 1, 24-26; Strabo, xiii. p. 606.

preceding year, Athens had been undisputed mistress of both the straits. But the revolt of Abydos in the Hellespont (about April 411 B.C.) and that of Byzantium with Chalkêdon in the Bosphorus (about June 411 B.C.), had deprived her of this pre-eminence; and her supplies obtained during the last few months could only have come through during those intervals when her fleets there stationed had the preponderance, so as to give them convoy. Accordingly it is highly probable that her supplies of corn from the Euxine during the autumn of 411 B.C. had been comparatively restricted.

Though Chalkêdon itself, assisted by Pharnabazus, still held out against Athens, Alkibiadês now took possession of Chrysopolis, its unfortified seaport, on the eastern coast of the Bosphorus opposite Byzantium. This place he fortified, established in it a squadron with a permanent garrison, and erected it into a regular tithing port for levying toll on all vessels coming out of the Euxine.¹

The Athenians seem to have habitually levied this toll at Byzantium, until the revolt of that place, among their constant sources of revenue: it was now re-established under the auspices of Alkibiadês. In so far as it was levied on ships which brought their produce for sale and consumption at Athens, it was of course ultimately paid in the shape of increased price by Athenian citizens and metics. Thirty triremes under Theramenês were left at Chrysopolis to enforce this levy, to convoy friendly merchantmen, and in other respects to serve as annoyance to the enemy.

The remaining fleet went partly to the Hellespont, partly to Thrace, where the diminished maritime strength of the Lacedæmonians already told in respect to the adherence

¹ See Demosthen. de Coronâ, c. 71; and Xenoph. Hellen. i. 1, 22. καὶ δεκατευτήριον κατεσχεύασαν ἐν αὐτῇ (Χρυσόπολει), καὶ τὴν δεκάτην ἐξελέγοντο τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου πλοίων: compare iv. 8, 27; and v. 1, 28: also Diodor. xiii. 64.

The expression τὴν δεκάτην implies that this tithe was something known and pre-established.

Polybius (iv. 44) gives credit to Alkibiadês for having been the first

to suggest this method of gain to Athens. But there is evidence that it was practised long before—even anterior to the Athenian empire, during the times of Persian preponderance (see Herodot. vi. 5).

See a striking passage, illustrating the importance to Athens of the possession of Byzantium, in Lysias, Orat. xxviii. cont. Ergokl. sect. 6.

of the cities. At Thasus especially,¹ the citizens, headed by Ekphantus, expelled the Lacedæmonian har-
most Eteonikus with his garrison, and admitted Thrasybulus with an Athenian force. It will be
recollected that this was one of the cities in which
Peisander and the Four Hundred conspirators (early in 411 B.C.) had put down the democracy and established an oligarchical government, under pretence that the allied cities would be faithful to Athens as soon as she was relieved from her democratical institutions. All the calculations of these oligarchs had been disappointed, as Phrynichus had predicted from the first. The Thasians, as soon as their own oligarchical party had been placed in possession of the government, recalled their disaffected exiles,² under whose auspices the Laconian garrison and harmost had since been introduced. Eteonikus, now expelled, accused the Lacedæmonian admiral Pasippidas of being himself a party to the expulsion, under bribes from Tissaphernês; an accusation, which seems improbable, but which the Lacedæmonians believed, and accordingly banished Pasippidas, sending Kratesippidas to replace him. The new admiral found at Chios a small fleet which Pasippidas had already begun to collect from the allies, to supply the recent losses.³

The Lacedæmonians are expelled from Thasus.

The tone at Athens, since the late naval victories, had become more hopeful and energetic. Agis, with his garrison at Dekeleia, though the Athenians could not hinder him from ravaging Attica, yet on approaching one day near to the city walls, was repelled with spirit and success by Thrasyllus. But that which most mortified the Lacedæmonian king, was to discern from his lofty station at Dekeleia the abundant influx into the Peiræus of corn-ships from the Euxine, again renewed in the autumn of 410 B.C., since the occupation of the Bosphorus and Hellespont by Alkibiadês. For the safe reception of these vessels, Thorikus was soon after fortified. Agis exclaimed that it was fruitless to shut out the Athenians from the produce of Attica, so long as plenty of imported corn was allowed to reach them. Accordingly he provided, in conjunction with the Megarians, a small

Klearchus the Lacedæmonian is sent to Byzantium.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 1, 32; Demosthen. cont. Leptin. s. 48. c. 14, p. 474.

² Thucyd. viii. 64.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 1, 32.

squadron of fifteen triremes, with which he despatched Klearchus to Byzantium and Chalkêdon. That Spartan was a public guest of the Byzantines, and had already been singled out to command auxiliaries intended for that city. He seems to have begun his voyage during the ensuing winter (B.C. 410—409), and reached Byzantium in safety, though with the destruction of three of his squadron by the nine Athenian triremes which guarded the Hellespont.¹

In the ensuing spring, Thrasyllus was despatched from Athens at the head of a large new force to act in Ionia. He commanded 50 triremes, 1000 of the regular hoplites, 100 horsemen, and 5000 seamen, with the means of arming these latter as peltasts; also transports for his troops besides the triremes.² Having reposed his armament for three days at Samos, he made a descent at Pygela, and next succeeded in making himself master of Kolophon with its port Notium. He next threatened Ephesus, but that place was defended by a powerful force which Tissaphernês had summoned, under proclamation "to go and succour the goddess Artemis;" as well as by twenty-five fresh Syracusan and two Selinusian triremes recently arrived.³ From these enemies Thrasyllus sustained a severe defeat near Ephesus, lost 300 men, and was compelled to sail off to Notium; from whence, after burying his dead, he proceeded northward towards the Hellespont. On the way thither, while halting for a while at Methymna in the north of Lesbos, Thrasyllus saw the twenty-five Syracusan triremes passing by on their voyage from Ephesus to Abydos. He immediately attacked them, captured four along with the entire crews, and chased

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 1, 35-36. He says that the ships of Klearchus, on being attacked by the Athenians in the Hellespont, fled first to *Sestos*, and afterwards to Byzantium. But *Sestos* was the Athenian station. The name must surely be put by inadvertence for *Abydos*, the Peloponnesian station.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 1, 34; i. 2, 1. Diodorus (xiii. 64) confounds Thrasybulus with Thrasyllus.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 2, 5-11. Xenophon distinguishes these twenty-five Syracusan triremes into τῶν

πρωτέρων εἶχοντι ναῶν—and then αἱ ἔσχατοι πάντα, αἱ νεωστί ἤχουσιν. But it appears to me that the twenty triremes, as well as the five, must have come to Asia, since the battle of Kyzikus—though the five may have been somewhat later in their period of arrival. All the Syracusan ships in the fleet of Mindarus were destroyed; and it seems impossible to imagine that that admiral can have left twenty Syracusan ships at Ephesus or Milêtus, in addition to those which he took with him to the Hellespont.

the remainder back to their station at Ephesus. All the prisoners taken were sent to Athens, where they were deposited for custody in the stone-quarries of Peiræus, doubtless in retaliation for the treatment of the Athenian prisoners at Syracuse: they contrived however during the ensuing winter to break a way out and escape to Dekeleia. Among the prisoners taken, was found Alkibiadês the Athenian (cousin and fellow-exile of the Athenian general of the same name), whom Thrasyllus caused to be set at liberty, while the others were sent to Athens.¹

After the delay caused by this pursuit, he brought back his armament to the Hellespont and joined Alkibiadês at Sestos. Their joint force was conveyed over, seemingly about the commencement of autumn, to Lampsakus on the Asiatic side of the strait; which place they fortified and made their headquarters for the autumn and winter, maintaining themselves by predatory excursions throughout the neighbouring satrapy of Pharnabazus. It is curious to learn, however, that when Alkibiadês was proceeding to marshal the army altogether (the hoplites, pursuant to Athenian custom, taking rank according to their tribes), his own soldiers, never yet beaten, refused to fraternise with those of Thrasyllus, who had been so recently worsted at Ephesus. Nor was this alienation removed until after a joint expedition against Abydos; Pharnabazus, presenting himself with a considerable force, especially cavalry, to relieve that place, was encountered and defeated in a battle wherein all the Athenians present took part. The honour of the hoplites of Thrasyllus was now held to be re-established, so that the fusion of ranks was admitted without farther difficulty.² Even the entire army, however, was not able to accomplish the conquest of Abydos; which the Peloponnesians and Pharnabazus still maintained as their station on the Hellespont.

Meanwhile Athens had so stripped herself of force, by the large armament recently sent with Thrasyllus, that her enemies near home were encouraged to active operations. The Spartans despatched an expedition, both of triremes and of land-force, to attack Pylus, which had remained as

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 2, 8-15.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 2, 13-17; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 29.

an Athenian post and a refuge for revolted Helots ever since its first fortification by Demosthenês in B.C. 425. The place was vigorously attacked both by sea and by land, and soon became much pressed. Not unmindful of its distress, the Athenians sent to its relief 30 triremes under Anytus, who however came back without even reaching the place, having been prevented by stormy weather or unfavourable winds from doubling Cape Malea. Pylus was soon afterwards obliged to surrender, the garrison departing on terms of capitulation.¹ But Anytus on his return encountered great displeasure from his countrymen, and was put on his trial for having betrayed, or for not having done his utmost to fulfill, the trust confided to him. It is said that he only saved himself from condemnation by bribing the Dikastery, and that he was the first Athenian who ever obtained a verdict by corruption.² Whether he could really have reached Pylus, and whether the obstacles which baffled him were such as an energetic officer would have overcome, we have no means of determining; still less, whether it be true that he actually escaped by bribery. The story seems to prove, however, that the general Athenian public thought him deserving of condemnation, and were so much surprised by his acquittal, as to account for it by supposing, truly or falsely, the use of means never before attempted.

It was about the same time also, that the Megarians recovered by surprise their port of Nisæa, which had been held by an Athenian garrison since B.C. 424. The Athenians made an effort to retake it, but failed; though they defeated the Megarians in an action.³

Thrasyllus, during the summer of B.C. 409—and even the joint force of Thrasyllus and Alkibiadês during the autumn of the same year—seem to have effected less than might have been expected from so large a force: indeed it must have been

B.C. 408.
Capture of
Chalkêdon
by Alkibi-
adês and the
Athenians.

¹ Diodor. xiii. 64. The slighting way in which Xenophon (Hellen. i. 2, 18) dismisses this capture of Pylus, as a mere retreat of some runaway Helots from Malea—as well as his employment of the name *Koryphasion*, and not of *Pylus*—prove how much he wrote from the statements of Lacedæmo-

nian informants.

² Diodor. xiii. 64; Plutarch, Coriolan. c. 14.

Aristotle, Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία, ap. Harpokration. v. Δεσφύων—and in the Collection of Fragment. Aristotel. no. 72. ed. Didot. (Fragment. Historic. Græc. vol. ii. p. 127).

³ Diodor. xiii. 65.

at some period during this year that the Lacedæmonian Klearchus, with his 15 Megarian ships, penetrated up the Hellespont to Byzantium, finding it guarded only by 9 Athenian triremes.¹ But the operations of 408 B.C. were more important. The entire force under Alkibiadês and the other commanders was mustered for the siege of Chalkêdon and Byzantium. The Chalkedonians, having notice of the project, deposited their moveable property for safety in the hands of their neighbours the Bithynian Thracians; a remarkable evidence of the good feeling and confidence between the two, contrasting strongly with the perpetual hostility which subsisted on the other side of the Bosphorus between Byzantium and the Thracian tribes adjoining.² But the precaution was frustrated by Alkibiadês, who entered the territory of the Bithynians and compelled them by threats to deliver up the effects confided to them. He then proceeded to block up Chalkêdon by a wooden wall carried across from the Bosphorus to the Propontis; though the continuity of this wall was interrupted by a river, and seemingly by some rough ground on the immediate brink of the river. The blockading wall was already completed, when Pharnabazus appeared with an army for the relief of the place, and advanced as far as the Herakleion (or temple of Heraklês) belonging to the Chalkedonians. Profiting by his approach, Hippokratês, the Lacedæmonian harmost in the town, made a vigorous sally: but the Athenians repelled all the efforts of Pharnabazus to force a passage through their lines and join him—so that, after an obstinate contest, the sallying force was driven back within the walls of the town, and Hippokratês himself killed.³

The blockade of the town was now made so sure, that Alkibiadês departed with a portion of the army to levy money and get together forces for the siege of Byzantium afterwards. During his absence, Theramenês and Thrasybulus came to terms with Pharnabazus for the capitulation of Chalkêdon. It was agreed that the town should again become a tributary dependency of Athens, on the same rate of tribute as before the revolt, and that the arrears during the subsequent period should be paid up. Moreover Phar-

Convention
concluded
by the
Athenians
with Pharnabazus.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 1, 36.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 3, 5-7.

³ Polyb. iv. 44-45.

Diodor. xiii. 69.

nabazus himself engaged to pay to the Athenians 20 talents on behalf of the town, and also to escort some Athenian envoys up to Susa, enabling them to submit propositions for accommodation to the Great King. Until those envoys should return, the Athenians covenanted to abstain from hostilities against the satrapy of Pharnabazus.¹ Oaths to this effect were mutually exchanged, after the return of Alkibiadês from his expedition. For Pharnabazus positively refused to complete the ratification with the other generals, until Alkibiadês should be there to ratify in person also; a proof at once of the great individual importance of the latter, and of his known facility in finding excuses to evade an agreement. Two envoys were accordingly sent by Pharnabazus to Chrysopolis, to receive the oaths of Alkibiadês, while two relatives of Alkibiadês came to Chalkêdon as witnesses to those of Pharnabazus. Over and above the common oath shared with his colleagues, Alkibiadês took a special covenant of personal friendship and hospitality with the satrap, and received from him the like.

Alkibiadês had employed his period of absence in capturing Selymbria, from whence he obtained
 B.C. 403. capturing Byzantium a sum of money, and in getting together a large
 captured by the Athenians. body of Thracians, with whom he marched by land to Byzantium. That place was now besieged, immediately after the capitulation of Chalkêdon, by the united force of the Athenians. A wall of circum-

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 3, 9. Ὑποταλεῖν τὸν φόρον Χαλκηδονίους Ἀθηναίοις ἔσονται εἰσώμενοι, καὶ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα χρήματα ἀποδοῦναι Ἀθηναίους δὲ μὴ πολεμεῖν Χαλκηδονίοις, ἕως ἂν οἱ παρὰ βασιλέα πρέσβεις ἐλθῶσιν.

This passage strengthens the doubts which I threw out in a former chapter, whether the Athenians ever did or could realise their project of commuting the tribute (imposed upon the dependent allies) for an *ad valorem* duty of five per cent. on imports and exports, which project is mentioned by Thucydides (vii. 28) as having been resolved upon at least, if not carried out, in the summer of 413 B.C.

In the bargain here made with the Chalkedonians, it seems implied that the payment of tribute was the last arrangement subsisting between Athens and Chalkêdon, at the time of the revolt of the latter.

Next, I agree with the remark made by Schneider in his note upon the passage Ἀθηναίους δὲ μὴ πολεμεῖν Χαλκηδονίοις. He notices the tenor of the covenant as it stands in Plutarch—τὴν Φαρναβάζου δὲ χάριον μὴ ἀδικεῖν (Alkib. c. 31), which is certainly far more suitable to the circumstances. Instead of Χαλκηδονίοις he proposes to read Φαρναβάζῳ. At any rate, this is the meaning.

vallation was drawn around it, and various attacks were made by missiles and battering engines. These however the Lacedæmonian garrison, under the harmost Klearchus, aided by some Megarians under Helixus and Bœotians under Kœratadas, was perfectly competent to repel. But the ravages of famine were not so easily dealt with. After the blockade had lasted some time, provisions began to fail; so that Klearchus, strict and harsh even under ordinary circumstances, became inexorable and oppressive from exclusive anxiety for the subsistence of his soldiers; and even locked up the stock of food while the population of the town were dying of hunger around him. Seeing that his only hope was from external relief, he sallied forth from the city to entreat aid from Pharnabazus; and to get together, if possible, a fleet for some aggressive operation that might divert the attention of the besiegers. He left the defence to Kœratadas and Helixus, in full confidence that the Byzantines were too much compromised by their revolt from Athens to venture to desert Sparta, whatever might be their suffering. But the favourable terms recently granted to Chalkêdon, coupled with the severe and increasing famine, induced Kydon and a Byzantine party to open the gates by night, and admit Alkibiadês with the Athenians into the wide interior square called the Thrakion. Helixus and Kœratadas, apprised of this attack only when the enemy had actually got possession of the town on all sides, vainly attempted resistance, and were compelled to surrender at discretion. They were sent as prisoners to Athens, where Kœratadas contrived to escape during the confusion of the landing at Peiræus. Favourable terms were granted to the town, which was replaced in its position of a dependent ally of Athens, and probably had to pay up its arrears of tribute in the same manner as Chalkêdon.¹

So slow was the process of siege in ancient times, that the reduction of Chalkêdon and Byzantium occupied nearly the whole year; the latter place surrendering about the beginning of winter.² Both of them, however, were

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 3, 15-22; Diodor. xiii. 67; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 31.

The account given by Xenophon of the surrender of Byzantium, which I have followed in the text, is perfectly plain and probable

It does not consist with the complicated stratagem described in Diodorus and Plutarch, as well as in Frontinus, iii. xi. 3; alluded to also in Polyænus, i. 48, 2.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 4, 1.

acquisitions of capital importance to Athens, making her again undisputed mistress of the Bosphorus, and ensuring to her two valuable tributary allies. Besides this improvement in her position, the accommodation just concluded with Pharnabazus was also a step of great value, and still greater promise. It was plain that the satrap had grown weary of bearing all the brunt of the war for the benefit of the Peloponnesians, and that he was well-disposed to assist the Athenians in coming to terms with the Great King. The mere withdrawal of his hearty support from Sparta, even if nothing else followed from it, was of immense moment to Athens; and thus much was really achieved. The envoys, five Athenians and two Argeians (all, probably, sent for from Athens, which accounts for some delay), were directed after the siege of Chalkêdon to meet Pharnabazus at Kyzikus. Some Lacedæmonian envoys, and even the Syracusan Hermokratês, who had been condemned and banished by sentence at home, took advantage of the same escort, and all proceeded on their journey upward to Susa. Their progress was arrested, during the extreme severity of the winter, at Gordium in Phrygia: and it was while pursuing their track into the interior at the opening of spring, that they met the young prince Cyrus, son of King Darius, coming down in person to govern an important part of Asia Minor. Some Lacedæmonian envoys (Bœotius and others) were travelling down along with him, after having fulfilled their mission at the Persian court.¹

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 4, 2-3.

CHAPTER LXIV.

FROM THE ARRIVAL OF CYRUS THE YOUNGER IN ASIA MINOR DOWN TO THE BATTLE OF ARGINUSÆ.

THE advent of Cyrus, commonly known as Cyrus the younger, into Asia Minor, was an event of the greatest importance, opening what may be called the last phase in the Peloponnesian war.

He was the younger of the two sons of the Persian king Darius Nothus by the cruel queen Parysatis, and was now sent down by his father as satrap of Lydia, Phrygia the greater, and Kappadokia; as well as general of all that military division of which the muster-place was Kastôlus. His command did not at this time comprise the Greek cities on the coast, which were still left to Tissaphernês and Pharnabazus.¹ But he nevertheless brought down with him a strong interest in the Grecian war, and an intense anti-Athenian feeling, with full authority from his father to carry it out into act. Whatever this young man willed, he willed strongly: his bodily activity, rising superior to those temptations of sensual indulgence which often enervated the Persian grandees, provoked the admiration even of Spartans;² and his energetic character was combined with a certain measure of ability. Though he had not as yet conceived that deliberate plan for mounting the Persian throne which afterwards absorbed his whole mind, and was so near succeeding by the help of the Ten Thousand Greeks—yet he seems to have had from the beginning the sentiment and ambition of a king in prospect, not those of a satrap. He came down well-aware that Athens was the efficient enemy by whom the pride of the Persian kings had been humbled, the insular Greeks kept out of the sight

¹ The *Anabasis* of Xenophon (i. 1, 6—8; i. 9, 7—9) is better authority, and speaks more exactly, than the *Hellenica*, i. 4, 3.

² See the anecdote of Cyrus and Lysander in Xenoph. *Æconom.* iv. 21, 23.

Cyrus the younger—effects of his coming down to Asia Minor.

of a Persian ship, and even the continental Greeks on the coast practically emancipated—for the last sixty years. He therefore brought down with him a strenuous desire, to put down the Athenian power, very different from the treacherous balancing of Tissaphernês, and much more formidable even than the straightforward enmity of Pharnabazus, who had less money, less favour at court, and less of youthful ardour. Moreover, Pharnabazus, after having heartily espoused the cause of the Peloponnesians for the last three years, had now become weary of the allies whom he had so long kept in pay. Instead of expelling Athenian influence from his coasts with little difficulty, as he had expected to do—he found his satrapy plundered, his revenues impaired or absorbed, and an Athenian fleet all-powerful in the Propontis and Hellespont; while the Lacedæmonian fleet, which he had taken so much pains to invite, was destroyed. Decidedly sick of the Peloponnesian cause, he was even leaning towards Athens; and the envoys whom he was escorting to Susa might perhaps have laid the foundation of an altered Persian policy in Asia Minor, when the journey of Cyrus down to the coast overthrew all such calculations. The young prince brought with him a fresh, hearty, and youthful antipathy against Athens,—a power inferior only to that of the Great King himself—and an energetic determination to use it without reserve in ensuring victory to the Peloponnesians.

From the moment that Pharnabazus and the Athenian envoys met Cyrus, their farther progress towards Susa became impossible. Bœotius, and the other Lacedæmonian envoys travelling along with the young prince, made extravagant boasts of having obtained all that they asked for at Susa; while Cyrus himself announced his powers as unlimited in extent over the whole coast, all for the purpose of prosecuting vigorous war in conjunction with the Lacedæmonians. Pharnabazus, on hearing such intelligence and seeing the Great King's seal to the words—"I send down Cyrus, as lord of all those who muster at Kastôlus"—not only refused to let the Athenian envoys proceed onward, but was even obliged to obey the orders of the young prince; who insisted that they should either be surrendered to him, or at least detained for some time in the interior, in order that no information might be conveyed to Athens. The satrap resisted the first of these

requisitions, having pledged his word for their safety; but he obeyed the second—detaining them in Kappadokia for no less than three years, until Athens was prostrate and on the point of surrender, after which he obtained permission from Cyrus to send them back to the sea-coast.¹

This arrival of Cyrus, overruling the treachery of Tissaphernês as well as the weariness of Pharnabazus, and supplying the enemies of Athens with a double flow of Persian gold at a moment when the stream would otherwise have dried up—was a paramount item in that sum of causes which concurred to determine the result of the war.²

B.C. 407.

Lysander—
Lacedæ-
monian
admiral in
Asia.

But important as the event was in itself, it was rendered still more important by the character of the Lacedæmonian admiral Lysander, with whom the young prince first came into contact on reaching Sardis.

Lysander had come out to supersede Kratesippidas about December 408 B.C., or January 407 B.C.³ He was the

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 4, 3—8. The words here employed respecting the envoys, when returning after their three years' detention—*ἔθεν προς τὸ ἄλλο στρατόπεδον ἀπέπλευσαν*—appear to me an inadvertence. The return of the envoys must have been in the spring of 404 B.C., at a time when Athens had no camp: the surrender of the city took place in April 404 B.C. Xenophon incautiously speaks as if that state of things which existed when the envoys departed, still continued at their return.

² The words of Thucydides (ii. 65) imply this as his opinion—*Κόρω τε ὕστερον βασιλέως παιδὶ προσγενομένῳ, &c.*

³ The commencement of Lysander's navarehy or year of maritime command appears to me established for this winter. He had been some time actually in his command before Cyrus arrived at Sardis—*οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, πρότερον τούτων οὐ πολλῷ χρόνῳ Κρατησιπιδᾶ τῆς ναυαρχίας παρεληλυθίας, Λυσανδρον ἐξέπεμψαν ναύαρχον.* 'Ο

δὲ ἀφικόμενος ἐς Ῥόδον, καὶ ναῦς ἐκείθεν λαβὼν, ἐς Κῶ καὶ Μίλητον ἔπλευσεν· ἐκείθεν δὲ ἐς Ἐφέσον· καὶ ἐκ εἰ ἔμεινε, ναῦς ἔχων ἐβδόμη· κοντα, μέχρις οὗ Κῦρος ἐς Σάρδεεις ἀφίκετο (Xenoph. Hellen. i. 5, 1).

Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fast. H. ad ann. 407 B.C.) has, I presume, been misled by the first words of this passage—*πρότερον τούτων οὐ πολλῷ χρόνῳ*—when he says—"During the stay of Alcibiadês at Athens, Lysander is sent as *ναύαρχος*—Xen. Hell. i. 5, 1. Then followed the defeat of Antiochus, the deposition of Aleibiadês, and the substitution of ἄλλους δέσπας, between September 407 and September 406, when *Callicratidas succeeded Lysander.*"

Now Alcibiadês came to Athens in the month of Thargelion, or about the end of May 407, and staid there till the beginning of September 407. Cyrus arrived at Sardis before Alcibiadês reached Athens, and Lysander had been some time at his post before Cyrus arrived; so that Lysander was not

last (after Brasidas and Gylippus) of that trio of eminent Spartans, from whom all the capital wounds of Athens proceeded, during the course of this long war. He was born of poor parents, and is even said to have been of that class called *Mothakes*, being only enabled by the aid of richer men to keep up his contribution to the public mess, and his place in the constant drill and discipline. He was not only an excellent officer,¹ thoroughly competent to the duties of military command, but possessed also great talents for intrigue, and for organising a political party as well as keeping up its disciplined movements. Though indifferent to the temptations either of money or of pleasure,² and willingly acquiescing in the poverty to which he was born, he was altogether unscrupulous in the prosecution of ambitious objects, either for his country or for himself. His family, poor as it was, enjoyed a dignified position at Sparta—belonging to the gens of the *Herakleidæ*, not connected by any near relationship with the kings: moreover his personal reputation as a Spartan was excellent, since his observance of the rules of discipline had been rigorous and exemplary. The habits of self-constraint thus acquired served him in good stead when it became necessary to his ambition to court the favour of the great. His recklessness about falsehood and perjury is illustrated by various current sayings ascribed to him—such as, that children were to be taken in by means of dice, men by means of oaths.³ A selfish ambition—for promoting the power of his country not merely in connection with, but in subservience to, his own—guided him from the beginning to the end of his

sent out "during the stay of Alcibiadès at Athens," but some months before. Still less is it correct to say that Kallikratidas succeeded Lysander in September 406. The battle of Arginusæ, wherein Kallikratidas perished, was fought about August 406, after he had been admiral for several months. The words *πρότερον τούτων*, when construed along with the context which succeeds, must evidently be understood in a large sense—"these events"—mean the general series of events which begins i. 4, 8—the proceedings of

Alkibiadès from the beginning of the spring of 407.

¹ *Ælian*, V. H. xii. 43; *Athenæus*, vi. p. 271. The assertion that Lysander belonged to the class of *Mothakes* is given by *Athenæus* as coming from *Phylarchus*, and I see no reason for calling it in question. *Ælian* states the same thing respecting Gylippus and Kallikratidas also; I do not know on what authority.

² *Theopompus*, *Fragm.* 21, ed. *Didot*; *Plutarch*, *Lysand.* c. 20.

³ *Plutarch*, *Lysander*, c. 8.

career. In this main quality, he agreed with Alkibiadês; in reckless immorality of means, he went even beyond him. He seems to have been cruel; an attribute which formed no part of the usual character of Alkibiadês. On the other hand, the love of personal enjoyment, luxury, and ostentation, which counted for so much in Alkibiadês, was quite unknown to Lysander. The basis of his disposition was Spartan, tending to merge appetite, ostentation, and expansion of mind, all in the love of command and influence—not Athenian, which tended to the development of many and diversified impulses; ambition being one, but only one, among the number.

Kratesippidas, the predecessor of Lysander, seems to have enjoyed the maritime command for more than the usual yearly period, having superseded Pasippidas during the middle of the year of the latter. But the maritime power of Sparta was then so weak (having not yet recovered from the ruinous defeat at Kyzikus), that he achieved little or nothing. We hear of him only as furthering, for his own profit, a political revolution at Chios. Bribed by a party of Chian exiles, he took possession of the acropolis, reinstated them in the island, and aided them in deposing and expelling the party then in office, to the number of 600. It is plain that this was not a question between democracy and oligarchy, but between two oligarchical parties, the one of which succeeded in purchasing the factious agency of the Spartan admiral. The exiles whom he expelled took possession of Atarneus, a strong post belonging to the Chians on the mainland opposite Lesbos. From hence they made war, as well as they could, upon their rivals now in possession of the island, and also upon other parts of Ionia; not without some success and profit, as will appear by their condition about ten years afterwards. ¹

The practice of reconstituting the governments of the Asiatic cities, thus begun by Kratesippidas, was extended and brought to a system by Lysander; not indeed for private emolument, which he always despised—but in views of ambition. Having departed from Peloponnesus with a squadron, he

Proceed-
ings of the
preceding
admiral,
Krate-
sippidas.

Lysander
visits Cyrus
at Sardis.

¹Diodor. xiii. 65; Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 2, 11. I presume that this conduct of Kratesippidas is the fact

glanced at by Isokratês de Pace, Sect. 128. p. 240, ed. Bekk.

reinforced it at Rhodes and then sailed onward to Kôs (an Athenian island, so that he could only have touched there) and Milêtus. He took up his final station at Ephesus, the nearest point to Sardis, where Cyrus was expected to arrive; and while awaiting his coming, augmented his fleet to the number of 70 triremes. As soon as Cyrus reached Sardis (about April or May 407 B.C.), Lysander went to pay his court to him along with some Lacedæmonian envoys, and found himself welcomed with every mark of favour. Preferring bitter complaints against the double-dealing of Tissaphernês—whom they accused of having frustrated the king's orders and sacrificed the interests of the empire, under the seductions of Alkibiadês,—they entreated Cyrus to adopt a new policy, and execute the stipulations of the treaty by lending the most vigorous aid to put down the common enemy. Cyrus replied that these were the express orders which he had received from his father, and that he was prepared to fulfil them with all his might. He had brought with him (he said) 500 talents, which should be at once devoted to the cause: if these were insufficient, he would resort to the private funds which his father had given him; and if more still were needed, he would coin into money the gold and silver throne on which he sat.¹

Lysander and the envoys returned the warmest thanks for these magnificent promises, which were not likely to prove empty words from the lips of a vehement youth like Cyrus. So sanguine were the hopes which they conceived from his character and proclaimed sentiments, that they ventured to ask him to restore the rate of pay to one full Attic drachma per head for the seamen; which had been the rate promised by Tissaphernês through his envoys at Sparta, when he first invited the Lacedæmonians across the Ægean, and when it was doubtful whether they would come—but actually paid only for the first month, and then reduced to half a drachma, furnished in practice with miserable irregularity. As a motive for granting this increase of pay, Cyrus was assured that it would determine

His dexter-
ous policy—
he acquires
the peculiar
esteem of
Cyrus.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 5, 3—4; Diodor. xiii. 70; Plutarch, Lysander, c. 4. This seems to have been a favourite metaphor, either used by, or at least ascribed to, the Persian grandees; we have already had it a little before from the mouth of Tissaphernês.

the Athenian seamen to desert so largely, that the war would sooner come to an end, and of course the expenditure also. But he refused compliance, saying that the rate of pay had been fixed both by the king's express orders and by the terms of the treaty, so that he could not depart from it.¹ In this reply Lysander was forced to acquiesce. The envoys were treated with distinction, and feasted at a banquet; after which Cyrus, drinking to the health of Lysander, desired him to declare what favour he could do to gratify him most. "To grant an additional obolus per head for each seaman's pay," replied Lysander. Cyrus immediately complied, having personally bound himself by his manner of putting the question. But the answer impressed him both with astonishment and admiration; for he had expected that Lysander would ask some favour or present for himself—judging him not only according to the analogy of most Persians, but also of Astyochus and the officers of the Peloponnesian armament at Milêtus, whose corrupt subservience to Tissaphernês had probably been made known to him. From such corruption, as well as from the mean carelessness of Theramenês (the Spartan) respecting the condition of the seamen,² Lysander's conduct stood out in pointed and honourable contrast.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 5, 5. εἶναι δὲ καὶ τὰς συνθήκας οὕτως ἐχούσας, τριάκοντα μνᾶς ἐκάστη νηὶ τοῦ μηνὸς διδόναι, ὅποσας ἂν βούλοιντο τρέφειν Λακεδαιμόνιοι.

This is not strictly correct. The rate of pay is not specified in either of the three conventions, as they stand in Thucyd. viii. 18, 37, 58. It seems to have been, from the beginning, matter of verbal understanding and promise; first a drachma per day was promised by the envoys of Tissaphernês at Sparta—next, the satrap himself at Milêtus cut down the drachma to half a drachma, and promised this lower rate for the future (viii. 29).

Mr. Mitford says—"Lysander proposed, that an Attic drachma, which was eight oboli, nearly tenpence sterling, should be allowed for daily pay to every seaman."

Mr. Mitford had in the previous sentence stated *three obolis* as equal to not quite *fourpence* sterling. Of course therefore it is plain that he did not consider three oboli as the half of a drachma (Hist. Greece, ch. xx. sect. i. vol. iv. p. 317, oct. ed. 1814).

That a drachma was equivalent to six oboli (that is, an Æginæan drachma to six Æginæan oboli, and an Attic drachma to six Attic oboli) is so familiarly known, that I should almost have imagined the word *eight* (in the first sentence here cited) to be a misprint for *six*—if the sentence cited next had not clearly demonstrated that Mr. Mitford really believed a drachma to be equal to *eight* oboli. It is certainly a mistake surprising to find.

² Thucyd. viii. 29.

The incident here described not only procured for the seamen of the Peloponnesian fleet the daily pay of four oboli (instead of three) per man, but also ensured to Lysander himself a degree of esteem and confidence from Cyrus which he knew well how to turn to account. I have already remarked,¹ in reference to Periklês and Nikias, that an established reputation for personal incorruptibility, rare as that quality was among Grecian leading politicians, was among the most precious items in the capital stock of an ambitious man—even if looked at only in regard to the durability of his own influence. If the proof of such disinterestedness was of so much value in the eyes of the Athenian people, yet more powerfully did it work upon the mind of Cyrus. With his Persian and princely ideas of winning adherents by munificence,² a man who despised presents was a phænomenon commanding the higher sentiment of wonder and respect. From this time forward he not only trusted Lysander with implicit pecuniary confidence, but consulted him as to the prosecution of the war, and even condescended to second his personal ambition to the detriment of this object.³

Returning from Sardis to Ephesus, after such unexampled success in his interview with Cyrus, Lysander was enabled not only to make good to his fleet the full arrear actually due, but also to pay them for a month in advance, at the increased rate of four oboli per man; and to promise that high rate for the future. A spirit of the highest satisfaction and confidence was diffused through the armament. But the ships were in indifferent condition, having been hastily and parsimoniously got up since the late defeat at Kyzikus. Accordingly Lysander employed his present affluence in putting them into better order, procuring more complete tackle, and inviting picked crews.⁴ He took another step pregnant with important results. Summoning to Ephesus a few of the most leading and active men from each of the Asiatic cities, he organized them into disciplined clubs or factions, in correspondence with himself.

Abundant
pay of the
Peloponne-
sian arma-
ment,
furnished
by Cyrus.

Factions
organized
by Lysander
among the
Asiatic
cities.

¹ See a former volume, ch. li.

² See the remarkable character of Cyrus the younger, given in the *Anabasis* of Xenophon, i. 9, 22—28.

³ Xenoph. *Hellen.* ii. 1, 13; Plutarch, *Lysand.* c. 4—9.

⁴ Xenoph. *Hellen.* i. 5, 10.

He instigated these clubs to the most vigorous prosecution of the war against Athens, promising that as soon as that war should be concluded, they should be invested and maintained by Spartan influence in the government of their respective cities.¹ His newly established influence with Cyrus, and the abundant supplies of which he was now master, added double force to an invitation in itself but too seducing. And thus, while infusing increased ardour into the joint warlike efforts of these cities, he at the same time procured for himself an ubiquitous correspondence, such as no successor could manage; rendering the continuance of his own command almost essential to success. The fruits of his factious manœuvres will be seen in the subsequent Dekarchies or oligarchies of Ten, after the complete subjugation of Athens.

While Lysander and Cyrus were thus restoring formidable efficacy to their side of the contest (during the summer of 407 B.C.), the victorious exile Alkibiadês had accomplished the important and delicate step of re-entering his native city for the first time. According to the accommodation with Pharnabazus, concluded after the reduction of Chalkêdon, the Athenian fleet was precluded from assailing his satrapy, and was thus forced to seek subsistence elsewhere. Byzantium and Selymbria, with contributions levied in Thrace, maintained them for the winter: in the spring (407 B.C.), Alkibiadês brought them again to Samos; from whence he undertook an expedition against the coast of Karia, levying contributions to the extent of 100 talents. Thrasybulus, with thirty triremes, went to attack Thrace, where he reduced Thasos, Abdêra, and all those towns which had revolted from Athens; Thasos being now in especial distress from famine as well as from past seditions. A valuable contribution for the support of the fleet was doubtless among the fruits of this success. Thrasyllus at the same time conducted another division of the army home to Athens, intended by Alkibiadês as precursors of his own return.²

Before Thrasyllus arrived, the people had already manifested their favourable disposition towards Alkibiadês by choosing him anew general of the armament, along with Thrasybulus and Konon.

B.C. 407.

Proceedings of Alkibiadês in Thrace and Asia.

B.C. 407.

His arrival at Athens.

¹ Diodor. xiii. 70; Plutarch, Lysander. c. 5.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 4, 8-10; Diodor. xiii. 72. The chronology

Alkibiadês was now tending homeward from Samos with twenty triremes, bringing with him all the contributions recently levied. He first stopped at Paros, then visited the coast of Laconia, and lastly looked into the Lacedæmonian harbour of Gytheion, where he had learnt that thirty triremes were preparing. The news which he received of his re-election as general, strengthened by the pressing invitations and encouragements of his friends, as well as by the recall of his banished kinsmen—at length determined him to sail to Athens. He reached Peiræus on a marked day—the festival of the Plyntêria on the 25th of the month Thargêlion—(about the end of May 407 B.C.). This was a day of melancholy solemnity, accounted unpropitious for any action of importance. The statue of the goddess Athênê was stripped of all its ornaments, covered up from every one's gaze, and washed or cleansed under a mysterious ceremonial, by the holy gens called Praxiergidæ.¹ The goddess thus seemed to turn away her face, and refuse to behold the returning exile. Such at least was the construction of his enemies; and as the subsequent turn of events tended to bear them out, it has been preserved; while the more auspicious counter-interpretation, doubtless suggested by his friends, has been forgotten.

The most extravagant representations of the pomp and splendour of this return of Alkibiadês to Athens, were given by some authors of antiquity—especially by Duris at Samos, an author about two generations later. It was said that he brought with him 200 prow-ornaments belonging to captive enemies' ships, or (according to some) even the 200 captured ships themselves; that his trireme was ornamented with gilt and

Feelings
and details
connected
with his
arrival.

of Xenophon, though not so clear as we could wish, deserves unquestionable preference over that of Diodorus.

¹ See the description of a similar solemnity performed by appointed priestesses and other women at Argos (the annual washing of the statue of Athênê in the river Inachus) given by the poet Kallimachus—Hymnus in Lavacrum Palladis—with the copious illustrative notes of Ezekiel Spanheim.

Here, again, we find analogies in the existing sentiment of the Hindoo religion. Colonel Sleeman mentions—"The water of the Ganges, with which the image of the God Vishnoo has been washed, is considered a very holy draught, fit for princes. That with which the image of the God Seva is washed, must not be drunk." (Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official, ch. 23. p. 182).

silvered shields, and sailed by purple sails; that Kallippidês, one of the most distinguished actors of the day, performed the functions of Keleustês, pronouncing the chant or word of command to the rowers; that Chrysogonus, a flute-player who had gained the first prize at the Pythian games, was also on board, playing the air of return.¹ All these details, invented with melancholy facility to illustrate an ideal of ostentation and insolence, are refuted by the more simple and credible narrative of Xenophon. The re-entry of Alkibiadês was not merely unostentatious, but even mistrustful and apprehensive. He had with him only twenty triremes; and though encouraged, not merely by the assurances of his friends, but also by the news that he had just been re-elected general,—he was nevertheless half-afraid to disembark, even at the instant when he made fast his ship to the quay in Peiræus. A vast crowd had assembled there from the city and the port, animated by curiosity, interest, and other emotions of every kind, to see him arrive. But so little did he trust their sentiments, that he hesitated at first to step on shore, and stood up on the deck looking about for his friends and kinsmen. Presently he saw Euryptolemus his cousin and others, by whom he was heartily welcomed, and in the midst of whom he landed. But they too were so apprehensive of his numerous enemies, that they formed themselves into a sort of body-guard to surround and protect him against any possible assault, during his march from Peiræus to Athens.²

No protection, however, was required. Not merely did his enemies attempt no violence against him, but they said nothing in opposition when he made his defence before the Senate and the public assembly. Protesting before the one as well as the other, his innocence of the impiety laid to his charge, he denounced bitterly the injustice of his enemies, and gently, but pathetically, deplored the unkindness of the people. His friends all spoke warmly in the same strain. So strenuous and so pronounced, was the sentiment in his

Unanimous
welcome
with which
he is re-
ceived.

¹ Diodor. xiii. 68; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 31; Athenæ. xii. p. 535.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 4, 18, 19. Ἀλκιβιάδης δὲ, πρὸς τὴν γῆν ὁρμισθεὶς, ἀπέβαινε μὲν οὐκ εὐθὺς, φοβούμενος τοὺς ἐχθρούς· ἐπαναστὰς δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ καταστρωματος, ἐσκόπει τοὺς

αὐτοῦ ἐπιτηδείους, εἰ παρήσαν. Κατιδὼν δὲ Εὐρυπτόλεμον τοῦ Πεισιάνκτου, ἐκαστοῦ δὲ ἀνέβη, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους οἰκείους καὶ φίλους μετ' αὐτῶν, τότε ἀποβάς ἀναβαίνει εἰς τὴν πόλιν, μετὰ τῶν παρεσκευασμένων, εἰ τις ἄπειτο, μὴ ἐπιτρέψει.

favour, both of the Senate and of the public assembly, that no one dared to address them in the contrary sense.¹ The sentence of condemnation passed against him was cancelled: the Eumolpidæ were directed to revoke the curse which they had pronounced upon his head: the record of the sentence was destroyed, and the plate of lead, upon which the curse was engraven, thrown into the sea: his confiscated property was restored: lastly, he was proclaimed general with full powers, and allowed to prepare an expedition of 100 triremes, 1500 hoplites from the regular muster-roll, and 150 horsemen. All this passed, by unopposed vote, amidst silence on the part of enemies and acclamations from friends—amidst unmeasured promises of future achievement from himself, and confident assurances, impressed by his friends on willing hearers, that Alkibiadês was the only man competent to restore the empire and grandeur of Athens. The general expectation, which he and his friends took every possible pains to excite, was, that his victorious career of the last three years was a preparation for yet greater triumphs during the next.

We may be satisfied, when we advert to the apprehensions of Alkibiadês on entering the Peiræus, and to the body-guard organized by his friends, that this overwhelming and uncontradicted triumph greatly surpassed the anticipations of both. It intoxicated him, and led him to make light of enemies whom only just before he had so much dreaded. This mistake, together with the carelessness and insolence arising out of what seemed to be an unbounded ascendancy, proved the cause of his future ruin. But the truth is, that these enemies, however they might remain silent, had not ceased to be formidable. Alkibiadês had now been eight years in exile, from about August 415 B.C. to May 407 B.C. Now absence was in many ways a good thing for his reputation; since his overbearing private demeanour had been kept out of sight, and his impieties partially forgotten. There was even a disposition among the majority to accept his own explicit denial of the fact laid to his charge; and to dwell chiefly upon the unworthy manœuvres of his enemies in resisting his demand for instant trial immediately after the accusation was broached, in order that they might calumniate him during his absence. He was characterized as a patriot

Effect produced upon Alkibiadês.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 4, 20; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 33; Diodor. xiii. 69.

animated by the noblest motives, who had brought both first-rate endowments and large private wealth to the service of the commonwealth, but had been ruined by a conspiracy of corrupt and worthless speakers, every way inferior to him; men, whose only chance of success with the people arose from expelling those who were better than themselves, while he (Alkibiadês), far from having any interest adverse to the democracy, was the natural and worthy favourite of a democratical people.¹ So far as the old causes of unpopularity were concerned, therefore, time and absence had done much to weaken their effect, and to assist his friends in countervailing them by pointing to the treacherous political manœuvres employed against him.

But if the old causes of unpopularity had thus, comparatively speaking, passed out of sight, others had since arisen, of a graver and more ineffaceable character. His vindictive hostility to his country had been not merely ostentatiously proclaimed, but actively manifested, by stabs but too effectively aimed at her vitals. The sending of Gylippus to Sy-

Sentiment
of the Athe-
nians to-
wards him.

racuse—the fortification of Dekeleia—the revolts of Chios and Milêtus—the first origination of the conspiracy of the Four Hundred—had all been emphatically the measures of Alkibiadês. Even for these, the enthusiasm of the moment attempted some excuse: it was affirmed that he had never ceased to love his country, in spite of her wrongs towards him, and that he had been compelled by the necessities of exile to serve men whom he detested, at the daily risk of his life.² Such pretences, however, could not really impose upon any one. The treason of Alkibiadês during the period of his exile remained indefensible as well as undeniable, and would have been more than sufficient as a theme for his enemies, had their tongues been free. But his position was one altogether singular: having first inflicted on his country immense mischief, he had since rendered her valuable service, and promised to render still more. It is true, that the subsequent service was by no means adequate to the previous mischief: nor had it indeed been rendered exclusively by him, since the victories of Abydos and Kyzikus belong not less to Theramenês and Thrasybulus than to Alkibiadês:³ moreover, the peculiar

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 4, 14—16.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 4, 15.

³ This point is justly touched upon, more than once, by Cor-

present or capital which he had promised to bring with him—Persian alliance and pay to Athens—had proved a complete delusion. Still the Athenian arms had been eminently successful since his junction, and we may see that not merely common report, but even good judges such as Thucydidês, ascribed this result to his superior energy and management.

Without touching upon these particulars, it is impossible fully to comprehend the very peculiar position of this returning exile before the Athenian people in the summer of 407 B.C. The more distant past exhibited him as among the worst of criminals—the recent past, as a valuable servant and patriot—the future promised continuance in this last character, so far as there were any positive indications to judge by. Now this was a case in which discussion and recrimination could not possibly answer any useful purpose. There was every reason for re-appointing Alkibiadês to his command; but this could only be done under prohibition of censure on his past crimes, and provisional acceptance of his subsequent good deeds as justifying the hope of yet better deeds to come. The popular instinct felt this situation perfectly, and imposed absolute silence on his enemies.¹ We are not to infer from hence that the people had forgotten the past deeds of Alkibiadês, or that they entertained for him nothing but unqualified confidence and admiration. In their present very justifiable sentiment of hopefulness, they determined that he should have full scope for prosecuting his new and better career, if he chose; and that his enemies should be precluded from reviving the mention of an irreparable past, so as to shut the door against him. But what was thus interdicted to men's lips as unseasonable, was not effaced from their recollections; nor were the enemies, though silenced for the moment, rendered powerless for the future. All this train of combustible matter

nelius Nepos—Vit. Alcibiad. c. 6—
 “quanquam Theramenês et Thrasybulus eisdem rebus præfuerant.”
 And again in the life of Thrasybulus (c. 1), “Primum Peloponnesiaco bello multa hic (Thrasybulus) sine Alcibiade gessit; ille nullam

rem sine hoc.”

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 4, 20. λεχθέντων δὲ καὶ ἄλλων τοιοῦτων, καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀντειπόντος, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀνασχεῖσθαι ἂν τήν ἐκκλησίαν, &c.

lay quiescent, ready to be fired by any future misconduct or negligence, perhaps even by blameless ill-success, on the part of Alkibiadês.

At a juncture when so much depended upon his future behaviour, he showed (as we shall see presently) that he completely misinterpreted the temper of the people. Intoxicated by the unexpected triumph of his reception—according to that fatal susceptibility so common among distinguished Greeks—he forgot his own past history, and fancied that the people had forgotten and forgiven it also; construing their studied and well-advised silence into a proof of oblivion. He conceived himself in assured possession of public confidence, and looked upon his numerous enemies as if they no longer existed, because they were not allowed to speak at a most unseasonable hour. Without doubt, his exultation was shared by his friends, and this sense of false security proved his future ruin.

Two colleagues, recommended by Alkibiadês himself—Adeimantus and Aristokratês—were named by the people as generals of the hoplites to go out with him, in case of operations ashore.¹ In less than three months, his armament was ready; but he designedly deferred his departure until that day of the month Boedromion (about the beginning of September) when the Eleusinian mysteries were celebrated, and when the solemn processional march of the crowd of communicants was wont to take place, along the Sacred Way from Athens to Eleusis. For seven successive years, ever since the establishment of Agis at Dekeleia, this march had been of necessity discontinued, and the procession had been transported by sea, to the omission of many of the ceremonial details. Alkibiadês on this occasion caused the land-march to be renewed, in full pomp and solemnity; assembling all his troops in arms to protect, in case any attack should be made from Dekeleia. No such attack was hazarded; so that he had the satisfaction of reviving the full regularity of this

Mistaken confidence and intoxication of Alkibiadês.

He protects the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries by land, against the garrison of Dekeleia.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 4, 20. Both Diodorus (xiii. 49) and Cornelius Nepos (Vit. Alcib. c. 7) state Thrasybulus and Adeimantus as his colleagues: both state also that

his colleagues were chosen on his recommendation. I follow Xenophon as to the names, and also as to the fact, that they were named as *κατὰ γῆν στρατηγοί*.

illustrious scene, and escorting the numerous communicants out and home, without the smallest interruption;—an exploit gratifying to the religious feelings of the people, and imparting an acceptable sense of undiminished Athenian power; while in reference to his own reputation, it was especially politic, as serving to make his peace with the Eumolpidæ and the Two Goddesses, on whose account he had been condemned.¹

Immediately after the mysteries, he departed with his armament. It appears that Agis at Dekeleia, though he had not chosen to come out and attack Alkibiadês when posted to guard the Eleusinian procession, had nevertheless felt humiliated by the defiance offered to him. He shortly afterwards took advantage of the departure of this large force, to summon reinforcements from Peloponnesus and Bœotia, and attempt to surprise the walls of Athens on a dark night. If he expected any connivance within, the plot miscarried: alarm was given in time, so that the eldest and youngest hoplites were found at their posts to defend the walls. The assailants—said to have amounted to 28,000 men, of whom half were hoplites, with 1200 cavalry, 900 of them Bœotians—were seen on the ensuing day close under the walls of the city, which were amply manned with the full remaining strength of Athens. In an obstinate cavalry battle which ensued, the Athenians gained the advantage even over the Bœotians. Agis encamped the next night in the garden of Akadêmus; again on the morrow he drew up his troops and offered battle to the Athenians, who are affirmed to have gone forth in order of battle, but to have kept under the protection of the missiles from the walls, so that Agis did not dare to attack them.² We may well doubt whether the Athenians went out at all, since they had been for years accustomed to regard themselves as inferior to the Peloponnesians in the field. Agis now withdrew, satisfied apparently with having offered battle, so as to efface the affront which he had received from the march of the Eleusinian communicants in defiance of his neighbourhood.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 4, 20; Plutarch, Alkih. c. 34. Neither Diodorus nor Cornelius Nepos mentions this remarkable incident

about the escort of the Eleusinian procession.

² Diodor. xiii. 72, 73.

The first exploit of Alkibiadês was to proceed to Andros, now under a Lacedæmonian harmost and garrison. Landing on the island, he plundered the fields, defeated both the native troops and the Lacedæmonians, and forced them to shut themselves up within the town; which he besieged for some days without avail, and then proceeded onward to Samos, leaving Konon in a fortified post, with twenty ships, to prosecute the siege.¹ At Samos he first ascertained the state of the Peloponnesian fleet at Ephesus—the influence acquired by Lysander over Cyrus—the strong anti-Athenian dispositions of the young prince—and the ample rate of pay, put down even in advance, of which the Peloponnesian seamen were now in actual receipt. He now first became convinced of the failure of those hopes which he had conceived, not without good reason, in the preceding year—and of which he had doubtless boasted at Athens; that the alliance of Persia might be neutralised at least, if not won over, through the envoys escorted to Susa by Pharnabazus. It was in vain that he prevailed upon Tissaphernês to mediate with Cyrus, to introduce to him some Athenian envoys, and to inculcate upon him his own views of the true interests of Persia; that is, that the war should be fed and protracted so as to wear out both the Grecian belligerent parties, each by means of the other. Such a policy, uncongenial at all times to the vehement temper of Cyrus, had become yet more repugnant to him since his intercourse with Lysander. He would not consent even to see the envoys, nor was he probably displeased to put a slight upon a neighbour and rival satrap. Deep was the despondency among the Athenians at Samos, when painfully convinced that all hopes from Persia must be abandoned for themselves; and farther, that Persian pay was both more ample and better assured, to their enemies, than ever it had been before.²

B.C. 407.
Sept.,
Octob.

Alkibiadês sails with an armament to Asia—ill-success at Andros—entire failure in respect to hopes from Persia.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 4, 22—i. 5, 18; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 35; Diodor. xiii. 69. The latter says that Thrasybulus was left at Andros—which cannot be true.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 5, 9; Plu-

tarch, Lysand. c. 4. The latter tells us that the Athenian ships were presently emptied by the desertion of the seamen: a careless exaggeration.

Lysander had at Ephesus a fleet of ninety triremes, which he employed himself in repairing and augmenting, being still inferior in number to the Athenians. In vain did Alkibiadês attempt to provoke him out to a general action. This was much to the interest of the Athenians, apart from their superiority of number, since they were badly provided with money, and obliged to levy contributions wherever they could: but Lysander was resolved not to fight unless he could do so with advantage, and Cyrus, not afraid of sustaining the protracted expense of the war, had even enjoined upon him this cautious policy, with additional hopes of a Phenician fleet to his aid,—which in his mouth was not intended to delude, as it had been by Tissaphernês.¹ Unable to bring about a general battle, and having no immediate or capital enterprise to constrain his attention, Alkibiadês became careless, and abandoned himself partly to the love of pleasure, partly to reckless predatory enterprises for the purpose of getting money to pay his army. Thrasybulus had come from his post on the Hellespont and was now engaged in fortifying Phokæa, probably for the purpose of establishing a post to be enabled to pillage the interior. Here he was joined by Alkibiadês, who sailed across with a squadron, leaving his main fleet at Samos. He left it under the command of his favourite pilot Antiochus, but with express orders on no account to fight until his return.

While employed in his visit to Phokæa and Klazomenæ, Alkibiadês, perhaps hard-pressed for money, conceived the unwarrantable project of enriching his men by the plunder of the neighbouring territory of Kymê, an allied dependency of Athens. Landing on this territory unexpectedly, after fabricating some frivolous calumnies against the Kymæans, he at first seized much property and a considerable number of prisoners. But the inhabitants assembled in arms, bravely defended their possessions, and repelled his men to their ships; recovering the plundered property, and lodging it in safety within their walls. Stung with this miscarriage,

¹ Plutarch, *Lysand.* c. 9. I venture to antedate the statements which he there makes, as to the encouragements from Cyrus to Lysander.

Alkibiadês sent for a reinforcement of hoplites from Mitylênê, and marched up to the walls of Kymê, where he in vain challenged the citizens to come forth and fight. He then ravaged the territory at pleasure; while the Kymæans had no other resource, except to send envoys to Athens, to complain of so gross an outrage inflicted by the Athenian general upon an unoffending Athenian dependency.¹

This was a grave charge, and not the only charge which Alkibiadês had to meet at Athens. During his absence at Phokæa and Kymê, Antiochus the pilot, whom he had left in command, disobeying the express order pronounced against fighting a battle, first sailed across from Samos to Notium, the harbour of Kolophon—and from thence to the mouth of the harbour of Ephesus, where the Peloponnesian fleet lay. Entering that harbour with his own ship and another, he passed close in front of the prows of the Peloponnesian triremes, insulting them scornfully and defying them to combat. Lysander detached some ships to pursue him, and an action gradually ensued, which was exactly that which Antiochus desired. But the Athenian ships were all in disorder, and came into battle as each of them separately could; while the Peloponnesian fleet was well-marshalled and kept in hand; so that the battle was all to the advantage of the latter. The Athenians, compelled to take flight, were pursued to Notium—losing fifteen triremes, several along with their full crews. Antiochus himself was slain. Before retiring to Ephesus, Lysander had the satisfaction of erecting his trophy on the shore of Notium; while the Athenian fleet was carried back to its station at Samos.²

It was in vain that Alkibiadês, hastening back to Samos, mustered the entire Athenian fleet, sailed to the mouth of the harbour of Ephesus, and there ranged his ships in

¹ Diodor. xiii. 73. I follow Diodorus in respect to this story about Kymê, which he probably copied from the Kymæan historian Ephorus. Cornelius Nepos (Alcib. c. 7) briefly glances at it.

Xenophon (Hellen. i. 5, 11) as well as Plutarch (Lysand. c. 5) mention the visit of Alkibiadês to Thrasybulus at Phokæa. They

Complaints of the Kymæans at Athens—defeat of Antiochus at Notium during the absence of Alkibiadês.

do not name Kymê, however: according to them, the visit to Phokæa has no assignable purpose or consequences. But the plunder of Kymê is a circumstance both sufficiently probable in itself, and suitable to the occasion.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 5, 12–15; Diodor. xiii. 71; Plutarch, Alcib. c. 35; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 5.

battle order, challenging the enemy to come forth. Lysander would give him no opportunity of wiping off the late dishonour. And as an additional mortification to Athens, the Lacedæmonians shortly afterwards captured both Teos and Delphinium; the latter being a fortified post which the Athenians had held for the last three years in the island of Chios.¹

Even before the battle of Notium, it appears that complaints and dissatisfaction had been growing up in the armament against Alkibiadês. He had gone out with a splendid force, not inferior, in number of triremes and hoplites, to that which he had conducted against Sicily—and under large promises, both from himself and his friends, of achievements to come. Yet in a space of time which can hardly have been less than three months, not a single success had been accomplished; while, on the other side, there was to be reckoned, the disappointment on the score of Persia—which had great effect on the temper of the armament, and which, though not his fault, was contrary to expectations which he had held out—the disgraceful plunder of Kymê—and the defeat at Notium. It was true that Alkibiadês had given peremptory orders to Antiochus not to fight, and that the battle had been hazarded in flagrant disobedience to his injunctions. But this circumstance only raised new matter for dissatisfaction, of a graver character. If Antiochus had been disobedient—if besides disobedience, he had displayed a childish vanity and an utter neglect of all military precautions—who was it that had chosen him for deputy; and that too against all Athenian precedent, putting the pilot, a paid officer of the ship, over the heads of the trierarchs who paid their pilots, and served at their own cost? It was Alkibiadês who placed Antiochus in this grave and responsible situation: a personal favourite, an excellent convivial companion, but destitute of all qualities befitting a commander. And this turned attention on another point of the character of Alkibiadês—his habits of excessive self-indulgence and dissi-

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 5, 15; Diodor. xiii. 76.

I copy Diodorns, in putting Teos, pursuant to Weiske's note, in place of Eion, which appears

in Xenophon. I copy the latter, however, in ascribing these captures to the year of Lysander, instead of to the year of Kallikratidas.

pation. The loud murmurs of the camp charged him with neglecting the interests of the service for enjoyments with jovial parties and Ionian women, and with admitting to his confidence those who best contributed to the amusement of such chosen hours.¹

It was in the camp at Samos that this general indignation against Alkibiadês first arose, and was from thence transmitted formally to Athens, by the mouth of Thrasybulus son of Thrason²—not the eminent Thrasybulus (son of Lykus) who has been already often mentioned in this history, and will be mentioned again. There came at the same time to Athens the complaints from Kymê, against the unprovoked aggression and plunder of that place by Alkibiadês; and seemingly complaints from other places besides.³ It was even urged as accusation against him, that he was in guilty collusion to betray the fleet to Pharnabazus and the Lacedæmonians, and that he had already provided three forts in the Chersonese to retire to, so soon as this scheme should be ripe for execution.

Such grave and wide-spread accusations, coupled with the disaster at Notium, and the complete disappointment of all the promises of success—were more than sufficient to alter the sentiments of the people of Athens towards Alkibiadês. He had no character to fall back upon; or rather, he had a character worse than none—such as to render the most criminal imputations of treason

Murmur and accusation against him transmitted to Athens.

Alteration of sentiment at Athens—displeasure of the Athenians against him.

¹ Plutarch, Alkib. c. 36. He recounts, in the tenth chapter of the same biography, an anecdote describing the manner in which Antiochus first won the favour of Alkibiadês, then a young man; by catching a tame quail, which had escaped from his bosom.

² A person named *Thrason* is mentioned in the Choiseul Inscription (No. 147, p. 221, 222 of the Corp. Inscr. of Boeckh) as one of the Hellenotamiæ in the year 410 B.C. He is described by his Deme as *Eutades*: he is probably enough the father of this Thrasybulus.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 5, 16—17. Ἀλκιβιάδης μὲν οὖν, πονηρῶς καὶ ἐν τῇ

στρατιᾷ φερόμενος, &c. Diodor. xiii. 73. ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ διαβολαὶ κατ' αὐτοῦ, &c.

Plutarch, Alkib. c. 36.

One of the remaining speeches of Lysias (Orat. xxi. Ἀπολογία Δωροδοκίης) is delivered by the trierarch in this fleet, on board of whose ship Alkibiadês himself chose to sail. This trierarch complains of Alkibiadês as having been a most uncomfortable and troublesome companion (sect. 7). His testimony on the point is valuable; for there seems no disposition here to make out any case against Alkibiadês. The trierarch notices the fact, that Alki-

not intrinsically improbable. The comments of his enemies, which had been forcibly excluded from public discussion during his summer visit to Athens, were now again set free; and all the adverse recollections of his past life doubtless revived. The people had refused to listen to these, in order that he might have a fair trial, and might verify the title, claimed for him by his friends, to be judged only by his subsequent exploits, achieved since the year 411 B.C. He had now had his trial; he had been found wanting; and the popular confidence, which had been provisionally granted to him, was accordingly withdrawn.

It is not just to represent the Athenian people (however Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos may set before us this picture) as having indulged an extravagant and unmeasured confidence in Alkibiadês in the month of July, demanding of him more than man could perform—and as afterwards in the month of December passing, with childish abruptness, from confidence into wrathful displeasure, because their own impossible expectations were not already realised. That the people entertained large expectations, from so very considerable an armament, cannot be doubted: the largest of all, probably (as in the instance of the Sicilian expedition), were those entertained by Alkibiadês himself, and promulgated by his friends. But we are not called upon to determine what the people would have done, had Alkibiadês, after performing all the duties of a faithful, skilful, and enterprising commander, nevertheless failed, from obstacles beyond his own control, in realising their hopes and his own promises. No such case occurred: that which did occur was materially different. Besides the absence of grand successes, he had farther been negligent and reckless in his primary duties—he had exposed the Athenian arms to defeat, by his disgraceful selection of an unworthy lieutenant¹—he had violated the territory and

biadês preferred *his* trireme, simply as a proof that it was the best equipped, or among the best equipped, of the whole fleet. Arcestratus and Erasinidês preferred it afterwards, for the same reason.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 5, 16. Oi

Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς ἡγγέλθη ἡ ναυμαχία, χαλεπῶς εἶχον τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ, εἰσμένοντι δὲ ἀμέλειάν τε καὶ ἀκράτειαν ἀπολωλέσθαι τὸς ναῦς.

The expression which Thucydides employs in reference to Alkibiadês requires a few words of comment: (vi. 15)—καὶ ἐημερία

property of an allied dependency, at a moment when Athens had a paramount interest in cultivating by every means the attachment of her remaining allies. The truth is, as I have before remarked, that he had really been spoiled by the intoxicating reception given to him so unexpectedly in the city. He had mistaken a hopeful public, determined, even by forced silence as to the past, to give him the full benefit of a meritorious future, but requiring as condition from him that that future should really be meritorious—for a public of assured admirers, whose favour he had already earned and might consider as his own. He became an altered man after that visit, like Miltiadês after the battle of Marathon; or rather, the impulses of a character essentially dissolute and insolent, broke loose from that restraint under which they had before been partially controlled. At the time of the battle of Kyzikus—when Alkibiadês was labouring to regain the favour of his injured countrymen and was yet uncertain whether he should succeed—he would not have committed the fault of quitting his fleet and leaving it under the command of a lieutenant like Antiochus. If therefore Athenian sentiment towards Alkibiadês underwent an entire change during the autumn of 407 B.C., this was in consequence of an alteration in *his* character and behaviour; an alteration for the worse, just at the crisis when everything turned upon his good conduct, and upon his deserving at least, if he could not command, success.

We may indeed observe that the faults of Nikias before Syracuse and in reference to the coming of Gylippus, were far graver and more mischievous than those of Alkibiadês during this turning-season of his career—and the disappointment of antecedent hopes at least equal.

Different
behaviour
towards
Nikias and
towards
Alkibiadês.

κράτιστα διαθέντα τὰ τοῦ πολέμου, ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστοι τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασιν αὐτοῦ ἀγέσθοντες, καὶ ἄλλοις ἐπιτρέψαντες (the Athenians), οὐ διὰ μακροῦ ἔσφηλαν τὴν πόλιν.

The "strenuous and effective prosecution of warlike business" here ascribed to Alkibiadês, is true of all the period between his exile and his last visit to Athens (about September B.C. 415 to September B.C. 407). During the first

four years of that time, he was very effective against Athens; during the last four, very effective in her service.

But the assertion is certainly not true of his last command, which ended with the battle of Notium; nor is it more than partially true (at least, it is an exaggeration of the truth) for the period before his exile.

Yet while these faults and disappointment brought about the dismissal and disgrace of Alkibiadês, they did not induce the Athenians to dismiss Nikias, though himself desiring it,—nor even prevent them from sending him a second armament to be ruined along with the first. The contrast is most instructive, as demonstrating upon what points durable esteem in Athens turned; how long the most melancholy public incompetency could remain overlooked, when covered by piety, decorum, good intentions, and high station;¹ how short-lived was the ascendancy of a man far superior in ability and energy, besides an equal station—when his moral qualities and antecedent life were such as to provoke fear and hatred in many, esteem from none. Yet on the whole, Nikias, looking at him as a public servant, was far more destructive to his country than Alkibiadês. The mischief done to Athens by the latter was done chiefly in the avowed service of her enemies.

On hearing the news of the defeat of Notium and the accumulated complaints against Alkibiadês, the Athenians simply voted that he should be dismissed from his command; naming ten new generals to replace him. He was not brought to trial, nor do we know whether any such step was proposed. Yet his proceedings at Kymê, if they happened as we read them, richly deserved judicial animadversion; and the people, had they so dealt with him, would only have acted up to the estimable function ascribed to them by the oligarchical Phrynichus—"of serving as refuge to their dependent allies, and chastising the high-handed oppressions of the optimates against them."² In the perilous position of Athens, however, with reference to the foreign war, such a political trial would have been

¹ To meet the case of Nikias, it would be necessary to take the converse of the judgement of Thucydides respecting Alkibiadês, cited in my last note, and to say—καὶ δημοσίᾳ χάρισται διαθέντα τὰ τοῦ πολέμου, ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστοι τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα αὐτοῦ ἀγασθέντας, καὶ αὐτῷ ἐπιτρέψαντας, οὐδὲν μακροῦ ἐσφίλαν τὴν πόλιν.

The reader will of course under-

stand that these last Greek words are not an actual citation, but a transformation of the actual words of Thucydides, for the purpose of illustrating the contrast between Alkibiadês and Nikias.

² Thucyd. viii. 48. τὸν δὲ δῆμον, σφῶν τε (of the allied dependencies) καταφυγῇ, καὶ ἐκείνων (i. e. of the high persons called χαλκοκράται or optimates) σωφρονιστῇ.

productive of much dissension and mischief. And Alkibiadês avoided the question by not coming to Athens. As soon as he heard of his dismissal, he retired immediately from the army to his own fortified posts on the Chersonese.

The ten new generals named were, Konon, Diomedon, Leon, Periklês, Erasinidês, Aristokratês, Archestratus, Protomachus, Thrasyllus, Aristogenês. Of these, Konon was directed to proceed forthwith from Andros, with the twenty ships which he had there to receive the fleet from Alkibiadês; while Phanosthenês proceeded with four triremes to replace Konon at Andros.¹

Konon and his colleagues—capture and liberation of the Rhodian Dorieus by the Athenians.

In his way thither, Phanosthenês fell in with Dorieus the Rhodian and two Thurian triremes, which he captured with every man aboard. The captives were sent to Athens, where all were placed in custody (in case of future exchange) except Dorieus himself. The latter had been condemned to death and banished from his native city of Rhodes, together with his kindred; probably on the score of political disaffection, at the time when Rhodes was a member of the Athenian alliance. Having since then become a citizen of Thurii, he had served with distinction in the fleet of Mindarus both at Milêtus and the Hellespont. The Athenians now had so much compassion upon him, that they released him at once and unconditionally, without even demanding a ransom or an equivalent. By what particular circumstance their compassion was determined, forming a pleasing exception to the melancholy habits which pervaded Grecian warfare in both belligerents—we should never have learnt from the meagre narrative of Xenophon. But we ascertain from other sources, that Dorieus (the son of Diagoras of Rhodes) was illustrious beyond all other Greeks for his victories in the pankration at the Olympic, Isthmian, and Nemean festivals—that he had gained the first prize at three Olympic festivals in succession (of which Olympiad 88 or 428 B.C. was the second), a distinction altogether without precedent, besides 8 Isthmian and 7 Nemean prizes—that his father Diagoras, his brothers, and his cousins were all celebrated as successful athletes—lastly, that the family were illustrious from

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 5, 18; Diodor. xiii. 74.

old date in their native island of Rhodes, and were even descended from the Messenian hero Aristomenês. When the Athenians saw before them as their prisoner a man doubtless of magnificent stature and presence (as we may conclude from his athletic success), and surrounded by such a halo of glory impressive in the highest degree to Grecian imagination—the feelings and usages of war were at once overruled. Though Dorieus had been one of their most vehement enemies, they could not bear either to touch his person, or to exact from him any condition. Released by them on this occasion, he lived to be put to death, about thirteen years afterwards, by the Lacedæmonians.¹

When Konon reached Samos to take the command, he found the armament in a state of great despondency; not merely from the dishonourable affair of Notium, but also from disappointed hopes connected with Alkibiadês, and from difficulties in procuring regular pay. So painfully was the last inconvenience felt, that the first measure of Konon was to contract the numbers of the armament from above 100 triremes to 70; and to reserve for the diminished fleet all the abler seamen of the larger. With this fleet he and his colleagues roved about the enemies' coasts to collect plunder and pay.²

Apparently about the same time that Konon superseded Alkibiadês (that is, about December 407 B.C. or January 406 B.C.), the year of Lysander's command expired, and Kallikratidas arrived from Sparta to replace him. His arrival was received with undisguised dissatisfaction by the leading Lacedæmonians in the armament, by the chiefs in the Asiatic cities, and by Cyrus. Now was felt the full influence of those factious correspondences and intrigues which Lysander had established with all of them, for indirectly working out the perpetuity of his own command. While loud complaints were heard of the impolicy of Sparta in annually changing her admiral—both Cyrus and the rest concurred with Lysander in throwing difficulties in the way of the new successor.

Kallikratidas, unfortunately only shown by the Fates,³

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 5, 19; Pausan. vi. 7, 2.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 5, 20; compare i. 6, 16; Diodor. xiii. 77.

³ Virgil, Æneid, vi. 870.

Ostendent terris hunc tantum fata, neque ultra Esse sinent.

and not suffered to continue in the Grecian world, was one of the noblest characters of his age. Besides perfect courage, energy, and incorruptibility, he was distinguished for two qualities, both of them very rare among eminent Greeks; entire straightforwardness of dealing—and a Pan-hellenic patriotism alike comprehensive, exalted, and merciful. Lysander handed over to him nothing but an empty purse; having repaid to Cyrus all the money remaining in his possession, under pretence that it had been confided to himself personally.¹ Moreover, on delivering up the fleet to Kallikratidas at Ephesus, he made boast of delivering to him at the same time the mastery of the sea, through the victory recently gained at Notium. "Conduct the fleet from Ephesus along the coast of Samos, passing by the Athenian station (replied Kallikratidas), and give it up to me at Milētus: I shall then believe in your mastery of the sea." Lysander had nothing else to say, except that he should give himself no farther trouble, now that his command had been transferred to another.

Kallikratidas soon found that the leading Lacedæmonians in the fleet, gained over to the interests of his predecessor, openly murmured at his arrival, and secretly obstructed all his measures; upon which he summoned them together, and said: "I for my part am quite content to remain at home; and if Lysander or any one else pretends to be a better admiral than I am, I have nothing to say against it. But sent here as I am by the authorities at Sparta to command the fleet, I have no choice except to execute their orders in the best way that I can. You now know how far my ambition reaches;² you know also the murmurs which are abroad

Murmurs
and ill-will
against
Kallikrati-
das—
energy and
rectitude
whereby he
represses
them.

¹ How completely this repayment was a manœuvre for the purpose of crippling his successor—and not an act of genuine and conscientious obligation to Cyrus, as Mr. Mitford represents it—we may see by the conduct of Lysander at the close of the war. He then carried away with him to Sparta all the residue of the tributes from Cyrus which he had in his possession, instead of giving them back to

Cyrus (Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 8). The obligation to give them back to Cyrus was greater at the end of the war than it was at the time when Kallikratidas came out, and when war was still going on; for the war was a joint business, which the Persians and the Spartans had sworn to prosecute by common efforts.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 5. ὑμεῖς δὲ, πρὸς ἃ ἐγὼ τε φιλοτιμούμαι, καὶ

against our common city (for her frequent change of admirals). Look to it and give me your opinion—Shall I stay where I am—or shall I go home, and communicate what has happened here?"

This remonstrance, alike pointed and dignified, produced its full effect. Every one replied that it was his duty to stay and undertake the command. The murmurs and cabals were from that moment discontinued.

His next embarrassments arose from the manoeuvre of Lysander in paying back to Cyrus all the funds from whence the continuous pay of the army was derived. Of course this step was admirably calculated to make every one regret the alteration of command. Kallikratidas, who had been sent out without funds, in full reliance on the unexhausted supply from Sardis, now found himself compelled to go thither in person and solicit a renewal of the bounty. But Cyrus, eager to manifest in every way his partiality for the last admiral, deferred receiving him,—first for two days, then for a farther interval, until the patience of Kallikratidas was wearied out, so that he left Sardis in disgust without an interview. So intolerable to his feelings was the humiliation of thus begging at the palace gates, that he bitterly deplored those miserable dissensions among the Greeks which constrained both parties to truckle to the foreigner for money; swearing that if he survived the year's campaign, he would use every possible effort to bring about an accommodation between Athens and Sparta.¹

In the meantime, he put forth all his energy to obtain money in some other way, and thus get the fleet to sea; knowing well, that the way to overcome the reluctance of Cyrus was, to show that he could do without him. Sailing first from Ephesus to Milêtus, he despatched from thence a small squadron to Sparta, disclosing his unexpected poverty, and asking for speedy pecuniary aid. In the meantime he convoked an assembly of the Milesians, communicated to them the mission just sent to Sparta, and asked from them a temporary supply until this money should arrive. He reminded them

His spirited
behaviour
in regard
to the
Persians.
His appeal
to the Milesians—Pan-
hellenic
feelings.
ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν αἰτιάσεται (ὅτι γὰρ
αὐτά, ὡς περ καὶ ἐγώ) συμβουλεύετε,
&c.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 7; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 6.

that the necessity of this demand sprang altogether from the manœuvre of Lysander in paying back the funds in his hands:—that he had already in vain applied to Cyrus for farther money, meeting only with such insulting neglect as could no longer be endured: that they (the Milesians), dwelling amidst the Persians, and having already experienced the maximum of ill-usage at their hands, ought now to be foremost in the war, and to set an example of zeal to the other allies,¹ in order to get clear the sooner from dependence upon such imperious taskmasters. He promised that when the remittance from Sparta and the hour of success should arrive, he would richly requite their forwardness. “Let us, with the aid of the Gods, show these foreigners (he concluded) that we can punish our enemies without worshipping them.”

The spectacle of this generous patriot struggling against a degrading dependence on the foreigner, which was now becoming unhappily familiar to the leading Greeks of both sides—excites our warm sympathy and admiration. We may add, that his language to the Milesians, reminding them of the misery which they had endured from the Persians as a motive to exertion in the war—is full of instruction as to the new situation opened for the Asiatic Greeks since the breaking up of the Athenian power. No such evils had they suffered while Athens was competent to protect them, and while they were willing to receive protection from her—during the interval of more than fifty years between the complete organization of the confederacy of Delos and the disaster of Nikias before Syracuse.

The single-hearted energy of Kallikratidas imposed upon all who heard him, and even inspired so much alarm to those leading Milesians who were playing underhand the game of Lysander, that they were the first to propose a large grant of money towards the war, and to offer considerable sums from their own purses; an example probably soon followed by other allied cities. Some of the friends of Lysander tried to couple their offers with conditions; demanding a warrant for the destruction of their political

B.C. 406.

He fits out a commanding fleet—his successes at Lesbos—he liberates the captives and the Athenian garrison at Methymna.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 9. ὁμᾶς βαρβάρους πλειστά κακὰ ᾗδ' ὑπ' αὐτῷ δὲ ἐγὼ ἄξιῳ προθυμοτάτους εἶναι ἐς τῶν πεπονήσασθαι τὸν πόλεμον, διὰ τὸ οἰκόντας ἐν

enemies, and hoping thus to compromise the new admiral. But he strenuously refused all such guilty compliances.¹ He was soon able to collect at Milêtus fifty fresh triremes in addition to those left by Lysander, making a fleet of 140 sail in all. The Chians having furnished him with an outfit of five drachmas for each seaman (equal to ten days' pay at the usual rate), he sailed with the whole fleet northward towards Lesbos. Of this numerous fleet, the greatest which had yet been assembled throughout the war, only ten triremes were Lacedæmonian;² while a considerable proportion, and among the best equipped, were Bœotian and Eubœan.³ In his voyage towards Lesbos, Kallikratidas seems to have made himself master of Phokæa and Kymê,⁴ perhaps with the greater facility in consequence of the recent ill-treatment of the Kymæans by Alkibiadês. He then sailed to attack Methymna, on the northern coast of Lesbos; a town not only strongly attached to the Athenians, but also defended by an Athenian garrison. Though at first repulsed, he renewed his attacks until at length he took the town by storm. The property in it was all plundered by the soldiers, and the slaves collected and sold for their benefit. It was farther demanded by the allies, and expected pursuant to ordinary custom, that the Methymnæan and Athenian prisoners should be sold also. But Kallikratidas peremptorily refused compliance, and set them all free the next day; declaring, that so long as he was in command, not a single free Greek should be reduced to slavery if he could prevent it.⁵

No one who has not familiarized himself with the details of Grecian warfare, can feel the full grandeur and sublimity of his proceeding—which stands, so far as I know, unparalleled in Grecian history. It is not merely that the prisoners were spared and set free: as to that point, analogous cases may be found, though not very frequent. It is, that this particular act of generosity was

¹ Plutarch, Apophthegm. Laconic. p. 222 C; Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 12.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 34.

³ Diodor. xiii. 99.

⁴ I infer this from the fact, that at the period of the battle of Arginusæ, both these towns appear as

adhering to the Peloponnesians; whereas during the command of Alkibiadês they had been both Athenian (Xenoph. Hellen. i. 5, 11; i. 6, 33; Diodor. xiii. 73—99).

⁵ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 14. Κριτελεγοντων των ζυμμάχων ἀποδόσαι

performed in the name and for the recommendation of Pan-Hellenic brotherhood and Pan-Hellenic independence of the foreigner: a comprehensive principle, announced by Kallikratidas on previous occasions as well as on this, but now carried into practice under emphatic circumstances, and coupled with an explicit declaration of his resolution to abide by it in all future cases. It is, lastly, that the step was taken in resistance to formal requisition on the part of his allies, whom he had very imperfect means either of paying or controlling, and whom therefore it was so much the more hazardous for him to offend. There cannot be any doubt that these allies felt personally wronged and indignant at the loss, as well as confounded with the proposition of a rule of duty so new as respected the relations of belligerents in Greece; against which too (let us add) their murmurs would not be without some foundation—"If *we* should come to be Konon's prisoners, he will not treat *us* in this manner." Reciprocity of dealing is absolutely essential to constant moral observance, either public or private; and doubtless Kallikratidas felt a well-grounded confidence, that two or three conspicuous examples would sensibly modify the future practice on both sides. But some one must begin by setting such examples, and the man who does begin—having a position which gives reasonable chance that others will follow—is the hero. An admiral like Lysander would not only sympathise heartily with the complaints of the allies, but also condemn the proceeding as a dereliction of duty to Sparta: even men better than Lysander would at first look coldly on it as a sort of Quixotism, in doubt whether the example would be copied: while the Spartan Ephors, though probably tolerating it because they interfered very sparingly with their admirals afloat, would certainly have little sympathy with the feelings in which it originated. So much the rather is Kallikratidas to be admired, as bringing out with him not only a Pan-Hellenic patriotism¹ rare either at Athens or Sparta, but also a

καὶ τοὺς Μηθυμαίους, οὐκ ἔργη ἐν-
τοῦ γε ἀργοντος οὐδένα Ἑλλήνων ἐς
τοῦ καίτου θανάτου ἀνδραποδεύειναι.

Compare a later declaration of Agesilaus, substantially to the same purpose, yet delivered under circumstances far less emphatic—

in Xenophon, Agesilaus, vii. 6.

¹ The sentiment of Kallikratidas deserved the designation of Ἑλλη-
νωπατρὸς πολιτισμοῦ—far more than
that of Nikias, to which Plutarch
applies those words (Compar. of
Nikias and Crassus, c. 2).

force of individual character and conscience yet rarer—enabling him to brave unpopularity and break through routine, in the attempt to make that patriotism fruitful and operative in practice. In his career, so sadly and prematurely closed, there was at least this circumstance to be envied; that the capture of Methymna afforded him the opportunity, which he greedily seized as if he had known that it would be the last, of putting in act and evidence the full aspirations of his magnanimous soul.

Kallikratidas sent word by the released prisoners to Konon that he would presently put an end to his adulterous intercourse with the sea;¹ which he now considered as his wife and lawfully appertaining to him, having 140 triremes against the 70 triremes of Konon. That admiral, in spite of his inferior numbers, had advanced near to Methymna to try and relieve it; but finding the place already captured, had retired to the islands called Hekatonnêsoi, off the continent bearing north-east from Lesbos. Thither he was followed by Kallikratidas, who, leaving Methymna at night, found him quitting his moorings at break of day, and immediately made all sail to try and cut him off from the southerly course towards Samos. But Konon, having diminished the number of his triremes from 100 to 70, had been able to preserve all the best rowers, so that in speed he outran Kallikratidas and entered first the harbour of Mitylênê. His pursuers however were close behind, and even got into the harbour along with him, before it could be closed and put in a state of defence. Constrained to fight a battle at its entrance, he was completely defeated: thirty of his ships were taken, though the crews escaped to land; and he preserved the remaining forty only by hauling them ashore under the wall.²

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 15. Κόνωνι δὲ εἶπεν, ὅτι παύσει αὐτὸν μοιχῶντα τὴν θάλασσαν, &c. He could hardly say *this* to Konon, in any other way than through the Athenian prisoners.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 17; Diodor. xiii. 78, 79.

Here, as on so many other occasions, it is impossible to blend these two narratives together.

Diodorus conceives the facts in a manner quite different from Xenophon, and much less probable. He tells us that Konon practised a stratagem during his flight (the same in Polyænus, i. 4²), whereby he was enabled to fight with and defeat the foremost Peloponnesian ships before the rest came up: also that he got into the harbour in time to put it into a state of

The town of Mitylênê, originally founded on a small islet off Lesbos, had afterwards extended across a narrow strait to Lesbos itself. By this strait (whether bridged over or not we are not informed), the town was divided into two portions, and had two harbours, one opening northward towards the Hellespont, the other southward towards the promontory of Kanê on the mainland.¹ Both these harbours were undefended, and both now fell into the occupation of the Peloponnesian fleet; at least all the outer portion of each, near to the exit of the harbour, which Kallikratidas kept under strict watch. He at the same time sent for the full forces of Methymna and for hoplites across from Chios, so as to block up Mitylênê by land as well as by sea. As soon as his success was announced, too, money for the fleet (together with separate presents for himself, which he declined receiving²) was immediately sent to him by Cyrus; so that his future operations became easy.

Triumphant position of Kallikratidas.

No preparations had been made at Mitylênê for a siege: no stock of provisions had been accumulated, and the crowd within the walls was so considerable, that Konon foresaw but too plainly the speedy exhaustion of his means. Nor could he expect succour from Athens, unless he could send intelligence thither of his condition; of which, as he had not been able to do so, the Athenians remained altogether ignorant. All his ingenuity was required to get a trireme safe out of the harbour in the face of the enemy's guard. Putting afloat two triremes, the best

Hopeless condition of Konon—his stratagem to send news to Athens and entreat relief.

defence before Kallikratidas came up. Diodorus then gives a prolix description of the battle by which Kallikratidas forced his way in.

The narrative of Xenophon, which I have followed, plainly implies that Konon could have had no time to make preparations for defending the harbour.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 6. τὸς ἐσθέρμους ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρους τοῖς λιμέσιν ἐποιόοντο —(Strabo, xiii. p. 617). Xenophon talks only of the harbour, as if it were one: and possibly, in very inaccurate language, it might be described as one harbour with two

entrances. It seems to me, however, that Xenophon had no clear idea of the locality.

Strabo speaks of the northern harbour as defended by a mole—the southern harbour, as defended by triremes chained together. Such defences did not exist in the year 406 B.C. Probably after the revolt of Mitylênê in 427 B.C., the Athenians had removed what defences might have been before provided for the harbour.

² Plutarch, Apophth. Laeonie. p. 222 E.

sailers in his fleet, and picking out the best rowers for them out of all the rest, he caused these rowers to go aboard before daylight, concealing the Epibatæ or maritime soldiers in the interior of the vessel (instead of the deck, which was their usual place), with a moderate stock of provisions, and keeping the vessel still covered with hides or sails, as was customary with vessels hauled ashore to protect them against the sun.¹ These two triremes were thus made ready to depart at a moment's notice, without giving any indication to the enemy that they were so. They were fully manned before daybreak, the crews remained in their position all day, and after dark were taken out to repose. This went on for four days successively, no favourable opportunity having occurred to give the signal for attempting a start. At length, on the fifth day about noon, when many of the Peloponnesian crews were ashore for their morning meal, and others were reposing, the moment seemed favourable, the signal was given, and both the triremes started at the same moment with their utmost speed; one to go out at the southern entrance towards the sea between Lesbos and Chios—the other to depart by the northern entrance towards the Hellespont. Instantly the alarm was given among the Peloponnesian fleet: the cables were cut, the men hastened aboard, and many triremes were put in motion to overtake the two runaways. That which departed southward, in spite of the most strenuous efforts, was caught towards evening and brought back with all her

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 19. Κα-
θαλύσας (Konon) τῶν νεῶν τὰς
ἀρίστας πλεούσας δύο, ἐπλήρωσε πρὸ
ἡμέρας, ἐξ ἀπασῶν τῶν νεῶν τοὺς
ἀρίστους ἐρέτας ἐκλέξας, καὶ τοὺς
ἐπιβάτας ἐς κοίλην ναῦν μεταβιβάσας,
καὶ τὰ παραῤῥώματα παραβα-
λὼν.

The meaning of παραῤῥώματα is very uncertain. The commentators give little instruction; nor can we be sure that the same thing is meant as is expressed by παραβλήματα (*infra*, ii. 1, 22). We may be certain that the matters meant by παραῤῥώματα were something which, if visible at all to a spectator without, would at least

afford no indication that the trireme was intended for a speedy start; otherwise, they would defeat the whole contrivance of Konon, whose aim was secrecy. It was essential that this trireme, though afloat, should be made to look as much as possible like the other triremes which still remained hauled ashore; in order that the Peloponnesians might not suspect any purpose of departure. I have endeavoured in the text to give a meaning which answers this purpose, without forsaking the explanations proposed by the commentators: see Boeckh, Ueber das Attische See-Wesen, ch. x. p. 150.

crew prisoners: that which went towards the Hellespont escaped, rounded the northern coast of Lesbos, and got safe with the news to Athens; sending intelligence also, seemingly, in her way, to the Athenian admiral Diomedon at Samos.

The latter immediately made all haste to the aid of Konon, with the small force which he had with him, no more than twelve triremes. The two harbours being both guarded by a superior force, he tried to get access to Mitylênê through the Euripus, a strait which opens on the southern coast of the island into an interior lake or bay, approaching near to the town. But here he was attacked suddenly by Kallikratidas, and his squadron all captured except two triremes, his own and another: he himself had great difficulty in escaping.¹

Athens was all in consternation at the news of the defeat of Konon and the blockade of Mitylênê. The whole strength and energy of the city was put forth to relieve him, by an effort greater than any which had been made throughout the whole war. We read with surprise that within the short space of thirty days, a fleet of no less than 110 triremes was fitted out and sent from Peiræus. Every man of age and strength to serve, without distinction, was taken to form a good crew; not only freemen but slaves, to whom manumission was promised as reward: many also of the Horsemen or Knights² and citizens of highest rank went aboard as Epibatæ, hanging up their bridles like Kimon before the battle of Salamis. The levy was in fact as democratical and as equalising as it had been on that memorable occasion. The fleet proceeded straight to Samos, whither orders had doubtless been sent to get together all the triremes which the allies could furnish as reinforcements, as well as all

Kallikratidas defeats the squadron of Diomedon.

Prodigious effort of the Athenians to relieve Konon—large Athenian fleet equipped and sent to Arginusæ.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 22. Διομέδων δὲ βορῶν Κόνωνι πολιορκουμένην δώδεκα ναυσὶν ὤρμισατο ἐς τὸν εὐρίπον τῶν Μιτυληνσίων.

The reader should look at a map of Lesbos, to see what is meant by the Euripus of Mitylênê—and the other Euripus of the neighbouring town of Pyrrha.

Diodorus (xiii. 79) confounds the Euripus of Mitylênê with the harbour of Mitylênê, with which it is quite unconnected. Schneider and Plehn seem to make the same confusion (see Plehn, Lesbica, p. 15).

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 24—25; Diodor. xiii. 97.

the scattered Athenian. By this means, forty additional triremes (ten of them Samian) were assembled, and the whole fleet, 150 sail, went from Samos to the little islands called Arginusæ, close on the mainland, opposite to Malea the south-eastern cape of Lesbos.

Kallikratidas, apprised of the approach of the new fleet while it was yet at Samos, withdrew the greater portion of his force from Mitylênê, leaving fifty triremes under Eteonikus to continue the blockade. Less than fifty probably would not have been sufficient, inasmuch as two harbours were to be watched; but he was thus reduced to meet the Athenian fleet with inferior numbers—120 triremes against 150. His fleet was off Cape Malea, where the crews took their suppers, on the same evening as the Athenians supped at the opposite islands of Arginusæ. It was his project to sail across the intermediate channel in the night, and attack them in the morning before they were prepared; but violent wind and rain forced him to defer all movement till daylight. On the ensuing morning both parties prepared for the greatest naval encounter which had taken place throughout the whole war. Kallikratidas was advised by his pilot, the Megarian Hermon, to retire for the present without fighting, inasmuch as the Athenian fleet had the advantage of thirty triremes over him in number. He replied that flight was disgraceful, and that Sparta would be no worse off even if he should perish.¹ The answer was one congenial to his chivalrous nature; and we may well conceive, that having for the last two or three months been lord and master of the sea, he recollected his own haughty message to Konon, and thought it dishonour to incur or deserve, by retiring, the like taunt upon himself. We may remark, too, that the disparity of numbers, though serious, was by no means such as to render the contest hopeless, or to serve as a legitimate ground for retreat to one who prided himself on a full measure of Spartan courage.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 32; Diodor. xiii. 97, 98—the latter reports terrific omens beforehand for the generals.

The answer has been a memorable one, more than once adverted to—Plutarch, Laconic. Apophthegm. p. 832; Cicero, De Offic. i. 24.

The Athenian fleet was so marshalled, that its great strength was placed in the two wings; in each of which there were sixty Athenian ships, distributed into four equal divisions, each division commanded by a general. Of the four squadrons of fifteen ships each, two were placed in front, two to support them in the rear. Aristokratês and Diomedon commanded the two front squadrons of the left division, Periklês and Erasinidês the two squadrons in the rear: on the right division, Protomachus and Thrasyllus commanded the two in front, Lysias and Aristogenês the two in the rear. The centre, wherein were the Samians and other allies, was left weak and all in single line: it appears to have been exactly in front of one of the isles of Arginusæ, while the two other divisions were to the right and left of that isle. We read with some surprise that the whole Lacedæmonian fleet was arranged by single ships, because it sailed better and manœuvred better than the Athenians; who formed their right and left divisions in deep order, for the express purpose of hindering the enemy from performing the nautical manœuvres of the *diekplus* and the *periplus*.¹ It would seem that the Athenian centre, having the land immediately in its rear, was supposed to be better protected against an enemy "sailing through the line out to the rear and sailing round about" than the other divisions, which were in the open waters; for which reason it was left weak, with the ships in single line. But the fact which strikes us the most is, that if we turn back to the beginning of the war, we shall find that this *diekplus* and *periplus* were the special manœuvres of the Athenian navy, and continued to be so even down to the siege of Syracuse; the Lacedæmonians being at first absolutely unable to perform them at all, and continuing for a long time to perform them far less skilfully than the Athenians. Now, the comparative value of both parties is reversed: the superiority of nautical skill has passed to the Peloponnesians and their allies: the precautions whereby that superiority is neutralized or evaded, are forced as a necessity on the Athenians. How astonished

The two fleets marshalled for battle. Comparative nautical skill, reversed since the beginning of the war.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 31. Οὕτω δ' ἐτάχθησαν (οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι) ἵνα μὴ διέκπλουν διδοίεν· χειρὸν γὰρ ἔπλεον. Αἱ δὲ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἀντιτεταγμέναι ἦσαν ἅπασαι ἐπὶ μιᾷς, ὥς πρὸς

διέκπλουν καὶ περίπλουν παρεσκευασμένοι, διὰ τὸ βέλτιον πλεῖν.

Contrast this with Thucyd. ii. 84-89 (the speech of L'hormion), iv. 12, vii. 36.

would the Athenian admiral Phormion have been, if he could have witnessed the fleets and the order of battle at Arginusæ!

Kallikratidas himself, with the ten Lacedæmonian ships, was on the right of his fleet: on the left were the Bœotians and Eubœans, under the Bœotian admiral Thrasondas. The battle was long and obstinately contested, first by the two fleets in their original order; afterwards, when all order was broken, by scattered ships mingled together and contending in individual combat. At length the brave Kallikratidas perished. His ship was in the act of driving against the ship of an enemy, and he himself probably (like Brasidas¹ at Pylus) had planted himself on the forecastle, to be the first in boarding the enemy or in preventing the enemy from boarding him—when the shock, arising from impact, threw him off his footing, so that he fell overboard and was drowned.² In spite of the discouragement springing from his death, the ten Lacedæmonian triremes displayed a courage worthy of his, and nine of them were destroyed or disabled. At length the Athenians were victorious in all parts: the Peloponnesian fleet gave way, and their flight became general, partly to Chios, partly to Phokæa. More than sixty of their ships were destroyed, over and above the nine Lacedæmonian, seventy-seven in all; making a total loss of above the half of the entire fleet. The loss of the Athenians was also severe—amounting to twenty-five triremes. They returned to Arginusæ after the battle.³

The victory of Arginusæ afforded the most striking proof how much the democratical energy of Athens could yet accomplish, in spite of so many years of exhausting war. But far better would it have been, if her energy on this occasion had been less efficacious and successful. The defeat of the Peloponnesian fleet, and the death of their admirable leader—we must take the second as inseparable from the first, since

¹ See Thucyd. iv. 11.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 33. ἐπεὶ δὲ Καλλικρατίδας τε εὐβαλοῦσης τῆς ναὸς ἀποπεσὼν ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν ἤφρανίσθη, &c.

The details given by Diodorus about this battle and the exploits of Kallikratidas are at once prolix

and unworthy of confidence. See an excellent note of Dr. Arnold on Thucyd. iv. 12—respecting the description given by Diodorus of the conduct of Brasidas at Pylus.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 34; Diodor. xiii. 99, 100.

Kallikratidas was not the man to survive a defeat—were signal misfortunes to Athens herself. If Kallikratidas had gained the victory and survived it, he would certainly have been the man to close the Peloponnesian war; for Mitylênê must immediately have surrendered, and Konon with all the Athenian fleet there blocked up must have become his prisoners; which circumstance, coming at the back of a defeat, would have rendered Athens disposed to acquiesce in any tolerable terms of peace. Now to have the terms dictated at a moment when her power was not wholly prostrate, by a man like Kallikratidas, free from corrupt personal ambition, and of a generous Pan-Hellenic patriotism—would have been the best fate which at this moment could befall her; while to the Grecian world generally, it would have been an unspeakable benefit, that in the re-organization which it was sure to undergo at the close of the war, the ascendant individual of the moment should be penetrated with devotion to the great ideas of Hellenic brotherhood at home, and Hellenic independence against the foreigner. The near prospect of such a benefit was opened by that rare chance which threw Kallikratidas into the command, enabled him not only to publish his lofty profession of faith, but to show that he was prepared to act upon it, and for a time floated him on towards complete success. Nor were the envious gods ever more envious, than when they frustrated, by the disaster of Arginusæ, the consummation which they had thus seemed to promise. The pertinence of these remarks will be better understood in the next chapter, when I come to recount the actual winding up of the Peloponnesian war under the auspices of the worthless, but able, Lysander. It was into his hands that the command was re-transferred: a transfer almost from the best of Greeks to the worst. We shall then see how much the sufferings of the Grecian world, and of Athens especially, were aggravated by his individual temper and tendencies—and we shall then feel by contrast, how much would have been gained if the commander armed with such great power of dictation had been a Pan-Hellenic patriot. To have the sentiment of that patriotism enforced, at a moment of break-up and re-arrangement throughout Greece, by the victorious leader of the day, with single-hearted honesty and resolution, would have been a stimulus to all the better feelings of the Grecian mind such as no

other combination of circumstances could have furnished. The defeat and death of Kallikratidas was thus even more deplorable as a loss to Athens and Greece, than to Sparta herself. To his lofty character and patriotism, even in so short a career, we vainly seek a parallel.

The news of the defeat was speedily conveyed to Eteonikus at Mitylênê by the admiral's signal-boat. As soon as he heard it, he desired the crew of the signal-boat to say nothing to any one, but to go again out of the harbour, and then return with wreaths and shouts of triumph—crying out that Kallikratidas had gained the victory and had destroyed or captured all the Athenian ships. All suspicion of the reality was thus kept from Konon and the besieged; while Eteonikus himself, affecting to believe the news, offered the sacrifice of thanksgiving; but gave orders to all the triremes to take their meal and depart afterwards without losing a moment; directing the masters of the tradingships also to put their property silently aboard, and get off at the same time. And thus, with little or no delay, and without the least obstruction from Konon, all these ships, triremes and merchantmen, sailed out of the harbour, and were carried off in safety to Chios, the wind being fair. Eteonikus at the same time withdrew his land-forces to Methymna, burning his camp. Konon thus finding himself unexpectedly at liberty, put to sea with his ships when the wind had become calmer, and joined the main Athenian fleet, which he found already on its way from Arginusæ to Mitylênê. The fleet presently came to Mitylênê, and from thence passed over to make an attack on Chios; which attack proving unsuccessful, they went forward to their ordinary station at Samos.¹

The news of the victory at Arginusæ diffused joy and triumph at Athens. All the slaves who had served in the armament were manumitted and promoted, according to promise, to the rights of Platæans at Athens—a qualified species of citizenship. Yet the joy was poisoned by another incident which became known at the same time, raising sentiments of a totally opposite character, and ending in one of the most gloomy and disgraceful proceedings in all Athenian history.

Joy of Athens for the victory—indignation arising from the fact that the Athenian seamen on the disabled ships had not been picked up after the battle.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 38; Diodor. xiii. 100.

Not only the bodies of the slain warriors floating about on the water had not been picked up for burial, but the wrecks had not been visited to preserve those who were yet living. The first of these two points, even alone, would have sufficed to excite a painful sentiment of wounded piety at Athens. But the second point, here an essential part of the same omission, inflamed that sentiment into shame, grief, and indignation of the sharpest character.

In the descriptions of this event, Diodorus and many other writers take notice of the first point, either exclusively,¹ or at least with slight reference to the second:

¹ See the narrative of Diodorus (xiii. 100, 101, 102), where nothing is mentioned except about picking up the floating *dead* bodies—about the crime, and offence in the eyes of the people, of omitting to secure burial to so many *dead* bodies. He does not seem to have fancied that there were any *living* bodies, or that it was a question between life and death to so many of the crews.

Whereas if we follow the narrative of Xenophon (Hellen. i. 7), we shall see that the question is put throughout about picking up the *living* men—the *shipwrecked* men, or the men belonging to, and still living aboard of, the broken ships—ἀνελέσθαι τοὺς ναυαγούς, τοὺς θωπευομένους, τοὺς καταδυνάτους (Hellen. ii. 3, 32): compare especially ii. 3, 35—πλεῖν ἐπὶ τὰς καταδυνάτους ναῦς καὶ τοὺς ἐπ' αὐτῶν ἀνθρώπους (i. 6, 36). The word *ναυαγός* does not mean a dead body, but a *living* man who has suffered shipwreck: Ναυαγός ἦν, ἔνας, σπυλῆτος γένης (says Menelaus, Eurip. Helen. 457): also 107.—Καὶ οὗ πάρας ναυαγός, ἀπολέσας φίλους Ἐξέπειτον ἐς γῆν τήνδε, &c., again 538. It corresponds with the Latin *naufragus*—"mersâ rate naufragus assem Dum rogat, et pietâ se tempestate tuetur" (Ju-

venal, xiv. 301). Thucydides does not use the word *ναυαγός*, but speaks of τοὺς νεκροὺς καὶ τὰ ναυαγία, meaning by the latter word the damaged ships with every person and thing on board.

It is remarkable that Schneider and most other commentators on Xenophon, Sturz in his *Lexicon Xenophonticum* (v. ἀναίρεσις), Stallbaum ad Platon. Apol. Socrat. c. 20. p. 32, Sievers, Comment. ad Xenoph. Hellen. p. 31, Forchhammer, Die Athener und Sokrates, p. 30—31. Berlin, 1837,—and others—all treat this event as if it were nothing but a question of picking up dead bodies for sepulture. This is a complete misinterpretation of Xenophon; not merely because the word *ναυαγός*, which he uses four several times, means a *living* person, but because there are two other passages, which leave absolutely no doubt about the matter—Περὶ ἧθες δὲ τις ἐς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, φάσων ἐπὶ τεύχεος ἀλφιῶν σωθῆναι ἐπιστέλλειν δ' αὐτῷ τοὺς ἀπολλυμένους, ἐάν τω θῇ, ἀπαγγεῖλαι τῷ δήμῳ, ὅτι οἱ στρατηγοὶ οὐκ ἀνείλοντο τοὺς ὀρίστους ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος γενομένους. Again (ii. 3, 35), Theramenes, when vindicating himself, before the oligarchy of Thirty two years after-

which latter, nevertheless, stands as far the gravest in the estimate of every impartial critic, and was also the most violent in its effect upon Athenian feelings. Twenty-five Athenian triremes had been ruined along with most of their crews; that is, lay heeled over or disabled, with their oars destroyed, no masts, nor any means of moving—mere hulls partially broken by the impact of an enemy's ship, and gradually filling and sinking. The original crew of each was 200 men. The field of battle (if we may use that word for a space of sea) was strewn with these wrecks; the men remaining on board being helpless and unable to get away—for the ancient trireme carried no boat, nor any aids for escape. And there were moreover, floating about, men who had fallen overboard, or were trying to save their lives by means of accidental spars or empty casks. It was one of the privileges of a naval victory, that the party who gained it could sail over the field of battle, and thus assist their own helpless or wounded comrades aboard the disabled ships;¹ taking captive, or sometimes killing the corresponding persons belonging to the enemy. According even to the speech made in the Athenian public assembly afterwards, by Euryptolemus, the defender of the accused generals, there were twelve triremes with their crews on board lying in the condition just described. This is an admission by the defence, and therefore the minimum of the reality: there cannot possibly have been fewer, but there were probably several more, out of the whole twenty-five stated by Xenophon.² No step being taken to preserve

wards, for his conduct in accusing the generals, says that the generals brought their own destruction upon themselves by accusing him first, and by saying that the men on the disabled ships might have been saved with proper diligence—*φάσχοντες γὰρ (the generals) οἶον τε εἶναι σῶσαι τοὺς ἄνδρας, προέμενοι αὐτοὺς ἀπολέσθαι, ἀποπλέοντες ψύχοντο.* These passages place the point beyond dispute, that the generals were accused of having neglected to save the lives of men on the point of being drowned, and who by *their* neglect

afterwards were drowned—not of having neglected to pick up dead bodies for sepulture. This misinterpretation of the commentators is here of the gravest import. It alters completely the criticisms on the proceedings at Athens.

¹ See Thucyd. i. 50, 51.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 34. Ἀπωλοντο δὲ τῶν μὲν Ἀθηναίων νῆες πάντε καὶ εἶχουσιν αὐτοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ἐκτός ὀλίγων τῶν πρὸς τὴν γῆν προσενηθέντων.

Schneider in his note, and Mr. Mitford in his History, express surprise at the discrepancy between

them, the surviving portion, wounded as well as unwounded, of these crews, were left to be gradually drowned as each disabled ship went down. If any of them escaped, it was by unusual goodness of swimming—by finding some fortunate plank or spar—at any rate by the disgrace of throwing away their arms, and by some method such as no wounded man would be competent to employ.

The first letter from the generals which communicated the victory, made known at the same time the loss sustained in obtaining it. It announced, doubtless, the fact which we read in Xenophon, that twenty-five Athenian triremes had been lost, with nearly all their crews; specifying, we may be sure, the name of each trireme which had so perished; for each trireme in the Athenian navy, like modern ships, had its own name.¹ It mentioned at the same time that no step

Despatch of the generals to Athens, affirming that a storm had prevented them from saving the drowning men.

the number *twelve* which appears in the speech of Euryptolemus, and the number *twenty-five* given by Xenophon.

But, first, we are not to suppose Xenophon to guarantee those assertions as to matters of fact which he gives as coming from Euryptolemus; who, as an advocate speaking in the assembly, might take great liberties with the truth.

Next, Xenophon speaks of the total number of ships ruined or disabled in action: Euryptolemus speaks of the total number of wrecks afloat and capable of being visited so as to rescue the sufferers *at the subsequent moment* when the generals directed the squadron under Theramenès to go out for the rescue. It is to be remembered that the generals went back to Arginusæ from the battle, and there determined (according to their own statement) to send out from thence a squadron for visiting the wrecks. A certain interval of time must therefore have elapsed between the close of the action,

and the order given to Theramenès. During that interval, undoubtedly *some* of the disabled ships went down or came to pieces: if we are to believe Euryptolemus, thirteen out of the twenty-five must have thus disappeared, so that their crews were already drowned, and no more than twelve remained floating for Theramenès to visit, even had he been ever so active and ever so much favoured by weather.

I distrust the statement of Euryptolemus, and believe that he most probably underrated the number. But assuming him to be correct, this will only show how much the generals were to blame (as we shall hereafter remark) for not having seen to the visitation of the wrecks *before* they went back to their moorings at Arginusæ.

¹ Boeckh, in his instructive volume—*Urkunden über das Attische Sec.-Wesen* (vii. p. 84 *seq.*) gives, from inscriptions, a long list of the names of Athenian triremes, between B.C. 356 and 322. All the

whatever had been taken by the victorious survivors to save their wounded and drowning countrymen on board the sinking ships. A storm had arisen (such was the reason assigned), so violent as to render all such intervention totally impracticable.¹

It is so much the custom, in dealing with Grecian history, to presume the Athenian people to be a set of children or madmen, whose feelings it is not worth while to try and account for—that I have been obliged to state these circumstances somewhat at length, in order to show that the mixed sentiment excited at Athens by the news of the battle of Arginusæ was perfectly natural and justifiable. Along with joy for the victory, there was blended horror and remorse at the

fact, that so many of the brave men who had helped to gain it, had been left to perish unheeded. The friends and relatives of the crews of these lost triremes were of course foremost in the expression of such indignant emotion. The narrative of Xenophon, meagre and confused as well as unfair, presents this emotion as if it were something causeless, factitious, pumped up out of the standing irascibility of the multitude by the artifices of Theramenès, Kallixenus, and a few others. But whatever may have been done by these individuals to aggravate the public excitement, or pervert it to bad purposes, assuredly the excitement itself was spontaneous, inevitable, and amply justified. The very thought that so many of the brave partners in the victory had been left to drown miserably on the sinking hulls, without any effort, on the part of their generals and comrades near, to rescue them—was enough to stir up all the sensibilities, public as well as private, of the most passive nature, even in citizens who were not related to the deceased—much more in those who were so. To expect that the Athenians would be so absorbed in the delight of the

names are feminine: some curious. We have a long list also of the Athenian ship-builders: since the name of the builder is commonly stated in the inscription along with that of the ship—Εὐχαρις, Ἀλεξιμάχου ἔργον—Σειρήν, Ἀριστοκράτους ἔργον—Ἐλευθερία, Ἀρκενέω ἔργον—Ἐπιδείξις, Λυσιστρά-

του ἔργον—Δημοκρατία, Χαίρεστράτου ἔργον, &c.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 4. Ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οὐδενὸς ἄλλου κατέχοντο (οἱ στρατηγοὶ) ἐπιστολὴν ἐπεδείκνυσαν οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἐς τὴν βουλὴν καὶ ἐς τὸν δῆμον, ἄλλο οὐδὲν αἰτιώμενοι ἢ τὸν χειμῶνα.

victory, and in gratitude to the generals who had commanded, as to overlook such a desertion of perishing warriors, and such an omission of sympathetic duty—is, in my judgement, altogether preposterous; and would, if it were true, only establish one more vice in the Athenian people, besides those which they really had, and the many more with which they have been unjustly branded.

The generals in their public letter accounted for their omission by saying that the violence of the storm was too great to allow them to move. First, was this true as matter of fact? Next, had there been time to discharge the duty, or at the least to try and discharge it, before the storm came on to be so intolerable? These points required examination. The generals, while honoured with a vote of thanks for the victory, were superseded, and directed to come home; all except Konon, who having been blocked up at Mitylênê, was not concerned in the question. Two new colleagues, Philoklês and Adeimantus, were named to go out and join him.¹ The generals probably received the notice of their recall at Samos, and came home in consequence; reaching Athens seemingly about the end of September or beginning of October—the battle of Arginusæ having been fought in August 406 B.C. Two of the generals, however, Protomachus and Aristogenês, declined to come: warned of the displeasure of the people, and not confiding in their own case to meet it, they preferred to pay the price of voluntary exile. The other six, Periklês, Lysias, Diomedon, Erasinidês, Aristokratês, and Thrasyllus (Archestratus, one of the original ten, having died at Mitylênê²), came without their two colleagues; an unpleasant augury for the result.

On their first arrival, Archedêmus, at that time an acceptable popular orator, and exercising some magistracy or high office which we cannot distinctly make out³, imposed upon Erasinidês a fine to that limited amount which was within the competence of magistrates without the sanction of the Dikastery—and accused him besides

The generals are superseded, and directed to come home.

Examination of the generals before the Senate and the people at Athens.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 1; Diodor. xii. 101—ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ νίκῃ τοὺς στρατηγούς ἐπήνουν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ περιδεῖν ἀτάφους τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡγεμονίας τετελευτηκότας, χαλεπῶς διετέλησαν.

I have before remarked that

Diodorus makes the mistake of talking about nothing but *dead bodies*, in place of the living *navy*—γῶι spoken of by Xenophon.

² Lysias, Orat. xxi. (Ἀπολογία Δημοδοκίας) sect. vii.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7. 2. Arche-

before the Dikastery; partly for general misconduct in his command, partly on the specific charge of having purloined some public money on its way from the Hellespont. Erasinidês was found guilty, and condemned to be imprisoned, either until the money was made good, or perhaps until farther examination could take place into the other alleged misdeeds.

This trial of Erasinidês took place before the generals were summoned before the Senate to give their formal exposition respecting the recent battle and the subsequent neglect of the drowning men. And it might almost seem as if Archedêmus wished to impute to Erasinidês exclusively, apart from the other generals, the blame of that neglect; a distinction, as will hereafter appear, not wholly unfounded. If however any such design was entertained, it did not succeed. When the generals went to explain their case before the Senate, the decision of that body was decidedly unfavourable to all of them, though we have no particulars of the debate which passed. On the proposition of the Senator Timôkratês,¹ a resolution was passed that the other five generals present should be placed in custody, as well as Erasinidês, and thus handed over to the public assembly for consideration of the case.²

dêmus is described as τῆς Δεκαλείας ἐπιμελούμενος. What is meant by these words, none of the commentators can explain in a satisfactory manner. The text must be corrupt. Some conjecture like that of Dobree seems plausible; some words like τῆς δεκάτης or τῆς δεκατέως—having reference to the levying of the tithe in the Hellespont; which would furnish reasonable ground for the proceeding of Archedêmus against Erasinidês.

The office held by Archedêmus, whatever it was, must have been sufficiently exalted to confer upon him the power of imposing the fine of limited amount called ἐπιβολή.

I hesitate to identify this Archedêmus with the person of that

name mentioned in the Memorabilia of Xenophon, ii. 9. There seems no similarity at all in the points of character noticed.

The popular orator Archedêmus was derided by Eupolis and Aristophanês as having sore eyes, and as having got his citizenship without a proper title to it (see Aristophan. Ran. 419—588, with the Scholia). He also is charged in a line of an oration of Lysias with having embezzled the public money (Lysias cont. Alkibiad. sect. 25. Orat. xiv.).

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 3. Τιμοκράτους δ' εἰπόντος, ὅτι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους χρεὴ δεθέντας ἐς τὸν δῆμον παραδοθήναι, ἡ βουλὴ ἔδησε.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 4.

The public assembly was accordingly held, and the generals were brought before it. We are here told who it was that appeared as their principal accuser, along with several others; though unfortunately we are left to guess what were the topics on which they insisted. Theramenês was the man who denounced them most vehemently, as guilty of leaving the crews of the disabled triremes to be drowned, and of neglecting all efforts to rescue them. He appealed to their own public letter to the people, officially communicating the victory; in which letter they made no mention of having appointed any one to undertake the duty, nor of having any one to blame for not performing it. The omission therefore was wholly their own: they might have performed it, and ought to be punished for so cruel a breach of duty.

Debate in the public assembly—Theramênês accuses the generals as guilty of omitting to save the drowning men.

The generals could not have a more formidable enemy than Theramenês. We have had occasion to follow him, during the revolution of the Four Hundred, as a long-sighted as well as tortuous politician: he had since been in high military command, a partaker in victory with Alkibiadês at Kyzikus and elsewhere; and he had served as trierarch in the victory of Arginusæ itself. His authority therefore was naturally high, and told for much, when he denied the justification which the generals had set up, founded on the severity of the storm. According to him, they might have picked up the drowning men, and ought to have done so: either they might have done so before the storm came on—or there never was any storm of sufficient gravity to prevent them: upon their heads lay the responsibility of omission.¹ Xenophon, in his very meagre narrative, does not tell us in express words, that Theramenês contradicted the generals as to the storm. But that he did so contradict them, point blank, is implied distinctly in that which Xenophon alleges him to have said. It seems also that Thrasybulus—another trierarch at Arginusæ, and a man

Effect of the accusation by Theramenês upon the assembly.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 4. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, ἐκκλησίαι ἐγένετο, ἐν ᾗ τῶν στρατηγῶν κατηγόρους ἄλλοι τε καὶ θηραμένης μάλιστα, διακαίους εἶναι λέγων λόγον ὑποσχεῖν, διότι οὐκ ἀνείλοντο τοὺς ναυαγούς. Ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ὅς ἄλλου καθήκοντο, ἐπιστολὴν ἐπέδεικνυε μαρτύριον· καὶ ἐπεμψαν οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἐς τὴν βουλὴν καὶ ἐς τὸν ὄχλον, ἄλλο οὐδὲν αἰτιώμενοι ἢ τὸν χειμῶνα.

not only of equal consequence, but of far more estimable character—concurred with Theramenês in this same accusation of the generals,¹ though not standing forward so prominently in the case. He too therefore must have denied the reality of the storm; or at least, the fact of its being so instant after the battle or so terrible, as to forbid all effort for the relief of these drowning seamen.

The case of the generals, as it stood before the Athenian public, was completely altered when men like Theramenês and Thrasybulus stood forward as their accusers. Doubtless what was said by these two had been said by others before, in the Senate and elsewhere; but it was now publicly advanced by men of influence, as well as perfectly cognizant of the fact. And we are thus enabled to gather indirectly (what the narrative of Xenophon, studiously keeping back the case against the generals, does not directly bring forward), that though the generals affirmed the storm, there were others present who denied it—thus putting in controversy the matter of fact, which formed their solitary justification. Moreover we come, in following the answer made by the generals in the public assembly to Theramenês and Thrasybulus—to a new point in the case, which Xenophon lets out as it were indirectly, and in that confused manner which pervades his whole narrative of the transaction. It is however a new point of extreme moment. The generals replied that if any one was to blame for not having picked up the drowning men, it was Theramenês and Thrasybulus themselves; for it was they two, to whom, together with various other trierarchs and with forty-eight triremes, the generals had expressly confided the performance of this duty: it was they two who were responsible for its omission, not the generals. Nevertheless they (the generals) made no charge against Theramenês and Thrasybulus—well knowing that

¹ That Thrasybulus concurred with Theramenês in accusing the generals, is intimated in the reply which Xenophon represents the generals to have made (i. 7, 6)—*Καὶ οὐχ, ὅτι γε κατηγοροῦσιν ἡμῶν, ἔφρασαν ψευδόμεθα φάσκοντες αὐτοῦς αἰτίους εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ*

μέγεθος τοῦ χειμῶνος εἶναι τὸ κωλύσαν τὴν ἀναίρεσιν.

The plural *κατηγοροῦσιν* shows that Thrasybulus as well as Theramenês stood forward to accuse the generals, though the latter was the most prominent and violent.

the storm had rendered the performance of the duty absolutely impossible, and that it was therefore a complete justification for one as well as for the other. They (the generals) at least could do no more than direct competent men like these two trierarchs to perform the task, and assign to them an adequate squadron for the purpose; while they themselves with the main fleet went to attack Eteonikus, and relieve Mitylênê. Diomedon, one of their number, had wished after the battle to employ all the ships in the fleet for the preservation of the drowning men, without thinking of anything else until that was done. Erasinidês, on the contrary, wished that all the fleet should move across at once against Mitylênê: Thrasyllus said that they had ships enough to do both at once. Accordingly it was agreed that each general should set apart three ships from his division, to make a squadron of forty-eight ships under Thrasybulus and Theramenês. In making these statements, the generals produced pilots and others, men actually in the battle, as witnesses in general confirmation.

Here then, in this debate before the assembly, were two new and important points publicly raised. First, Theramenês and Thrasybulus denounced the generals as guilty of the death of these neglected men: next, the generals affirmed that they had delegated the duty to Theramenês and Thrasybulus themselves. If this latter were really true, how came the generals in their official despatch first sent home, to say nothing about it? Eurypolemus, an advocate of the generals (speaking in a subsequent stage of the proceedings, though we can hardly doubt that the same topics were also urged in this very assembly), while blaming the generals for such omission, ascribed it to an ill-placed good-nature on their part, and reluctance to bring Theramenês and Thrasybulus under the displeasure of the people. Most of the generals (he said) were disposed to mention the fact in their official despatch, but were dissuaded from doing so by Periklês and Diomedon; an unhappy dissuasion (in his judgement), which Theramenês and Thrasybulus had ungratefully requited by turning round and accusing them all.¹

Reason why
the generals
had not
mentioned
this com-
mission in
their
despatch.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 17. Eurypolemus says—Κατηγορῶ μὲν οὖν αὐτῶν, ὅτι ἐπεισαν τοὺς ξυνάρχ-

χοντας, βουλομένους πέμπειν γράμματα τῇ τε βουλῇ καὶ ὑμῖν, ὅτι ἐπέταξαν τῷ Θερραμένει καὶ Θρασυβούλῳ

This remarkable statement of Euryptolemus, as to the intention of the generals in working the official despatch, brings us to a closer consideration of what really passed between them on the one side, and Theramenês and Thrasybulus on the other; which is difficult to make out clearly, but which Diodorus represents in a manner completely different from Xenophon. Diodorus states that the generals were prevented partly by the storm, partly by the fatigue and reluctance and alarm of their own seamen, from taking any steps to pick up (what he calls) the dead bodies for burial—that they suspected Theramenês and Thrasybulus, who went to Athens before them, of intending to accuse them before the people—and that for this reason they sent home intimation to the people that they had given special orders to these two trierarchs to perform the duty. When these letters were read in the public assembly (Diodorus says), the Athenians were excessively indignant against Theramenês; who however defended himself effectively and completely, throwing the blame back upon the generals. He was thus forced, against his own will and in self-defence, to become the accuser of the generals, carrying with him his numerous friends and partisans at Athens. And thus the generals, by trying to ruin Theramenês, finally brought condemnation upon themselves.¹

Such is the narrative of Diodorus, in which it is implied that the generals never really gave any special orders to Theramenês and Thrasybulus, but falsely asserted afterwards that they had done so, in order to discredit the accusation of Theramenês against themselves. To a certain extent, this coincides with what was asserted by Theramenês himself two years afterwards in his defence before the Thirty—that he was not the first to accuse the generals—they were the first to accuse him, affirming that they had

τετταράχοντα καὶ ἑπτα τριῖρας
ἀνελέσθαι τοὺς ναυαγούς, οἱ δὲ οὐκ
ἀνείλοντο. Εἶτα νῦν τὴν αἰτίαν κοινὴν
ἔχουσιν, ἐκείνων ἰδίᾳ ἀμάρτανόντων
καὶ ἀντὶ τῆς τότε φιλανθρώπιας, νῦν
ὅπ' ἐκείνων τε καὶ τινῶν ἄλλων ἐπι-
βουλευόμενοι κινδυνεύουσιν ἀπολέσθαι.

We must here construe ἔπεισαν
as equivalent to ἀνέπεισαν or μετέ-

πεισαν, placing a comma after
ἐπιάρχοντας. This is unusual, but
not inadmissible. To persuade a
man to alter his opinion or his
conduct might be expressed by
πειθεῖν, though it would more prop-
erly be expressed by ἀναπειθεῖν:
see ἐπισθῆναι, Thucyd. iii. 32.

¹ Diodor. xiii. 100, 101.

ordered him to undertake the duty, and that there was no sufficient reason to prevent him from performing it—they were the persons who distinctly pronounced the performance of the duty to be possible, while he had said from the beginning that the violence of the storm was such as even to forbid any movement in the water; much more, to prevent rescue of the drowning men.¹

Taking the accounts of Xenophon and Diodorus together, in combination with the subsequent accusation and defence of Theramenês at the time of the Thirty—and blending them so as to reject as little as possible of either—I think it probable that the order for picking up the exposed men was really given by the generals to Theramenês, Thrasybulus, and other trierarchs; but that, first, a fatal interval was allowed to elapse between the close of the battle and the giving of such order—next, that the forty-eight triremes talked of for the service, and proposed to be furnished by drafts of three out of each general's division, were probably never assembled—or if they assembled, were so little zealous in the business as to satisfy themselves very easily that the storm was too dangerous to brave, and that it was now too late. For when we read the version of the transaction even as given by Euryptolemus, we see plainly that none of the generals, except Diomedon, was eager in the performance of the task. It is a memorable fact, that of all the eight generals, not one of them undertook the business in person, although its purpose was to save more than a thousand drowning comrades from death.² In a proceeding where every interval even of

Probable
version of
the way in
which the
facts really
occurred.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 35. If Theramenês really did say, in the actual discussions at Athens on the conduct of the generals, that which he here asserts himself to have said (viz. that the violence of the storm rendered it impossible for any one to put to sea), his accusation against the generals must have been grounded upon alleging that they might have performed the duty at an earlier moment; before they came back from the battle—before the storm arose—before they gave the order to him. But I think it

most probable that he misrepresented at the later period what he had said at the earlier, and that he did not, during the actual discussions, admit the sufficiency of the storm as fact and justification.

² The total number of ships lost with all their crews was twenty-five, of which the aggregate crews (speaking in round numbers) would be 5000 men. Now we may fairly calculate that each one of the disabled ships would have on board half her crew, or 100 men, after the action: not more than half would

five minutes was precious, they go to work in the most dilatory manner, by determining that each general shall furnish three ships and no more, from his division. Now we know from the statement of Xenophon, that towards the close of the battle, the ships on both sides were much dispersed.¹ Such collective direction therefore would not be quickly realised; nor, until all the eight fractions were united, together with the Samians and others, so as to make the force complete, would Theramenês feel bound to go out upon his preserving visitation. He doubtless disliked the service—as we see that most of the generals did—while the crews also, who had just got to land after having gained a victory, were thinking most about rest and refreshment, and mutual congratulations.² All were glad to find some excuse for staying in their moorings instead of going out again to buffet what was doubtless unfavourable weather. Partly from this want of zeal, coming in addition to the original delay—partly from the bad weather—the duty remained unexecuted, and these men on board the damaged ships were left to perish unassisted.

But presently arose the delicate, yet unavoidable question, "How are we to account for the omission of this sacred duty in our official despatch to the Athenian people?" Here the generals differed among themselves, as Eurypotemus expressly states: Periklês and Diomedon carried it, against the judgement of their colleagues, that in the official despatch (which was necessarily such as could be agreed to by all) nothing should be said about the delegation to Theramenês and others; the whole omission being referred to the terrors of the storm. But though such was the tenor of the official report, there was nothing to hinder

have been slain or drowned in the combat. Even ten disabled ships would thus contain 1000 living men, wounded and unwounded. It will be seen therefore that I have understated the number of lives in danger.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 33.

² We read in Thucydides (vii. 73) how impossible it was to prevail on the Syracusans to make any military movement after their last maritime victory in the Great Harbour, when they were full of tri-

umph, felicitation, and enjoyment.

They had visited the wrecks and picked up both the living men on board and the floating bodies, before they went ashore. It is remarkable that the Athenians on that occasion were so completely overpowered by the immensity of their disaster, that they never even thought of asking permission (always granted by the victors when asked) to pick up their dead or visit their wrecks (viii. 72).

the generals from writing home and communicating individually with their friends in Athens as each might think fit; and in these unofficial communications, from them as well as from others who went home from the armament—communications not less efficacious than the official despatch in determining the tone of public feeling at Athens—they did not disguise their convictions that the blame of not performing the duty belonged to Theramenês. Having thus a man like Theramenês to throw the blame upon, they did not take pains to keep up the story of the intolerable storm, but intimated that there had been nothing to hinder *him* from performing the duty if he had chosen. It is this which he accuses them of having advanced against him, so as to place him as the guilty man before the Athenian public: it was this which made him, in retaliation and self-defence, violent and unscrupulous in denouncing them as the persons really blameable.¹ As they had made light of the alleged storm, in casting the blame upon him—so he again made light of it, and treated it as an insufficient excuse, in his denunciations against them; taking care to make good use of their official despatch, which virtually

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 32. The light in which I here place the conduct of Theramenês is not only coincident with Diodorus, but with the representations of Kritias, the violent enemy of Theramenês, under the government of the Thirty—just before he was going to put Theramenês to death—Οὕτως δὲ τοι ἐστίν, ὅς ταχέως ἀνελέσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν στρατηγῶν τοὺς καταδόντας Ἀθηναίων ἐν τῇ περὶ Δέσβον ναυμαχίᾳ, αὐτὸς οὐκ ἀνελομένος ὅμως τῶν στρατηγῶν κατηγορῶν ἀπέχτεινεν αὐτοῦς, ἵνα αὐτὸς περισωθεῖη (Xen. *ut sup.*).

Here it stands admitted that the first impression at Athens was (as Diodorus states expressly) that Theramenês was ordered to pick up the men on the wrecks—might have done it if he had taken proper pains—and was to blame for not doing it. Now how did this impression arise? Of course through communications received from the

armament itself. And when Theramenês in his reply says, that the generals themselves made communications in the same tenor, there is no reason why we should not believe him; in spite of their joint official despatch, wherein they made no mention of him—and in spite of their speech in the public assembly afterwards, where the previous official letter fettered them, and prevented them from accusing him, forcing them to adhere to the statement first made of the insufficiency of the storm.

The main facts which we here find established even by the enemies of Theramenês, are—1. That Theramenês accused the generals because he found himself in danger of being punished for the neglect. 2. That his enemies, who charged him with the breach of duty, did not admit the storm as an excuse for *him*.

exonerated him, by its silence, from any concern in the matter.

Such is the way in which I conceive the relations to have stood between the generals on one side and Theramenês on the other; having regard to all that is said both in Xenophon and in Diodorus. But the comparative account of blame and recrimination between these two parties is not the most important feature of the case. The really serious inquiry is, as to the intensity or instant occurrence of the storm. Was it really so instant and so dangerous, that the duty of visiting the wrecks could not be performed, either before the ships went back to Arginusæ, or afterwards? If we take the circumstances of the case, and apply them to the habits and feelings of the English navy—if we suppose more than 1000 seamen, late comrades in the victory, distributed among twenty damaged and helpless hulls, awaiting the moment when these hulls would fill and consign them all to a watery grave—it must have been a frightful storm indeed, which would force an English admiral even to go back to his moorings, leaving these men so exposed—or which would deter him, if he were at his moorings, from sending out the very first and nearest ships at hand to save them. And granting the danger to be such, that he hesitated to give the order, there would probably be found officers and men to volunteer against the most desperate risks, in a cause so profoundly moving all their best sympathies. Now unfortunately for the character of Athenian generals, officers, and men, at Arginusæ—for the blame belongs, though in unequal proportions, to all of them—there exists here strong presumptive proof that the storm on this occasion was not such as would have deterred any Grecian seamen animated by an earnest and courageous sense of duty. We have only to advert to the conduct and escape of Eteonikus and the Peloponnesian fleet from Mitylênê to Chios; recollecting that Mitylênê was separated from the promontory of Kanê on the Asiatic mainland, and from the isles of Arginusæ, by a channel only 120 stadia broad¹—about fourteen English miles. Eteonikus, apprised of the defeat by the Peloponnesian official signal-boat, desired that boat to go out of the harbour, and then to sail into it

Justifica-
tion of the
generals—
how far
valid?—
The alleged
storm.
Escape of
Eteonikus.

¹ Strabo, xiii. p. 617.

again with deceptive false news, to the effect that the Peloponnesians had gained a complete victory: he then directed his seamen, after taking their dinners, to depart immediately, and the masters of the merchant vessels silently to put their cargoes aboard and get to sea also. The whole fleet, triremes and merchant vessels both, thus went out of the harbour of Mitylênê and made straight for Chios, whither they arrived in safety; the merchant vessels carrying their sails, and having what Xenophon calls "a fair wind."¹ Now it is scarcely possible that all this could have taken place, had there blown during this time an intolerable storm between Mitylênê and Arginusæ. If the weather was such as to allow of the safe transit of Eteonikus and all his fleet from Mitylênê to Chios—it was not such as to form a legitimate obstacle capable of deterring any generous Athenian seamen, still less a responsible officer, from saving his comrades exposed on the wrecks near Arginusæ. Least of all was it such as ought to have hindered the attempt to save them—even if such attempt had proved unsuccessful. And here the gravity of the sin consists, in having remained inactive while the brave men on the wrecks were left to be drowned. All this reasoning, too, assumes the fleet to have been already brought back to its moorings at Arginusæ; discussing only how much was practicable to effect after that moment, and leaving untouched the no less important question, why the drowning men were not picked up before the fleet went back?

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 37. 'Ετεονίκος δὲ, ἐπειδὴ ἐκέλευσι (the signal-boat with news of the pretended victory) κατέπλεον, ἔθυσ τὰ εὐαγγέλια, καὶ τοῖς στρατιώταις παρήγγειλε δειπνοποιεῖσθαι καὶ τοῖς ἐμπόροις, τὰ χρήματα σιωπῇ ἐνθεμένους ἐς τὰ πλοῖα ἀποπλεῖν ἐς Χίον, ἣν δὲ τὸ πνεῦμα οὖρον, καὶ τὰς τριῖρας τὴν ταχίστην. Αὐτὸς δὲ τὸ πλοῖον ἀπῆγεν ἐς τὴν Μηθύμνην, τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐμπρὶς. Κόνων δὲ κατελχόμενος τὰς ναῦς, ἐπεὶ οἱ τε πολέμιοι ἀποδεδράκεσαν, καὶ ὁ ἄνεμος εὐδαιμονεὶς ἦν, ἀπαντήσας τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἥδη ἀνηγμένους ἐκ τῶν Ἀργινουσῶν, ἔφρασε τὰ περὶ Ἐτεονίκου.

One sees by the expression used by Xenophon respecting the proceedings of Konon—that he went out of the harbour "as soon as the wind became calmer"—that it blew a strong wind, though in a direction favourable to carry the fleet of Eteonikus to Chios. Konon was under no particular motive to go out immediately: he could afford to wait until the wind became quite calm. The important fact is, that wind and weather were perfectly compatible with, indeed even favourable to, the escape of the Peloponnesian fleet from Mitylênê to Chios.

I have thought it right to go over these considerations, indispensable to the fair appreciation of so memorable an event—in order that the reader may understand the feelings of the assembly and the public of Athens, when the generals stood before them, rebutting the accusations of Theramenês and recriminating in their turn against him. The assembly had before them the grave and deplorable fact, that several hundreds of brave seamen had been suffered to drown on the wrecks, without the least effort to rescue them. In explanation of this fact, they had not only no justification, at once undisputed and satisfactory—but not even any straightforward, consistent, and uncontradicted statement of facts. There were discrepancies among the generals themselves, comparing their official with their unofficial, as well as with their present statements—and contradictions between them and Theramenês, each having denied the sufficiency of the storm as a vindication for the neglect imputed to the other. It was impossible that the assembly could be satisfied to acquit the generals, on such a presentation of the case; nor could they well know how to apportion the blame between them and Theramenês. The relatives of the men left to perish would be doubtless in a state of violent resentment against one or other of the two, perhaps against both. Under these circumstances, it could hardly have been the sufficiency of their defence—it must have been rather the apparent generosity of their conduct towards Theramenês, in formally disavowing all charge of neglect against him, though he had advanced a violent charge against them—which produced the result that we read in Xenophon. The defence of the generals was listened to with favour and seemed likely to prevail with the majority.¹ Many individuals present offered themselves

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 5-7. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οἱ στρατηγοὶ βραχὴν ἔκαστος ἀπολογήσατο, οὐ γὰρ προὔτεθ' ἄλλος λόγος κατὰ τὸν νόμον. . . .

Τοιαῦτα λέγοντες ἔπειθον τὸν δῆμον. The imperfect tense ἔπειθον must be noticed: "they were persuading," or *seemed in the way to persuade*, the people: not ἔπεισαν the aorist, which would mean that

they actually did satisfy the people.

The first words here cited from Xenophon do not imply that the generals were checked or abridged in their liberty of speaking before the public assembly, but merely that no judicial trial and defence were granted to them. In judicial defence, the person accused had a measured time for defence (by the

as bail for the generals, in order that the latter might be liberated from custody: but the debate had been so much prolonged (we see from hence that there must have been a great deal of speaking) that it was now dark, so that no vote could be taken, because the show of hands was not distinguishable. It was therefore resolved that the whole decision should be adjourned until another assembly; but that in the meantime the senate should meet to consider what would be the proper mode of trying and judging the generals—and should submit a proposition to that effect.

It so chanced, that immediately after this first assembly, during the interval before the meeting of the senate or the holding of the second assembly, the three days of the solemn annual festival called Apaturia intervened; early days in the month of October. This was the characteristic festival of the Ionic race; handed down from a period anterior to the constitution of Kleisthenês, and to the ten new tribes each containing so many demes—and bringing together the citizens in their primitive unions of family, gens, phratry, &c., the aggregate of which had originally constituted the four Ionic tribes, now superannuated. At the Apaturia the family ceremonies were gone through; marriages were enrolled, acts of adoption were promulgated and certified, the names of youthful citizens first entered on the gentile and phratric roll; sacrifices were jointly celebrated by these family assemblages to Zeus Phratrius, Athênê, and other deities, accompanied with much festivity and enjoyment. A solemnity like this, celebrated every year, naturally provoked, in each of these little unions, questions of affectionate interest—"Who are those that were with us last year, but are not here now? The absent—where are they? The deceased—where or how did they die?" Now the crews of the twenty-five Athenian triremes, lost at the battle of Arginusæ, (at least all those among them who were freemen) had been members of some one of these family unions, and were missed on this occasion. The answer to the above inquiry, in their case, would be one alike melancholy and

Occurrence of the festival of Apaturia—the great family solemnity of the Ionic race.

clepsydra or water-clock) allotted much longer than any single to him, during which no one could speaker would be permitted to interrupt him; a time doubtless occupy in the public assembly.

revolting—"They fought like brave men and had their full share in the victory: their trireme was broken, disabled, and made a wreck, in the battle: aboard this wreck they were left to perish, while their victorious generals and comrades made not the smallest effort to preserve them." To hear this about fathers, brothers, and friends—and to hear it in the midst of a sympathising family circle—was well-calculated to stir up an agony of shame, sorrow, and anger, united; an intolerable sentiment, which required as a satisfaction, and seemed even to impose as a duty, the punishment of those who had left these brave comrades to perish. Many of the gentile unions, in spite of the usually festive and cheerful character of the Apaturia, were so absorbed by this sentiment, that they clothed themselves in black garments and shaved their heads in token of mourning, resolving to present themselves in this guise at the coming assembly, and to appease the manes of their abandoned kinsmen by every possible effort to procure retribution on the generals.¹

Xenophon in his narrative describes this burst of feeling at the Apaturia as false and factitious, and the men in mourning as a number of hired impostors, got up by the artifices of Theramenês,² to destroy the generals. But the case was one in which no artifice was needed. The universal and self-acting stimulants of intense human

Burst of feeling at the Apaturia—misrepresented by Xenophon.

¹ Lysias puts into one of his orations a similar expression respecting the feeling at Athens towards these generals—*ηγούμενοι χρῆναι τῇ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἀρετῇ παρ' ἐκείνων οἰκὴν λαβεῖν*—Lysias cont. Eratosth. s. 37.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 8. Οἱ οὖν περὶ τὸν Θηραμένην παρεσκεύασαν ἀνθρώπους μέλανα ἱμάτια ἔχοντας, καὶ ἐν χρῶματι κειραμένους πολλοὺς ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἑορτῇ, ἵνα πρὸς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἦκοιεν, ὡς δὴ ξοῦγγενεῖς ὄντες τῶν ἀπολωλότων.

Here I adopt substantially the statement of Diodorus, who gives a juster and more natural description of the proceeding; representing it as a spontaneous action of

mournful and vindictive feeling on the part of the kinsmen of the deceased (xiii. 101).

Other historians of Greece, Dr. Thirlwall not excepted (Hist. of Greece, ch. xxx. vol. iv. p. 117-125), follow Xenophon on this point. They treat the intense sentiment against the generals at Athens as "popular prejudices"—"excitement produced by the artifices of Theramenês" (Dr. Thirlwall, p. 117-124). "Theramenês (he says) hired a great number of persons to attend the festival, dressed in black, and with their heads shaven, as mourning for kinsmen whom they had lost in the sea-fight."

Yet Dr. Thirlwall speaks of the narrative of Xenophon in the most

sympathy stand here so prominently marked, that it is not simply superfluous but even misleading, to look behind for the gold and machinations of a political instigator. Theramenês might do all that he could to turn the public displeasure against the generals, and to prevent it from turning against himself: it is also certain that he did much to annihilate their defence. He may thus have had some influence in directing the sentiment against them, but he could have had little or none in creating it. Nay, it is not too much to say that no factitious agency of this sort could ever have prevailed on the Athenian public to desecrate such a festival as the Apaturia by all the insignia of mourning. If they did so, it could only have been through some internal emotion alike spontaneous and violent, such as the late event was well-calculated to arouse.

Moreover, what can be more improbable than the allegation that a great number of men were hired to personate the fathers or brothers of deceased Athenian citizens, all well-known to their really surviving kinsmen? What more improbable than the story that numbers of men would suffer themselves to be hired, not merely to

unfavourable terms; and certainly in terms no worse than it deserves (see p. 116, the note)—“It looks as if Xenophon had *purposely involved the whole affair in obscurity.*” Compare also p. 123, where his criticism is equally severe.

I have little scruple in deserting the narrative of Xenophon (of which I think as meanly as Dr. Thirlwall), so far as to supply (without contradicting any of his main allegations) an omission which I consider capital and preponderant. I accept his account of what actually passed at the festival of the Apaturia, but I deny his statement of the manœuvres of Theramenês as the producing cause.

Most of the obscurity which surrounds these proceedings at Athens arises from the fact, that no notice has been taken of the intense and spontaneous emotion which the desertion of the men on the wrecks

was naturally calculated to produce on the public mind. It would (in my judgement) have been unaccountable if such an effect had not been produced, quite apart from all instigations of Theramenês. The moment that we recognise this capital fact, the series of transactions becomes comparatively perspicuous and explicable.

Dr. Thirlwall, as well as Sievers (Commentat. de Xenophontis Hellen. p. 25-30), supposes Theramenês to have acted in concert with the oligarchical party, in making use of this incident to bring about the ruin of generals odious to them—several of whom were connected with Alkibiadês. I confess that I see nothing to countenance this idea: but at all events, the cause here named is only secondary—not the grand and dominant fact of the moment.

put on black clothes for the day, which might be taken off in the evening—but also to shave their heads, thus stamping upon themselves an ineffaceable evidence of the fraud, until the hair had grown again? That a cunning man, like Theramenês, should thus distribute his bribes to a number of persons, all presenting naked heads which testified his guilt, when there were real kinsmen surviving to prove the fact of personation? That having done this, he should never be arraigned or accused for it afterwards,—neither during the prodigious reaction of feeling which took place after the condemnation of the generals, which Xenophon himself so strongly attests, and which fell so heavily upon Kallixenus and others—nor by his bitter enemy Kritias under the government of the Thirty? Not only Theramenês is never mentioned as having been afterwards accused, but for aught that appears, he preserved his political influence and standing, with little, if any, abatement. This is one forcible reason among many others, for disbelieving the bribes and the all-pervading machinations which Xenophon represents him as having put forth, in order to procure the condemnation of the generals. His speaking in the first public assembly, and his numerous partisans voting in the second, doubtless contributed much to that result—and by his own desire. But to ascribe to his bribes and intrigues the violent and overruling emotion of the Athenian public, is, in my judgement, a supposition alike unnatural and preposterous both with regard to them and with regard to him.

When the senate met, after the Apaturia, to discharge the duty confided to it by the last public assembly, of determining in what manner the generals should be judged, and submitting their opinion for the consideration of the next assembly—the senator Kallixenus (at the instigation of Theramenês, if Xenophon is to be believed) proposed, and the majority of the senate adopted, the following resolution: “The Athenian people, having already heard in the previous assembly, both the accusation and the defence of the generals, shall at once come to a vote on the subject by tribes. For each tribe two urns shall be placed, and the herald of each tribe shall proclaim—All citizens who think the generals guilty for not having rescued the

Proposition
of Kallixe-
nus in the
senate
against the
generals—
adopted
and sub-
mitted to
the public
assembly.

warriors who had conquered in the battle, shall drop their pebbles into the foremost urn; all who think otherwise, into the hindmost. Should the generals be pronounced guilty (by the result of the voting), they shall be delivered to the Eleven, and punished with death; their property shall be confiscated, the tenth part being set apart for the goddess Athênê."¹ One single vote was to embrace the case of all the eight generals.²

The unparalleled burst of mournful and vindictive feeling at the festival of the Apaturia, extending by contagion from the relatives of the deceased to many other citizens—and the probability thus created that the coming assembly would sanction the most violent measures against the generals—probably emboldened Kallixenus to propose and prompted the senate to adopt, this deplorable resolution. As soon as the assembly met, it was read and moved by Kallixenus himself, as coming from the senate in discharge of the commission imposed upon them by the people.

Injustice of the resolution,—by depriving the generals of the customary securities for judicial trial. Psephism of Kannônus.

It was heard by a large portion of the assembly with well-merited indignation. Its enormity consisted in breaking through the established constitutional maxims and judicial practices of the Athenian democracy. It deprived the accused generals of all fair trial, alleging, with a mere faint pretence of truth which was little better than utter falsehood, that their defence as well as their accusation had been heard in the preceding assembly. Now there has been no people, ancient or modern, in whose view the formalities of judicial trial were habitually more sacred and indispensable than in that of the Athenians—formalities including ample notice beforehand to the accused party, with a measured and sufficient space of time for him to make his defence before the Dikasts; while those Dikasts were men who had been sworn beforehand as a body, yet were selected by lot for each occasion as individuals. From all these securities the generals were now to be debarred, and submitted, for their lives, honours, and fortunes, to a simple vote of the unsworn public assembly, without hearing or defence. Nor was this all. One single vote was to be taken in condemnation or absolution of the eight generals collectively. Now there was a rule in Attic judicial procedure,

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 8, 9.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 34.

called the psephism of Kannónus (originally adopted, we do not know when, on the proposition of a citizen of that name, as a psephism or decree for some particular case—but since generalized into common practice, and grown into great prescriptive reverence), which peremptorily forbade any such collective trial or sentence, and directed that a separate judicial vote should in all cases be taken for or against each accused party. The psephism of Kannónus, together with all the other respected maxims of Athenian criminal justice, was here audaciously trampled under foot.¹

¹ I cannot concur with the opinion expressed by Dr. Thirlwall in Appendix III. vol. iv. p. 501 of his History—on the subject of the psephism of Kannónus. The view which I give in the text coincides with that of the expositors generally, from whom Dr. Thirlwall dissents.

The psephism of Kannónus was the only enactment at Athens which made it illegal to vote upon the case of two accused persons at once. This had now grown into a practice in the judicial proceedings at Athens; so that two or more prisoners, who were ostensibly tried under some other law, and not under the psephism of Kannónus with its various provisions, would yet have the benefit of this its particular provision—viz. severance of trial.

In the particular case before us, Euryptolemus was thrown back to appeal to the psephism itself; which the senate, by a proposition unheard-of at Athens, proposed to contravene. The proposition of the senate offended against the general law in several different ways. It deprived the generals of trial before a sworn dikastery; it also deprived them of the liberty of full defence during a measured time: but farther, it prescribed that they should all be condemned or

absolved by one and the same vote, and in this last respect it sinned against the psephism of Kannónus. Euryptolemus in his speech, endeavouring to persuade an exasperated assembly to reject the proposition of the senate and adopt the psephism of Kannónus as the basis of the trial, very prudently dwells upon the severe provisions of the psephism, and artfully slurs over what he principally aims at, the severance of the trials, by offering his relative Periklês to be tried *first*. The words διχαῖστατον (sect. 37) appear to me to be naturally construed with κατὰ τὸ Καννώνου ψήφισμα, as they are by most commentators, though Dr. Thirlwall dissents from it. It is certain that this was the capital feature of illegality, among many, which the proposition of the senate presented—I mean the judging and condemning all the generals by one vote. It was upon this point that the amendment of Euryptolemus was taken, and that the obstinate resistance of Sokratês turned (Plato, Apol. 20; Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 18).

Farther, Dr. Thirlwall, in assigning what he believes to have been the real tenor of the psephism of Kannónus, appears to me to have been misled by the Scholiast in his interpretation of the much-dis-

As soon as the resolution was read in the public assembly, Euryptolemus, an intimate friend of the generals, denounced it as grossly illegal and unconstitutional; presenting a notice of indictment against Kallixenus, under the Graphê Paranomôn, for having proposed a resolution of that tenor. Several other citizens supported the notice of indictment, which according to the received practice of Athens, would arrest the farther progress of the measure until the trial of its proposer had been consummated. Nor was there ever any proposition made at Athens, to which the Graphê Paranomôn more closely and righteously applied.

Opposition taken by Euryptolemus on the ground of constitutional form — Graphê Paranomôn.

But the numerous partisans of Kallixenus—especially the men who stood by in habits of mourning, with shaven heads, agitated with sad recollections and thirst of vengeance—were in no temper to respect this constitutional impediment to the discussion of what had already been passed by the senate. They loudly clamoured that “it

Excitement of the assembly—constitutional impediment overruled.

cussed passage of Aristophanès, Ekklesiaz, 1089:—

Τουτὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα κατὰ τὸ Καννώνου
σαφῶς

Ψήφισμα, βινεῖν δεῖ με διαλελημ-
μένον,

Πῶς οὖν δικωπεῖν ἀμφοτέρους δυ-
νήσομαι;

Upon which Dr. Thirlwall observes — “that the young man is comparing his plight to that of a culprit, who, under the decree of Kannónus, was placed at the bar held by a person on each side. In this sense the Greek Scholiast, though his words are corrupted, clearly understood the passage.”

I cannot but think that the Scholiast understood the words completely wrong. The young man in Aristophanès does not compare his situation *with that of the culprit*, but *with that of the dikastery which tried culprits*. The psephism of Kannónus directed that each defendant should be tried separately:

accordingly, if it happened that two defendants were presented for trial, and were both to be tried without a moment's delay, the dikastery could only effect this object by dividing itself into two halves or portions; which was perfectly practicable (whether often practised or not), as it was a numerous body. By doing this (χρίνειν διαλελημμένον) it could *try both the defendants at once*; but in no other way.

Now the young man in Aristophanès compares himself to the dikastery thus circumstanced; which comparison is signified by the pun of βινεῖν διαλελημμένον in place of χρίνειν διαλελημμένον. He is assailed by two obtrusive and importunate customers, neither of whom will wait until the other has been served. Accordingly he says — “Clearly I ought to be divided into two parts, like a dikastery acting under the psephism of Kannónus,

was intolerable to see a small knot of citizens thus hindering the assembled people from doing what they chose:" and one of their number, Lykiskus, even went so far as to threaten that those who tendered the indictment against Kallixenus should be judged by the same vote along with the generals, if they would not let the assembly proceed to consider and determine on the motion just read.¹ The excited disposition of the large party thus congregated, farther inflamed by this menace of Lykiskus, was wound up to its highest pitch by various other speakers; especially by one, who stood forward and said—"Athenians, I was myself a wrecked man in the battle: I escaped only by getting upon an empty meal-tub; but my comrades, perishing on the wrecks near me, implored me, if I should myself be saved, to make known to the Athenian people, that their generals had abandoned to death warriors who had bravely conquered in behalf of their country." Even in the most tranquil state of the public mind, such a communication of the last words of these drowning men reported by an ear-witness, would have been heard with emotion; but under the actual predisposing excitement, it went to the inmost depth of the hearers' souls, and marked the generals as doomed men.² Doubtless there were other similar statements, not expressly mentioned to us, bringing to view the

to deal with this matter: yet how *shall* I be able to serve both at once?"

This I conceive to be the proper explanation of the passage in Aris-tophanēs; and it affords a striking confirmation of the truth of that which is generally received as purport of the psephism of Kannónus. The Scholiast appears to me to have puzzled himself, and to have misled everyone else.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7. Τὸν δὲ Καλλιξένον προσεχάλεσαντο παράνομα φάσκοντες συγχεσθῆναι, Εὐρυπτόλεμός τε καὶ ἄλλοι τινές· τοῦ δὲ δήμου ἔνιοι ταῦτα ἐπῄνουν· τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἐβόα, δεινὸν εἶναι, εἰ μὴ τις ἐάσει τὸν δῆμον πράττειν, ὃ ἂν βούληται. Καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις εἰπόντος Λυκίσκου, καὶ τούτους τῇ αὐτῇ ψήφῳ κρίνεσθαι, ἥπερ καὶ τοὺς

στρατηγούς, ἐὰν μὴ ἀφῶσι τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ἐπεβορύβησε πάλιν ὁ ὄχλος, καὶ ἡναγκάσθησαν ἀφιέναι τὰς κλήσεις.

All this violence is directed to the special object of getting the proposition discussed and decided on by the assembly, in spite of constitutional obstacles.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 11. Παρηγήθη δὲ τις ἐς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν φάσκων, ἐπὶ τεύχους ἀλφίτων σωθῆναι· ἐπιστέλλειν δ' αὐτῷ τοὺς ἀπολλυμένους, ἐὰν σωθῇ, ἀπαγγεῖλαι τῷ δήμῳ, ὅτι οἱ στρατηγοὶ οὐκ ἀνείλοντο τοὺς ἀρίστους ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος γενομένους.

I venture to say that there is nothing, in the whole compass of ancient oratory, more full of genuine pathos and more profoundly impressive, than this simple incident and speech; though re-

same fact in other ways, and all contributing to aggravate the violence of the public manifestations; which at length reached such a point, that Euryptolemus was forced to withdraw his notice of indictment against Kallixenus.

Now, however, a new form of resistance sprung up, still preventing the proposition from being taken into consideration by the assembly. Some of the Prytanes—or senators of the presiding tribe, on that occasion the tribe Antiochis—the legal presidents of the assembly, refused to entertain or put the question: which, being illegal and unconstitutional, not only inspired them with aversion, but also rendered them personally open to penalties. Kallixenus employed against them the same menaces which Lykiskus had uttered against Euryptolemus: he threatened, amidst encouraging clamour from many persons in the assembly, to include them in the same accusation with the generals. So intimidated were the Prytanes by the incensed manifestations of the assembly, that all of them, except one, relinquished their opposition, and agreed to put the question. The single obstinate

The Prytanes refuse to put the question—their opposition overruled, all except that of Sokratēs.

counted in the most bald manner, by an unfriendly and contemptuous advocate.

Yet the whole effect of it is lost, because the habit is to dismiss everything which goes to inculpate the generals, and to justify the vehement emotion of the Athenian public, as if it was mere stage trick and falsehood. Dr. Thirlwall goes even beyond Xenophon when he says (p. 119, vol. iv.)—"A man was brought forward, who pretended he had been preserved by clinging to a meal-barrel, and that his comrades," &c. So Mr. Mitford—"A man was produced," &c. (p. 347.)

Now *πρῆξις* does not mean "*he was brought forward*:" it is a common word employed to signify one who comes forward to speak in the public assembly (see Thucyd. iii. 44, and the participle *πρὸςελθών* in numerous places).

Next, *φάσκειν*, while it sometimes means *pretending*, sometimes also

means simply *affirming*: Xenophon does not guarantee the matter affirmed, but neither does he pronounce it to be false. He uses *φάσκειν* in various cases where he himself agrees with the fact affirmed (see Hellen. i. 7, 12; Memorab. i. 2, 29; Cyropæd. viii. 3, 41; Plato, Ap. Socr. c. 6. p. 21).

The people of Athens heard and fully believed this deposition; nor do I see any reason why an historian of Greece should disbelieve it. There is nothing in the assertion of this man which is at all improbable: nay, more, it is plain that several such incidents must have happened. If we take the smallest pains to expand in our imaginations the details connected with this painfully interesting crisis at Athens, we shall see that numerous stories of the same affecting character must have been in circulation—doubtless many false, but many also perfectly true.

Prytanis, whose refusal no menace could subdue, was a man whose name we read with peculiar interest, and in whom an impregnable adherence to law and duty was only one among many other titles to reverence. It was the philosopher Sokratês; on this trying occasion, once throughout a life of seventy years, discharging a political office, among the fifty senators taken by lot from the tribe Antiochis. Sokratês could not be induced to withdraw his protest, so that the question was ultimately put by the remaining Prytanes without his concurrence.¹ It should be observed that his resistance did not imply any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the generals, but applied simply to the illegal and unconstitutional proposition now submitted for determining their fate; a proposition, which he must already have opposed once before, in his capacity of member of the senate.

The constitutional impediments having been thus violently overthrown, the question was regularly put by the Prytanes to the assembly. At once the clamorous outcry ceased, and those who had raised it resumed their behaviour of Athenian citizens—patient hearers of speeches and opinions directly opposed to their own. Nothing is more deserving of notice than this change of demeanour. The champions of the men drowned on the wrecks had resolved to employ as much force as was required to eliminate those preliminary constitutional objections, in themselves indisputable, which precluded the discussion. But so soon as the discussion was once begun, they were careful not to give to the resolution the appearance of being carried by force. Euryptolemus, the personal friend of the generals, was allowed not only to move an amendment negating the proposition of Kallixenus, but also to develop it in a long speech, which Xenophon sets before us.²

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ptolemus.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 14, 15; Plato, Apol. Socr. c. 20; Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 18; iv. 4, 2.

In the passage of the Memorabilia, Xenophon says that Sokratês is Epistatês, or presiding Prytanis for that actual day. In the Hellenica, he only reckons him as one

among the Prytanes. It can hardly be accounted certain that he *was* Epistatês—the rather as this same passage of the Memorabilia is inaccurate on another point: it names *nine* generals as having been condemned, instead of *eight*.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 16. Μετὰ

His speech is one of great skill and judgement in reference to the case before him and to the temper of the assembly. Beginning with a gentle censure on his friends the generals Periklēs and Diomedon, for having prevailed on their colleagues to abstain from mentioning, in their first official letter, the orders given to Theramenēs,—he represented them as now in danger of becoming victims to the base conspiracy of the latter, and threw himself upon the justice of the people to grant them a fair trial. He besought the people to take full time to instruct themselves before they pronounced so solemn and irrevocable a sentence—to trust only to their own judgement, but at the same time to take security that judgement should be pronounced after full information and impartial hearing—and thus to escape that bitter and unavailing remorse which would otherwise surely follow. He proposed that the generals should be tried each separately, according to the psephism of Kannōnus—with proper notice, and ample time allowed for the defence as well as for the accusation; but that if found guilty, they should suffer the heaviest and most disgraceful penalties—his own relation Periklēs the first. This was the only way of striking the guilty, of saving the innocent, and of preserving Athens from the ingratitude and impiety of condemning to death, without trial as well as contrary to law, generals who had just rendered to her so important a service. And what could the people be afraid of? Did they fear lest the power of trial should slip out of their hands,—that they were so impatient to leap over all the delays prescribed by the law?¹ To the worst of public traitors, Aristarchus, they had granted a day with full notice for trial, with all the legal means for making his defence: and would they now show such flagrant contrariety of measure to victorious and faithful officers? “Be not ye (he said) the men to act thus, Athenians. The laws are your own work; it is through them that ye chiefly hold your greatness: cherish them, and attempt not any proceeding without their sanction.”²

δὲ ταῦτα, (that is, after the cries and threats above recounted) ἀντιβὰς Εὐρυπτόλεμος ἔλεξεν ὑπὲρ τῶν στρατηγῶν τάδε, &c.

¹ It is this accusation of “reck-

less hurry” (προπέτεια) which Pausanias brings against the Athenians in reference to their behaviour towards the six generals (vi. 7, 2).

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 30. Μή

Euryptolemus then shortly recapitulated the proceedings after the battle, with the violence of the storm which had prevented approach to the wrecks; adding, that one of the generals, now in peril, had himself been on board a broken ship, and had only escaped by a fortunate accident.¹ Gaining courage from his own harangue, he concluded by reminding the Athenians of the brilliancy of the victory, and by telling them that they ought in justice to wreath the brows of the conquerors, instead of following those wicked advisers who pressed for their execution.²

It is no small proof of the force of established habits of public discussion, that the men in mourning and with shaven heads, who had been a few minutes before in a state of furious excitement, should patiently hear out a speech so effective and so conflicting with their strongest sentiments as this of Euryptolemus. Perhaps others may have spoken also; but Xenophon does not mention them. It is remarkable that he does not name Theramênês as taking any part in this last debate.

The substantive amendment proposed by Euryptolemus was, that the generals should be tried each separately, according to the psephism of Kannônus; implying notice to be given to each, of the day of trial, and full time for each to defend himself. This proposition, as well as that of the Senate moved by Kallixenus, was submitted to the vote of the assembly; hands being separately held up, first for one, next for the other. The Prytanes pronounced the amendment of Euryptolemus to be carried. But a citizen named Meneklês impeached their decision as wrong or invalid, alleging seemingly some informality or trick in putting the question, or perhaps erroneous report of the comparative show of hands. We must recollect that in this case the Prytanes were declared partisans. Feeling that they were doing wrong in suffering so illegal a proposition as that of Kallixenus to be put at all, and that the adoption of it would be a great public

ὁμοίως γε, ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι· ἀλλ' ἑαυτῶν ὄντας τοὺς νόμους, δι' οὓς μάλιστα μέγιστοί ἐστε, φυλάττοντες, ἄνευ τούτων μηδὲν πράττειν πειρᾶσθε.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 35. τούτων δὲ μάρτυρες οἱ σωθέντες ἀπὸ τοῦ

αὐτομάτου, ὧν εἰς τῶν ὁματέρων στρατηγῶν ἐπὶ καταδύσης νεῶς σωθεῖς, &c.

² The speech is contained in Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 16-36.

mischief, they would hardly scruple to try and defeat it even by some unfair manoeuvre. But the exception taken by Meneklês constrained them to put the question over again, and they were then obliged to pronounce that the majority was in favour of the proposition of Kallixenus.¹

That proposition was shortly afterwards carried into effect by disposing the two urns for each tribe, and collecting the votes of the citizens individually. The condemnatory vote prevailed, and all the eight generals were thus found guilty; whether by a large or a small majority, we should have been glad to learn, but are not told. The majority

The six generals are condemned and executed.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 38. Τοῦτων δὲ διαχειροτονομένων, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἔκριναν τὴν Εὐρυπτολέμου ὑπομασμένου δὲ Μενεκλέους, καὶ πάλιν διαχειροτονίας γενομένης, ἔκριναν τὴν τῆς βουλῆς.

I cannot think that the explanation of this passage given either by Schömann (De Comitii Athen. part ii. l. p. 160 seq.) or by Meier and Schömaun (Der Attische Prozess, b. iiii. p. 295; b. iv. p. 696) is satisfactory. The idea of Schömann, that in consequence of the unconquerable resistance of Sokratês, the voting upon this question was postponed until the next day, appears to me completely inconsistent with the account of Xenophon; though countenanced by a passage in the Pseudo-Platonic dialogue called Axiochus (c. 12), altogether loose and untrustworthy. It is plain to me that the question was put without Sokratês, and could be legally put by the remaining Prytanês, in spite of his resistance. The word ὑπομασία must doubtless bear a meaning somewhat different here to its technical sense before the dikastery; and different also, I think, to the other sense which Meier and Schömann ascribe to it, of a formal engagement to prefer at some future time an indictment or γράφῃ παρ' αὐτόμων. It seems

to me here to denote, an objection taken on formal grounds, and sustained by oath either tendered or actually taken, to the decision of the Prytanês or presidents. These latter had to declare on which side the show of hands in the assembly preponderated: but there surely must have been some power of calling in question their decision, if they declared falsely, or if they put the question in a treacherous, perplexing, or obscure manner. The Athenian assembly did not admit of an appeal to a division, like the Spartan assembly or like the English House of Commons; though there were many cases in which the votes at Athens were taken by pebbles in an urn, and not by show of hands.

Now it seems to me that Meneklês here exercised the privilege of calling in question the decision of the Prytanês, and constraining them to take the vote over again. He may have alleged that they did not make it clearly understood which of the two propositions was to be put to the vote first—that they put the proposition of Kallixenus first, without giving due notice—or perhaps that they misreported the numbers. By what followed, we see that he had good grounds for his objection.

was composed mostly of those who acted under a feeling of genuine resentment against the generals, but in part also of the friends and partisans of Theramenês,¹ not inconsiderable in number. The six generals then at Athens—Periklês (son of the great statesman of that name by Aspasia), Diomedon, Erasinidês, Thrasyllus, Lysias, and Aristokratês—were then delivered to the Eleven, and perished by the usual draught of hemlock; their property being confiscated, as the decree of the senate prescribed.

Respecting the condemnation of these unfortunate men, pronounced without any of the recognised tutelary preliminaries for accused persons, there can be only one opinion. It was an act of violent injustice and illegality, deeply dishonouring the men who passed it, and the Athenian character generally. In either case, whether the generals were guilty or innocent, such censure is deserved; for judicial precautions are not less essential in dealing with the guilty than with the innocent. But it is deserved in an aggravated form, when we consider that the men against whom such injustice was perpetrated, had just come from achieving a glorious victory. Against the democratical constitution of Athens, it furnishes no ground for censure—nor against the habits and feelings which that

¹ Diodor. xiii. 101. In regard to these two component elements of the majority, I doubt not that the statement of Diodorus is correct. But he represents, quite erroneously, that the generals were condemned by the vote of the assembly, and led off from the assembly to execution. The assembly only decreed that the subsequent urn-voting should take place, the result of which was necessarily uncertain beforehand. Accordingly the speech which Diodorus represents Diomedon to have made in the assembly, after the vote of the assembly had been declared, cannot be true history:—"Athenians, I wish that the vote which you have just passed may prove beneficial to the city. Do you take care to fulfil those vows to Zeus Soter,

Apollo, and the Venerable Goddesses, under which we gained our victory, since fortune has prevented us from fulfilling them ourselves." It is impossible that Diomedon can have made a speech of this nature, since he was not then a condemned man; and after the condemnatory vote, no assembly can well have been held; since the sentence was peremptory, that the generals, if condemned, should be handed over to the Eleven. The sentiment, however, is one so natural for Diomedon to express, that he may well be imagined to have said something of the kind to the presiding Archon or to the Eleven, though there was no opportunity for saying it to the assembled people.

constitution tended to implant in the individual citizen. Both the one and the other strenuously forbade the deed: nor could the Athenians ever have so dishonoured themselves, if they had not, under a momentary ferocious excitement, risen in insurrection not less against the forms of their own democracy, than against the most sacred restraints of their habitual constitutional morality.

If we wanted proof of this, the facts of the immediate future would abundantly supply it. After a short time had elapsed, every man in Athens became heartily ashamed of the deed.¹ A vote of the public assembly was passed,² decreeing that those who had misguided the people on this occasion ought to be brought to judicial trial, that Kallixenus with four others should be among the number, and that bail should be taken for their appearance. This was accordingly done, and the parties were kept under custody of the sureties themselves, who were responsible for their appearance on the day of trial. But presently both foreign misfortunes and internal sedition began to press too heavily on Athens to leave any room for other thoughts, as we shall see in the next chapter. Kallixenus and his accomplices found means to escape, before the day of trial arrived, and remained in exile until after the dominion of the Thirty and the restoration of the democracy. Kallixenus then returned under the general amnesty. But the general amnesty protected him only against legal pursuit, not against the hostile memory of the people. "Detested by all, he died of hunger"—says Xenophon;³ a memorable proof how much the condemnation of these six generals shocked the standing democratical sentiment at Athens.

From what cause did this temporary burst of wrong arise, so foreign to the habitual character of the people? Even under the strongest political provocation, and towards the most hated traitors,

Earnest repentance of the people soon afterwards—disgrace and end of Kallixenus.

Causes of the popular excitement.

¹ I translate here literally the language of Sokratēs in his Defence (Plato, Apol. c. 20)—*παρὰ νόμῳ, ὥς ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ πᾶσι τοῖς ἄνθρωποις ἐδόξε*.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 39. This vote of the public assembly was

known at Athens by the name of Probolê. The assembled people discharged on this occasion an antejudicial function, something like that of a Grand Jury.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 40. *μισοῦμενος ὑπὸ πάντων, λιμῷ ἀπέθανεν*.

(as Euryptolemus himself remarked by citing the case of Aristarchus,) after the Four Hundred as well as after the Thirty, the Athenians never committed the like wrong—never deprived an accused party of the customary judicial securities. How then came they to do it here, where the generals condemned were not only not traitors, but had just signalized themselves by a victorious combat? No Theramenês could have brought about this phænomenon; no deep-laid oligarchical plot is, in my judgement, to be called in as an explanation.¹ The true explanation is different, and of serious moment to state. Political hatred, intense as it might be, was never dissociated, in the mind of a citizen of Athens, from the democratical forms of procedure: but the men, who stood out here as actors, had broken loose from the obligations of citizenship and commonwealth, and surrendered themselves, heart and soul, to the family sympathies and antipathies; feelings, first kindled, and justly kindled, by the thought that their friends and relatives had been left to perish unheeded on the wrecks—next, inflamed into preternatural and overwhelming violence by the festival of the Apaturia, where all the religious traditions connected with the ancient family tie, all those associations which imposed upon the relatives of a murdered man the duty of pursuing the murderer, were expanded into detail and worked up by their appropriate renovating solemnity. The garb of mourning and the shaving of the head—phænomena unknown at Athens either in a political assembly or in a religious festival—were symbols of temporary transformation in the internal man. He could think of nothing but his drowning relatives, together with the generals as having abandoned them to death, and his own duty as survivor to ensure to them vengeance and satisfaction for such abandonment. Under this self-justifying impulse, the shortest and surest proceeding appeared the best, whatever amount of political wrong it might entail:² nay, in this case it appeared the

¹ This is the supposition of Sievers, Forchhammer, and some other learned men; but, in my opinion, it is neither proved nor probable.

² If Thucydidês had lived to continue his history so far down as to include this memorable event,

he would have found occasion to notice τὸ συγγενές (kinship) as being not less capable of ἀπροφύσιστος τόλμα (unscrupulous daring) than τὸ ἐταίρικόν (faction). In his reflections on the Korkyraean disturbances (iii. 82) he is led to dwell chiefly on the latter—the anti-

only proceeding really sure, since the interposition of the proper judicial delays, coupled with severance of trial on successive days according to the psephism of Kannônus, would probably have saved the lives of five out of the six generals, if not of all the six. When we reflect that such absorbing sentiment was common, at one and the same time, to a large proportion of the Athenians, we shall see the explanation of that misguided vote, both of the Senate and of the Ekklesia, which sent the six generals to an illegal ballot—and of the subsequent ballot which condemned them. Such is the natural behaviour of those who, having for the moment forgotten their sense of political commonwealth, become degraded into exclusive family-men. The family affections, productive as they are of much gentle sympathy and mutual happiness in the interior circle, are also liable to generate disregard, malice, sometimes even ferocious vengeance, towards others. Powerful towards good generally, they are not less powerful occasionally towards evil; and require, not less than the selfish propensities, constant subordinating control from that moral reason which contemplates for its end the security and happiness of all. And when a man, either from low civilization, has never known this large moral reason—or when from some accidental stimulus, righteous in the origin, but wrought up into fanaticism by the conspiring force of religious as well as family sympathies, he comes to place his pride and virtue in discarding its supremacy—there is scarcely any amount of evil or injustice which he may not be led to perpetrate, by a blind obedience to the narrow instincts of relationship. “*Ces pères de famille sont capables de tout*”—was the satirical remark of Talleyrand upon the gross public jobbing so largely practised by those who sought place or promotion for their sons. The same words, understood in a far more awful sense, and generalized for other cases of relationship, sum up the moral of this melancholy proceeding at Athens.

pathies of faction, of narrow political brotherhood or conspiracy for the attainment and maintenance of power—as most powerful in generating evil deeds: had he described the proceedings after the battle of

Arginusæ, he would have seen that the sentiment of kinship, looked at on its antipathetic or vindictive side, is pregnant with the like tendencies.

Lastly, it must never be forgotten that the generals themselves were also largely responsible in the case. Through the unjustifiable fury of the movement against them, they perished like innocent men—without trial—“*inauditi et indefensi, tamquam innocentes, perierunt*,” but it does not follow that they were really innocent. I feel persuaded that neither with an English, nor French, nor American fleet, could such events have taken place as those which followed the victory of Arginusæ. Neither admiral nor seamen, after gaining a victory and driving off the enemy, could have endured the thoughts of going back to their anchorage, leaving their own disabled wrecks unmanageable on the waters, with many living comrades aboard, helpless, and depending upon extraneous succour for all their chance of escape. That the generals at Arginusæ did this, stands confest by their own advocate Euryptolemus,¹ though they must have known well the condition of disabled ships after a naval combat, and some ships even of the victorious fleet were sure to be disabled. If these generals, after their victory, instead of sailing back to land, had employed themselves first of all in visiting the crippled ships, there would have been ample time to perform this duty, and to save all the living men aboard before the storm came on. This is the natural inference, even upon their own showing; this is what any English, French, or American naval commander would have thought it an imperative duty to do. What degree of blame is imputable to Theramenês, and how far the generals were discharged by shifting the responsibility to him, is a point which we cannot now determine. But the storm, which is appealed to as a justification of both, rests upon evidence too questionable to serve that purpose, where the neglect of duty was so serious, and cost

¹ Xen. Hellen. i. 7, 31. Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ κρατήσαντες τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ πρὸς τὴν γῆν κατέπλευσαν, Διομέδων μὲν ἐκέλευεν, ἀναγκέντας ἐπὶ κέρως ἅπαντας ἀναγεῖσθαι τὰ ναύαγια καὶ τοὺς ναυαγοὺς, Ἐρασινίδης δὲ, ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐς Μιτυλήνην πολέμους τὴν ταχίστην πλεῖν ἅπαντας· Θράσυλλος δ' ἀμφοτέρω εἶπε γενέσθαι, ἂν τὰς μὲν αὐτοῦ καταλίπωσι, ταῖς δὲ ἐπὶ τοὺς πολέμους πλέωσι καὶ

δοξάντων τούτων, &c.

I remarked a few pages before, that the case of Erasinidês stood in some measure apart from that of the other generals. He proposed, according to this speech of Euryptolemus, that all the fleet should at once go again to Mitylênê; which would of course have left the men on the wrecks to their fate.

the lives probably of more than 1000 brave men. At least the Athenian people at home, when they heard the criminations and recriminations between the generals on one side and Theramenês on the other—each of them in his character of accuser implying that the storm was no valid obstacle, though each, if pushed for a defence, fell back upon it as a resource in case of need—the Athenian people could not but look upon the storm more as an afterthought to excuse previous omissions, than as a terrible reality nullifying all the ardour and resolution of men bent on doing their duty. It was in this way that the intervention of Theramenês chiefly contributed to the destruction of the generals, not by those manœuvres ascribed to him in Xenophon: he destroyed all belief in the storm as a real and all-covering hindrance. The general impression of the public at Athens—in my opinion, a natural and unavoidable impression—was that there had been most culpable negligence in regard to the wrecks, through which negligence alone the seamen on board perished. This negligence dishonours, more or less, the armament at Arginusæ as well as the generals: but the generals were the persons responsible to the public at home, who felt for the fate of the deserted seamen more justly as well as more generously than their comrades in the fleet.

In spite, therefore, of the guilty proceeding to which a furious exaggeration of such sentiment drove the Athenians—in spite of the sympathy which this has naturally and justly procured for the condemned generals—the verdict of impartial history will pronounce that the sentiment itself was well-founded, and that the generals deserved censure and disgrace. The Athenian people might with justice proclaim to them—"Whatever be the grandeur of your victory, we can neither rejoice in it ourselves, nor allow you to reap honour from it, if we find that you have left many hundreds of those who helped in gaining it to be drowned on board the wrecks, without making any effort to save them, when such effort might well have proved successful." And the condemnation here pronounced, while it served as a painful admonition to subsequent Athenian generals, provided at the same time an efficacious guarantee for the preservation of combatants on the wrecks or swimming for their lives after a naval victory. One express case in point may be mentioned. Thirty years

afterwards (B.C. 376) the Athenian admiral Chabrias defeated, though not without considerable loss, the Lacedæmonian fleet near Naxos. Had he pursued them vigorously, he might have completed his victory by destroying all or most of them; but recollecting what had happened after the battle of Arginusæ, he abstained from pursuit, devoted his attention to the wrecks of his own fleet, saved from death those citizens who were yet living, and picked up the dead for interment. ¹

¹ Diodor. xv. 35.

Γενόμενος δὲ (Χαβρίας) ἐπὶ τοῦ προτερήματος, καὶ πάσας τὰς τῶν πολεμίων ναῦς φυγεῖν ἀναγκάσας, ἀπέσχετο παντελῶς τοῦ διωγμοῦ, ἀναμνησθεὶς τῆς ἐν Ἀργινούσαις ναυμαχίας, ἐν ᾗ τοὺς νικήσαντας στρατηγούς ὁ δῆμος ἀντὶ μεγάλης εὐεργεσίας θανάτῳ περιέβαλεν, αἰτιασάμενος ὅτι τοὺς τετελευτηκότας κατὰ τὴν ναυμαχίαν οὐκ ἔθαψαν, εὐλαβήθη μὴ ποτε τῆς περιστάσεως ὁμοίας γενομένης κινδυνεύσῃ παθεῖν παραπλήσια. Διόπερ ἀποστάς τοῦ διώκειν, ἀνελέγετο τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς διανηχομένους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἔτι ζῶντας

διέσωσε, τοὺς δὲ τετελευτηκότας ἔθαψεν. Εἰ δὲ μὴ περὶ ταύτην ἐγένετο τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν, ῥαδίως ἂν ἅπαντα τὸν πολεμίων στόλον διέσθαιρ.

Here Diodorus, in alluding to the battle of Arginusæ, repeats the mistake which he had before made, as if the omission there concerned only dead bodies and not living men. But when he describes what was done by Chabrias at Naxos, he puts forward the preservation of living citizens not merely as a reality, but as the most prominent reality of the proceeding.

END OF VOL. VII.

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